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Abstract  
Initial public offerings (IPOs) underpricing is a widely researched area in finance literature. Yet, 
empirical evidence demonstrating and theoretical models explaining differences in underpricing 
across countries have remained an enigma in academia for a long time. This thesis consists of three 
independently interconnected essays that explain differences in underpricing observed across the 
Group of Twenty (G20) IPO markets. This is achieved using the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses’ 
(EWL) theory, time-variant differences in country-level transparency, and differences in country-
level national cultures. Specifically, the purpose is to answer the following three main research 
questions: (1) does entrepreneurial wealth losses theory explain underpricing differences across 
IPO markets?; (2) do differences in country-level transparency directly explain underpricing and 
moderate the relationship between firm-level variables and underpricing across IPO markets?; and 
(3) do differences in country-level national cultures directly explain underpricing and modify the 
relationship between firm-level variables and underpricing across IPO markets? A total of 10,217 
IPOs, covering 12 developed and 10 developing G20 economies from January 1995 to December 
2016, were obtained from secondary sources. The quantitative techniques of unbalanced cross-
sectional regression models, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), 
one-way clustered 2SLS, and two-way clustered 2SLS models, Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(HLM), and number of robustness tests were employed to test the hypotheses. The EWL model is 
adopted and extended in this thesis. This research contributes to the theoretical framework by 
providing methodological advances in various finance areas like IPOs, IPO-governance and IPO-
cultural literature, and has practical implications for researchers, investors, entrepreneurs and 
policy-makers.  
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Executive Summary 
Remarkably, only a comparatively small number of corporate events have garnered much attention 
from scholars, the business-world, media, and the general public when compared to Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs). The general focus is on the high and occasionally remarkable first-day immediate 
returns that the share prices of newly listed firms record. Recently, Ritter (2018) indicates that 108 
IPO firms floated part of their shareholdings in 2017, so raising total proceeds of US$24.53 billion. 
The money left on the table by these United States (U.S.) IPO issuers accounted for US$3.69 
billion, attracting an average underpricing level of 15%. The IPO underpricing phenomenon is 
reported not only in the developed equity markets such as the U.S., but is also recognised in 
virtually in every stock market around the globe. In an annually updated report in January 9, 2018, 
Loughran et al. (1994) document average country-level underpricing ranging from 3.3% to 270.1% 
across 54 nations over the last three decades. It is not fully understood why entrepreneur founders 
across countries sell their own shares to initial IPO investors at large discount, an act that 
constitutes a considerable cost of going public (Liu & Ritter 2011). In fact, what is mystifying is 
trying to understand the willingness of IPO owners across countries to give away part of their firms 
very cheaply, particularly given the existence of substantial heterogeneity in underpricing across 
national economies, specifically within industrial and emerging nations. In Loughran et al.’s (1994) 
report, average underpricing for advanced countries such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
Denmark is recorded as being 44.7%, 7.4%, and 25.9%, respectively, while similar figures for 
developing nations of Saudi Arabia, Argentina, and Pakistan are 239.8%, 4.2%, and 22.1%, also 
respectively. What makes average underpricing to be as low as 4.2% and as high as 239.8% in 
emerging economies such as Argentina and Saudi Arabia. Also what makes average underpricing 
figures to be as high as 44.7% and as low as 7.4% in Japan and Denmark, respectively, these 
countries being advanced economies.  
 
The critical question is what theoretical model and determining factors can explain such mystifying 
variations in underpricing across global IPO markets and in both developed and developing 
economies? In response the existence of varying levels of underpricing across IPO markets, Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001) developed a theoretical model known as “Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses” 
(hereafter EWL) theory. The theory is based on three dimensions including the incentive of IPO 
issuers, promotion cost, and ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering. Habib and Ljungqvist 
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(2001) argue that the information asymmetry problem, causing underpricing in the IPO market and 
resulting from the presence of ex-ante uncertainty between IPO parties, can be endogenously 
controlled and influenced. This occurs through using promotion costs such as employing a 
reputable underwriter who certifies the quality of the IPO firm leading to lower underpricing 
particularly when ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering is high. 
 
The model claims that IPO issuers will have incentives to reduce underpricing, thus endogenously 
affecting underpricing, using high-status underwriters when they are only selling more of a stake 
in their firms to the public. The authors assert that issuers of IPO firms do not randomly select 
underwriting banks, and neither do underwriters randomly agree to underwrite IPO companies. 
Therefore, the decision to choose an underwriter by the issuer is predetermined and it is likely to 
be based on their decision, at least in part, on the amount of underpricing they anticipate will occur. 
Consequently, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) conclude that this results in endogeneity bias when 
regressing underpricing on the choice of underwriter. This thesis is primarily motivated by the 
work of Kennedy et al. (2006) who examine the relative importance of six asymmetric information 
models in explaining the mystifying phenomenon of IPO underpricing in the U.S. IPO market. The 
authors conclude that the EWL theory offers the most compelling explanation for IPO underpricing 
in that country’s IPO market. Hence, the critical question is this: can the EWL model elucidate the 
mystifying variability in IPO underpricing across global IPO markets and in both advanced and 
emerging1 stock markets? 
 
This thesis establishes a theoretical and empirical basis, upon which the research progresses. This 
is achieved by empirically examining the validity of the EWL theory in global settings while 
controlling for some econometric problems related to the inherited clustering characteristics of the 
IPO data. However, this thesis is also motivated by observations noted by Engelen and van Essen 
(2010) and Gupta et al. (2018), who contend that IPO participants have to navigate between two 
problematic types of information asymmetry across different countries. An internal category of 
information asymmetry related to firm-level characteristics and an external category of asymmetric 
information associated with the physiognomies of their formal and informal institutional 
environments. Hence, this thesis extends the empirical testing of the EWL model by capturing the 
                                                 
1 Please note that in this thesis, the author interchangeably uses the term ‘developing’ which refers to emerging 
countries and ‘developed’ to denote advanced or industrial countries.  
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direct and indirect influences of neglected country-level characteristics. This includes differences 
in country-level transparency and national cultures, in influencing differences in IPO underpricing 
across national economies. In pursuing the research, the author accounts for some econometric 
issues to capture the nesting structure of the IPO data across different formal and informal 
institutional environments by employing the application of Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM).   
 
This thesis consists of three segregated but interlinked essays that examine the curious issue of IPO 
underpricing difference in the global IPO market. To this end, the author looks at employing a 
global dataset ranging over 22 years, incorporating 33 industries domiciled in three datasets 
including 22 countries, 12 advanced, and 10 emerging countries with heterogeneous levels of 
formal and informal institutional backgrounds. This thesis controls for a number of extended 
econometric issues in pursuing the objectives of examining the relevance of firm-level, country-
level transparency, and country-level culture differences in influencing IPO underpricing 
difference.  
 
The first essay (Chapter Two) examines if the perceived dispersion in IPO underpricing in the 
global IPO market is related to the following: 
 Firstly, failure to account for the endogenous effect of underwriter reputation on 
underpricing; or 
 Secondly, ignoring the effect of clustering in standard errors within years, 
industries, countries, and developed versus developing countries; or 
  Thirdly, disregarding the simultaneous effect of endogeneity and clustering in 
the IPO data.  
The author acquires the results utilising a battery of tests including OLS, 2SLS, one-way clustered 
2SLS, and two-way clustered 2SLS models; controlling for year, industry, and country effects. The 
findings attribute variances in level of the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion cost, and ex-ante 
uncertainty amongst the G20 economies and developed G20 IPO markets to the manifestation of 
underpricing variance. Yet, the findings demonstrate that the EWL theory does not hold well in 
elucidating difference in IPO underpricing in developing G20 stock markets. This chapter uncovers 
significant evidence supporting the endogenous underwriting-underpricing association in the 
international IPO market and between developed IPO markets. Conversely, the author discovers 
that in emerging IPO markets this endogenous relationship does not exist. Instead, in emerging 
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stock markets, the occurrence of what is known as spinning behaviour is evident in the results. This 
is because the findings illustrate that prestigious underwriting banks charge IPO issuers a large 
underwriting fee, and in turn, they leave significant amounts of money on the table to be cashed 
out by investors at the expense of IPO firms. The results attribute this important finding to the 
behaviour of entrepreneur founders in developing nations. The author uncovers evidence showing 
that IPO issuers in emerging economies appear not to get concerned by this spinning practice 
because they do not care much about their wealth losses in exchange for securing successful 
offering. This is because - as opposed to their counterparts in developed countries - issuers in 
developing economies, on average, sell 1% and create 10% less secondary and primary shares 
when they go public, respectively. This makes it possible to rationalise why issuers of IPO firms 
domiciled in an emerging G20 economy suffer from higher underpricing premiums by up to as 
much as 19%.    
 
 The second essay (Chapter Three) employs Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) with an 
investigation of the following: 
 Firstly, assessing the relative importance of the levels of firm and country on the 
variance of IPO underpricing;  
 Secondly, testing the direct effect of the characteristics of country-level 
transparency on the variability of IPO underpricing in the global IPO market; and 
 Thirdly, examining the indirect effect of the characteristics of country-level 
transparency in modifying the relationship between firm-level variables and IPO 
underpricing in the global IPO market.  
The author finds that nearly 88%, 95%, and 75% of underpricing variance is related to intrinsic 
characteristics of firms between all (22 countries) within developed (12 countries), and developing 
(10 countries) G20 countries, respectively. The results reveal that dissimilarities in country-level 
formal institutions proxies including voice and accountability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption directly explain up to 34% of the 
changeability in IPO underpricing across countries. While the results find no direct connection 
between changes in country-level transparency and underpricing difference within developed G20 
economies, the author discovers that the variability of voice and accountability in developing G20 
nations directly explains up to 28% of the underpricing variance. The results show that time-variant 
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variability in country-level formal institutional quality indirectly impact on underpricing in three 
ways. The first is by improving the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers and 
underpricing by up 1.4%. The second is by curtailing the association between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing by up to 12%. Lastly, the third is by diminishing the association 
between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing by up to 5%.  
 
The third essay (Chapter Four) utilises HLM to investigate the relative association of the levels 
of firm and country on the variance of IPO underpricing. Also looked at here is the direct effect of 
the characteristics of national cultures on the variance of IPO underpricing across countries. 
Furthermore, the indirect influence of the characteristics of national cultures in moderating the 
association between firm-level variables and IPO underpricing across nations is examined. The 
findings demonstrate that differences in country-level characteristics account for 22%, 5%, and 
25% of the deviations in IPO underpricing between all G20, developed, and developing countries, 
respectively. Findings indicate that only differences in the level of power distance, individualism, 
femininity, and indulgence across countries directly affect the global IPO underpricing difference 
by up to 32%. The author finds that the difference in power distance and femininity in developing 
and developed G20 countries explains up to 40% and 59% of the underpricing variance, 
respectively. As well, the results confirm that culture indirectly affects underpricing variance in 
three ways: first, by influencing the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers and 
underpricing by up 33%; second, by adjusting the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing by up to 10%; and third, by moderating the link between ex-ante uncertainty and 
underpricing by up to 30%.  
 
Confidence in the findings across the three essays remained unimpaired after conducting a series 
of robustness tests, incorporating an extra firm and country-level covariates, and executing a 
number of diagnostic tests. The findings from this thesis provide a number of practical 
contributions to scholars, policy-makers, entrepreneurs and investors.  
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 Introduction  
The underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) occurs when the share price of a newly listed 
firm on its first trading day exceeds its offer price. There has been ample scholarly and practical 
interest in understanding why entrepreneur founders of IPO firms have a propensity to offer their 
firms at a discount “underpricing”. Beginning with early empirical evidence in the U.S. market, 
Ibbotson (1975) shows that IPO underpricing averaged around 16.8% during the 1960s. Recently, 
Ritter (2018) shows that 108 IPO firms floated part of their equities in 2017, thereby raising 
aggregate proceeds of US$24.53 billion. The money left on the table by these U.S. IPO issuers 
accounted for US$3.69 billion with an average underpricing level of 15%. Across the global IPO 
market, 1,974 firms floated part of their holdings in 2017 and amassed US$338.4 billion, of which 
countries in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Africa accounted for approximately 82% of these 
IPOs (EY Global IPO 2017).  
 
Loughran et al. (1994) provide an updated survey of international insights of 54 countries dated 
January 9, 2018 documenting the existence of varying levels of underpricing across the global IPO 
market. For example, the authors show average levels of underpricing of 6.4% for Austria, 33.1% 
for Brazil, 21.8% for Australia, 145.4% for China, 6.5% for Canada, 7.4% for Denmark, 50.80% 
for Greece, 88% for India, 24.90% for Indonesia, 44.70% for Japan, 239.8% for Saudi Arabia, and 
16% for United Kingdom. These countries are heterogeneous in relation to the observed level of 
IPO underpricing, country-level transparency, and country-level national cultures. Hence, 
assuming the continuity of this heterogeneity, it seems that the academic and practical attention 
being paid to this subject is not going to subside anytime soon. 
 
However, the critical question to ask is: how can these substantial underpricing differences across 
countries be explained? The common rationale is that buying shares in a newly listed company 
lacking historical market valuation processes and records makes IPO parties including issuers, 
underwriters, and investors apprehensive about the associated investment risk and returns (Gupta 
et al. 2018). Consequently, this means that IPO companies suffer from a syndrome known as 
“liability of newness”, one which affects the balance of information asymmetry amongst IPO 
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parties. Underpricing therefore is understood as a justifiable cost IPO issuers have to incur, in order 
to compensate for such liability of newness (Zattoni et al. 2017). This underpricing cost inflates 
the cost of going public to entrepreneur founders in many countries, depending on the existing level 
of information asymmetry within their equity markets (Liu & Ritter 2011). Consequently, a larger 
cost of going public is likely to deter prospective private companies from raising equity through 
equity markets. This in turn is likely to hinder future growth plans for private sector firms and 
subsequently affect the growth of equity markets. The explanation for this lies in the development 
of the IPO market, which supports the growth of economies wherein growing IPO listings are 
perceived as a vital strategic tool in boosting stock market growth (Tian 2011; Jamaani & Roca 
2015). Despite the cost of this underpricing, IPO issuers attain a number of benefits from listing 
their firms, for example improving their firms’ legitimacy, visibility, and prestige. This in turn 
supports the firm’s long-term success (Luo 2008). 
 
IPO underpricing researchers have employed a variety of firm- and country-level determining 
factors and utilised diverse theoretical models to explain why there is a notable difference in the 
level of underpricing from country to country (Ritter & Welch 2002; Kennedy et al. 2006; Colaco 
et al. 2009; Chourou et al. 2018). To pursue this aim, IPO underpricing scholars develop dozens of 
theories based on information asymmetry, institutional explanations, ownership and control 
reasons, and behavioural explanations aiming to comprehend this phenomenon (Jenkinson & 
Ljungqvist 2001; Ritter & Welch 2002). The authors contend that this underpricing phenomenon 
is ultimately explained by the existence of an asymmetric information problem between the key 
pillars of the IPO process including issuers, underwriter, and investors. They contend that 
asymmetric information models are deemed to be well-established and modelled theories compared 
to other non-information asymmetry-based models.  
 
IPO underpricing literature asserts that besides firm-level characteristics that may trigger the 
problem of information asymmetry amongst IPO players, underpricing can be mitigated or 
seriously compromised by the prevailing formal (i.e., legal, governance, and transparency 
frameworks) and informal (i.e., cultural values) institutional environments across countries 
(Banerjee et al. 2011; Judge et al. 2014; Chourou et al. 2018; Gupta et al. 2018). Differences in the 
quality of both formal and informal institutions can therefore influence the observed level of 
information asymmetry in the IPO market, consequently affecting the perceived level of IPO 
underpricing from country to country (Engelen & van Essen 2010). 
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The law and finance literature including La Porta et al. (1997), Engelen and van Essen (2010), 
Boulton et al. (2010), Hopp and Dreher (2013), and Zattoni et al. (2017) demonstrates the 
considerable influence of differences in the quality of country-level legal systems on corporate 
financial decisions and asset pricing. According to this school of thought, a country with a feeble 
legal framework is likely to maintain an information environment characterised by a weak level of 
transparency, enabling an asymmetric information environment to form between market 
participants. This in turn leads to a market environment that suffers from an increasing ex-ante 
uncertainty problem related to two things: the value of firms; and the future distribution of realised 
company value among various stakeholders. 
 
At the national level, an environment of asymmetric information may develop in some national 
cultures more effortlessly than in others (Aggarwal & Goodell 2010; Gupta et al. 2018). This is 
attributed to the manifestation of commonly acknowledged cultural values that facilitate the 
development of uncertain market environment amongst market participants (Kang & Kim 2010; 
Li et al. 2013). For instance, Hofstede (2001) contends a lack of social equality can be caused by 
the materialisation of a high level of power distance in a given society, and it easily transmits into 
inequality throughout that society. Once this low level of communal egalitarianism is established 
in a nation, then a low level of social trust amongst its members emerges (Hofstede 1980). 
Consecutively, in such cultures, it becomes problematic for socially isolated individuals to advance 
from a lower to a higher social category or caste. In this context, Bjørnskov (2008), Lewellyn and 
Bao (2014), and Chourou et al. (2018) associate a corrosion in social trust between peoples to an 
intensification of conflicts of interest and development of an environment with asymmetric 
information problem between market participants. 
 
Consequently, investigations into the effects of differences in the formal and informal institutions 
on IPO underpricing difference across country institutional settings are critical research objectives 
discussed in this thesis. This thesis contributes to the literature by offering three interlinked essays 
dedicated to examining the phenomenon of underpricing difference in the global IPO market. A 
succinct discussion of these three essays is provided below. 
 
 The first essay (Chapter Two) examines issues so that the phenomenon of underpricing difference 
in the global IPO market can be explained and better understood. This essay employs the theoretical 
explanation offered by the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses (EWL) model as it solves the problem 
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of information asymmetry between the issuer and investor while accounting for the endogenous 
relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. Specifically, it examines if the 
observed dispersion in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market is: 
 Firstly, due to not capturing the endogenous effect of underwriter reputation on 
underpricing;  
 Secondly, due to not capturing the effect of clustering in standard errors within 
years, industries, countries, and developed versus developing countries; or 
  Thirdly, due to not capturing the simultaneous effect of endogeneity and 
clustering amongst IPO observations.  
To achieve these goals, this essay employs a large set of global data comprising 10,217 IPO-
issuing firms from 22 developed and developing countries between 1995 and 2016. The results 
are documented using a battery of tests including OLS, 2SLS, one-way clustered 2SLS, and two-
way clustered 2SLS models; controlling for year, industry, and country effects. Results show that, 
from an international perspective, significant dissimilarities in IPO underpricing are attributed to 
the three dimensions of the EWL theory. The findings document that when the incentive of IPO 
issuers increases by 1% underpricing reduces by up to 1.4%. Furthermore, the results discover 
significant evidence presenting that when IPO firms’ entrepreneur founders endogenously pick 
reputable underwriters to take their firms public, they effectively decrease their underpricing by 
up to 12%. This research finds that ex-ante uncertainty about IPO firms increases underpricing in 
the global IPO market. This is because the outcomes reveal that when the pre-IPO stock market 
volatility increases by one percent, on average, IPO firms underpriced by 5%. Results also show 
that underpricing decreases by 3.3% when the length of elapsed time between setting the offer 
price and first trading day increases by one unit. The findings document a reduction in IPO 
underpricing by 2.2% when the size of the IPO firms increases by one unit across countries.  
 
Using developed stock market data, the findings confirm that difference in IPO underpricing is 
well explained by the three dimensions of the EWL theory also. Yet, dissimilarity in underpricing 
is elucidated by other factors as the EWL model provides weak explanation in developing 
economies. For instance, this research uncovers evidence showing that an increase in the incentive 
of IPO owners by one percent reduces underpricing by up to 1.1% in developed equity markets. 
The endogenous choice of high-status underwriters by IPO issuers is found to decrease 
underpricing by 4.2% in advanced stock markets. The findings confirm that an increase in the 
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level of ex-ante uncertainty by one unit attracts underpricing by up to 2.5% in these developed 
economies.  
 
Conversely, in developing stock markets, the findings confirm that the endogenous underwriting-
underpricing association does not exist. Instead, traces of evidence found documenting the 
likelihood that underpricing variance are attributed to the spinning behaviour exclusively in 
developing equity markets. This is because the results show that in emerging nations entrepreneur 
founders of IPO firms suffer from the cost of employing prestigious underwriting banks paying 
them large underwriting fees. Sequentially, instead of attaining lower underpricing, issuers receive 
larger underpricing by 4.7%. This research attributes these findings to the lack of care issuers 
demonstrated about their inclination to accept larger wealth losses in exchange for achieving a 
successful listing. Therefore, the results relate the significant gap in initial return of 19% between 
advanced and emerging equity markets to the difference in the incentive of issuers when going 
public. This is because IPO firms in developing economies sell 1% and create 10% less secondary 
and primary shares when they go public, respectively. The conclusion remained robust after 
accounting for a number of robustness considerations including omitted variable bias, shared 
correlations in error terms between developed and developing economies, and existence of outliers.  
 
The second essay (Chapter Three) examines the direct and indirect effects of time-variant changes 
in the formal institutional quality on the underpricing difference across countries. The intersection 
of law and finance literature suggests that time-invariant differences in the formal institutional 
quality could be or could not be related to the perceived underpricing variance across nations. 
Hence, current IPO underpricing-law literature has neither accounted for the time-variant changes 
in country-level transparency and underpricing across countries nor distinguished the indirect 
effect of country-level transparency on IPO underpricing simultaneously. This essay advances this 
literature through the application of Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) to achieve three 
significant objectives:  
 Firstly, study the relative prominence of the levels of firm and country on the 
variance of IPO underpricing; 
 Secondly, investigate the direct effect of the characteristics of country-level 
transparency on the variability of IPO underpricing in the global IPO market; and 
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 Thirdly, examine the indirect effect of the characteristics of country-level 
transparency in modifying the relationship between firm-level variables and IPO 
underpricing in the global IPO market. 
To accommodate these objects, this research employs five country-level formal institutions proxies 
(i.e., voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption). This research makes use of the EWL theory to control for traditional 
determining factors of IPO underpricing. To examine the proposed 20 research hypotheses, this 
research use 10,217 IPO companies listed in 22 different countries from January 1995 until 
December 2016. This research finds a significant percentage of the underpricing variance attributed 
to nearly 88%, 95%, and 75% are related to intrinsic characteristics of firms across, within 
developed, and within developing, G20 countries respectively. The results of this essay settle the 
confusion in the legal and IPO underpricing literature. This is done by confirming there is a 
significantly negative relationship between time-variant changes in country-level transparency and 
underpricing across countries. The results document that differences in country-level formal 
institutional quality’s proxies directly explain up to 34% of the variability in IPO underpricing 
across G20 countries. This research uncovers evidence showing that time-variant differences in the 
level of voice and accountability in developing G20 countries directly clarify up to 28% of the 
underpricing variance. Not found here is any link between changes in country-level transparency 
countries and underpricing difference within developed G20 nations.  
 
Remarkably, the findings also produce first-hand evidence documenting that time-variant changes 
in country-level transparency indirectly influence underpricing in three ways: first, through 
increasing the association between the incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing by up 1.4%; 
second, by reducing the relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing by up to 
12%; and third, by curtailing the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing by up 
to 5% for every unit increase in the transparency proxies. Structural differences in the behaviour 
of firm-level variables are observed when this research split the data between IPO firms nested 
within developed and developing stock markets. For example, this research finds that when time-
variant variability in country-level transparency is in effect, the EWL theory weakly elucidates IPO 
underpricing variance between all G20 countries, within advanced and emerging G20 economies. 
This finding allowed this thesis to conclude that in cross-country settings, differences in the formal 
institutional quality matter the most in IPO underpricing difference while firm-level determinants 
7 
 
of IPO underpricing play marginal role. The findings continued to be significant after performing 
a series of robustness tests, including adding an extra eight firm- and country-level factors, and 
performing a number of diagnostic tests.  
 
The third essay (Chapter Four) examines the influence of informal institutional quality on the 
underpricing difference across countries. Previous empirical evidence suggests that differences in 
national cultures may influence the observed variability in the level of IPO underpricing from 
country to country. Yet, current IPO underpricing-culture literature neither has a cognisance of the 
nesting structure of the IPO data nor recognises the indirect effect of national cultures on IPO 
underpricing. This essay advances the literature on this subject by implementing hierarchical linear 
modelling estimation to attain three important objectives.  
 The first aim is to evaluate the relative importance of the levels of firm and 
country on the variance of IPO underpricing.  
 For the second objective, this research tests the direct influence of the 
characteristics of national cultures on the variance IPO underpricing across 
countries.  
 The third goal is to examine the indirect influence of the characteristics of 
national cultures in moderating the association between firm-level variables and 
IPO underpricing across nations.  
To address these objectives, while this research controls for traditional factors of IPO underpricing 
at both company and country levels, this research uses Hofstede's (2010) national culture 
dimensions (i.e., power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term 
orientation and indulgence). This research employs the EWL theory to capture traditional 
determining covariates of IPO underpricing. To test the proposed 24 research hypotheses, this essay 
employs a global dataset of 10,217 IPO-issuing firms from January 1995 until December 2016 in 
22 countries with varying levels of cultural characteristics. The results show that differences in 
country-level characteristics account for 22%, 5%, and 25% of the divergences in IPO underpricing 
between all G20, developed, and developing countries, respectively. The findings demonstrate that 
against the shared awareness in the IPO underpricing-culture literature, not all-cultural dimensions 
matter to the IPO market. This research shows that only differences in the level of power distance, 
individualism, femininity, and indulgence across countries matter directly in influencing the global 
IPO underpricing difference by up to 32%. This research finds that the variability of power distance 
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and femininity in industrial and emerging G20 countries explains up to 40% and 59% of the 
underpricing variance, respectively.  
 
This research also generates exclusive evidence confirming that culture indirectly impacts on 
underpricing variance in three ways: first, by transmogrifying the association between the incentive 
of IPO issuers and underpricing by up 33%; second, by modifying the liaison between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing by up to 10%; and third, by moderating the connection between ex-
ante uncertainty and underpricing by up to 30%. Documented here are some structural differences 
in the behaviour of firm-level variables between IPO firms nested within developed and developing 
equity markets. For instance, while this research finds weak support for the EWL theory within the 
emerging G20 economies, this research uncovers strong support for the model using industrial IPO 
data when differences in country-level national cultures are captured. Confidence in the main 
findings remained unimpaired after conducting a series of robustness tests, incorporating an extra 
nine firm and country-level covariates, and executing a number of diagnostic tests.  
 
In summary, this thesis seeks to contribute to advancing the understanding of the mystifying 
phenomenon of IPO underpricing difference in the global IPO market. To this end, this research 
provides the first international empirical evidence for testing the validity of a theoretical model - 
the EWL theory - in revealing simultaneous interactions between the three players in the IPO 
process. These are the issuers, underwriters, and investors. While examining this model, this 
research takes into account a largely ignored but important econometric issue related to capturing 
the effect of clustering in error terms. Subsequently, this research extends the EWL model to 
capture the nesting structure of the IPO data using the HLM technique. This helps to examine the 
direct and indirect effects of formal and informal institutional settings in shaping this global 
underpricing difference. The cross-country and long dataset that this research employs which 
contains heterogonous levels of underpricing, transparency, cultural characteristics, enabled this 
thesis to effectively assess the interaction of firm- and country-level covariates in reaching a better 
understanding - from a global perspective - of IPO underpricing variance. Hence, the results of this 
thesis will be of great importance to researchers in the literature on cross-country IPO underpricing, 
law-IPO underpricing, and culture-IPO underpricing. The findings also provide a number of 
practical contributions to policy-makers, entrepreneurs and investors. 
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This thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter One introduces the context of the topic and the 
subsequent three chapters are presented as separate papers. Chapter Two presents the first paper 
which is called “The Simultaneous Effects of Clustering and Endogeneity on the Underpricing 
Difference of IPO Firms: A Global Evidence”. Chapter Three presents the second paper with the 
title “The Modifier Effect of Country-level Transparency on Global Underpricing Difference: New 
Hierarchical Evidence”. Chapter Four is concerned with the third paper, “Hierarchical Explanation 
of the Direct and Indirect Effects of National Cultures on Underpricing Variance in the Global IPO 
Market”. Finally, the conclusion of the thesis is provided in Chapter Five with a summary of the 
main themes covered here and directions for future research.   
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 The Simultaneous Effects of Clustering and Endogeneity on 
the Underpricing Difference of IPO Firms: A Global Evidence 
2.1. Introduction and Research Background  
It is now well documented2 that the degree of underpricing in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) varies 
substantially across global IPO markets, in particular across developed and developing IPO 
markets3. However, the critical question is how this substantial underpricing across countries can 
be explained. Loughran et al. (1994) report, in a yearly updated international insight on January 9, 
2018, average underpricing stretching from 3.3% to 270.1% across 54 nations over the last 30 
years. There is a lack of understanding why entrepreneur founders across stock markets float part 
of their holdings at great discount creating a substantial cost of going public (Liu & Ritter 2011). 
In reality, the existence of a considerable heterogeneity in underpricing across economies and 
within developed and developing nations can be mystifying, especially in trying to comprehend 
the inclination of entrepreneur founders IPO firms to give away part of their firms very cheaply. 
Loughran et al.’s (1994) report documents average underpricing for developed stock markets such 
as Japan, the United Kingdom, and Denmark at 44.7%, 7.4%, and 25.9%, respectively, while 
similar statistics for developing economies are reported at 239.8%, 4.2%, and 22.1% for Saudi 
Arabia, Argentina, and Pakistan, also respectively. What causes average underpricing to be as low 
as 4.2% and as high as 239.8% in developing economies such as Argentina and Saudi Arabia? 
Similarly, what causes average underpricing statistics in developed economies of Japan and 
Denmark to be as high as 44.7% and as low as 7.4%, respectively?   
 
Understanding what explains underpricing difference in IPO firms in the global IPO market 
continues to be an ongoing and challenging research topic in the literature. Researchers endeavour 
                                                 
2 See Loughran et al. (1994), Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), Ljungqvist et al. (2003), 
Boulton et al. (2010), Engelen and van Essen (2010), Banerjee et al. (2011), Boulton et al. (2011), Hopp and Dreher 
(2013), Autore et al. (2014), Judge et al. (2014), Boulton et al. (2017), and Chourou et al. (2018). 
3 This thesis uses the Bloomberg definition of emerging IPO markets, that is, all listed IPOs in Latin America, the 
Middle East, Africa, Asia (excluding Japan and Singapore), and Eastern Europe stock markets. This chapter uses the 
words ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ interchangeably. 
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to employ a range of determining factors, relying on different theoretical models, and seek to apply 
different econometric estimations to explain why there is a large dispersion in the level of 
underpricing in the global IPO market (Ritter & Welch 2002; Kennedy et al. 2006; Colaco et al. 
2009; Boulton et al. 2017). The fusion of those empirical attempts has created a methodological 
problem in the literature leading to fragmented conclusions about what does explain underpricing 
difference in the global IPO market. 
 
For example, one strand of research includes Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Chahine (2008), 
Mantecon and Poon (2009), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) who have proved empirically that 
IPO issuers are affected most from underpricing and concurrently made the absolute decision to 
select from the highest or lowest reputable underwriters proportionally. This depends on the stake 
of their holdings they intended to float, and implies that the decision to employ a prestigious 
underwriter is determined endogenously by IPO issuers in the pre-IPO stage. This literature argues 
the failure to account for this endogeneity explains the empirical claim that there is a positive 
relationship between hiring high-status underwriters and underpricing during the 1990s. When 
empirically controlling for this endogenous effect using an endogeneity correction model 
developed by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) using a 2SLS estimation with a proper instrumental 
variable, this literature demonstrates that the employment of reputable underwriters is a costly 
promotion exercise. In fact, it curtails investors’ uncertainty and subsequently leads to lower IPO 
underpricing. 
 
This strand of the literature concludes that this erroneous methodological estimation caused by 
treating underwriter reputation as an exogenous factor, ensures the IPO underpricing literature 
maintains a false understanding of the phenomenon of IPO underpricing in the global IPO market. 
This strand of the IPO literature also suffers from two critical limitations. Firstly, this literature 
provides fragmented results for the endogenous underwriting-underpricing relationship making the 
understanding of this relationship largely distorted at best. For example, Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2003), and Kennedy et al. (2006) prove the existence of a 
significantly negative relationship, while Franzke (2003) and Alavi et al. (2008) find no 
relationship at all. In contrast, Chahine (2008) contends that there is a significantly positive 
relationship. Secondly, the IPO data of this literature are heavily clustered during the 1990s and 
early 2000s and focused only on single developed countries such as the U.S., France, Germany, 
and Australia. They also concentrated on particular industries such as technology-related 
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manufacture leading to potential year, country, and industry clustering effects. For example, Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2003), Kennedy et al. (2006), Mantecon and 
Poon (2009), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) employ only U.S. data while Franzke (2003), Alavi 
et al. (2008), and Chahine (2008) utilise German, Australian, and French IPO data. 
 
Is there an influential difference using IPO data clustered in developed countries to understand the 
global underpricing difference across countries? The problem is that the developed IPO markets, 
for example, differ from developing IPO markets in that the former are characterised by a different 
information asymmetry environment and regulatory requirement. This occurs because developed 
countries impose tougher disclosure regulations and more transparent trading and listing 
regulations, making the findings of those studies difficult to generalise (Ritter 2003; Goergen et al. 
2009). Kayo and Kimura (2011) acknowledge the impact of differences in information 
environments between developed and developing stock markets, and their impact on the capital 
structure of firms. The authors argue that firms clustered within developing stock markets exhibit 
similar firm-level information characteristics that are not similar to developed ones. Consequently, 
the evidence obtained by this strand of the IPO literature is likely to be biased because they are 
only clustered empirical evidence about the endogenous relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing in the global IPO market without controlling econometrically for this 
clustering effect. This leads to questioning whether the theories designed to explain corporate 
finance behaviours in developed countries are applicable to developing countries. 
 
 Another literature strand concentrating on the impact of clustering in the IPO market focuses only 
on detecting the existence of numerous patterns of one-way and two-way clustering in the IPO 
market. This includes, for example, Lowry (2003), Torstila (2003), Benninga et al. (2005), and Jain 
and Kini (2006). Also, there are theorising models elucidating the materialisation of this clustering 
effect, such as the studies by Hoffmann-Burchardi (2001), Benveniste et al. (2002), and Lowry and 
Schwert (2002). Consequently, this research follow Cao and Shi (2006), Cameron and Miller 
(2015) and Thompson (2011) to contend that not accounting for the impact of clustered error terms 
in the IPO data may bias the results of previous studies. This research attributes the paucity in 
capturing this clustering effect to the existence of a distorted understanding in comprehending the 
underpricing difference in the IPO market. Yet, this scholarly perspective provides no knowledge 
of the consequences of the following: (i) one or two-way clustering effects on triggering the 
witnessed differences in underpricing across countries; (ii) between developed and developing 
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countries; (iii) across years, industries and industries; or (iv) across years within similar countries, 
etc.  
 
In this chapter, this research bridges the very different two literature strands by providing the first 
empirical evidence for the simultaneous effect of one-way and two-way clustering effects on the 
endogenous underwriter-underpricing relationship in the global IPO market. This allows this thesis 
to examine if the observed dispersion in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market is: due to not 
capturing the endogenous effect of underwriter reputation on underpricing; or due to not capturing 
the effect of clustering in standard errors within years, industries, countries, and developed versus 
developing countries; or due to not capturing the simultaneous effect of endogeneity and clustering 
in the IPO data. 
 
Here, two deliberate departures from current empirical literature are made in relation to the 
empirical method and data. First, this research employs 48 OLS, 2SLS, one-way clustered 2SLS, 
and two-way clustered 2SLS models. This is accomplished in order to investigate the simultaneous 
effect of clustering in the IPO data on determinants of IPO underpricing in the global IPO market 
using the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses (EWL) theory, which seeks to explain the endogenous 
underwriter-underpricing relationship. Second, this research employs a large set of global IPO 
underpricing data comprising 10,217 IPO-issuing firms from 22 developed and developing 
countries that operate within 33 different industries and listed between January 1995 and December 
2016. The employment of this global dataset allows this thesis to produce the first comprehensive 
cross-country study that examines the validity of the EWL theory in explaining underpricing 
difference in a global context. It also permits the author of this thesis to conduct the first study that 
investigates the existence of the endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing from an international perspective. Furthermore, this research can examine for the first 
time the impact of numerous forms of one-way and two-way clustering on causing underpricing 
difference in the global IPO market. This research is able to empirically capture the consequences 
of one-way and two-way clustering for the existence of the endogenous underwriter reputation-
underpricing relationship in a global context. 
 
A number of robustness checks are incorporated to ensure the findings are not an artefact of omitted 
variable bias, shared correlations in error terms between developed and developing stock markets, 
and existing of outliers. The findings document that comprehending the challenging phenomenon 
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of IPO underpricing difference in the global IPO market is not straightforward. Yet, the 
employment of three phases of econometric analysis using OLS, 2SLS, and one- and two-way 
clustered robust 2SLS estimations led the author to solve part of this enigma. The findings attribute 
underpricing difference in the global IPO market to variations in level of the incentive of IPO 
issuers, promotion cost, and ex-ante uncertainty across the G20 countries. This is because this 
research finds that when in the incentive of IPO issuers increases by one percent underpricing 
decreases by 1.4%. Yet, issuers who endogenously choose to hire prestigious underwriters succeed 
to decrease their underpricing by 12%. IPOs that are listed when the pre-IPO stock market volatility 
is high by one percent, suffer from higher discount by 5%. When the span of elapsed time between 
setting the offer price and first trading day increases by one unit, underpricing falls by 3.3%. An 
increase in the size of the IPO company by one unit also results in decreasing underpricing by 
2.2%. This research finds that underpricing difference across countries is linked to the difference 
in information asymmetry between developing versus developed markets. When IPO firms are 
listed in a developing country, then that adds more uncertainty to the offering due to the existence 
of more asymmetric information in developing countries compared to developed ones. 
Subsequently, the results indicate that those developing IPO issuers should accept a larger discount 
of up to 19% compared to their counterparts in developed stock markets. 
 
From a developed G20 perspective, this study attributes differences in IPO underpricing to the 
three dimensions of the EWL theory as well. The results show that an increase in the incentive of 
IPO issuers by one percent results in alleviating underpricing by up to 1.1%. Conversely, the 
endogenous decision to select high-status underwriters by IPO owners decreases underpricing by 
4.2% in developed equity markets. The amount of money left on the table by IPO firms increases 
by up to 2.5% when the level of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO firm increases by one 
unit. Yet, the EWL theory does not elucidate much of the underpricing variance in developing 
stock markets. This is because the findings document that the endogenous underwriting-
underpricing does not exist in developing IPO markets. This possibly could explain why this 
research attained persistent outcomes rejecting the underwriting-underpricing relationship 
whenever this research captures correlations in error terms within developing versus developed 
G20 clusters. As a substitute, the findings lend support to the spinning behaviour rationale. This 
research finds that prestigious underwriters in developing stock markets burden IPO firms with 
hefty underwriting fee, sequentially, they leave big amount of money on the table for investors to 
15 
 
cash it out at the expense of issuers4. Remarkably, this research discovers that in developing nations 
entrepreneur founders appear not at all disturbed by this spinning practice because they simply do 
not care much about their wealth losses in exchange for a successful listing. This is because, unlike 
their counterparts in industrial nations, owners of IPO firms in emerging stock markets, on average, 
sell 1% and create 10% less secondary and primary shares when they float their firms to the public, 
respectively. 
 
This chapter provides several practical contributions to researchers, issuers, investors, and policy-
makers. First, this research contributes methodologically to the intersection of IPO underpricing 
and the clustering literature by showing empirically the consequences of ignoring the effect of 
clustering in error terms and proposing a better way to capture it. Second, this research contributes 
to many strands of finance literature that employ data suffering from the clustering effect in error 
terms. For example, researchers in the field of seasonal equity offering (Mola & Loughran 2004), 
long-term underperformance of IPO firms (Schultz 2003), and merger and acquisition (Harford 
2005; Netter et al. 2011), all document the existence of a clustering effect in their data without 
proper econometric adjustment. Hence the study contributes to the knowledge by demonstrating 
the consequences IPO clustering and how robust results could be achieved in this context. Third, 
the results will benefit researchers who embark on testing the validity of underpricing theories such 
as Kennedy et al. (2006) and examining determinants of IPO underpricing like Butler et al. (2014). 
The findings may alert researchers to pay more attention to the impact of IPO clustering and the 
consequences of ignoring it which may lead to erroneous conclusions. This is because the results 
document the sensitivity of accepting the explanatory of the EWL theory and the influential effect 
of clustering on the underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship after capturing the clustering 
effect in the IPO data, specifically between developed and developing countries.  
 
Fourth, the losses of IPO issuers are gains made by IPO investors. Hence, the results will benefit 
those IPO parties in understanding two aspects that contribute to the observed dispersion in 
underpricing in the global IPO market. This enables them to formulate informed investment 
decisions. The important findings of this thesis such as the true nature of the endogenous 
relationship between prestigious underwriter and underpricing and the impact of IPO clustering on 
                                                 
4 The results reported in this thesis document an opposing evidence in developed stock markets where reputable 
underwriters leave small amount of money on the table when they charge high underwriting fees. 
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the determinants of IPO underpricing across countries may aid investors to make more efficient 
investment decisions. Lastly, the traces of evidence documenting the possible existence of spinning 
behaviour could be of interest to policy-makers in developing economies. Legislators in emerging 
markets are interested in growing their local equity markets. This is because the progression of the 
IPO market supports their local economic growth objective in which more IPO listings are seen as 
an important strategic tool in ensuring continuous stock market expansion (Tian 2011; Jamaani & 
Roca 2015). The results show evidence that may contradict with the objectives of policy-makers 
in developing economies. This is because this research finds that high-status underwriters in 
emerging stock markets charge IPO firms large underwriting fees, and in turn, they leave large 
amounts of money on the table at the expense of IPO owners. This will increase the cost of going 
public, resulting in less incentive for private sector firms to expand their operations through raising 
equity using their local equity markets. Consequently, this leads to slower economic growth in 
emerging countries.    
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature on the 
impact of the endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. 
Section 2.3 reviews the studies on the influence of clustering in the IPO market. Section 2.4 
presents the theoretical framework while a discussion on the research questions and hypothesis 
development is presented in Section 2.5. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 present the data and methodology 
employed in this chapter, respectively. Sections 2.8 and 2.9 deliver the empirical results and 
concluding remarks, also respectively.    
 
2.2. Related Literature on the Impact of Endogenous Relationship between 
Underwriter Reputation and IPO Underpricing   
In recent decades, the volatile empirical evidence concerning the relationship between prestigious 
underwriter and underpricing in the IPO market has become one of the most disputed topics in the 
IPO underpricing literature. One school of thought provides empirical evidence documenting that 
the employment of a high-status underwriter by IPO firms alleviates the level of information 
asymmetry in the IPO market. This occurs through reducing the ex-ante uncertainty about the 
firm’s value, providing a certification signal to investors resulting in the mitigation of underpricing 
(Beatty & Ritter 1986; Benveniste & Spindt 1989; Carter & Manaster 1990; Spatt & Srivastava 
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1991; Liu et al. 2011). One explanation for this negative effect of underwriter reputation on 
underpricing is offered by Ruud (1993) who contends that although IPO issuers may be involved 
in a restricted number of offerings, underwriters are permanent players in the IPO market. 
Underwriters fear setting a low offer price leading to higher underpricing of IPO firms, thus 
resulting in upsetting future IPO issuers from floating their firms at a large discount. Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist (2001) also assert that the use of reputable underwriters leads to lower underpricing due 
to the development of an asymmetric information problem that may occur between underwriters 
and IPO investors. This is a scenario where the former deliberately overprice the IPO company, 
benefiting the issuer and themselves at the expense of investors. 
 
 In contrast, another school of thought provides contrary empirical evidence documenting the 
existence of either a positive relationship or no relationship at all between underwriter reputation 
and underpricing. Studies here include Beatty and Welch (1996), Logue et al. (2002), Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), and Autore et al. (2014), and Boulton et al. (2017). The argument in favour of 
this positive relationship is provided by Ljungqvist (2007) who argues that the asymmetric 
information problem may exist between underwriters and IPO issuers when the former 
intentionally underprice the latter for a personal gain. Liu and Ritter (2010) contend that some 
underwriters take advantage of their superior market knowledge and position for their own benefit 
by receiving side payments from large IPO investors. They want this in exchange for a discount 
offering or large allocation of IPO stocks, a practice known as “spinning”. In addition, Lowry and 
Shu (2002) argue that underwriters fear setting the offer price of IPO firms too high because this 
could result in upsetting or even being sued by angry IPO investors on the grounds the underwriter 
opportunistically overpriced the IPO. 
 
Fang (2005) argues that the observed reversal of the relationship between prestigious underwriter 
and underpricing from negative to positive is likely to be attributed to a radical shift in the incentive 
structure in the IPO market. This follows a similar proposition offered by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). The authors hypothesise this shift is due to a change in the issuer’s objective function in 
which they postulate IPO issuers during the 1990s become less concerned about underpricing and 
more concerned about analysts’ research coverage. Consequently, those issuers are willing to 
accept underpricing in exchange for high post-IPO coverage service provided by highly ranked 
analysts who are employed by reputable underwriters.  
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Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) criticised the two above-mentioned strands of literature by 
developing and testing a theoretical model known as “Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses” (hereafter 
EWL) theory. The theory is based on three dimensions including the incentive of IPO issuers, 
promotion cost, and ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering. The second dimension of the 
theory attributes the mystifying results about the true nature of the relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing in the IPO market to not accounting for the endogeneity in the 
matching between issuers and underwriters. Underwriter reputation serves as a proxy for promotion 
cost as employing prestigious underwriter is expensive. The authors contend that the change in the 
relationship between high-status underwriters and underpricing is a result of a failure to account 
for an endogeneity problem; it is not due to a shift in the incentive structure in the IPO market. 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that the information asymmetry problem, causing underpricing 
in the IPO market and resulting from the presence of ex-ante uncertainty between IPO parties, can 
be endogenously controlled and influenced.  
 
This occurs through using promotion costs such as employing a high-status underwriting bank that 
certifies the quality of the IPO firm leading to lower underpricing. Initial public offering issuers 
will have incentives to reduce underpricing, thus endogenously affecting underpricing, using 
reputable underwriters when they are only selling more of a stake in their firms to the public. The 
authors assert that issuers of IPO firms do not randomly select underwriters, and neither do 
underwriters randomly agree to underwrite IPO firms. Therefore, the decision to select an 
underwriter by the issuer is predetermined and it is likely to be based on their decision, at least in 
part, on the amount of underpricing they anticipate will occur. Consequently, Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) conclude that this results in endogeneity bias when regressing underpricing on the choice 
of underwriter. 
 
Econometrically, endogeneity materialises when a significant correlation between the error term 
of the model and underwriter reputation variable occurs as shown in Figure 1. This implies that 
prestigious underwriter is not an exogenous variable as previous literature suggested, but is in fact 
an endogenous factor (Habib & Ljungqvist 2001). 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Endogeneity Problem 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
Using 1,376 IPO issuing firms listed in the United States (U.S.) between 1991 and 1995, Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001) empirically prove that the failure to account for this endogeneity explains 
the empirical claim that there is a positive relationship between hiring prestigious underwriters and 
underpricing during the 1990s. When empirically controlling for this endogenous effect using the 
2SLS model with a proper instrumental variable, the authors find a significantly negative 
coefficient for underwriter reputation. As shown in Figure 1, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) find that 
the sign between underpricing and the decision to employ reputable underwriters flipped to 
negative after being positive when the employment of a reputable underwriter is erroneously 
treated as an exogenous factor using an OLS model. The authors empirically confirm that the 
employment of reputable underwriters is a costly promotion exercise. In turn, the use of a reputable 
underwriter curtails investors’ uncertainty, leading to lower IPO underpricing. Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) also show that the loss of wealth resulting from IPO underpricing is positively 
associated with the proportion of primary and secondary shares sold, along with the level of ex-
ante uncertainty surrounding the offering. Consequently, issuers who increase their participation 
in offerings by selling more secondary shares and furthermore, incur more wealth loss caused by 
the dilution of their ownership due to the creation of more primary shares, may attempt to reduce 
underpricing. Their results show that issuers do this in order to reduce their wealth losses by 
incurring promotion costs such as employing a reputable underwriter, this being necessary when 
the magnitude of ex-ante uncertainty concerning the issue is higher.  
 
Since the introduction of Habib and Ljungqvist’s (2001) theory, endogeneity correction model, and 
empirical results, a third strand of literature emerges. This literature focuses on examining the 
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validity of the EWL theory in explaining the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. The central aim of 
this school of thought directed towards testing the endogenous nature of the relationship between 
underwriter reputation and underpricing in the IPO market which is an important dimension of the 
EWL model. Remarkably, this literature – much like the previous two strands of literature - adds 
more mystery to the topic and fragmented results to the underwriting-underpricing relationship. 
For example, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2003) find some support for the prediction of the EWL 
theory employing 2,178 listed IPO firms in the U.S. market between January 1996 and December 
2000, specifically in relation to explaining the underpricing of technology IPO firms. The authors 
document significant evidence showing that underpricing is higher for technology compared to 
non-technology firms because IPO issuers of the former sell and create fewer secondary and 
primary shares, and there is less participation ratio and dilution factor when they go public, 
respectively.  
 
The authors also find that when IPO issuers intend to sell fewer secondary shares, they show less 
care about underpricing and for this reason they employ less reputable underwriters who charger 
cheaper underwriting fees. They also find that when the ex-ante uncertainty of the technology firm 
is high proxied by a small size of the IPO firm, underpricing tends to be higher. Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm Jr (2003) document that when they treated underwriter reputation as an exogenous factor 
using an OLS estimation, they find a positive and significant coefficient between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. However, after applying an endogeneity correction model using a 
2SLS model with a robust instrument variable following Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), the authors 
find a significant and negative coefficient between prestigious underwriters and underpricing.   
 
Kennedy et al. (2006) examine the relative importance of six asymmetric information models in 
explaining the mystifying phenomenon of IPO underpricing of 2,381 IPO firms listed in the U.S. 
IPO market between 1991 and 1998. The authors discover that the EWL theory offers the most 
compelling explanation for IPO underpricing in that country’s IPO market. The authors also 
document a significant change in the underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship from 
positive to negative after applying the endogeneity correction method proposed by Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001). Fang (2005) also cautions for not accounting for the endogenous choice 
between the issuer-underwriter matching in the bond market using 3,000 corporate nonconvertible 
bonds issued between January 1991 and December 2000 in the U.S. market. The authors apply the 
endogeneity correction procedure proposed by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), finding that reputable 
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underwriters charge higher underwriting fees in exchange for lower yields leading to higher net 
proceeds for bond issuers. Similar evidence also documented by Mantecon and Poon (2009) and 
Akkus et al. (2016) shows that the positive relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing found in the 1990s by previous studies disappears. This occurs after controlling for 
the endogenous choice of IPO issuers in selecting reputable underwriters when they intend to sell 
large portions of their holdings which changed to negative in the U.S. IPO market.  
 
In contrast, a stream of opposing empirical evidence about the change in the relationship between 
underwriter reputation and underpricing of IPO firm due to the existence of this endogeneity effect 
emerges in the literature. For example, Franzke (2003) employs the endogeneity correction method 
of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) on 160 listed IPO firms between March 1997 and March 2002. 
This is done to explain the underpricing phenomenon in the German IPO market. The author finds 
that after controlling for the endogeneity effect, underwriter reputation shows a positive but 
insignificant effect on underpricing in the German IPO market. Alavi et al. (2008) provide 
consistent results using 565 listed IPOs from 1995 to 2005 in the Australian stock market. The 
authors reject the exogeneity test for underwriter reputation. They reveal that after treating the 
choice of IPO issuers to select reputable underwriters being endogenous, underwriter reputation 
insignificantly increases underpricing. Chahine (2008) examines the validity of the EWL theory in 
elucidating underpricing in the French IPO market using 172 listed IPOs from 1997 to 2000. The 
author finds robust evidence indicating that IPO issuers endogenously determine the fraction of 
secondary and primary shares sold. The author factors the endogeneity effect between the choice 
of issuers in choosing reputable underwriters when they go public. Chahine (2008) concludes that 
underwriter reputation significantly increases the level of underpricing in the French IPO market.  
 
Jones and Swaleheen (2010) attempted to resolve the fragmentary nature of results provided by the 
third strand of literature that employs the endogeneity correction method of Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001). The authors use a dataset comprising 6,320 IPOs from January 1980 to December 2003 in 
the U.S. IPO market. The authors split their data into two periods, i.e. 1980-1991 and 1992-2003. 
They partitioned their data to investigate if the inconsistent results about the endogenous nature of 
the relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing are driven by an unobserved year 
effect. Jones and Swaleheen (2010) commence their empirical testing by treating underwriter 
reputation as an exogenous variable. They document an insignificantly positive relationship 
between 1980 and 2003 while they find a negative and significant relationship between 1980 and 
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1991. They discovered this relationship shifted to a significantly positive one between 1992 and 
2003 using OLS estimation. However, Jones and Swaleheen (2010) progress in their empirical 
testing to endogenise the decision to employ reputable underwriters based on the issuer’s decision 
to sell secondary shares using a 2SLS model. The authors find that a positive and significant 
relationship exists between 1980 and 2003. The results of Jones and Swaleheen (2010) also show 
that between 1980 and 1991 a negative but insignificant relationship exists, while from 1992 to 
2003 the sign of underwriter reputation coefficient became positive with no statistical significance. 
 
The achieved fragmented results after controlling for the endogeneity effect documented in 
previous literature and after portioning the IPO data over two year groups by Jones and Swaleheen 
(2010) lead to a mystifying situation. They could imply the existence of unobserved autocorrelation 
or clustering in error terms for IPO firms within years or industries or countries as argued by Lowry 
and Schwert (2002) and Cao and Shi (2006) that causes this poorly understood change. Hence, 
there is no current understanding if the observed differences in IPO underpricing in the global IPO 
market are due to not capturing patterns of clustering in the IPO data that caused confusion in 
understanding the true nature of the relationship between underwriter reputation and the 
underpricing of IPO firms. Stated differently, could the observed effect of endogeneity between 
underwriter reputation and underpricing in the global IPO market be a temporary effect or even 
vanish once these unobserved autocorrelations or clustering in the IPO data are empirically 
captured? This research discusses this in more detail next. 
 
2.3. Related Literature on the Impact of Clustering in the IPO Market 
To clearly understand and appreciate the influential effect of clustering in the IPO market, this 
research should understand how clustering occurs, in what forms, and to understand what is the 
consequence of not accounting econometrically for this effect? The consequence of IPO clustering 
has attracted the attention of finance literature scholars who want to examine if the failure to 
observe the impact of clustered error terms in the finance and economic data may bias the results 
of previous studies (Ritter 1984; Lowry & Shu 2002; Helwege & Liang 2004; Benninga et al. 2005; 
Jain & Kini 2006; Colaco et al. 2009; Baschieri et al. 2015; Cameron & Miller 2015). For example, 
clustering literature including Petersen (2009), Sorokina and Thornton (2016), Smith (2016), and 
Onali et al. (2017) provides empirical evidence showing that finance and economic data suffer 
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from an influential one-way clustering in the error terms across years, industries, and countries. 
They caution that failure to account for the impact of clustering results in biased standard errors 
and subsequently biased statistical results.  
 
An explanation of the year clustering effect is offered by Ibbotson (1975) and Lowry and Schwert 
(2002). The authors observe a year clustering effect in the 1960s and 1990s in the U.S. IPO market. 
This occurred where periods with a large and small volume of IPO listing “hot IPO” and “cold 
IPO” periods are frequently shadowed by periods of intense and low IPO activity, respectively. 
Lowry (2003) develops an asymmetric information model linking the presence of time-varying 
difference in the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the valuation of IPO firms and its influence on 
the existence of IPO waves. The author predicts the establishment of a negative association 
between the level of information asymmetry and IPO waves. Lowry (2003) also links the creation 
of year clustering effect due to the development of bullish price expectations by IPO investors 
about the first day return of IPO firms. Yung et al. (2008) also develop and test a model to predict 
the effect of year clustering on the development of information asymmetry in the IPO market using 
7,409 IPOs from 1973 to 2004 listed in the U.S. stock market exchange. The authors show that IPO 
issuers reduce underpricing by strategically floating their IPO firms in specific years when the 
observed level of asymmetric information regarding those years is low.   
 
The year clustering effect is not the only episode of one-way clustering because industry clustering 
also exists in the IPO market. This occurs where a disproportionate number of IPO companies 
within a specific industry list their firms simultaneously. Ritter (1984) highlights that the IPO 
market experiences industry clustering because the observed IPO waves in the primary market are 
attributed to some specific industries. Benveniste et al. (2003) and Benninga et al. (2005) contend 
that industry clustering occurs due to the development of a rapid IPO activity caused by the listing 
of IPO firms with similar high cash flow benefiting from higher market valuation. Consequently, 
important information about IPO firms with similar high cash flow is released to the market 
throughout the IPO process. This allows potential IPO investors to obtain valuable information 
about the future expected cash flows of those IPO firms as well as the overall investment 
opportunities in the whole industry. As a result, Benninga et al. (2005) argue there will be no 
benefits to remain private in that industry in which similar firms with high cash flow expectations 
find it worthwhile to float their firms. Eventually, a spillover effect occurs in the IPO market 
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causing a large percentage of IPO firms in the same industry to float their companies within a short 
period of time (Altı 2005). 
 
Similarly, Jain and Kini (2006) investigate differences between IPO firms that go public during 
industry clustered compared to non-clustered periods using 6,922 listed IPO firms in the U.S. 
market between 1980 and 1997. The authors also evaluate industry characteristics that cause 
clustering between IPO firms and examine the impact of industry clustering on the long-term 
performance of these firms. Jain and Kini (2006) find that IPO firms clustered within industries 
share similar characteristics including the ability to raise more capital, employ reputable 
underwriters, have higher underpricing, outspend their industry rivals on research and 
development, and attract more venture capital. The authors show that due to over-investing and 
investors’ over-optimism for the initial return of IPO firms, industry clustering occurs in some 
industries inducing high growth and research-intensive industries. Jain and Kini (2006) conclude 
that non-clustered IPOs exhibit superior long-term performance when compared to clustered IPOs. 
The authors attribute the existence of industry clustering to the existence of the spillover effect. 
This occurs when IPO firms in a particular industry are floated during a short period. Consequently, 
a large amount of private information about that industry is disseminated to the market leading to 
a reduction in information asymmetry.  
 
However, much of the empirical evidence for the existence of one-way clustering including year 
and industry in the IPO market refers to the U.S. market specifically and in the developed IPO 
markets such as the European countries generally (Hansen 2001; Hoffmann-Burchardi 2001; Cao 
& Shi 2006). If IPOs experience clustering effect between developed and developing countries 
based on the existence of clustering in the underwriting fees, then would the underwriter reputation-
underpricing relationship be a global phenomenon or only exist in developed countries? Torstila 
(2003) intuitively addresses this hypothetical question. The author examines the existence of a 
clustering effect in underwriting fees for 11,000 IPOs from 27 developed and developing countries 
between 1986 and 1999. Torstila (2003) shows empirically that patterns of clustering in 
underwriting fees not only exist in the U.S. IPO market; they also constitute a pronounced global 
phenomenon across countries. The author finds average underwriter fees clustered at a rate ranging 
between 2% and 3% for 86%, 27.3%, 88.80%, 65.40%, and 42.90% of underwritten IPOs in 
developing Asian countries including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, and Thailand, 
respectively. In contrast, the author shows that the underwriting fees of European IPOs cluster at a 
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range of 3% to 4% for 25%, 25%, 34%, 38.6%, 40%, and 33.3% of IPO underwritten IPO firms in 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, and Switzerland, respectively.  
 
Torstila (2003) also documents a large dispersion of underwriting fees between developed and 
developing IPOs. The author concludes that underwriting fees tend to exhibit similarity within 
advanced and emerging countries. This implies the existence of potential two-way clustering in the 
IPO market where some reputable underwriters cluster in specific countries or developed countries 
or industries or years. If this likelihood is to exist, then this research might expect observing 
unobservable multiple combinations of two-way clustering effects in the IPO market. For instance, 
this research might discover two-dimensional clustering for some IPOs within some industries in 
specific years, industries in specific countries, industries in developing countries, years in specific 
countries, years in developing countries, and so forth.  
 
Helwege and Liang (2004) and Thompson (2011) contend that the clustering phenomenon in the 
finance and economic data including IPO data is distinct as it can develop in other forms of two-
dimensional clustering. For example, Helwege and Liang (2004) assert the possibility of the two-
way clustering in the IPO market where IPOs listed during hot market periods are typically caused 
by the bouncing of IPO volume in some industries. Similarly, Hoffmann-Burchardi (2001) 
highlights that the bouncing of IPO activity in the biotechnology industry on the London stock 
market during the 1990s is an example of the existence of two-way clustering such as year-industry 
clustering effect in the IPO market. Cao and Shi (2006) argue that two-way clustering occurs in the 
U.S. and the European IPO markets. The authors relate observing large numbers of highly 
underpriced IPO firms floated into market both during hot market periods, for example in the 
1999s, and in specific industries, for example in biotech and technology industries, to the 
development of two-way clustering. The authors theorise the existence of this two-way clustering 
in the IPO data is caused by unobserved clusters of private information in the IPO market within a 
particular industry in a particular year. 
 
 Cao and Shi (2006) postulate that this clustered private information about the price expectations 
caused by valuation uncertainty of Internet IPO firms during the 1999 period. Hence, once this 
private information is channelled into the IPO market, a creation of clustered asymmetric 
information develops within a year and industry-wide scale. In this way, a group of IPO firms 
experiences a similar level of information asymmetry caused by similar ex-ante valuation 
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uncertainty within specific years and industries causing the creation of unobserved correlations 
within error terms. Cao and Shi (2006) contend that this IPO clustering causes researchers to 
observe differences in underpricing of IPO firms between years and industries while it makes 
observing underpricing similar within specific years and industries. The question to follow is: how 
do this research visualise this clustering and what might happen when this research fail 
econometrically to capture its existence? Graphically, this research show in Figure 2 a hypothetical 
example of data that experiences one-way clustering in standard errors. This clustering occurs in 
error terms within 6 coloured years or industries or countries or clusters of which those error terms 
have a tendency to correlate each cluster. Yet, those error terms are uncorrelated between those 
years or industries or countries or clusters. Figure 2 implies that when this research fail to observe 
the effect of clustering, for example within 6 coloured years or industries or countries, then this 
research only observe one big cloud of clustered standard errors instead of six actual clouds. 
 
Figure 2: Hypothetical Example of Data Experiences One-Way Clustering in Standard Errors 
 
 (Sourced from Smart (2017)) 
 
Cameron and Miller (2015) argue that a failure to empirically account for the effect of clustering 
in standard errors if they exist over years or industries or countries may result in two severe 
consequences. First, the authors caution that if errors are indeed correlated within a cluster, and 
this research fail to account for this effect, then the OLS or 2SLS estimator produces a less efficient 
estimation. Second, Cameron and Miller (2015) stress that the failure to account for within-cluster 
error correlation is likely to lead to utilising standard errors that are very small, leading to an 
overstatement of T-statistic or Z-statistic values. Consequently, this leads to over-rejecting the true 
null hypothesis. Colaco et al. (2009), Cameron and Miller (2015), Reinhardt and Riddiough (2015), 
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Bradley et al. (2016), and Isshaq and Faff (2016) conclude that failure to account for within-cluster 
error correlation is a costly econometric problem frequently ignored in the literature. Thus, ignoring 
the effect of clustering in error terms has a detrimental effect on the reliability of inferences drawn 
from empirical testing. 
 
To this end, the prior IPO literature focuses only on identifying the existence of various patterns of 
clustering in the IPO market and developing models to explain the formation of this clustering 
effect. Yet, there is no understanding of the consequences of those clustering effects on causing the 
observed differences in underpricing across countries, or between developed and developing 
countries or across years and industries, etc. Stated differently, can the failure to observe the 
existence of one-way or two-way clustering effects alter the relationship between determinants of 
IPO underpricing in the global IPO market? For example, can the observed effect of endogeneity 
between underwriter reputation and underpricing in the IPO market be a temporary effect or even 
vanish once these unobserved clustering effects are empirically captured? This thesis attempts to 
answer some of those important questions in this chapter. 
 
2.4. Theoretical Framework  
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) and Ritter and Welch (2002) provide an extensive review of 
theories that claim to explain the underpricing phenomenon in the IPO market. The authors contend 
that this underpricing phenomenon is ultimately explained by the existence of asymmetric 
information in the IPO market. The authors contend that asymmetric information models are 
considered to be well-established and modelled theories compared to other non-information 
asymmetry-based models. Hence, this chapter formulates its explanation of differences in IPO 
underpricing across the global IPO market based on asymmetric information reasoning. In 
particular, this chapter employs the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses (EWL) theory developed by 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001).  
 
This research employs the theoretical explanation offered by the EWL model since it is the only 
one that solves the problem of information asymmetry between the issuer and investor, while 
accounting for the endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. 
There are other theoretical explanations of the phenomenon of IPO underpricing reviewed in the 
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literature based on other information asymmetry, institutional, ownership and control, and 
behavioural explanations; these are briefly discussed in Appendix 1. This research also shows in 
Appendix 1 other reasons for those theories’ unsuitability in explaining IPO underpricing across 
the global IPO market after this research present a brief discussion of why IPO companies decide 
to go public. Appendix 1 also presents the key IPO parties in order to provide an extended 
understanding of the mechanism of information asymmetry in the IPO market. 
 
Conceptually, as shown in Figure 3, Habib and Ljungqvist's (2001) model explains the 
phenomenon of IPO underpricing by combining the “winners’ curse” hypothesis of Rock (1986), 
the “ex-ante uncertainty” hypothesis of Beatty and Ritter (1986), the “certification” hypothesis of 
Booth and Smith (1986), and the “signalling” models of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989).  
 
Figure 3: Interaction between the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses Theory and Other Asymmetric Information 
Models 
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(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) address the “winners’ curse” hypothesis by arguing that participation 
of uninformed investors can be determined endogenously by incurring more promotion costs. This 
is achieved, for example, by hiring reputable underwriters to reduce the “adverse selection” 
problem faced by uninformed investors. This in turn leads to lower underpricing. They also address 
the “ex-ante uncertainty” hypothesis by arguing that Beatty and Ritter (1986) do not take into 
account IPO issuers’ incentives to alleviate investors’ ex-ante uncertainty by increasing promotion 
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costs, for example, employing underwriters with prestigious market reputation. Furthermore they 
address the “certification” hypothesis of Booth and Smith (1986), arguing that promotion costs can 
include the employment of a reputable underwriter or prestigious auditor as “certification” signals. 
These serve to verify the quality of the issuer that was endogenously determined by the issuer when 
they aim to sell part of their holdings. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) also address “signalling” 
models by arguing that when IPO issuers reduce their ownership retention rate and bear the cost of 
promotion activities such as employing a reputable underwriter, prestigious auditor, or providing 
voluntary disclosure, promotion activities can serve as substitutes to underpricing. 
 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) revolutionised the IPO underpricing literature by providing the first 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the existence of the endogeneity problem between the key 
IPO parties. The authors assert that the issuers of IPO firms do not randomly select underwriters, 
and neither do underwriters randomly agree to underwrite IPO firms. Therefore, the decision to 
select an underwriter by the issuer is predetermined and it is likely to be based on their decision, at 
least in part, on the amount of underpricing they anticipate will occur. Consequently, this results 
in endogeneity bias when regressing underpricing on the choice of underwriter. Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) model has two main premises and they are as follows:  
 
 The first is that IPO owners care about underpricing, they are willing to stand to 
lose from it, and any such losses are proportionally conditional on the number of 
primary and secondary shares being sold.  
 The second is that IPO owners can influence the degree of underpricing by 
promoting their offerings.  
 
The EWL theory emphasises that neglecting the endogeneity in IPO issuers’ incentives to 
discourage information asymmetry, in turn, reduces underpricing results in the omitted variable 
bias and leads to biased inferences from empirical work. Based on this rationale, the EWL model 
provides two separately testable models to explain factors affecting wealth losses and underpricing 
of IPO issuers as shown below in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Information Asymmetry Based on Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses Rationale 
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The two testable hypotheses explain underpricing and wealth losses of IPO firms based on three 
dimensions: incentive of IPO issuers, promotion costs, and uncertainty surrounding the offering as 
shown in Figure 4: 
 The first hypothesis, i.e. underpricing hypothesis, argues that underpricing 
decreases in line with promotion costs, participation ratio, and dilution factor5 
while underpricing increases in uncertainty when controlling for promotion costs.  
 The second hypothesis, i.e. wealth losses hypothesis, argues wealth losses 
increase in line with the participation ratio, the dilution factor, and uncertainty, 
                                                 
5 Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that the relationship between underpricing and dilution factor is indeterminate. 
This means it could be positive or negative as they find that when using OLS models the relationship is positive but 
when accounting for endogeneity using 2SLS models the sign turns to negative. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2003), 
Kennedy et al. (2006), Chahine (2008), Goergen et al. (2009), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) also found empirical 
evidence detecting a negative relationship between underpricing and dilution factor. This evidence is followed in the 
thesis to predict a negative relationship between underpricing and dilution factor. 
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but are invariant to promotion costs. For both hypotheses, promotion costs 
increase in line with the participation ratio, the dilution factor, and uncertainty.  
 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) calculate wealth losses as the sum of “auditing, legal, roadshow, 
exchange, printing, and other expenses of the offering as well as accountable and non-accountable 
underwriter expenses, but not the underwriter spread, which they view as a payment for 
underwriting risk and thus not as a choice variable”. Unfortunately, such data is not adequately 
available for the cross-country setting. For example, this research finds only 1,458 out of the 10,217 
IPO-issuing firms this thesis employs have data for wealth losses in the Bloomberg New Issues 
Database. It emerges that 85% of these 1,458 IPO firms are dominated by U.S. IPOs and for this 
reason the chapter only examines the underpricing hypothesis. 
 
2.5. Research Questions and Hypothesis Development   
In this chapter this thesis aims to examine if the observed dispersion in IPO underpricing in the 
global IPO market is due to: firstly, not capturing the endogenous effect of underwriter reputation 
on underpricing; secondly, not capturing the effect of clustering in standard errors within years, 
industries, countries, and developed versus developing countries; or thirdly, not capturing the 
simultaneous effect of endogeneity and clustering in the IPO data. To achieve this goal, this 
research employs the EWL theory, which aims to solve the problem of information asymmetry 
between the issuer and investor while accounting for the endogenous relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. This research econometrically accounts for the effect 
of one-way and two-way clustering in several clustering forms on the three dimensions of the EWL 
model. The second dimension of the EWL theory - promotion cost proxy by underwriter reputation 
- allows the author to examine for the endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and 
IPO underpricing. The EWL theory comprises three dimensions that can be tested to ascertain its 
validity in explaining differences in IPO underpricing across countries as shown in Figure 5. 
32 
 
Figure 5: Dimensions of the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses Theory 
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Those dimensions include the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion costs, and ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding the offering. Based on those three dimensions, this chapter develops three sub-research 
questions in order to test every dimension, consequently leading to the development of three 
research hypotheses as shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Research Questions and Related Hypotheses  
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A successful testing of these three dimensions will provide strong support for the theory. This 
chapter answers the following question along with three related sub-research questions as follows:  
 
Q1: Does EWL theory explain underpricing differences across countries? 
 
Q1.1: Does the incentive of IPO issuers explain underpricing across countries?  
 
Q1.2: Does promotion cost incurred by issuers explain underpricing across countries?  
 
Q1.3: Does ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering explain underpricing across countries?  
 
2.5.1. Relationship Between the Incentive of IPO Issuers and Underpricing 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) measure the incentive of IPO issuers through the participation ratio 
and dilution factor. The former is defined as the percentage of secondary shares sold to pre-IPO 
outstanding shares while the latter is defined as the percentage of primary shares created to pre-
IPO outstanding shares. The authors document the existence of a negative relationship between 
both participation ratio and dilution factor and the degree of underpricing at the time of IPOs. The 
authors contend that the greater the participation ratio and dilution factor, the more incentive issuers 
have to reduce underpricing. Despite the similarity between participation ratio and dilution factor, 
they differ slightly in creating the incentives of issuers to reduce underpricing. According to Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001), participation ratio causes issuers to experience direct wealth losses since 
every percentage of underpricing causes a reduction in the wealth of owners of shares. Thus, the 
higher the percentage of secondary shares sold the greater the incentive of issuers to reduce 
underpricing.  
 
Similarly, although the dilution factor seems to have no direct effect on underpricing, it does have 
a direct effect on issuers’ wealth losses, as every new share created will dilute the entrepreneur’s 
outstanding wealth. However, the creation of new discounted shares that are sold to new investors 
at the offering enlarges the investors’ base at a cheaper value. Furthermore, it reduces both control 
and future cash benefits that were previously solely preserved for the entrepreneur, thus indirectly 
affecting underpricing. The negative association between participation ratio and dilution factor 
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with underpricing is empirically supported by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2003), Kennedy et al. 
(2006), Chahine (2008), Goergen et al. (2009), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010). Based on the 
above discussion, the following hypothesis is developed to answer the first sub-research question: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
There is a negative relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing across 
countries.  
 
2.5.2. Relationship Between Underwriter Reputation and Underpricing 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) empirically show that the loss of wealth resulting from IPO 
underpricing is positively associated with the proportion of primary and secondary shares sold, 
along with the level of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering. Consequently, issuers who 
increase their participation in offerings by selling more secondary shares and incur more wealth 
loss caused by the dilution of their ownership due to the creation of more primary shares, may 
attempt to curtail underpricing. They will do this in order to reduce their wealth losses by incurring 
promotion costs, this being necessary when the magnitude of ex-ante uncertainty concerning the 
issue is higher.  
 
To accomplish a reduction in IPO underpricing, issuers incur greater promotion costs, for instance 
hiring reputable underwriters who can certify the quality of the issuer in order to lessen the ex-ante 
uncertainty of uninformed investors (Benveniste & Spindt 1989; Spatt & Srivastava 1991; Liu et 
al. 2011). Of course, the hiring of a reputable underwriter comes at an additional cost compared to 
employing a cheaper underwriter with an inferior market reputation (Beatty & Ritter 1986; 
Kirkulak & Davis 2005; Jones & Swaleheen 2010). Incurring such promotion costs may attract 
more uninformed investors to participate in offerings, who demand less discounting since their 
uncertainty about the offerings is less, thus lowering underpricing. Beatty and Ritter (1986) and 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) assert that IPO firms’ use of reputable underwriters can reduce the 
ex-ante uncertainty about the firm’s value, providing a certification signal to investors and, in turn, 
mitigating underpricing. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is created to 
answer the second sub-research question: 
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Hypothesis 2:  
There is a negative relationship between promotion cost and IPO underpricing across countries. 
 
2.5.3. Relationship Between Ex-ante Uncertainty and Underpricing 
To capture and test the third dimension of Habib and Ljungqvist’s (2001) model, ex-ante 
uncertainty, this thesis uses three commonly employed ex-ante uncertainty proxies in the literature: 
pre-IPO market volatility, elapsed time, and offer size. Firstly, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2002) 
and Chang et al. (2017) find that the level of volatility of a stock reflects its degree of risk perceived 
by market participants in which more volatility makes pre-market prices to be less informative. 
Consequently, when IPO investors experience greater ex-ante uncertainty related to pre-market 
prices then greater discount is imposed on the offer price of IPO firms relative to the pre-market 
prices. Thus, a positive association between underpricing and pre-IPO market volatility is expected. 
  
Secondly, Lee et al. (1996) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) argue that the longer the elapsed 
time between first trading day and IPO announcement day where offer price is set, the less demand 
informed investors will have for the issue. This implies that when informed investors indicate low 
demand for an IPO firm, then the IPO requires more time to be fully subscribed to avoid failure of 
subscription. Lee et al. (2003) explained this matter by contending that the low demand by 
informed investors would be favoured with high uncertainty about the quality of the IPO by 
uninformed investors. This leads to less demand for the offering on the first trading day and then 
in turn results in lower underpricing. Consequently, it is expected that IPOs with a long elapsed 
period of time will experience a higher level of ex-ante uncertainty leading to lower IPO demand 
and underpricing.  
 
Thirdly, Beatty and Ritter (1986), Loughran et al. (1994), Kim et al. (2008), and Boulton et al. 
(2010) used IPO offer size measured by the gross proceedings to proxy for ex-ante uncertainty. 
Here they empirically documented that larger offerings are normally offered by established firms, 
while smaller offerings are offered by speculative firms, calling this phenomenon “empirical 
regularity”. Thus, this thesis follows Beatty and Ritter (1986) in asserting that a negative 
association between gross proceeds of IPO firms and underpricing is present. Based on the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis sets out to answer the third sub-research question: 
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Hypothesis 3:  
There is a positive relationship between ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and 
underpricing across countries. 
 
2.6. Data  
The dataset contains firm-specific data, this being secondary data sourced from Bloomberg New 
Issues Database and DataStream databases covering the Group of Twenty (i.e., G20) market 
countries. The data covers the period January 1995 to December 2016, and consists of 10,217 IPO-
issuing firms from 33 industries and 22 developed and developing countries. Why the G20 
countries? This thesis chooses them because they offer a diverse and heterogeneous dataset that 
allows the research hypotheses to be rigidly tested. They also provide generalisable answers to the 
research questions posed in this thesis. The G20 is a global gathering that takes the form of an 
annual forum for advancing international cooperation and coordination among 20 major emerging 
and advanced economies6 (The G20 China 2016). 
 
The G20 includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, and the European Union. Since its establishment in 1999, the G20 
has emerged as a prominent international economic cooperation forum and had to deal with the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The G20 leaders meet on an annual basis (at a “summit”) to 
discuss primary issues related to the stability and growth of the international economy and financial 
system. Other topics are also discussed, including development, food security, and the environment 
(G20 Turkey 2015). The G20 countries include 19 nations and the European Union is considered 
to be the 20th country (The G20 China 2016).  
 
The sheer size and importance of the G20 economies in the global economy make this body a focus 
of practitioners and academics worldwide (Christiansen et al. 2011; Johannesen & Zucman 2014; 
                                                 
6 Some guest countries and the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade 
Organization, the Financial Stability Board, the International Labour Organization, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) were also invited to attend the G20 Summit (G20 Turkey 2015). 
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Kelly et al. 2016). To understand the size of the G20 economies and financial markets, for example, 
Table 1 shows a summary of statistics illustrating the G20 economies’ share of the world economy. 
It is in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), market capitalisation, number of listed companies, 
global population, export of goods and services, number of IPO listings, and size of IPO listings in 
2014 (The World Bank Group 2015). In 2014, the contribution of the G20 economies’ GDP to the 
global GDP was approximately 81% and 82.6% of global market capitalisation occurred in the G20 
stock markets. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the G20 Countries  
 World G20 countries Share of G20 to World (%) 
GDP at market prices (trillion US$) 77.80 63.10 81.1% 
Market capitalisation (trillion US$) 66.5 54.90 82.6% 
Listed domestic companies (total thousands) 44.00 33.40 75.9% 
Population (total billion) 7.26 4.56 62.8% 
Exports of goods and services (trillion US$) 23.60 12.10 51.1% 
IPO listing (total thousands) 32.30 25.3 78.3% 
Size of IPO listing (trillion US$) 3.60 2.90 80.4% 
(Sourced from The World Bank Group (2015)) 
 
In 2014, 75.9% of global listed companies were traded on the G20 stock markets, and the 
population of the G20 countries accounted for more than 60% of the world’s population. The G20 
economies controlled 51.1% of global exports of goods and services, amounting to US$12.1 
trillion. Up to 2014, approximately 25 thousand IPOs were listed in the G20 stock markets, 
accounting for 78.3% of all listed IPOs in the global market since 1995, and accounting for 80.4% 
of the value of all listed companies. Thus, a focus on the G20 countries allows for a more 
generalised coverage of a comprehensive dataset that encapsulates a variety of established and 
underdeveloped stock markets. This in turn permits rigid testing of the first set of research 
hypotheses.  
 
The research sample is selected from this chapter and refers to these selection criteria following 
Ritter and Welch (2002) and Boulton et al. (2017) as exhibited in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Sample Selection Criteria for IPO Data 
Selected search criteria Description 
Number 
of IPOs 
Matches 
Exclusion of 
Duplicates 
This research excludes all duplicate7 IPOs from this sample from January 
1995 to December 2016 (9,548 IPOs are excluded). 
 
32,585 
   
Exclusion non-
trading IPOs 
 
This research only includes IPO firms that are already traded at the time of 
inclusion; therefore, all pending, withdrawn, postponed, and rejected IPOs 
are excluded since they are beyond the research interest of this study (1,450 
IPOs are excluded). 
23,037 
Exclusion of non-G20 
IPOs 
The G20 countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the 
United States plus the European Union as the 20th country. Within the 
European Union, there are other countries including Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, and Sweden making up the 
G20 group. Due to IPO data unavailability, Argentina, Romania, Slovenia, 
and Spain were excluded making a final sample of 22 countries (5,951 
IPOs are excluded). 
21,587 
Exclusion of IPO 
data with missing 
values for PR and 
DF, UR, PMV, LET, 
and LOP 
This research excludes IPOs with missing values needed to calculate all 
explanatory variables (6,047 IPOs are excluded). 
15,339 
Exclusion of IPO 
data with missing 
values for UP 
This research excludes IPOs with missing values of the dependent variable 
(2,045 IPOs excluded). 
12,886 
Exclusion of Non 
initial public offering 
data  
This research excludes REITs, ADRs, units offer, close-end-funds, and 
stock with warrants (2,669 IPOs are excluded).  
10,217 
 
2.6.1. Variables Definition  
The dependent variable is IPO underpricing. Explanatory variables are constructed following the 
three dimensions of the EWL theory, these being the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion cost, and 
ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering as shown in Table 3.  
                                                 
7 This thesis follows cautionary observation made by Smart and Zutter (2003) to scrutinise into the existence of 
duplicate IPO records and to eliminate them from the sample to avoid double counting.  
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Table 3: Variables Definition 
                                                                                            Dependent Variable 
        Variable Description  
Source 
 of  
Data 
IPO Underpricing 
(UP) 
UP is the percentage return from the offer price to the first closing price on its first trading day.  
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
       Independent Variables 
 
Panel A: Incentive of IPO issuers 
 
Variables Description 
Expected 
Coefficient 
Sign 
Source  
of  
Data 
Participation 
Ratio (PR) 
PR is a calculated percentage of secondary shares sold to pre-IPO outstanding shares. This research provides a discussion of 
the expected sign in hypothesis 1 in Section 2.5.1. 
Negative 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
 
Dilution Factor 
(DF) 
DF is a calculated percentage of primary shares sold to post-IPO outstanding shares. This research provides a discussion of 
the expected sign in hypothesis 1 in Section 2.5.1. 
Negative 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
Panel B: Promotion cost8 
 
Underwriter 
Reputation 
(UR) 
UR is a dummy variable constructed based on a ranking scale that is designed to equal a ten-point scale based on the total 
proceeds raised (measured in US$) for the largest 10 underwriters in every G20 country. Each underwriter is assigned a rank 
of 0-9, where 0 (9) donates to the least (most) reputable underwriter. If an IPO underwriter is within those top ten underwriters, 
Negative 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
                                                 
8 Habib et al.’s (2001) model uses only U.S. data to calculate promotion cost including the fees paid to underwriters, auditors and lawyers and direct costs associated with 
road shows and listing fees. Global data related to those costs are not available in the data source, Bloomberg New Issues Database. For example, across the 10,217 IPO 
firms listed in the G20 countries this thesis covers, the author finds less than 829 IPOs match the selection criteria and at the same time have information related to fees 
paid to underwriters, auditors and lawyers and direct costs associated with road shows and listing fees. The research finds 64% of those 829 IPOs are listed in the United 
States. To solve this problem, the author treats the employment of reputable underwriters as a costly promotion activity following Franzke (2003), Chahine et al. (2007), 
and Migliorati et al. (2012). This is because Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Lewellen (2006) argue that underwriters can be classified into reputable and non-reputable ones 
where employing the former usually comes at high financial cost. The authors argue that reputable underwriters tend to control a large stake in the IPO market, have 
superior advisory teams, and tend to have established connections with institutional investors including hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds. They can 
subsequently conduct thorough evaluations for IPO firms. Lewellen (2006) pointed out that it is not surprising reputable underwriters are expensive to hire in exchange 
for the premium service they offer. In contrast, Jones and Swaleheen (2010) contend that non-reputable underwriters tend to have small market presentation, small advisory 
teams, and limited business connections; hence they tend to charge cheaper underwriting fees for taking the IPO firm public. Beatty and Welch (1996), Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm Jr (2002), and Torstila (2003) also support the association between the employment of reputable underwriter and higher underwriting fees paid by IPO issuers.  
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then it is labelled as “reputable underwriter” and given a dummy variable equal to 1; otherwise it is labelled as “reputable 
underwriter” with a dummy variable equal the value of 0. This calculation follows a similar ranking method for reputable IPO 
underwriters developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) based on the relative market share 
for underwriters. This is because Torstila (2003) argues that Carter and Manaster’s (1990) metric of investment bank 
reputation is not applicable for international underwriters as it only includes United States banks. Hence, this research follows 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2002), Neupane and Thapa (2013), and Boulton et al. (2017) to mimic the ranking mechanism 
used by Carter and Manaster (1990). This is done by converting the reputable underwriter ranking scale into dummy method 
approach. This research provides a discussion of the expected sign in hypothesis 2 in Section 2.5.2. 
 
Panel C: Ex-ante uncertainty 
  
Pre-IPO stock 
Market 
Volatility 
(PMV) 
 
Standard deviation of local stock market returns 15 days before the first trading date. This research provides a discussion of 
the expected sign in hypothesis 3 in Section 2.5.3. 
Positive DataStream 
Log Elapsed 
Time 
(LET) 
Natural log of the length of time between the setting of the offering price and the first trading date. This research provides a 
discussion of the expected sign in hypothesis 3 in Section 2.5.3. Negative 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
Log Offer 
Proceeds 
(LOP) 
Natural log of IPO proceeds. This research provides a discussion of the expected sign in hypothesis 3 in Section 2.5.3. 
Negative 
 
 Panel D: Country-level control variable   
Developing 
Status  
(DS) 
To capture the difference in IPO underpricing for listed IPO firms in developing as compared to developed G20 IPO markets, 
this research uses the DS variable, which refers to developing country status. It is a dummy variable that equals one when an 
IPO firm is listed in a developing G20 country; otherwise, it equals zero when the IPO is located in a developed (DVS) G20 
country. Developed countries include Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Africa, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. Developing countries include Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Poland, and Turkey. The classification of developed versus developing countries follows 
the classification offered by Bloomberg New Issues Database. Finance literature documents the considerable difference in 
underpricing between developed and developing IPO markets, highlighting that the latter differ from the former and this 
reflects the existence of varied market environments. A number of finance scholars argue for the presence of different 
informational environments between developed and developing stock markets in which more information asymmetry and 
underpricing are witnessed in the latter markets (Harvey 1995; Autore et al. 2014; Jamaani & Roca 2015). As a result, this 
research expects IPOs listed to developing countries to whines higher underpricing compared to IPOs listed in developed 
stock markets. 
Positive 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
Dummy Effects 
This research adds number of dummies to capture for the impact of year effect (YE), industry effect (IE), and country effect 
(CE). This research follows prior IPO underpricing literature to control for differences in years, industries, and countries on 
the consistency of the results (Engelen & van Essen 2010; Banerjee et al. 2011; Boulton et al. 2011).   
No sign is 
expected 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
 Panel E: Additional firm-level control variables   
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Book-building 
Method  
(BBM) 
This research controls for the type of pricing method by designating a dummy variable that equals one when an IPO firm is 
underwritten using book-building pricing method. This research defines the IPO book-building price method as an offer price 
that is set after the showcase conducted by an underwriter. This is done in order to solicit indications of interest from investors 
and where the underwriter may have a full discretion over the allocation of shares. Ljungqvist et al. (2003) distinguished 
between three IPO principal pricing methods, including auction9, fixed price10, and book-building. Sherman (2005) argued 
that as the book-building method permits an underwriter to control share allocation decisions, in order to solicit information 
about the true market value of the IPO firm, book building reduces ex-ante uncertainty, leading to lower expected 
underpricing. Thus, this research follows Engelen and van Essen (2010) to expect lower underpricing for IPOs underwritten 
by book-building methods.    
Negative 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
Technology 
Firm 
 (TF) 
This research controls for technology IPO firms by specifying a dummy variable that equals one when an IPO firm is a 
technology firm type, otherwise it equals zero. This research follows a definition used by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2002) 
of high technology firms that operate in the following type of industries: biotech, pharmaceuticals, medical instruments, 
software and hardware development, communications technology, advanced electronics, and specialty chemicals. Ritter 
(1984) and Ljungqvist et al. (2003) found that the degree of underpricing varies across industries due to the presence of 
different levels of information asymmetry, where a higher degree of ex-ante uncertainty tends to be inherited in high 
technology firms due to a valuation uncertainty problem. Thus, this research follows Boulton et al. (2010) in the contention 
that IPOs in the technology sector are expected to be underpriced more.  
Positive 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
Private Firm 
(PF) 
This research controls for the type of IPO firm in relation of being private company by specifying a dummy variable that 
equals one when an IPO firm is not related to telecommunications, utilities, transportation, and banking firm type, otherwise 
it equals zero. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2002) identify Privatisation firm IPOs compared to private IPO firms those who 
are classified as telecommunications, utilities, transportation, and banking firms, among others. Prior literature mainly 
discriminated between two types of IPO firms, including privatisation and private companies (Huang & Levich 2003; Shi et 
al. 2013). Privatisation IPOs often involve older firms and those well known in relatively regulated and well established 
industries, but private sector firm IPOs tend to be young, small, and relatively unknown (Jones et al. 1999). This implies that 
ex-ante uncertainty and its role on underpricing should be higher for private firm IPOs than for Privatisation IPOs; in turn, 
this research follow Fan et al. (2007) because this research expect more underpricing will occur in private firm IPOs.  
Positive 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
Integer Offer 
Price 
 (IOP) 
 
This research controls for IPO firms that are listed with integer offer price versus fractional offer price by specifying a dummy 
variable that equals one when an IPO firm has an integer offer price, otherwise it equals zero. Fractional offer price is 
hypothesised by Bradley et al. (2004) to be a result of negotiation between the underwriter and IPO firms, due to a valuation 
uncertainty about the true value of the firm11. This research follows Banerjee et al. (2011) in expecting the presence of a 
Positive 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
                                                 
9 According to Ljungqvist et al. (2003) the auction price method is defined as an offer price that is set in accordance with either discretionary or mandatory clearing rules. 
However, the allocations to bidders are not discretionary. 
10 Ljungqvist et al. (2003) defined the IPO fixed price method as an offer price that is set prior to the marketing of the offer to investors where the decisions of allocations 
are not discretionary.  
11 Bradley et al. (2004) proposed a “negotiation hypothesis”, where IPO issuer and underwriter negotiate over finer offer price increments while ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding the value of the firm gradually diminishes.  
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higher degree of valuation uncertainty for IPOs with integer offer prices; in turn, this research expects IPOs with integer offer 
price to be underpriced more than those with fractional offer prices. 
Underwriting 
Fees 
 (UF) 
 
This thesis controls for the impact of underwriting fees on IPO underpricing. Therefore, the variable UF is the per cent of IPO 
proceeds (gross spread) charged for every underwriter for underwriting the IPO company. Fang (2005) found quality 
underwriters charge higher underwriting fees in exchange for lower underpricing. Hence, this research expects the variable 
UF to have a negative coefficient.  
Negative 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
AFC 1997 
& 
 GFC 2008 
This research controls for effect of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. 
If an IPO underwriter is listed on the AFC or GFC year, then it is given a value of one otherwise it equals zero. Güçbilmez 
(2015) finds that IPO firms listed during financial crises period experience lower underpricing. The author relates his finding 
to an increase in uncertainty for both IPO investors and issuers about the stability of the global economy, so consequently 
IPOs become less desirable investments during crisis periods.   
Negative 
Bloomberg New 
Issues Database 
 Panel F: Additional country-level control variables   
Regulation of 
Securities 
Exchanges 
(RSX) 
This research controls for the level of financial market development by measuring the level of regulation of securities 
exchanges across countries. It is a time series index runs from 1995 to 2017 for the weight average ranking results of opinion 
survey to the following question: In your country, how effective are the regulation and supervision of securities exchanges? 
[1 = not at all effective; 7 = extremely effective]. This research follows Engelen and van Essen (2010) to create a dummy 
variable that equals one when an IPO firm is listed in a country where level regulation of securities exchanges in that country 
is above the mean of the entire sample, otherwise it equals zero if it is below. The degree of enforcement of securities 
exchanges differs widely from country to country (Pagano & Volpin 2001). The degree of required financial disclosure, 
compliance with financial reporting and auditing standards, effective governance, and implemented regulations related to 
anti-insider trading are all enforced by securities exchange bodies (Black 2001; Daouk et al. 2006). Engelen and van Essen 
(2010) find that investors’ ex-ante uncertainty is lower in countries where securities regulations are effectively enforced. The 
authors found a negative association between underpricing and effective enforcement of securities regulation.  
Negative 
World 
Economic 
Forum12 
Financial 
Market 
Sophistication 
(FMS) 
This research controls for the level of market sophistication across countries measured by the level of financing through local 
equity market. It is a time series index runs from 1995 to 2017 for the weight average ranking results of opinion survey to the 
following question: In your country, to what extent can companies raise money by issuing shares and/or bonds on the capital 
market? [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent]. This research creates a dummy variable that equals one when an IPO firm is 
listed in a country where level regulation of securities exchanges in that country is above the mean of the entire sample, 
otherwise it equals zero if it is below. Boolaky and Cooper (2015) proxy financial market sophistication by the level of 
financing through local equity market across countries. The authors find a positive relationship between transparent market 
practices and the level of market sophistication. This research expects IPOs listed in financially sophisticated markets to 
experience higher levels of transparency resulting in lower expected levels of underpricing.  
Negative 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
Market Size 
(MS) 
This research controls for difference across countries in terms of the overall economic development by gauging the size of 
domestic markets. It is a time series index runs from 1995 to 2017 for the sum of gross domestic product plus value of imports 
of goods and services, minus value of exports of goods and services, normalized on a 1–7 (best) scale. This research creates 
Positive 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
                                                 
12 Data is sourced from the Global Competitiveness Report published by The World Economic Forum (2017).  
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a dummy variable that equals one when an IPO firm is listed in a country where level domestic market size in that country is 
above the mean of the entire sample, otherwise it equals zero if it is below. Hopp and Dreher (2013) observe that IPO firms 
that are listed in large economies tend to have higher levels of underpricing.  
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Additional firm-level and country-level variables are included in the table. This chapter also 
includes a number of control variables that account for the whole year, the industry, and specific 
country’s effects. This research also includes a dummy variable to control for the impact of listing 
an IPO firm in a developing G20 stock market. This research also adds additional controlling firm-
level and country-level variables known to influence IPO underpricing. Additional firm-level 
factors contain book-building, technology firms, private firms, integer offer price, underwriter fees, 
the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and Global Financial Crisis that erupted in 2008. Additional 
country-level factors control for differences across stock markets in relation to the development of 
financial markets. This includes the enforcement of regulations concerning securities exchanges, 
financing through local equity markets, and the size of domestic markets. 
2.7. Methodological Framework and Research Strategy  
To fulfil the research objectives, the empirical examination progresses over three phases as follows: 
 In the first phase, this research begins by testing the EWL theory using OLS estimation. This 
implies that this research intentionally treat the firm-level covariates, especially the variable 
underwriter reputation (UR), as exogenous factors following Habib and Ljungqvist (2001). This 
research produces two sets of tests here where in the first set this research observe the effects of 
the three dimensions of the EWL model on IPO underpricing while gradually adding year, 
industry, and country dummies. This is done to choose the best model fit. In the second set, the 
author captures the effect of listing an IPO firm in developing stock markets. This research does 
this to capture the change in the three dimensions of the EWL model after accounting for the 
impact of listing in developing economies. This is likely to assist this thesis to understand if the 
variance in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market is related to dissimilarity between 
developed and developing nations.   
  In the second phase, this research reproduces the previous two sets of tests, as in the first phase, 
but after treating the UR variable as an endogenous factor using 2SLS estimation following 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001). The objective of this phase is to observe if, first, the EWL model 
explains the problem of underpricing in the global IPO market and, second, the endogenous 
underwriter-underpricing link exists globally. 
  In the third and final phase, this thesis advances the testing to extend the 2SLS estimation by 
capturing the one- and two-way clustering in standard errors following Cameron and Miller 
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(2015) and Isshaq and Faff (2016). This step makes it possible to observe if the existence of 
one-way or two-way clustering effects really influence the relationship between determinants of 
IPO underpricing in the global IPO market, specifically the endogenous reputable underwriter-
underpricing relationship.    
 
2.7.1. OLS Estimation 
For testing hypotheses related to the research questions, this chapter follows the standard testing 
method used in the empirical IPO literature including Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Boulton et al. 
(2010), Banerjee et al. (2011), and Boulton et al. (2017). It employs OLS estimation with 
unbalanced cross-sectional regression with the model having the following form as shown in 
Equation (1):  
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Where ijUP  refers to the dependent variable of IPO underpricing that is defined as the percentage 
return from the offer price to the closing price of an IPO firm on its first trading day following the 
calculation as shown in Equation (2): 
 
First-day Closing Pr ice  Offer Pr ice
Offer Price
ij ij
ij
ij
UP
 
   
 
                                                                     (2)       
                                                                                                   
Where the subscripts i and j indicate an IPO firm listed in a G20 country, 0ij  is the intercept of 
the model. Proxies of incentive of IPO issuers for firms listed in a G20 country include Participation 
Ratio (PR) and Dilution Factor (DF). The variable Underwriter Reputation (UR) is a proxy for 
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promotion cost. Ex-ante uncertainty includes Pre-IPO Stock Market Volatility (PMV), Log Elapsed 
Time (LET), and Log Offer Size (LOP). Country-level control variables include Developing-
country Status (DS), Year Effect (YE), Industry Effect (IE), and Country Effect (CE) dummies.  
 
For extended robustness testing, this thesis employa number of additional firm-level control 
variables including Book-Building Method (BBM), Technology Firms (TF), Private Firms (PF), 
Integer Offer Price (IOP), Underwriter Fees (UF), the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC 1997) 
and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 (GFC 2008). The author also utilises two additional 
country-level control variables as a part of the sensitivity testing for this chapter. These variables 
include Financial Market Sophistication (FMS) and Market Size (MS). Following Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001), this research assumes the error term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑗, follows the normal distribution with 
mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1. This thesis applies unbalanced cross-sectional regression 
because the distribution of IPO data is not balanced across sample countries, which is a common 
case in the cross-country IPO underpricing literature (Boulton et al. 2010; Engelen & van Essen 
2010; Autore et al. 2014; Boulton et al. 2017). 
 
2.7.2. Endogeneity Issues Within the OLS Model  
Endogeneity occurs due to the presence of significant correlations between the error term and one 
of the independent variables in the employed model (Maddala & Lahiri 2009). The presence of an 
endogenous variable may bias the results of a model leading to biased conclusions (Vella & 
Verbeek 1999). It is therefore imperative to test for the presence of endogeneity. Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) argue that although IPO issuers are financially hurt by underpricing they have 
the discretion to choose between the highest or least prestigious underwriters when large stakes of 
their firms are offered to the public. Thus, the decision to choose between them could be 
endogenously determined by the issuer, leading to biased OLS coefficients, which in turn generates 
erroneous conclusions. No account is taken of issuers’ incentives to reduce underpricing when they 
aim to sell more shares. Furthermore, by incurring promotion costs such as those of employing 
reputable underwriters to verify the quality of issuers, in order to reduce the ex-ante uncertainty of 
investors and then reduce underpricing, this leads to endogeneity. This is theoretically justified by 
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Hausman (1978) and empirically proven by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001). To account for any 
potential endogeneity in equation (1), this chapter follows Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) who 
propose employing a 2SLS13 procedure to correct for this endogeneity. Given the linear regression 
model mentioned above in Equation (1), subsequently, Equations (3) and (4) develop into the 
following two-step procedure as shown in:   
 
0
1 1
1
I
    l
U
     
r
   
t
  
o
 
nderwrite  Repu ati n Incentive of  IPO Issuers nstrumental Variables
 Uncertainty Country-lev                            el o   Cont r  
A B
ij a aij b bijij
a b
C
c cij d
c
Ex - ante
  
 
 

  
 
 

1
1
 Variables
Additional Firm-level Control                          
t
                         +
                                t              e 
l
 
a
 
r
 
V
+
a i b es
Additional Coun ry-lev l Con
D
dij
d
E
e eij
e
f






1
rol Variables
F
fij ij
f



           (3) 
 
In order to obtain the predicated values of Underwriter Reputationij , the aggregated endogenous 
variable from Equation (1), 
1
Underwriter Reputation
B
b bij
b


 is individually regressed on the following 
aggregated exogenous variables from Equation (1):  
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 .Then Underwriter Reputation ij , is the aggregated 
residuals from the above mentioned individual regressions. 
 
1
nstrumental VariableI s
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 refers to the employed instrument variables to correct for this 
endogeneity. The second step begins by inserting the predicated values of UR ,
                                                 
13 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is an alternative efficient estimation method to model endogeneity, 
especially when data exhibits heteroscedasticity or serial correlation in the error terms (Baum et al. 2007). The 
employed data is cross-sectional, therefore unlikely to exhibit auto-correlation. This thesis therefore selected a more 
parsimonious model, 2SLS, instead. The author controls the heteroscedasticity issue using the White heteroscedastic-
robust standard errors (Habib et al. 2001). 
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Underwriter Reputationij , which are derived from Equation (3) into Equation (1) to obtain Equation 
(4) as follows: 
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To examine if endogeneity is present, this research follows Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) to use 
Housman’s (1978) endogeneity test to examine the null hypothesis which asserts that the identified 
regressor (i.e., underwriter reputation) is indeed an exogenous variable. However, Sanderson and 
Windmeijer (2016) argue that to correct for this endogeneity, researchers need to employ a robust 
instrumental variable to avoid causing an equivalent bias that could eventuate from the use of a 
weak instrumental variable. Hausman (1978) defines a robust instrument as one that is sufficiently 
correlated with the identified endogenous variable 
1
Underwriter Reputation
B
b bij
b


 but must be 
uncorrelated with the ,iˆ j  in order to correct for the endogeneity problem.  
 
Problems associated with the use of a weak instrument have attracted the attention of many 
researchers. For exmaple, Staiger and Stock (1997), Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016), and Jakob 
and Nam (2017) discuss two common challenges resulting from employing a weak instrument for 
the 2SLS estimator. First, the author argues that a weak instrument leads to far-reaching biased and 
misleading results compared to the OLS estimator. Second, the authors argue that the estimated 
parameters of hypothesis tests produced by a weak instrument may suffer from large size 
distortions. 
 
 IPO underpricing literature demonstrates no unanimity about the best instrument to use. For 
instance, while Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Alavi et al. (2008) utilise earnings per share and 
return on assets, Chahine (2008) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) employ gross proceeds and 
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number of IPO firms, respectively. This research could not obtain sufficient data related to earnings 
per share and return on assets for the international data. Moreover, in un-tabulated results for the 
weak instrument test, this research finds that both gross proceeds and number of IPO firms are not 
suitable instruments for the UR variable. Alternatively, this thesis employs two instrumental 
variables, 
1
nstrumental VariableI s
B
b bij
b


 , which are defined as the ratio equalling to the average and 
median amount of proceeds of all underwritten IPOs for every underwriter for every country, 
divided by the average and median number of underwritten IPOs in that country, respectively, as 
shown in Equations (5) and (6);  
 
1
Average Amount of Proceeds of All Underwritten IPOs for Every Underwriter for Every Country
nstrumental Variables
Average Number of Underwritten IPOs for Every Underwriter for every Countr
I
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 
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Median Amount of Proceeds of All Underwritten IPOs for Every Underwriter for Every Country
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The rationale for employing these two instruments is that prestigious underwriters have a tendency 
to underwrite enormous numbers of IPOs and retain a dominant stake of the IPO market. This 
research anticipates that the regressor, 
1
Underwriter Reputation
B
b bij
b


 , is unlikely to have a strong 
correlation with the error term of the model. To protect against using a weak instrument that can 
lead to flawed inferences, this research employs a weak instrument test developed by Cragg and 
Donald (1993) following Boulton et al. (2017) and Jakob and Nam (2017). The null hypothesis of 
Cragg and Donald’s Weak Instrument Test is that the utilised instrument is weak. 
 
2.7.3. Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
To deal with the possibility of a clustering effect in the IPO data, this chapter follows Cameron and 
Miller (2015) to apply one-way and two-way cluster-robust standard errors. This procedure was 
developed and incorporated into Stata by Rogers (1994) and later extended by Cameron and Miller 
(2015) in Stata 15. Below are three models illustrating a comparison of standard errors obtained 
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using variance estimators in OLS or 2SLS, robust (un-clustered), and robust cluster standard errors 
estimators as shown in Equations (7), (8), and (9), respectively.  
 
                       
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
                                                                             (7)                                                
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where:    
1
*i i ijcluster x    
 
Where N refers to the number of obervations within every cluster, K  indicates the number of 
regressors, and n  indciates the number of clusters. X represents the matrix of predictors including 
the constant term and ix represents ith row vector of X and i denotes the error term for the ith 
observations. For one-way clustering the number of clusters is determined based on what this 
research are clustering. For example, when this research clusters by industries, then this research 
will have 33 industry clusters of which the observation within each cluster will be unbalanced. On 
the other hand, this research determines the number of clusters in the two-way clustering by using 
Stata to create an interaction term between two individual clusters to form a two-dimensional 
cluster following Cameron and Miller (2015). For example, when this research captures the two-
way clustering in error terms within years or industries in developing versus developed countries, 
respectively, then this research has two-way clusters, and so forth. For simplicity, Rogers (1994) 
omits the multipliers that are near to a value of 1 from Equations (8) and (9). The difference 
between Equations (8) and (9) is that in the robust cluster estimator’s model, Rogers (1994) adds a 
multiplication vector with the *i ix  substituted with their sums in each cluster. If the variability in 
a model of which the variance of the clustered estimator is high compared to the robust (un-
clustered) estimator, then this suggests the model has high variability in the cluster sums of *i ix  
rather than individual *i ix . Furthermore, it indicates the presence of a correlation within a cluster. 
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If the OLS or 2SLS model is unbiased, then the i of the model should not be correlated with ix
(Cameron & Miller 2015).  
 
2.8. Empirical Results 
This section comprises three subsections. The first subsection presents the summary statistics for 
firm-specific variables, IPO underpricing by year, and IPO underpricing by industry. It also 
includes mean and median equality test of unequal variance for firm-specific variables in the G20 
developed and developing IPO markets14. Also the variance inflation factors for firm-specific 
variables are provided. In the second subsection are the results and discussion of the OLS models, 
the results and discussion of the 2SLS models, results and discussion of the 2SLS models with one-
way clustered robust standard errors, and results and discussion of the 2SLS models with two-way 
clustered robust standard errors. In the third subsection, number of robustness checks are provided.  
 
2.8.1. Summary Statistics on the Nature of the Date  
2.8.1.1. Summary Statistics for Firm-specific Variables  
Table 4 summarises the range of descriptive statistics for firm-level variables. The table shows that 
the United States (Turkey) has the largest (smallest) number of IPOs in the sample with 3,211 IPOs 
(24 IPOs), followed by Japan, China, and Australia with 1,913, 1,533, and 1,138 IPOs (Denmark, 
Greece, and Mexico with 26, 28, and 28 IPOs), respectively. Across all the 10,217 G20 listed IPO 
firms, IPOs listed in developed countries are more than double the number of IPOs listed in 
developing countries where such IPO firms constitute approximately 30% of the entire sample. 
Figures related to the mean of IPO underpricing in Table 4 show that Saudi Arabia (Denmark) has 
the highest (lowest) mean value of UP equal to 213% (2%), followed by Japan and China (Germany 
and Mexico) with mean values of UP equal to 60% and 57% (2% and 3%), respectively.  
                                                 
14 This thesis tests for mean and median equality in order to explore whether differences between firm-specific 
variables are similar or dissimilar across the two blocks of countries. 
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Across the entire sample, the mean UP is 38% of which the mean of UP for IPOs listed in 
developing countries is higher by 19% than the mean of UP for developed IPOs. By observing the 
median underpricing value across the entire sample, Saudi Arabia (France) maintains the highest 
(lowest) median value of UP equal to 77% (0%). It is followed by China, Japan, and South Korea 
(Italy, Mexico, and Brazil) with median values of UP equal to 44%, 22%, and 21% (0.1% equally), 
respectively. Throughout the G20 listed IPOs, the median UP is 14%, of which the median of UP 
for developed countries’ IPOs is 22% lower than the median of UP for developing countries. The 
lowest (highest) recorded UP is observed in Italy and the United Kingdom (India and South Korea) 
with UP of -89% and -88% (1680% and 1600%), respectively. Saudi Arabia (Mexico) records the 
highest (lowest) dispersion from the mean of UP, equal to 309% (0.5%), followed by India, Italy, 
Poland, and Japan (Turkey, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, France, and Brazil), equal to 127%, 
115%, 113%, and 104% (8%, 14%, 24%, and 25%), respectively. The table also shows that 
standard deviation. for the entire sample is equal to 84%, of which the dispersion from the mean 
of UP for developing countries is 30% larger than for developed countries. 
 
According to Table 4, across all listed IPO firms in the G20 countries, the mean PR is 4% while 
mean DF is 24%. IPO issuers in developed G20 countries, on average, tend to sell 4% of their 
existing shares and create 27% in new shares. In contrast, G20 developing market IPO issuers 
prefer to sell 3% of PR and create 17% primary shares when they go public. On average, across all 
G20 countries, issuers in Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States tend to sell the 
most PR with 12%, 8%, 65, and 5%, respectively, while issuers in the United States, Turkey, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom tend to create more DF with 42%, 26%, 25%, and 24%, 
respectively, when they go public. Across the entire sample, Saudi Arabian, Japanese, and Brazilian 
IPO issuers tend to employ reputable underwriters when they go public as 73%, 64%, and 61% of 
their underwritten IPOs are managed by reputable underwriters. On average, 31% of IPOs listed in 
the G20 countries employ reputable underwriters, with IPO issuers in developed countries tending 
to rely less on reputable underwriters when they go public as compared to IPO issuers in developing 
countries. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Firm-specific Variables of the G20 Countries 
  UP PR DF UR PMV LET LOP 
Total Sample                  
(Count: 10217) 
Mean 0.38 0.04 0.24 0.31 0.02 92 89 
Median 0.14 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.01 48 24 
Minimum -0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Maximum 16.80 0.90 2.30 1.00 0.10 3742 16007 
Standard Deviation 0.84 0.09 0.18 0.46 0.01 143 340 
Developed Countries 
(Count: 7192) 
Mean 0.32 0.04 0.27 0.30 0.02 75 88 
Median 0.10 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.01 47 22 
Minimum -0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Maximum 13.50 0.90 2.30 1.00 0.09 1627 16007 
Standard Deviation 0.74 0.10 0.20 0.46 0.01 93 361 
Developing Countries 
(Count: 3025) 
Mean 0.51 0.03 0.17 0.33 0.02 130 92 
Median 0.32 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.02 49 29 
Minimum -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Maximum 16.80 0.73 0.53 1.00 0.10 3742 7988 
Standard Deviation 1.04 0.05 0.07 0.47 0.01 216 286 
Australia 
(Count: 1138) 
Mean 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.01 60 31 
Median 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 44 5 
Minimum -0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 6.50 0.21 0.09 1.00 0.05 928 2000 
Standard Deviation 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.01 65 122 
Brazil                              
(Count: 88) 
Mean 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.61 0.02 72 380 
Median 0.01 0.00 0.09 1.00 0.02 25 294 
Minimum -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 3 12 
Maximum 2.05 0.10 0.10 1.00 0.03 1208 3589 
Standard Deviation 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.49 0.01 160 446 
Canada 
(Count: 193) 
Mean 0.21 0.02 0.10 0.47 0.01 98 46 
Median 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01 64 5 
Minimum -0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 5.72 0.13 0.13 1.00 0.05 1098 1097 
Standard Deviation 0.63 0.03 0.03 0.50 0.01 116 118 
China Mean 0.57 0.03 0.13 0.32 0.02 156 91 
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(Count: 1533) Median 0.44 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.02 65 44 
Minimum -0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7 1 
Maximum 8.64 0.19 0.19 1.00 0.08 1703 3671 
Standard Deviation 0.73 0.04 0.04 0.47 0.01 218 229 
Denmark                          
(Count: 26) 
Mean 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.35 0.01 29 238 
Median 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.01 24 65 
Minimum -0.65 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 5 0 
Maximum 0.50 0.15 0.19 1.00 0.02 130 1849 
Standard Deviation 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.49 0.00 25 469 
France                               
(Count: 95) 
Mean 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.01 41 69 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.01 16 10 
Minimum -0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 1.90 0.19 0.19 1.00 0.06 1530 1216 
Standard Deviation 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.01 161 228 
Germany                        
(Count:35) 
Mean 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.37 0.01 65 229 
Median 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.01 18 58 
Minimum -0.38 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 3 2 
Maximum 0.39 0.13 0.19 1.00 0.04 692 1767 
Standard Deviation 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.49 0.01 142 437 
Greece                         
(Count:28) 
Mean 0.16 0.02 0.18 0.11 0.02 49 15 
Median 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.02 38 7 
Minimum -0.35 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0 2 
Maximum 1.94 0.18 0.32 1.00 0.04 203 174 
Standard Deviation 0.49 0.05 0.08 0.31 0.01 39 33 
India                                  
(Count: 363) 
Mean 0.29 0.02 0.18 0.24 0.02 168 59 
Median 0.06 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.01 67 13 
Minimum -0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 16.80 0.20 0.20 1.00 0.07 1597 3483 
Standard Deviation 1.27 0.05 0.05 0.43 0.01 230 218 
Indonesia                           
(Count: 103) 
Mean 0.34 0.01 0.19 0.28 0.02 121 90 
Median 0.15 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.02 83 27 
Minimum -0.18 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 3 1 
Maximum 6.30 0.13 0.20 1.00 0.10 893 1323 
Standard Deviation 0.72 0.03 0.03 0.45 0.01 149 179 
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Italy                                 
(Count: 63) 
Mean 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.02 68 151 
Median 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.02 22 34 
Minimum -0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0 1 
Maximum 8.84 0.83 2.30 1.00 0.06 1109 2374 
Standard Deviation 1.15 0.16 0.33 0.46 0.01 151 350 
Japan                              
(Count: 1913) 
Mean 0.60 0.03 0.20 0.64 0.02 33 44 
Median 0.22 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.02 33 11 
Minimum -0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 12.00 0.25 0.25 1.00 0.09 196 6355 
Standard Deviation 1.04 0.05 0.06 0.48 0.01 6 238 
Mexico                             
(Count: 28) 
Mean 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.39 0.01 82 159 
Median 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.01 23 112 
Minimum -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 6 
Maximum 0.17 0.25 0.25 1.00 0.04 997 541 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.50 0.01 201 140 
Poland                              
(Count:64) 
Mean 0.35 0.03 0.23 0.05 0.02 71 46 
Median 0.09 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.01 21 13 
Minimum -0.52 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 3 1 
Maximum 7.86 0.15 0.26 1.00 0.07 2140 1281 
Standard Deviation 1.13 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.01 268 162 
Russia                              
(Count: 31) 
Mean 0.56 0.08 0.10 0.61 0.02 295 464 
Median 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 18 100 
Minimum -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0 0 
Maximum 2.89 0.33 0.53 1.00 0.04 3742 7988 
Standard Deviation 0.92 0.11 0.14 0.50 0.01 805 1426 
Saudi Arabia                      
(Count: 102) 
Mean 2.13 0.03 0.23 0.73 0.02 113 263 
Median 0.77 0.00 0.26 1.00 0.01 49 87 
Minimum -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 7 
Maximum 14.00 0.26 0.26 1.00 0.08 1114 3600 
Standard Deviation 3.09 0.06 0.06 0.45 0.01 223 519 
South Africa                         
(Count: 29) 
Mean 0.17 0.04 0.22 0.41 0.01 50 89 
Median 0.06 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.01 22 48 
Minimum -0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 3 1 
Maximum 1.18 0.26 0.26 1.00 0.03 401 616 
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Standard Deviation 0.36 0.07 0.07 0.50 0.01 91 130 
South Korea                      
(Count: 689) 
Mean 0.37 0.04 0.23 0.33 0.02 60 35 
Median 0.21 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.01 43 10 
Minimum -0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 1 
Maximum 16.00 0.73 0.29 1.00 0.10 1341 2835 
Standard Deviation 0.77 0.07 0.07 0.47 0.01 100 175 
Sweden                             
(Count: 57) 
Mean 0.06 0.04 0.25 0.42 0.01 27 101 
Median 0.03 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.01 14 51 
Minimum -0.77 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 1.33 0.18 0.29 1.00 0.06 183 681 
Standard Deviation 0.28 0.06 0.06 0.50 0.01 30 134 
Turkey                             
(Count: 24) 
Mean 0.06 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.02 224 27 
Median 0.04 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.01 191 5 
Minimum -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 11 2 
Maximum 0.22 0.22 0.29 1.00 0.04 727 229 
Standard Deviation 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.01 186 56 
United Kingdom                    Mean 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.01 38 134 
(Count: 404) Median 0.09 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.01 20 19 
Minimum -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 10.67 0.31 0.31 1.00 0.04 1091 3294 
 Standard Deviation 0.87 0.10 0.10 0.34 0.01 80 326 
United States                                
(Count: 3211) 
Mean 0.24 0.05 0.42 0.19 0.02 113 128 
Median 0.10 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.01 83 53 
Minimum -0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0 
Maximum 13.50 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.09 1627 16007 
Standard Deviation 0.52 0.13 0.19 0.39 0.01 109 475 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3.
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The PMV, pre-IPO stock market volatility, is measured by the standard deviation from a local stock 
market for a specific IPO firm 15 days before listing. On average, the PMV for the entire sample 
of the G20 countries is 2%, whereas the maximum recorded PMV of 10% is seen in both South 
Korea and Indonesia. This is followed by Japan and the United States, with PMV values of 9%, 
followed by Saudi Arabia, and China, with PMV values of 8%. Looking at the median values of 
PMV of 2% and 1% for developing and developed stock markets, respectively, it appears that 
developing stock markets seem to experience double the volatility than what has been observed in 
developed stock markets when an IPO firm goes public. Table 4 also presents the LET variable 
that measures the length of time between the setting of the offering price and the first trading date. 
On average, across the G20 countries, Sweden has the lowest LET because it takes only 27 days 
for an IPO firm to be listed when the offer price is set, while Russian IPOs require the longest LET 
since for a Russian IPO to be listed, it takes almost 295 days. The mean LET for the G20 countries’ 
IPOs is 92 days in which IPO firms listed in developing countries require 38 days above the mean, 
while IPO firms listed in developed countries require 17 days below the mean of LET across the 
entire G20 sample.  
 
LOP measures the IPO proceeds for every G20 IPO denominated in United States dollars. Within 
the G20 countries, IPOs issued in Brazil (Australia), on a median perspective, raise the largest 
(smallest) total amount of proceeds, equal to approximately $294 ($5) million, followed by Mexico, 
Russia, and Saudi Arabia (Canada, Turkey, and Greece), with total amounts of LOP equal to $112, 
$100, and $87 ($5, $5, and $7) million, respectively. Across the entire G20 sample, average LOP 
is $89 million, of which LOP for developing countries is roughly 4% higher than the average LOP 
for developed countries.  
 
In summary, Table 4 provides preliminary statistical evidence that the G20 countries do not share 
similar firm and market characteristics. This dissimilarity becomes notable when comparing firm 
and market characteristics in developing and developed G20 countries. For example, although 
differences in the mean and median results of UP clearly indicate that underpricing in developing 
IPO markets is far higher than developed markets, this argument is not mutually inclusive to 
developing countries, since UP for Brazil and Turkey is relatively lower than the UP in Australia, 
Japan, United Kingdom, and United States IPO firms. This implies that UP is heterogeneous across 
the G20 countries and its heterogeneity is observed within developed and developing IPO markets. 
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Moreover, the overall statistical evidence indicates the presence of early support for two out of the 
three sub-research hypotheses, conveying the idea that underpricing is higher in developing G20 
countries because IPO issuers in those countries tend to sell and create less PR and DF. The extent 
of ex-ante uncertainty for IPO firms located in developing G20 countries as measured by PMV, 
LET, and LOP is higher compared to developed G20 IPO markets. Early support for the second 
research hypothesis seems to be absent because developing IPO issuers employ more reputable 
underwriters to provide a certification signal about the quality of their underwritten IPO firms. 
 
2.8.1.2. Summary Statistics for IPO Underpricing by Year 
Table 5 provides year-by-year analysis for the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation related to IPO underpricing, and the number of IPOs listed in the G20 countries in the 
sample period covering the years 1995 to 2016. The highest (lowest) mean of IPO underpricing 
occurred in 1999 (2016), with 71% (13%) of IPOs underpriced, followed by 2007 (1997), with 
average IPO underpricing of 57% (14%). IPO issuers issued the highest (lowest) percentage of 
primary shares to outstanding shares in 2013 (1997), with the mean percentage dilution factor ratio 
that year being 40.8% (12.3%), followed by 1999 and 2006 (2000 and 2001), with average 
percentage of dilution factors of 38.4% and 36.5% (16.2% and 18.2%), respectively. Owners of 
IPO firms sold the largest (lowest) proportion of secondary shares in 2006 (1999), with the mean 
participation ratio equal to 26.1% (0.3%) that year, followed by 1997 and 2005 (2001 and 1996), 
with mean participation ratios equal to 12% and 11.1% (0.6% and 0.7%), respectively.  
 
The largest recorded underpricing is witnessed in developing IPO markets in 2003 with 1680%, 
while the lowest documented underpricing recorded in developed IPO markets was in 1998 – at 
89%. In the year 2007 (2016) the largest (lowest) number of IPOs occurred, with 979 (7) IPOs 
occurring, followed by 2006 and 2005 (2001 and 1998), with the number of IPOs issued equal to 
779 and 629 (193 and 231), respectively.  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics of IPO Underpricing by Year in the G20 Countries 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation  Number of Observations 
Year All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS 
1995 0.27 0.26 0.40 0.13 0.13 0.11 -0.77 -0.77 -0.57 13.50 13.50 3.50 0.74 0.73 1.03 462 444 18 
1996 0.18 0.18 -0.06 0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.80 -0.77 -0.80 2.18 2.18 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.37 654 645 9 
1997 0.14 0.14 0.51 0.07 0.07 0.51 -0.86 -0.86 0.51 3.70 3.70 0.51 0.30 0.30 0 418 417 1 
1998 0.27 0.26 0.88 0.09 0.09 0.88 -0.89 -0.89 0.88 6.08 6.08 0.88 0.68 0.68 0 231 230 1 
1999 0.71 0.71 0 0.36 0.36 0 -0.32 -0.32 0 8.09 8.09 0 1.00 1.00 0 364 364 0 
2000 0.34 0.34 0 0.10 0.10 0 -0.64 -0.64 0 4.40 4.40 0 0.66 0.66 0 301 301 0 
2001 0.41 0.37 1.16 0.17 0.16 1.00 -0.77 -0.77 -0.16 6.30 6.04 6.30 0.89 0.79 1.99 193 184 9 
2002 0.31 0.27 1.48 0.07 0.06 1.19 -0.46 -0.40 -0.46 10.67 10.67 4.31 0.92 0.87 1.45 252 243 9 
2003 0.42 0.33 2.17 0.15 0.14 1.12 -0.59 -0.59 -0.10 16.80 2.97 16.80 1.18 0.58 4.64 259 247 12 
2004 0.50 0.48 0.55 0.21 0.17 0.39 -0.57 -0.36 -0.57 5.94 5.94 5.60 0.79 0.81 0.70 592 454 138 
2005 0.56 0.53 0.64 0.17 0.13 0.44 -0.68 -0.68 -0.24 14.00 8.84 14.00 1.15 1.10 1.35 629 492 137 
2006 0.44 0.36 0.66 0.15 0.11 0.41 -0.88 -0.88 -0.71 13.50 8.64 13.50 0.96 0.81 1.26 779 572 207 
2007 0.57 0.30 1.04 0.16 0.10 0.48 -0.88 -0.61 -0.88 12.00 12.00 11.05 1.21 0.73 1.66 979 620 359 
2008 0.40 0.14 0.62 0.12 0.00 0.31 -0.67 -0.60 -0.67 6.80 6.50 6.80 0.87 0.66 0.96 369 172 197 
2009 0.49 0.20 0.64 0.31 0.05 0.43 -0.64 -0.64 -0.29 6.70 2.18 6.70 0.78 0.42 0.87 278 94 184 
2010 0.31 0.08 0.41 0.15 0.02 0.26 -0.77 -0.50 -0.77 16.00 1.25 16.00 0.85 0.25 0.99 724 217 507 
2011 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.03 0.13 -0.73 -0.56 -0.73 5.72 5.72 1.99 0.40 0.46 0.35 666 249 417 
2012 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.09 0.07 0.13 -0.40 -0.40 -0.26 10.06 10.06 8.64 0.73 0.77 0.68 450 233 217 
2013 0.32 0.35 0.22 0.12 0.13 0.07 -0.87 -0.50 -0.87 4.72 4.72 2.00 0.64 0.68 0.41 364 291 73 
2014 0.34 0.31 0.42 0.15 0.07 0.44 -0.60 -0.60 -0.50 10.37 5.88 10.37 0.74 0.74 0.75 603 404 199 
2015 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.38 0.13 0.44 -0.68 -0.68 -0.23 5.13 5.13 1.60 0.57 0.78 0.25 643 318 325 
2016 0.13 -0.10 0.17 0.09 -0.10 0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 0.44 -0.10 0.44 0.21 0 0.20 7 1 6 
Total 0.38 0.32 0.51 0.14 0.10 0.32 -0.89 -0.89 -0.88 16.80 13.50 16.80 0.84 0.74 1.04 10217 7192 3025 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3.
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In sum, the change in UP across the period of study from January 1995 to December 2016 reveals 
that time could play an influencing factor. It could help in explaining the underpricing difference 
across the G20 countries, specifically between developed and developing G20 IPO markets. A 
similar observation has been noted by Loughran and Ritter (2004), Boulton et al. (2010), and 
Engelen and van Essen (2010). Across the 22-year window that this study employs, UP seems to 
peak around the global financial crisis for G20 IPO markets. However, across this timeframe, the 
high level of UP seems to be persistent for developing IPO firms as IPO underpricing is higher in 
19 out of the 22 yearly-occasions in developing countries compared to developed market IPOs. 
Consequently, this finding clearly indicates that it is necessary to control for the year effect. 
 
2.8.1.3. Summary Statistics for IPO Underpricing by Industry 
Table 6 presents summary statistics including mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard 
deviation, and the number of IPOs listed for IPO underpricing by industry grouping for the G20 
countries from 1995 to 2016. Table 6 above shows that across the G20 market IPOs with the highest 
mean of IPO underpricing occurred in other utility industries, with underpricing being at 342%, 
followed by the regional agency and insurance industries, with average IPO underpricing equal to 
163% and 109%, respectively. The IPO firms listed in developing markets and operating in other 
utility industries experienced the highest underpricing, with average underpricing of 579%, 
followed by the regional agency and insurance industries, with average underpricing of 454% and 
334%, respectively. On the other hand, the table does demonstrate that IPO companies traded in 
developed stock markets and categorized under pers/bus/rep svc industry suffer the largest 
underpricing, equal to 54%, followed by the real estate and investment bank industries, with 
average underpricing equal to 47% and 37%, respectively.  
 
Across the G20 countries, the largest recorded number of IPO listings occurred in the 
manufacturing, the pers/bus/rep svc, and natural resources industries, with 3,815, 2,176, and 932 
listed IPOs from 1995 to 2016, respectively. Across the 33 IPO industries displayed in Table 6, UP 
indeed tends to be high in some industries, for instance agriculture, insurance, other utilities, and 
pers/bus/rep svc in the G20 IPO markets. 
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 Table 6: Summary Statistics of IPO Underpricing by Industry in the G20 Countries 
 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation  Number of Observations 
Industry All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS All DVS DS 
Agriculture 0.50 0.21 0.68 0.25 0.06 0.44 -0.14 -0.10 -0.14 2.33 2.03 2.33 0.63 0.47 0.65 73 28 45 
Co-generation -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.23 -0.23 -0.05 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.02 13 9 4 
Commercial Bank 0.29 0.09 0.76 0.07 0.06 0.13 -0.88 -0.54 -0.88 14.00 1.49 14.00 1.34 0.20 2.40 119 84 35 
Construction 0.33 0.26 0.44 0.13 0.10 0.28 -0.46 -0.34 -0.46 6.63 6.63 3.40 0.74 0.79 0.63 182 111 71 
Credit Inst. 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 -0.50 -0.34 -0.50 1.21 1.21 0.57 0.23 0.23 0.22 93 75 18 
Electric Service 0.38 0.19 0.64 0.11 0.05 0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.21 7.86 2.17 7.86 1.06 0.46 1.51 65 37 28 
Fedl Credit Agcy -0.03 0 -0.03 -0.03 0 -0.03 -0.03 0 -0.03 -0.03 0 -0.03 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Gas Distribution 0.23 0.17 0.39 0.16 0.09 0.43 -0.01 -0.01 0.18 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.21 0.20 0.15 16 12 4 
Healthcare 0.29 0.28 0.46 0.13 0.11 0.35 -0.39 -0.39 -0.17 4.26 4.26 2.00 0.56 0.56 0.54 151 136 15 
Insurance 1.09 0.20 3.34 0.14 0.09 2.67 -0.23 -0.23 -0.17 11.05 3.03 11.05 2.36 0.44 3.49 144 103 41 
Investment Bank 0.32 0.37 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.04 -0.77 -0.77 -0.69 3.43 3.43 2.28 0.60 0.65 0.44 194 138 56 
Leisure 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.13 0.10 0.27 -0.77 -0.77 -0.43 3.58 3.58 1.48 0.55 0.58 0.39 132 106 26 
Manufacturing 0.35 0.23 0.48 0.16 0.08 0.35 -0.86 -0.86 -0.80 13.50 12.00 13.50 0.69 0.57 0.79 3815 1955 1860 
Mortgage Bank 0.21 0.21 0 0.10 0.10 0 -0.15 -0.15 0 1.64 1.64 0 0.40 0.40 0 27 27 0 
Mtg Securities 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.08 0.33 -0.02 -0.02 0.33 0.43 0.43 0.33 0.15 0.14 0 9 8 1 
National Agency 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Natural Resource 0.22 0.19 0.59 0.07 0.06 0.38 -0.61 -0.61 -0.39 10.67 10.67 4.28 0.63 0.60 0.81 932 874 58 
Oil/Gas Pipeline 0.14 0.09 1.00 0.09 0.08 1.00 -0.05 -0.05 0.51 1.49 0.33 1.49 0.27 0.10 0.69 34 32 2 
Other Finance 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.88 -0.88 -0.73 3.50 3.50 1.00 0.45 0.47 0.33 201 176 25 
Other Services 0.31 0.28 0.44 0.13 0.13 0.22 -0.50 -0.50 -0.13 2.23 1.87 2.23 0.49 0.45 0.67 100 84 16 
Other Utility 3.42 -0.12 5.79 0.07 -0.12 1.29 -0.13 -0.13 0.07 16.00 -0.12 16.00 7.06 0.00 8.87 5 2 3 
Pers/Bus/Rep Svc 0.52 0.54 0.40 0.20 0.19 0.30 -0.89 -0.89 -0.87 13.50 13.50 6.91 0.98 1.02 0.65 2176 1861 315 
Radio/TV/Telecom 0.31 0.23 0.46 0.11 0.07 0.25 -0.41 -0.37 -0.41 5.60 3.13 5.60 0.70 0.54 0.93 155 104 51 
Real Estate 0.45 0.47 0.38 0.10 0.14 0.06 -0.35 -0.35 -0.24 6.30 5.72 6.30 0.89 0.86 0.97 239 176 63 
Regional Agency 1.63 0.17 4.54 0.28 0.09 4.54 -0.20 -0.20 0.44 8.64 0.70 8.64 3.45 0.38 5.80 6 4 2 
Restaurant/Hotel 0.31 0.30 0.46 0.13 0.11 0.23 -0.52 -0.52 -0.08 4.44 4.44 2.71 0.55 0.53 0.70 210 189 21 
Retail 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.12 0.11 0.28 -0.35 -0.35 -0.23 4.00 4.00 2.33 0.60 0.62 0.43 416 362 54 
S&L/Thrift 0.06 0.06 0 0.02 0.02 0 -0.08 -0.08 0 0.23 0.23 0 0.10 0.10 0 10 10 0 
Sanitation 0.19 0.11 0.36 0.10 0.08 0.44 -0.28 -0.28 -0.25 1.20 0.67 1.20 0.29 0.19 0.39 35 24 11 
Telephone Comm. 0.33 0.30 0.40 0.18 0.16 0.26 -0.50 -0.50 -0.09 2.20 2.20 1.40 0.42 0.43 0.41 73 53 20 
Transportation 0.29 0.20 0.40 0.11 0.08 0.27 -0.34 -0.34 -0.24 8.84 8.84 3.81 0.76 0.82 0.66 223 128 95 
Water Supply 0.31 0.09 0.49 0.30 0.01 0.44 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.89 0.39 0.89 0.33 0.20 0.32 9 4 5 
Wholesale 0.34 0.26 0.62 0.12 0.09 0.33 -0.65 -0.65 -0.37 16.80 4.16 16.80 1.04 0.54 1.94 358 279 79 
Total 0.38 0.32 0.51 0.14 0.10 0.32 -0.89 -0.89 -0.88 16.80 13.50 16.80 0.84 0.74 1.04 10217 7192 3025 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3.
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The variation in UP between different IPO industries illustrates that some specific industries could 
play an important role in elucidating differences in underpricing across the G20 countries, 
particularly between developed and developing G20 IPO markets. For developing stock markets, 
the IPO industry concentration is seen in the manufacturing, pers/bus/rep svc, and transportation 
industries with total IPOs equal to 1,860, 315, and 95, respectively, during the study period. 
Similarly, IPOs listed in developed stock markets tend to concentrate the most in the 
manufacturing, pers/bus/rep svc, and natural resources industries, with total listings of 1,955, 1861, 
and 874, respectively, from 1995 to 2016. However, when comparing if these industries exhibit 
similarity in UP across developing and developed G20 IPO countries, then heterogeneity arises. 
For example, while UP in the insurance sector in developing countries is equal to 334%, it is very 
low in developed markets at only 20%. 
 
However, the other observation to carry forward is that UP is also persistent in developing G20 
market IPO industries since UP is high in 27 industries, which is comparable to only 6 industries 
in developed IPO markets. Loughran and Ritter (2004), Boulton et al. (2010), and Engelen and van 
Essen (2010) argue that controlling for industry effects when examining underpricing in IPO 
markets is an imperative procedure. This is because some industries have particular uncertainty 
characteristics that require investors to demand larger premiums, leading to higher underpricing. 
This finding indicates the importance of controlling for industry effect. 
 
2.8.1.4. Mean and Median Equality Test of Unequal Variance for Firm-
specific Variables in the G20 Developed and Developing 
Countries 
Table 7 displays the results for both the mean and median equality tests of unequal15 variances 
between the developing and developed G20 countries. The objective being to explore whether 
differences between firm-specific variables are similar or dissimilar across the two categories. The 
previous descriptive statistics subsections provide an indication that firm-specific variables could 
have a dissimilar impact on developed and developing IPO markets. In other words, the existence 
                                                 
15 This thesis performed a variance ratio equality test to examine the equality of variance of IPO underpricing between 
developed and developing IPO markets in which the research rejected the null hypothesis of equal variance at 1% of 
significance. Thus, the author employs the mean and median equality test of unequal variance.  
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of such dissimilarity could suggest the presence of different market environments between 
developed and developing countries, as summarised by Kayo and Kimura (2011), Autore et al. 
(2014), and Jamaani and Roca (2015). If indeed there is a difference in terms of the divergent effect 
of firm-specific variables across developed and developing G20 market IPOs, then it would be 
necessary to control for this effect. 
 
The presence of such differences without the supporting statistical testing would be a redundant 
pursuit. Inspecting the results of the mean values in Table 7 of UP, PR, DF, UR, PMV, and LET 
across developed and developing G20 countries, it emerges that developed and developing IPO 
markets are entirely different in all aspects, with the exception of LOP. For example, the mean 
difference in UP, PR, DF, UR, PMV, LET, and LOP indicates that in developing G20 countries 
underpricing is higher by 19% as IPO issuers: firstly, sell and create less secondary and primary 
shares by 1% and 10%, respectively; secondly, go public with reputable underwriters by 3% more; 
thirdly, experience higher pre-IPO stock market volatility by 0.04% more; fourthly, have longer 
time elapse between the time of offer price and the first trading day by 54 days; and fifthly, their 
IPOs have a much larger offering by almost $3.7 million compared to developed IPO issuers. 
 
Table 7: Mean and Median Equality Test of Unequal Variance of Firm-specific Variables across Developed and 
Developing G20 Countries 
Variables 
Mean 
Mean   
Difference 
T-test Median 
Median 
Difference 
Wilcoxon-
test 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed – 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed -  
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed – 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed– 
Developing 
Countries 
UP 0.32 0.51 -0.19 -9.09*** 0.10 0.32 -0.22 -17.63*** 
PR 0.04 0.03 0.01 4.64*** 0 0 0 -8.11*** 
DF 0.27 0.17 0.10 39.38*** 0.24 0.16 0.07 25.84*** 
UR 0.3 0.33 -0.03 -2.85*** 0 0 0 -2.88*** 
PMV 0.015 0.019 -0.004 -17.29*** 0.012 0.016 -0.004 -18.86*** 
LET 75.41 129.76 -54.35 -13.33*** 47 49 -2 -2.63*** 
LOP 87.99 91.72 -3.73 -0.5547 22.1 29 -6.9 -7.07*** 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. T-statistics and Wilcoxon-test’s Z-statistics equal *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for two-tail. 
 
All these results are significant at the 1% level, with the exception of LOP because the difference 
in the mean of offer proceeds between developed and developing G20 IPO markets is not 
significant. Consistently, when looking at the results for the median equality test of firm-level 
variables across developing and developed G20 market IPOs, the difference between the two broad 
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markets persists across all variables, including the LOP at the 1% level of significance. It is, 
consequently, imperative to control for this difference by including a new variable that accounts 
for IPOs listed in the G20 developing versus developed IPO markets.  
 
2.8.1.5. Variance Inflation Factors for Firm- and Country-specific, and 
Control Variables 
The presence of high correlations amongst independent variables can violate the OLS assumption 
of independence leading to a multicollinearity problem (Belsley et al. 2005). To detect the absence 
of this type of problem that could arise from the existence of collinear relationships amongst 
independent variables, Table 8 presents the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of the firm-level, 
country-level, additional firm-level, additional country-level, and dummy effects control variables. 
Liu et al. (2011) argue that a multicollinearity problem exists when the value of VIF exceeds a 
threshold value of 5. The table above shows that amongst all of the employed main and controlling 
covariates, the VIF values are largely lower than a value of 5. This implies that any concern about 
the presence of multicollinearity in the data is largely marginal. 
 
Table 8: Variance Inflation Factors of Variables in the G20 Countries 
Variables                                                       VIF 
                         Model 1 
                            Firm-level variables 
PR 1.67 
DF 3.47 
UR 1.12 
PMV 1.15 
LET 1.31 
LOP 1.40 
                           Country-level variable 
DS 2.22 
                                     Additional firm-level variables 
BBM 1.17 
TF 1.10 
PF 1.08 
IOP 1.39 
UF 1.07 
AFC 1997 1.11 
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GFC 2008 1.14 
                                          Additional country-level variables  
FMS  1.83 
MS   2.73 
                        Dummy Effects 
IE   1.06 
YE  1.58 
CE  3.75 
Mean VIF 1.71 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. 
 
2.8.2. Results and Discussion 
2.8.2.1. Results and Discussion of the OLS Models  
Table 9 presents the empirical results of ten OLS models using robust standard errors estimation 
to adjust for heteroscedasticity. The models differ in the gradual inclusion of year, industry, 
country, and developing status dummies. To accept H1, both PR and DF ought to provide 
negatively significant coefficients, thereby confirming the negative effect of the incentive of IPO 
issuers on underpricing in the G20 countries. The results of PR and DF are -0.6% and -0.7%, 
respectively, in Model 1 and they confirm the negative effect of PR and DF on IPO underpricing 
in the G20 countries at the 1% level of significance. This outcome suggests that the higher the 
proportion of secondary shares sold and primary shares created to pre-IPO outstanding shares, the 
lower the underpricing in the G20 countries. Thus, H1 is accepted and confirms the negative effect 
of the incentive of IPO issuers in explaining underpricing in the G20 countries, hence supports the 
first sub-research question. This supporting result for H1 is consistent with several empirical 
studies, including Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2003), Kennedy et al. 
(2006), Chahine (2008), Goergen et al. (2009), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010).  
 
To provide support for H2, UR should present a significantly negative coefficient in order to 
support the proposition that the use of reputable underwriters by IPO firms can reduce the ex-ante 
uncertainty about the firm’s value, providing a certification signal to investors and, in turn, 
mitigating underpricing. The result of UR in Model 1 in Table 9 provides a significant coefficient 
but with the opposite prediction sign of H2 at the 1% level of significance.  
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Table 9: OLS Results for IPO Underpricing in the G20 Countries 
Robust Standard Errors Estimation to Adjust for Heteroscedasticity   
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 [-8.81] [-8.81] [-8.85] [-8.98] [-8.92] [-7.40] [-7.87] [-7.38] [-8.93] [-8.87] 
DF -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 [-20.5] [-18.0] [-20.7] [-12.4] [-12.2] [-14.9] [-15.5] [-14.8] [-12.1] [-12.0] 
UR 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
 [4.47] [4.50] [4.37] [4.70] [4.64] [4.52] [4.59] [4.40] [4.81] [4.74] 
PMV 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 [7.35] [7.30] [7.33] [8.03] [8.04] [6.11] [5.70] [5.99] [6.39] [6.06] 
LET -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.020** -0.020** -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.025*** 
 [-3.28] [-2.69] [-3.22] [-2.15] [-2.13] [-4.12] [-3.17] [-4.06] [-3.22] [-2.66] 
LOP -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.030*** 
 [-3.61] [-3.25] [-3.53] [-4.25] [-4.19] [-4.44] [-3.96] [-4.33] [-5.51] [-5.10] 
Country-level variable 
DS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 
      [5.32] [6.01] [5.72] [7.48] [7.82] 
Dummy Effects  YE IE CE YE & IE & CE  YE IE CE YE & IE & CE 
Constant 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.83*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.88*** 0.93*** 0.89*** 
 [8.90] [8.97] [8.64] [8.40] [8.50] [9.50] [9.80] [8.94] [9.19] [9.10] 
Observations 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.0616 
P-value of F-statistic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail. 
                                                 
16 It may seem that adjusted R2 is too low, however, this is common in similar studies. For example, adjusted R2 values reported by Loughran and Ritter (2004) (0.05; 
Table VII; Model 2), Lowry et al. (2010) (0.03; Table V; Model c), Boulton et al. (2011) (0.07; Table 5; Model 2), Shi et al. (2013) (0.05; Table 6; Model 1), Leitterstorf 
and Rau (2014) (0.06; Table 2; Model 1), and Chang et al. (2017) (0.03; Table 4; Model 5). 
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This significantly positive coefficient indicates that when IPO issuers employ a reputable 
underwriter, then the underpricing of their firms should be higher by almost 9%. This result is 
consistent with the empirical evidence reported in Boulton et al. (2010), Banerjee et al. (2011), 
Autore et al. (2014), and Boulton et al. (2017). They assert that the employment of reputable 
underwriters increases underpricing. The authors explain this relationship by arguing that issuers 
accept higher underpricing to compensate for the high post-IPO coverage service provided by 
highly ranked analysts who are employed by prestigious underwriters. 
 
To accept the proposition of H3, i.e. there is a positive relationship between ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding the offering and underpricing, PMV should provide a positive significant coefficient, 
while Model 1 in Table 9 should present significantly negative coefficients for LET and LOP. 
Model 1 shows that the first proxy of ex-ante uncertainty, PMV, provides a positive significant 
coefficient of 5.70% at the 1% level of significance. This result means that prior to the listing of 
an IPO firm in the G20 countries from 1995 to 2016, IPO firms suffered from greater underpricing 
when stock market volatility is high. This finding is in harmony with those Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
Jr (2002) and Chang et al. (2017). Moreover, the second proxy of ex-ante uncertainty, LET, 
demonstrates that the longer the elapsed time between the offer price set up and the first trading 
date, the lower underpricing will be in the G20 stock markets. This outcome suggests that when 
informed investors show low demand for an IPO firm then this IPO requires more time to be fully 
subscribed to avoid failure of subscription. In other words, informed investors’ low demand would 
be interpreted by uninformed investors with high uncertainty about the quality of the IPO leading 
to lower demand for the offering on the first trading day, thus leading to even lower underpricing. 
The result of the LET in Model 1 is similar to what has been documented by Lee et al. (1996), Lee 
et al. (2003) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012). 
 
The third proxy of ex-ante uncertainty is LOP, which examines the proposition that the 
underpricing of IPO firms with large offer proceeds is lower as these firms tend to be well-
established and considered non-speculative businesses. Thus, IPO investors regard firms with large 
size offerings with lower ex-ante uncertainty, as a harbinger of lower underpricing. The result of 
Model 1 in Table 9 clearly supports this proposition as the coefficient of LOP equals -0.021 and is 
significant at the 1% level. This finding is in line with similar supporting evidence obtained by 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Loughran et al. (1994), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Kim et al. (2008), 
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and Boulton et al. (2010). The collective results of PMV, LET, and LOP in Model 1 in Table 9 
provide solid support for H3, that there is a positive relationship between ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding an offering and underpricing in the G20 stock markets. Hence, the third sub-research 
question is supported.  
 
Table 9 reveals how the results obtained from Model 1 remain qualitatively the same after 
controlling for year, industry, country, developing status effects as exhibited in Models 2 to 10. 
The DS variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the IPO is listed in a developing G20 country, 
otherwise it is equal to zero. After controlling for the effect of DS, the results of Models 6 and 10 
that employ robust standard errors estimation to adjust for heteroscedasticity produce consistent 
results. Models 6 to 10 also provide statistical evidence that underpricing in developing versus 
developed G20 stock markets is not similar. In fact, the significantly positive coefficients of DS in 
Models 6 to 10 indicate that IPO firms listed in developing G20 stock markets should experience 
higher underpricing ranging from 12% to 20% as compared to developed G20 market IPOs. This 
result supports previous studies’ conclusions that the market environment for developing stock 
markets is very different to that concerning developed markets. This is because the former possess 
inferior institutional quality, weaker price informativeness, greater earnings opacity, and lack of 
investor confidence (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Gelos & Wei 2005; Biddle & Hilary 2006; 
Fernandes & Ferreira 2009; Fratzscher & Imbs 2009).  
 
However, the conclusion drawn from the ten OLS models in Table 9 infers that the EWL theory 
may partially explain underpricing differences across market IPOs. This research finds that only 
the incentive of IPO issuers and ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering explains underpricing 
in the G20 market IPOs while promotional cost employed by issuers does not. This conclusion 
seems premature due to the fact that a concern related to the presence of endogeneity between UR 
and UP may exist as argued by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001). This conclusion should therefore be 
treated with caution as this research prove this cautionary note using the results documented in the 
next section.  
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2.8.2.2. Results and Discussion of the 2SLS Models 
Table 10 presents the results of ten 2SLS models employing robust standard errors estimation to 
adjust for heteroscedasticity between the G20 countries. The results of PR and DF are -0.6% and -
0.7%, respectively. For example, Model 1 confirms the negative effect of PR and DF on IPO 
underpricing in G20 countries at the 1% level of significance. This outcome infers that the larger 
the percentage of secondary shares sold and primary shares created to pre-IPO outstanding shares, 
the lower is the underpricing in the G20 countries. Therefore, H1 is accepted confirming the 
negative effect of the incentive of IPO issuers in explaining underpricing in the G20 countries. This 
supporting result of H1 is consistent with the evidence obtained in Table 9 using an OLS 
estimation.  
 
Interestingly, after treating UR as an endogenous variable, the result of UR in Model 1 in Table 10 
provides a significant and negative coefficient that is consistent with the prediction of H2 at the 
1% level of significance. This significantly negative coefficient shows that the employment of 
reputable underwriters by IPO issuers reduces underpricing of IPO firms when they go public by 
12% in the G20 countries. This result disagrees with the one in Table 9 that uses an OLS model, 
and is also in conflict with the finding documented by Boulton et al. (2010), Banerjee et al. (2011), 
Autore et al. (2014), and Boulton et al. (2017), i.e. the hiring of underwriters with a high market 
reputation increases underpricing. 
 
In other words, this negative relationship between UR and UP confirms the presence of an 
endogeneity effect between UR and PR on the basis that the choice of a reputable underwriter is 
an endogenous decision made by issuers. Hence, the results support the second sub-research 
question. The implication is that H2 is supported and confirms the proposition that employing 
underwriters with a high market reputation can indeed reduce ex-ante uncertainty about a firm’s 
value, providing a certification signal to investors and, in turn, mitigating underpricing. This 
evidence supports the cautionary empirical note raised by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) that 
empirical results obtained without accounting for the endogeneity between the issuer's decision in 
relation to the choice of hiring reputable underwriters and IPO underpricing can lead to omitted 
variable bias. This proves that the results obtained by OLS models lack methodological credibility. 
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Table 10: 2SLS Regression Results for IPO Underpricing in the G20 Countries 
                                                Robust Standard Errors Estimation to Adjust for Heteroscedasticity  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 [-9.28] [-9.21] [-9.33] [-9.14] [-9.07] [-15.3] [-15.9] [-15.3] [-12.4] [-12.2] 
DF -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 [-21.1] [-18.4] [-21.3] [-12.7] [-12.4] [-7.85] [-8.28] [-7.83] [-9.08] [-9.01] 
UR -0.120*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.092** -0.100** -0.096** -0.110** -0.120*** 
 [-2.38] [-2.52] [-2.46] [-2.98] [-2.96] [-1.80] [-2.01] [-1.87] [-2.20] [-2.37] 
PMV 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 [7.99] [7.96] [7.98] [8.74] [8.75] [6.68] [6.33] [6.55] [7.04] [6.73] 
LET -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.033*** 
 [-3.99] [-3.47] [-3.92] [-2.98] [-2.97] [-4.71] [-3.84] [-4.65] [-3.89] [-3.38] 
LOP -0.013** -0.011** -0.011** -0.015** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.022*** 
 [-2.12] [-1.80] [-1.98] [-2.54] [-2.49] [-3.13] [-2.60] [-2.98] [-4.05] [-3.58] 
Country-level variables 
DS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 
      [5.21] [5.83] [5.68] [7.31] [7.66] 
Dummy Effects  YE IE CE YE & IE & CE  YE IE CE YE & IE & CE 
Constant 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.76*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.83*** 
 [8.46] [8.49] [8.10] [7.89] [7.86] [9.13] [9.39] [8.49] [8.79] [8.55] 
Observations 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
P-value of F-statistic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. Robust Z-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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Consequently, the empirical results obtained by Boulton et al. (2010), Banerjee et al. (2011), 
Autore et al. (2014), and Boulton et al. (2017) should be treated with caution as they do not account 
for this endogeneity. Table 10 shows the results obtained from Model 1 remain qualitatively the 
same after controlling for year, industry, country, developing status effects as exhibited in Models 
2 to 10. Hence, Table 10 provides supporting results to H1, H2, and H3. Models 6 to 10 in Table 
10 also provide statistical evidence similar to the evidence obtained in Table 9 that underpricing in 
developing versus developed G20 stock markets is not alike.   
 
In fact, the significantly positive coefficients of DS in Models 6 to 10 indicate that, even after 
controlling for the problem of endogeneity and various dummy effects, IPO firms with DS status 
should experience higher underpricing ranging from 12% to 19% when compared to developed 
G20 market IPOs. Collectively, the results of the 2SLS models confirm that the EWL theory does 
explain IPO underpricing difference in the global IPO market. 
 
In summary, the results show that IPO firms underpriced differently across the G20 countries, 
because on average some IPO issuers care less about underpricing as they sell less secondary and 
create less primary shares when they go public. Those issuers also employ less reputable 
underwriters especially when the perceived level of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding their offering 
is low. Stated differently, in a G20 country where the average level of participation ratio and 
dilution factor is low, the likelihood of employing reputable underwriters will be low when the 
average level of ex-ante uncertainty of that country is low too. If those conditions occur, then this 
G20 country is likely to suffer from higher underpricing up to 19% when its stock market is 
classified as a developing one. The effect of the endogeneity on the relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing is a global effect. The results of the Housman 
Endogeneity Test confirm its existence across G20 countries. Not capturing this effect explains the 
fragmented results obtained by current literature on the true nature of the relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. This eventually leads to biased conclusions being 
drawn from empirical testing and resulting in misunderstandings in the IPO literature. Next, this 
research examines if the consistency of the findings persists after the author controls for the effect 
of clustered standard errors.  
 
72 
 
2.8.2.3. Results and Discussion of the 2SLS Models with One-Way 
Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
To illustrate graphically the possible existence of a clustering effect in the data, Figure 7 displays 
firstly, the one-way clustering standard errors by DS, YE, IE, CE, and secondly, the remaining 
firm-specific variable including PR, DF, UR, PMV, LET, and LOP. Across the ten figures shown 
below, this research indicates that the IPO data may suffer from the clustering effect of YE, IE, and 
CE.  
 
Figure 7: Graphical Display of Clustered Standard Errors by Independent Variables 
 
 
 
Agriculture 
 
Insurance 
 
Manufacturing 
 Wholesale 
 
1999 
 2003 
 
2007 
 2007 
 
France 
Greec
e 
Japan 
Saudi 
Ar
abi
a 
73 
 
 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis using Stata 15) 
 
For example, observing the structural behaviour of the error terms and taking into consideration 
the clustering effect of standard errors in the period 1995 to 2016, Figure 7 shows there is visual 
year effect in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2016. The error terms seem to be correlated within every year 
but between those years error terms exhibit uncorrelated structural behaviour. Likewise, looking at 
structural behavior when clustering standard errors are evident within industries, some industries - 
for example, the variance of error terms in agriculture and wholesale industries - seem to have a 
similar pattern of errors that correlate with every industry. On the other hand, error terms for 
insurance and manufacturing industries seem visually to have a larger variance in standard errors 
where these errors may correlate within every industry as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 When observing the structural behavior of the error terms and taking into account the clustering 
effect of standard errors within the G20 countries, Figure 7 illustrates the presence of the clustering 
effect of error terms within countries. For example, standard errors in France and Greece seem to 
present a similar pattern of low variance while the dispersion of standard errors in Japan and Saudi 
Arabia appear to have larger variability. The standard errors in Japan, for example, are likely to 
correlate while those errors are not likely to correlate between Japan and France.  
 
For the remaining variables including DS, PR, DF, UR, PMV, LET, and LOP this research cannot 
detect a clear visual existence of clustering effect. This initial graphical evidence implies that the 
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observations are grouped into a number of clusters where the error terms are uncorrelated across 
clusters but graphically seem to correlate within YE, IE, and CE. Cameron and Miller (2015) argue 
that not controlling for this within-cluster error correlation results in achieving biased values of 
standard errors. The outcome of this is obtaining large misleading T-statistic values and low p-
values, and in turn an over-rejection of the true null hypothesis. 
 
Cameron and Miller (2015) show that one way to understand the absolute effect of clustering in 
error terms is to compare the results of a model that uses clustered robust standard errors versus 
non-clustered robust standard errors to observe the change in standard error values post-
estimation17. Petersen (2009) contends that if data experience a clustering effect, for example by 
time or industry or country, then one should observe a notable downward change in the standard 
errors for clustered robust estimator compared to the standard errors of the un-clustered robust 
estimator. To account for the impact of this one-way clustering within DS, YE, IE, and CE, Table 
1118 summarises  the results after accounting for these clustering effects. Model 1 shows that when 
clustering the standard errors utilising two clusters including developing versus developed G20 
countries, the results provide overall consistent support for H1, H2, and H3. 
 
However, once the author clusters standard errors according to developing versus developed G20 
countries, this research observes a negative change in the standard errors values for UR, PMV, 
LOP, and DS while this thesis observes positive changes in PR, DF, and LET variables in Model 
1 in Table 11 compared to the reference point in Model 10 in Table 1019. For example, the Z-
statistics for PR and DF changed by approximately +71% and +164% while the Z-statistics for 
PMV and LOP changed by -60% and -72%, respectively. 
 
                                                 
17 Cameron and Miller (2015) recommend using White (1980) heteroscedastic-robust standard error for 2SLS estimator 
which the author implements in this thesis.  
18 For un-tabulated results, the author runs different models in which this thesis clusters standard errors by all employed 
independent variables to examine if the author may fail to recognize the presence of the DS, PR, DF, UR, PMV, LET, 
and LOP variables’ clustering effect. The results found that only DS present a clustering effect and the author proceeds 
by presenting the empirical results in Table 11 by showing empirical clustering results for the DS, YE, IE, and CE 
effects.  
19 The author chooses Model 10 in Table 10 as the reference point of comparison to capture changes in Z-statistics as 
it provides the best model fit. The calculation of the change in the Z- statistics is done by dividing, for example, Z-
statistic value of -23.80 for the variable DF in Model 1 in Table 11 on the Z- statistic value of -9.01 in Model 10 in 
Table 10, the reference point of comparison. Thus, change in the Z- statistic in Model 1 in Table 11 for the variable 
DF is +164% = ((-23.8/-9.01)-1) and so forth for all other variables. 
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Table 11: 2SLS Regression Results for IPO Underpricing after Controlling for Underpricing Difference Between Developing and Developed G20 Countries 
Using One-Way Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
                                                                                                                                One-Way Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
Variables 
Model 1 
Clustered on 
DS 
Change in 
Z-statistics 
Model 2 
Clustered on 
YE 
Change in 
Z-statistics 
Model 3 
Clustered on 
IE 
Change in  
Z-statistics 
Model 4 
Clustered on 
CE 
Change in  
Z-statistics 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  
 [-20.9] +71% [-5.82] -52% [-3.99] -67% [-4.31] -65% 
DF -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  
 [-23.8] +164% [-6.60] -27% [-4.82] -47% [-4.49] -50% 
UR -0.120**  -0.120**  -0.120**  -0.120  
 [-1.71] -28% [-1.88] -21% [-1.89] -20% [-1.20] -49% 
PMV 0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06**  
 [2.70] -60% [2.63] -61% [6.69] -1% [2.31] -66% 
LET -0.033***  -0.033**  -0.033***  -0.033  
 [-4.84] +43% [-1.93] -43% [-3.06] -10% [-0.97] -71% 
LOP -0.022  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.022  
 [-0.95] -72% [-1.98] -45% [-1.68] -53% [-0.82] -77% 
Country-level variables 
DS 0.190***  0.190***  0.190**  0.190  
 [7.27] -5% [2.74] -64% [1.99] -74% [1.17] -85% 
Dummy Effects YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE 
Constant 0.83***  0.83***  0.83***  0.83**  
 [6.84] -20% [4.47] -48% [3.71] -57% [1.80] -79% 
Observations 10,209  10,209  10,209  10,209  
Adjusted R2 0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  
P-value of F-statistic 0.05  0.01  0.01  0.01  
Number of Clusters 2  22  33  22  
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust Z-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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This implies that IPO data experiences one-way clustering effect within developing and developed 
countries even after controlling for year, industry, and country dummy effects. One explanation for 
observing positive20 changes in the Z-statistics values instead of negative ones after clustering by 
DS is likely due to clustering over a small number of clusters, two clusters including developed 
versus developing. Cameron and Miller (2015) provide empirical evidence showing that the 
possibility for clustered robust standard errors to be negatively correlated within clusters. Here a 
smaller number when NCluster = 2 clusters result in smaller standard errors values leading to positive 
changes in Z-statistics values post-estimation. Cameron and Miller (2015) also contend that by 
definition cluster-robust standard errors estimation employs White (1980) heteroscedastic-robust 
standard errors estimation that sometimes provides larger or smaller standard errors than the default 
estimator.  
 
Consistent with Petersen’s (2009) note, when this research clusters the standard errors of 22 years 
and 33 industries as shown in Models 2 and 3 in Table 11, this research perceives substantial 
negative changes in the Z-statistics values in most variables. Overall, this result means that IPO 
data experiences remarkable one-way clustering effect within developing versus developed G20 
countries, years, and industries even after controlling for year, industry, and country effects. That 
is, the results evidently indicate that residuals correlate within developing versus developed G20 
country, years, and industries. These results are in line with similar empirical evidence regarding 
the impact of industry clustering as reported in Sorokina and Thornton (2016) and year clustering 
as noted in Smith (2016). However, the statistical power of most of the variables in Models 1, 2, 
and 3 in Table 11 remains significant, thus generating support for the hypotheses.  
 
However, when the author clusters the standard errors by 22 countries as shown in Model 4, this 
research presents a different story. This thesis is not only observing the considerably larger negative 
change in the standard errors of all the variables, but the author fails to find significant results 
supporting H2 and H3. This research finds two of three ex-ante uncertainty proxies related to H3 
of statistical insignificance including LET and LOP. Model 4 in fact shows that due to efficiently 
capturing within country correlations in error terms, the Z-statistic for the UR, LET, and LOP 
                                                 
20 Petersen (2009) notes that clustering standard errors normally result in increasing standard errors, consequently 
producing lower T-statistic or Z-statistic values for the OLS or 2SLS estimators, respectively. Therefore, in this case 
a positive change in Z-statistic values resembles a reduction in the values of standard errors. 
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variables diminished by 50%, 71%, and 77%, respectively. The results support similar findings 
reported by Moulton (1990) who recorded a large reduction in T-statistic values from 13.3 to 3.7 
after clustering standard errors on states. Similar findings on the influential impact of country-
clustering are documented by De la Croix and Gobbi (2017) and Onali et al. (2017). Although the 
results of Model 4 provide full support for the prediction of H1, this research still documents 
considerable reduction in the Z-statistic values for the two variables including PR and DF related 
to H1 by 65% and 50%, respectively. Model 4 shows that the relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing remains negative but becomes statistically insignificant. This is despite 
the result of the Housman Endogeneity Test confirming that UR is indeed an endogenous variable 
at the 1% level of significance.  
 
Subsequently, the effect of country-clustering may differently affect the behaviour of underwriter 
reputation and ex-ante uncertainty factors in influencing the IPO underpricing across the G20 
countries. This is most likely be due to unobserved large correlations between IPO observations 
within each G20 country. Furthermore, the impact of listing in developing G20 countries becomes 
statistically insignificant as the Z-statistic of the DS variable largely changed by -85% compared 
to the reference point in Model 10 in Table 10. This may suggest that when controlling for the 
effect of country-clustering, then the effect of listing in developing compared to developed G20 
country does not explain the underpricing difference in the global IPO market. The reason is the 
presence of unobserved correlations observations within developed and developing G20 countries 
(Petersen 2009). The loss of significance in UR, LET, PMV, and DS variables may entail that 
standard errors become larger after this research account for unobserved correlations amongst 
residuals within countries. It leads to lower Z-statistic values and higher P-values, so consequently 
fewer stars appear next to the coefficients of the UR, LET, PMV, and DS variables as argued by 
Cameron and Miller (2015).  
 
Collectively, the results of the 2SLS models using one-way clustering estimation are consistent 
with the previous section. This is in relation to the explanatory of the EWL theory and the global 
effect of endogeneity between underwriter reputation and underpricing. However, after the author 
captures the existence of correlation through one way clustering, these findings do not hold within 
the G20 countries. The relationship between IPO underpricing and its determinants may exhibit 
varying behaviours between countries. This occurs due to the existence of common shocks of a 
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similar information environment that induces correlation amongst error terms to behave similarly 
within each G20 country. At the same time, they may behave differently across the G20 countries.  
 
2.8.2.4. Results and Discussion of the 2SLS Models with Two-Way 
Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
Tables 12 and 13 present the results of six 2SLS models that capture the simultaneous correlation 
along two dimensions in error terms using pairs of clusters. One important outcome is expected 
from the data. If this research obtains insignificant results for the three hypotheses, the author then 
infers that the IPO data do suffer from a significant two-way clustering effect. This leads the author 
to question the reliability of empirical results that failed to capture the existence of simultaneous 
correlation along two dimensions in error terms. Such results demonstrate the influential effect of 
the two-way clustering on the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
 
Across the 6 two-way pairs of clustering models in Tables 12 and 13, this research continues to 
find a significant and negative association between the PR and DF variables and IPO underpricing 
in the G20 countries. This evidence provides solid re-support for H1. The results show large 
negative changes for the Z-statistic values for PR and DF compared to the reference point in Model 
10 in Table 10. For example, this thesis observes a large increase in standard errors causing the Z-
statistic values of PR and DF to decrease by 65% and 50%, respectively. This occurred due to the 
existence of correlations between error terms of IPO firms within 22 clusters of developing versus 
developed domiciles within G20 countries as shown in Model 3 in Table 12. Nonetheless, this 
research still observes explanatory power for the PR and DF variables in explaining IPO 
underpricing in the G20 countries at the 1% level of significance. It can be stated that capturing the 
simultaneous correlation along six pairs of two-way clustering in error terms has no effect on the 
behaviour of the PR and DF variables. 
 
When this research assesses the consistency of the negative relationship between underwriter 
reputation and IPO underpricing across the six two-way pairs of clustering models in Tables 12 
and 13, this research finds a different story. The author rejects H2 at the 5% level of significance 
in three out of six models. This indicates that the employment of reputable underwriters has an 
insignificant effect in reducing underpricing across the G20 countries. 
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Table 12: 2SLS Regression Results for IPO Underpricing after Controlling for Underpricing Difference Between Developing and Developed G20 Countries 
Using Two-Way Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
                                   Two-Way Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
Variables 
Model 1 
Clustered 
on 
DS & YE 
Change in 
Z-statistics 
Model 2 
Clustered 
on 
DS & IE 
Change in  
Z-statistics 
Model 3 
Clustered 
on 
DS & CE 
Change in  
Z-statistics 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  
 [-5.84] -52% [-4.32] -65% [-4.31] -65% 
DF -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  
 [-6.56] -27% [-5.11] -43% [-4.49] -50% 
UR -0.12**  -0.12**  -0.12  
 [-1.65] -30% [-1.75] -26% [-1.20] -49% 
PMV 0.06***  0.06***  0.06**  
 [2.42] -64% [4.50] -33% [2.31] -66% 
LET -0.033**  -0.033**  -0.033  
 [-1.89] -44% [-2.24] -33% [-0.97] -71% 
LOP -0.022*  -0.022*  -0.022  
 [-1.53] -57% [-1.34] -63% [-0.82] -77% 
Country-level variable 
DS 0.19***  0.19**  0.19  
 [2.73] -64% [2.17] -72% [1.17] -85% 
Dummy Effect YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE& CE 
Constant 0.83***  0.83***  0.83**  
 [4.02] -53% [4.01] -53% [1.80] -79% 
Observations 10,209  10,209  10,209  
Adjusted R2 0.05  0.05  0.05  
P-value of F-statistic 0.01  0.01  0.01  
Number of Clusters 42  62  22  
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.01  0.05  0.05  
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.01  0.01  0.01   
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust Z-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail 
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Table 13: 2SLS Regression Results for IPO Underpricing after Controlling for Underpricing Difference between Developing and Developed G20 Countries Using 
Two-Way Clustered Robust Standard Errors (Continues) 
                                   Two-Way Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
Variables 
Model 4 
Clustered 
on 
YI & IE 
Change in 
 Z-statistics 
Model 5 
Clustered 
On 
YE & CE 
Change in  
Z-statistics 
Model 6 
Clustered 
on 
IE & CE 
Change in 
 Z-statistics 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  
 [-6.62] -46% [-5.26] -57% [-5.88] -52% 
DF -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  
 [-7.65] -15% [-5.99] -34% [-6.90] -23% 
UR -0.12**  -0.12*  -0.12  
 [-1.96] -17% [-1.61] -32% [-1.21] -49% 
PMV 0.06***  0.06**  0.06***  
 [3.59] -47% [2.21] -67% [3.36] -50% 
LET -0.033**  -0.033*  -0.033**  
 [-2.05] -39% [-1.37] -59% [-2.28] -33% 
LOP -0.022**  -0.022*  -0.022**  
 [-2.08] -42% [-1.45] -59% [-2.02] -44% 
Country-level variable 
DS 0.19***  0.19***  0.19***  
 [3.51] -54% [2.35] -69% [3.35] -56% 
Dummy Effect YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE 
Constant 0.83***  0.83***  0.83***  
 [5.25] -39% [3.37] -61% [4.90] -43% 
Observations 10,209  10,209  10,209  
Adjusted R2 0.05  0.05  0.05  
P-value of F-statistic 0.01  0.01  0.01  
Number of Clusters 523  304  375  
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.01  0.01  0.05  
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.01  0.01  0.01   
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust Z-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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The loss of significance of the UR variable is most likely due to capturing the simultaneous 
correlations along two dimensions in error terms. This indeed causes the behaviour of the UR 
variable to be very sensitive. For example, the result in Model 3 in Table 12 shows that the Z-
statistic value for the UR variable largely dropped by 49% compared to the reference point in 
Model 10 in Table 10. This happens when this research controls for the two-way clustering effect 
concerning the IPO observations within 22 clusters of developing versus developed countries 
within the G20 stock markets. Furthermore, this result indicates that IPOs underwritten by 
reputable underwriters in developing G20 economies compared to the ones underwritten by 
prestigious underwriters in developed G20 countries share similar unobservable features. 
Meanwhile those IPOs are distinctly different from each other between those 22 clusters. This 
evidence has not been captured by the prior underpricing literature. The author interprets this 
finding following Thompson (2011) to attribute the existence of underwriting industry-wide shocks 
that induce correlations between IPO firms within developed and developing G20 countries. 
 
Collectively, the results of the UR variable provide strong evidence of the influential role played 
by two-way clustering in affecting the behaviour of underwriter reputation in explaining IPO 
underpricing across countries. The underwriting-underpricing relationship should be captured 
while accounting for the simultaneous correlations along two dimensions in error terms to avoid 
arriving at biased results. This research scrutinises the results of the Housman Endogeneity Test to 
examine if the reason for the failure to find support for H2 could be caused by the failure to reject 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity for the UR variable. Results from endogeneity test reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity for the UR variable. This research also inspects the results if this research 
perhaps employed weak instrumental variable to correct for this endogeneity problem. The results 
in Tables 12 and 13 show that this research rejects the Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test in 
all six models at 1% level of significance. This surely rejects the possibility of employing a weak 
instrument to correct for this endogeneity.  
 
In relation to H3, the results of the three ex-ante uncertainty proxies including PMV, LET, and 
LOP in Tables 12 and 13 collectively provide supporting results. This thesis documents a large 
reduction in the Z-statistic values for the PMV variable reaching 67% when clustering error terms 
within 304 clusters across years and countries as shown in Model 5 in Table 13. Yet, the impact of 
pre-IPO market volatility on underpricing remains positively significant across the six two-way 
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clustering models. However, the second proxy of ex-ante uncertainty LET, demonstrates 
significant correlations only within error terms when this research clusters them within the G20 
countries and pair them with developing clusters as shown in Model 3 in Table 12. Hence, this 
research finds support for the variable LET in five of the six models. Likewise, the third proxy of 
ex-ante uncertainty, LOP, portrays a similar form of the influential impact of the two-way 
clustering when the author clusters residuals within the G20 countries and pair them with 
developing clusters as presented in Model 3 in Table 12. This is because this research only rejects 
the association between the offer size of IPO firm and IPO underpricing in the G20 countries in 
one out of six clustering pairs. For example, the results indicate that within developing G20 
countries there is a large correlation in error terms in IPO observations existing. This causes error 
terms to correlate within 22 country-clusters while they are uncorrelated between those 22 clusters. 
This occurs to the extent that the Z-statistic of the variable LOP in Model 3 in Table 12 largely 
dropped by 77% compared to the reference point in Model 10 in Table 10 causing this observed 
statistical insignificance.  
 
The results also document that the positive impact of listing IPO firms in a developing G20 country 
on underpricing difference remains significant in five out of six pairs of clustering. Once this 
research captures the two-dimensional correlations in error terms within 22 clusters of developing 
versus developed G20 countries as shown in Model 3 in Table 12, the impact of DS disappears. 
This thesis attributes this finding to the existence of within cluster correlations within 22 identified 
clusters in Model 3. In fact, those results confirm the sensitivity of the impact of listing IPO firms 
in developing G20 countries on underpricing post-clustering estimation. For example, the Z-
statistic values for the variable DS in Model 3 in Table 12 dropped by 85% compared to the 
reference point in Model 10 in Table 10. The results imply there some correlations within 
developing versus developing G20 countries in which the behaviour of firm-level variables may 
be similar within every group yet differ between the two ‘blocks’ of economies.  
 
To recapitulate, across the six two-clustering models presented in Tables 12 and 13, the author 
finds support for the three hypotheses of the EWL theory in four out of six models. This enables 
this thesis to reconfirm the answer of the first research question showing that the EWL theory does 
indeed explain underpricing difference across countries. The evidence this research uncovers here 
also permits the author to reconfirm answering the remaining three research questions. This 
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research now confirms that the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion cost, and ex-ante uncertainty 
explain IPO underpricing difference across the G20 countries. This is because this research finds 
that when the incentive of IPO issuers increases by one percent underpricing decreases by 1.4%. 
This research also discovers that issuers who employ reputable underwriters manage to reduce their 
underpricing by 12%. IPO owners who list their firms when the pre-IPO stock market volatility is 
high by one percent, on average, experience higher discount by 5%. When the length of elapsed 
time between setting the offer price and first trading day increases by one unit, underpricing reduces 
by 3.3%. An increase in the size of the IPO firms by one unit also leads to reducing underpricing 
by 2.2%. When this IPO firm is listed in a developing stock market, it attracts 19% more discount 
in comparison to listing it in a developed G20 market. Jointly, the results using the one- and two-
way clustering estimations show consistency in relation to the existence of correlations within error 
terms for IPO observations within developing versus developed G20 countries. The association 
between determinants of IPO underpricing and IPO underpricing difference is likely to exhibit 
varying behaviours between the two blocks of stock markets. The existence of common shocks of 
a similar information environment or market practices related to reputable underwriters induce 
correlations amongst residuals to behave similarly within but dissimilarly between developed and 
developing G20 countries. 
 
2.8.3. Sensitivity Tests and Robustness Checks 
In this section, this research carries out three robustness checks in order to maximise the confidence 
and reliability of the findings. This includes additional firm and country-level variables to avoid 
potential omitted variable bias concern. Also incorporated here is the process of splitting the data 
between developed and developing countries to completely isolate the effect of correlation. This 
thesis also excludes outliers to avoid potential misleading results. Specifically, these additional 
checks are done to moderate the possibility that the previous findings that rejected the underwriter 
reputation-underpricing relationship using some forms of one- and two-way clustering are not an 
artefact of omitted variable bias, shared correlations in residuals between developed and 
developing economies, and existence of outliers.  
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Firstly, the author captures additional firm- and country-level characteristics that IPO underpricing 
literature considers (Butler et al. 2014). Additional firm-level variables contain book-building, 
technology firms, private sector firms, integer offer price, underwriter fees, the 1997-98 Asian 
Financial Crisis and Global Financial Crisis that seriously undermined the world economy in 2008. 
This research also adds two country-level factors to control for development of financial markets’ 
difference between the G20 stock markets. This is gauged by the level of financing through local 
equity markets and by the size of domestic markets. 
 
Secondly, this research divides the data over two blocks of equity markets to check for what might 
have caused the previous results to show some rejections of the prestigious underwriter-
underpricing relationship. This rejection repeatedly occurred when this research mainly clustered 
error terms between developed versus developing G20 countries. Kayo and Kimura (2011) 
discover a differential influence of information environments between developed and developing 
stock markets, and their influence on the capital structure of firms. They contend that companies 
clustered within developing economies illustrate comparable firm characteristics that are dissimilar 
to developed ones. Based on this evidence, Kayo and Kimura (2011) question whether the theories 
designed to explain corporate finance behaviours in developed countries are applicable to 
developing ones. This research checks if the EWL model would hold for both developed and 
developing stock markets. 
 
Thirdly, the author safeguards the results against possible influence of outliers following Zattoni 
et al. (2017). Recall that in Table 4 this research finds a subnational underpricing observation of 
1680% and 1350% recorded for developing and developed G20 economies while the average 
underpricing level for the entire sample of 10,217 IPOs is 38%. What makes a concern about the 
outlier problem becoming inevitable is that Table 4 shows the mean IPO underpricing for 
developed and developing countries’ IPOs is 32% and 51%, respectively. Therefore, this research 
worries that the existence of such extreme underpricing observations may cause a bias in the 
findings. To overcome this problem, the author employs an outlier recognition procedure proposed 
by Rousseeuw and Leroy (2005) to remove those extreme underpricing observations greater than 
an underpricing value of 150%. This research implements this outlier procedure to eliminate 573, 
388, and 188 observations related to the entire sample (22 countries), developed country sample 
(12 countries), and developing country sample (10 countries), respectively.  
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Table 14 presents the results of four one- and two robust clustered models using the 2SLS 
estimation for the whole sample of 22 countries. They aim to check if the previous findings this 
research obtained that rejected the association between underwriter reputation and underpricing is 
not driven by outliers and omitted variable bias. This is scenario let the author to partially refute 
the EWL model when clustering standard errors across countries, countries and years, countries 
and industries, and countries and developing stock markets. Table 14 shows that even after 
excluding the extreme underpricing values and adding the extra firm- and country-level variables, 
this research obtains consistently supporting results for H1. 
 
 Although PMV is insignificant in all of the four models in Table 14, this research finds strong 
support for the remaining two proxies of ex-ante including LEP and LOP lending overall support 
to H3. Table 14 demonstrates that the impact of country-clustering in standard errors remains 
influentially present in affecting the results. This is because the author continues to find the 
relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing to be insignificant similar to previous 
results in Tables 11, 12, and 13. Across the four models in Table 14, the results of the DS variable 
are generally persistent documenting higher underpricing by up 7.6% for IPOs listed in developing 
G20 stock markets.  
 
Table 14 also reports the results of Housman Endogeneity Test showing that the endogenous 
relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing remains significant. Collectively, the 
Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test confirms that the null hypothesis of employing a weak 
instrument is rejected at the 1% level of significance. Thus, the identified instrument is indeed a 
robust one. Now this research turns the attention to checking what might have driven the rejection 
of the underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship after this research isolate the effect of 
correlated error terms between developed versus developing G20 countries. 
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Table 14: Excluding Outliers and Controlling for Omitted Variable Bias Using the Entire Sample 
Variables 
Model 1 
Clustered 
on 
CE 
Model 2 
Clustered 
on 
YE & CE 
Model 3 
Clustered 
on 
IE & CE 
Model 4 
Clustered 
on 
DS & CE 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 [-5.41] [-6.89] [-6.42] [-5.41] 
DF -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 [-6.53] [-8.14] [-8.83] [-6.53] 
UR -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 
 [-0.68] [-1.08] [-0.93] [-0.68] 
PMV 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 
 [0.70] [0.86] [0.98] [0.70] 
LET -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 [-2.70] [-2.49] [-3.94] [-2.70] 
LOP -0.021** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021** 
 
[-2.02] [-3.74] [-3.18] [-2.02] 
Country-level variable 
DS 0.076* 0.076** 0.076** 0.076* 
 [1.35] [2.16] [1.95] [1.35] 
Additional firm-level variables 
BBM -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.43] [-0.60] [-0.48] [-0.43] 
TF 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 [3.05] [4.04] [2.60] [3.05] 
PF 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 [0.13] [0.18] [0.24] [0.13] 
IOP 0.035 0.035* 0.035 0.035 
 [0.66] [1.62] [0.93] [0.66] 
UF -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.57] [-0.65] [-0.67] [-0.57] 
AFC 1997 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
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 [-2.54] [-3.20] [-4.58] [-2.54] 
GFC 2008 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
 [-0.74] [-0.53] [-0.91] [-0.74] 
Additional country-level variables  
FMS 
-0.065*** -0.065** -0.065*** -0.065*** 
 
[-2.61] [-2.03] [-3.45] [-2.61] 
MS 
0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 [6.13] [5.75] [10.1] [6.13] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE 
Constant 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 
0.68*** 
 
[3.41] 
[6.29] [5.21] 
[3.41] 
Observations 
9,644 9,644 9,644 9,644 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
P-value of F-statistic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number of Clusters 22 303 370 22 
Diagnostics 
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: Firm-level variables and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust Z -statistics in brackets donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail and 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Error terms are clustered by one- and two-clusters as displayed under every model.
88 
 
Table 15 presents the results for six one- and two clustered robust 2SLS models using only 
developed G20 data while excluding the extreme underpricing observations and including the 
additional firm- and country-level covariates. Interestingly, across the six models in Table 15, this 
research finds there is overall support for H1, H2, and H3. The results indicate that within advanced 
G20 equity markets, one percentage increase in PR and DF leads to reduced underpricing by 1% 
and 1.1%, respectively. Entrepreneur founders who employ reputable underwriting banks to 
underwrite their IPO firms in developed stock markets reduce their underpricing by 4.2%. When 
the length of the elapsed time and IPO size increases by one unit, underpricing of IPO firms listed 
in developed economies decreases by 1% and 2.5%, respectively.  
 
Results related to the additional firm- and country-level variables show consistent results with 
previous literature. Within developed stock markets, this research finds that technology firms, 
integer offer price, and domestic market size increases IPO underpricing (Boulton et al. 2010; 
Banerjee et al. 2011; Hopp & Dreher 2013). In contrast, IPOs incur higher underwriting fees and 
those listed during a crisis period experience lower underpricing (Fang 2005; Güçbilmez 2015). 
Variables related to BBM, PF, and FMS were found not to affect underpricing in developed G20 
stock markets (Engelen & van Essen 2010; Autore et al. 2014).  
 
Remarkably, when this research employ developing G20 data as shown by the 18 models in Tables 
16 and 17, this research obtains interestingly reverse evidence. This research first rejects the 
endogenous underwriting-underpricing relationship as shown by the results of the Housman 
Endogeneity Test for Models 1, 4, and 7 in Table 16 and for Models 10, 13, and 16 in Table 1721. 
However, the source of this rejection turned out to be due to the employment of a weak instrumental 
variable as indicated by the outputs of the Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test for the same 
models. To overcome this problem, this research employs the second instrumental variable that 
equals to ratio of the median amount of proceeds of all underwritten IPOs for every underwriter 
for every country, divided by the median number of underwritten IPOs in that country.  
 
 
                                                 
21 For these models, the author employs a ratio equalling to the average amount of proceeds of all underwritten IPOs 
for every underwriter for every country, divided by the average number of underwritten IPOs in that country. 
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Table 15: Excluding Outliers and Controlling for Omitted Variable Bias Using the 2SLS Models for Developed G20 Countries 
Variables 
Model 1 
Clustered 
on 
YE 
Model 2 
Clustered 
on 
IE 
Model 3 
Clustered 
on 
CE 
Model 4 
Clustered 
on 
YI & IE 
Model 5 
Clustered 
on 
YE & CE 
Model 6 
Clustered 
on 
IE & CE 
  Firm-level variables 
PR -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 [-6.85] [-7.25] [-4.89] [-7.27] [-6.64] [-5.90] 
DF -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 [-8.14] [-8.75] [-6.17] [-9.53] [-7.82] [-8.17] 
UR -0.042** -0.042*** -0.042 -0.042*** -0.042** -0.042** 
 [-2.29] [-2.70] [-1.15] [-2.37] [-1.92] [-1.65] 
PMV -0.056 -0.056** -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 
 [-0.76] [-1.69] [-0.33] [-1.08] [-0.67] [-0.61] 
LET -0.010** -0.010** -0.010 -0.010** -0.010* -0.010 
 [-1.70] [-1.93] [-0.82] [-1.96] [-1.45] [-1.22] 
LOP -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 [-4.89] [-5.13] [-1.98] [-6.55] [-4.59] [-3.51] 
  
Additional firm-level variables 
BBM 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 [0.55] [0.46] [0.53] [0.54] [0.51] [0.46] 
TF 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049** 
 [3.77] [2.62] [2.43] [4.22] [3.62] [2.21] 
PF 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 [0.13] [0.23] [0.100] [0.24] [0.14] [0.19] 
IOP 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 [5.73] [4.27] [2.71] [7.98] [5.29] [4.57] 
UF -0.016* -0.016** -0.016* -0.016** -0.016* -0.016** 
 [-1.30] [-2.04] [-1.55] [-1.82] [-1.43] [-1.86] 
AFC 1997 -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** 
 [-5.55] [-9.81] [-2.65] [-6.67] [-2.67] [-4.60] 
GFC 2008 -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** 
 [-6.40] [-5.89] [-4.37] [-3.95] [-2.50] [-4.31] 
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Additional country-level variables  
FMS -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 [-0.34] [-1.15] [-0.88] [-0.63] [-0.38] [-0.92] 
MS 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 [2.97] [5.54] [2.50] [4.04] [2.75] [3.33] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE & CE 
YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE 
Constant 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 
 [5.64] [5.65] [3.22] [7.55] [5.08] [5.61] 
Observations 6,804 6,804 6,804 6,804 6,804 6,804 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
P-value of F-statistic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number of Clusters 22 32 12 486 179 205 
  Diagnostics 
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: Firm-level variables and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust Z -statistics in brackets donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail and are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Error terms are clustered by one- and two-clusters as displayed under every model. 
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Consistently, this research continues to refute the endogenous underwriting-underpricing 
association as indicated by the outputs of the Housman Endogeneity Test for Models 2, 5, and 8 in 
Table 16 and for Models 11, 14, and 17 in Table 17. This indicates that the reason for this rejection 
is not due to the use of a weak instrument. In fact, the results of the Cragg and Donald Weak 
Instrument Test for the same models confirm that the second instrument is robust at the 1% level 
of significance. This important finding implies that the reputable underwriting-underpricing 
relationship does in fact have an exogenous nature in developing countries. Hence, in Models 3, 6, 
and 9 for Table 16 and in Models 12, 15, and 18 for Table 17, this research treats the variable UR 
as the exogenous factor using robust clustered OLS estimation with different forms of one- and 
two- clustering.  
 
Remarkably, the results of these models only provide consistent confirmation for H1, lending a 
weak level of support to the EWL theory in developing stock markets. Collectively, the results of 
the UR variable reveal that the employment of prestigious underwriters by developing IPO issuers 
leads to higher underpricing by 4.7%. This result along with significant and positive coefficient of 
UF, indicating that IPO issuers pay higher underwriting fees22 and instead of receiving lower 
underpricing by reputable underwriters they receive a larger discount by 6.7%. This situation points 
towards one probable outcome indicating the existence of spinning’s effect on IPO underpricing in 
developing stock markets.  
 
This perhaps could explain why this research obtained persistently rejected results for the 
underwriting-underpricing relationship whenever this research captures correlations in error terms 
within emerging versus advanced G20 countries. This finding is in line with Liu and Ritter (2010) 
who find evidence showing that some underwriters benefit from their market power by receiving 
side payments from investors. The authors argue that underwriters are involved in such practices 
by heavily discounting IPO firms or offering large allocations of IPO stocks.  
 
                                                 
22 In the un-tabulated mean equality test, the author attains evidence showing that prestigious underwriters in 
developing countries charge almost double underwriting fees compared to their counterparts in advanced stock 
markets. This thesis finds that in emerging G20 countries, high-status underwriters charge an average gross spread of 
4% compared to 2.2% in developed countries where the difference between the two means is significant at the 5% 
level. This evidence is consistent with a similar global observation made by Torstila (2003). Across the entire sample, 
we find that the average gross spread is 6.2% which is relatively consistent with average gross spread of 6.7% observed 
in the U.S. market (Abrahamson et al. 2011). 
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Table 16: Excluding Outliers and Controlling for Omitted Variable Bias Using the 2SLS Models for Developing G20 Countries 
Variables 
Model 1 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
YE 
Model 2 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
YE 
Model 3 
OLS 
Clustered 
on 
YE 
Model 4 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
IE 
Model 5 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
IE 
Model 6 
OLS 
Clustered 
on 
IE 
Model 7 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
CE 
Model 8 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
CE 
Model 9 
OLS 
Clustered 
on 
CE 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.025 *** -0.022*** -0.021* -0.025 -.026* 
 [-3.17] [-4.43] [-4.18] [-3.34] [-3.35] [-3.17] [-1.30] [-1.24] [-1.30] 
DF -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.024* -0.025* -0.022 
 [-3.41] [-4.58] [-4.09] [-3.61] [-3.54] [-2.99] [-1.39] [-1.35] [-1.16] 
UR 0.049 0.010 0.047** 0.049 0.010 0.047*** 0.049 0.010 0.047*** 
 [0.14] [0.043] [2.05] [0.17] [0.054] [4.14] [0.12] [0.036] [3.97] 
PMV 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 [0.83] [0.83] [0.79] [4.20] [4.14] [3.51] [1.01] [1.14] [1.07] 
LET -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.19] [-0.24] [-0.22] [-0.38] [-0.47] [-0.40] [-0.51] [-0.99] [-0.81] 
LOP -0.025 -0.021** -0.025*** -0.025 -0.021** -0.025*** -0.025 -0.021 -0.025 
 [-0.83] [-1.98] [-2.70] [-0.95] [-2.02] [-3.49] [-0.55] [-1.05] [-1.23] 
Additional firm-level variables 
BBM -0.10* -0.100* -0.10* -0.10* -0.100** -0.10** -0.10** -0.100** -0.10*** 
 [-1.49] [-1.41] [-1.45] [-1.46] [-1.66] [-1.77] [-2.57] [-2.39] [-2.57] 
TF 0.039** 0.040** 0.039** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039** 0.040** 0.039** 
 [1.92] [2.09] [2.01] [3.54] [3.89] [3.94] [2.08] [1.99] [1.88] 
PF -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.048] [-0.079] [-0.051] [-0.074] [-0.12] [-0.079] [-0.049] [-0.073] [-0.045] 
IOP -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 [-3.23] [-2.75] [-2.76] [-2.53] [-4.24] [-5.06] [-2.06] [-2.65] [-2.97] 
UF 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 [2.26] [2.30] [2.20] [3.16] [3.02] [3.05] [2.81] [2.96] [2.69] 
AFC 1997 -0.078 -0.095 -0.079 -0.078 -0.095*** -0.079** -0.078 -0.095 -0.079 
 [-0.45] [-0.81] [-0.78] [-0.80] [-2.91] [-2.17] [-0.44] [-1.08] [-1.08] 
GFC 2008 -0.010 0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.010 
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 [-0.068] [0.037] [-0.083] [-0.085] [0.059] [-0.15] [-0.043] [0.026] [-0.062] 
Additional country-level variables  
FMS -0.11** -0.11** -0.11** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11** -0.11*** -0.11** 
 [-2.02] [-2.19] [-2.04] [-4.02] [-3.78] [-3.71] [-2.18] [-2.73] [-2.68] 
MS 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 [5.42] [5.40] [5.23] [13.2] [12.7] [12.6] [4.64] [4.76] [4.42] 
Dummy Effects 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
Constant 1.17*** 1.12*** 1.16*** 1.17** 1.12*** 1.16*** 1.17* 1.12** 1.16** 
 [2.45] [3.81] [4.01] [2.31] [3.88] [4.94] [1.34] [2.16] [2.21] 
Observations 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
P-value of F-statistic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number of Clusters 20 20 20 30 30 30 10 10 10 
Diagnostics 
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.95 0.64 N/A 0.99 0.42 N/A 0.96 0.43 N/A 
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.25 0.01 N/A 0.30 0.01 N/A 0.30 0.01 N/A 
Note: Firm-level variables and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust Z -statistics in brackets donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail and are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Error terms are clustered by one- and two-clusters as displayed under every model. 
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Table 17: Excluding Outliers and Controlling for Omitted Variable Bias Using the 2SLS Models for Developing G20 Countries (Continues) 
Variables 
Model 10 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
YE & IE 
Model 11 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
YE & IE 
Model 12 
OLS 
Clustered 
on 
YE & IE 
Model 13 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
YE & CE 
Model 14 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
YE & CE 
Model 15 
OLS 
Clustered 
on 
YE & CE 
Model 16 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
IE & CE 
Model 17 
2SLS  
Clustered 
on 
IE & CE 
Model 18 
OLS 
Clustered 
on 
IE & CE 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.021** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.021** -0.25** -0.024 *** 
 [-2.90] [-3.83] [-4.41] [-2.04] [-2.48] [-2.72] [-2.54] [-2.24] [-2.34] 
DF -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.024** -0.025 *** -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.25 *** -0.020 ** 
 [-3.22] [-4.38] [-3.88] [-2.22] [-2.73] [-2.48] [-2.81] [-2.46] [-2.13] 
UR 0.049 0.0031 0.047*** 0.049 0.0031 0.047** 0.049 0.0031 0.047*** 
 [0.12] [0.053] [2.43] [0.11] [0.041] [2.20] [0.12] [0.049] [3.23] 
PMV 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012* 0.012* 
 [0.89] [1.00] [0.98] [0.81] [0.89] [0.86] [1.16] [1.37] [1.36] 
LET -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.21] [-0.30] [-0.26] [-0.20] [-0.28] [-0.24] [-0.33] [-0.54] [-0.48] 
LOP -0.025 -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.025 -0.021** -0.025** -0.025 -0.021 -0.025* 
 [-0.77] [-2.62] [-3.34] [-0.63] [-1.76] [-2.25] [-0.60] [-1.24] [-1.51] 
Additional firm-level variables 
BBM -0.10** -0.100** -0.10** -0.10* -0.100* -0.10* -0.10** -0.100** -0.10** 
 [-1.74] [-1.78] [-1.86] [-1.42] [-1.45] [-1.52] [-1.99] [-2.16] [-2.28] 
TF 0.039** 0.040** 0.039** 0.039** 0.040** 0.039** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 [1.88] [2.10] [2.08] [1.69] [1.78] [1.76] [2.55] [2.66] [2.66] 
PF -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.044] [-0.077] [-0.050] [-0.051] [-0.082] [-0.054] [-0.060] [-0.092] [-0.061] 
IOP -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 [-3.25] [-3.50] [-3.58] [-2.93] [-3.05] [-3.17] [-2.33] [-3.78] [-4.03] 
UF 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 [2.31] [2.30] [2.28] [2.21] [2.22] [2.20] [2.56] [2.60] [2.55] 
AFC 1997 -0.078 -0.095 -0.079 -0.078 -0.095 -0.079 -0.078 -0.095* -0.079 
 [-0.42] [-1.01] [-0.92] [-0.38] [-0.83] [-0.75] [-0.51] [-1.38] [-1.30] 
GFC 2008 -0.010 0. 010 -0.010 -0. 010 0.010 -0. 010 -0.010 0.010 -0.010 
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 [-0.082] [0.044] [-0.10] [-0.044] [0.022] [-0.051] [-0.052] [0.035] [-0.089] 
Additional country-level variables  
FMS 
-0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11** -0.11** -0.11** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
 
[-2.41] [-2.58] [-2.53] [-1.92] [-2.07] [-2.02] [-2.96] [-3.69] [-3.73] 
MS 
0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 [7.13] [7.10] [7.06] [4.45] [4.44] [4.42] [8.19] [8.49] [8.33] 
Dummy Effects 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
Constant 1.17** 1.12*** 1.16*** 1.17** 1.12*** 1.16*** 1.17* 1.12*** 1.16*** 
 
[2.25] [4.95] [4.97] [1.83] [3.70] [3.84] [1.51] [2.56] [2.74] 
Observations 
2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
P-value of F-statistic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number of Clusters 267 267 267 124 124 124 165 165 165 
Diagnostics 
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.96 0.42 N/A 0.98 0.64 N/A 0.97 0.65 N/A 
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.30 0.01 N/A 0.28 0.01 N/A 0.30 0.01 N/A 
Note: Firm-level variables and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust Z -statistics in brackets donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail and are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Error terms are clustered by one- and two-clusters as displayed under every model. 
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Recently, Chen et al. (2017) also show that in developing stock markets such as China some IPO 
issuers suffer from the exploitation of influential investment banks. The authors show that 
powerfully connected underwriters charge IPO issuers higher underwriting fees compared to non-
connected underwriters for the same service they offer.  
 
Collectively, the findings attribute differences in level of the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion 
cost, and ex-ante uncertainty across the G20 countries and developed G20 IPOs to the occurrence 
of underpricing difference. Yet, in developing G20 stock markets, the EWL theory does not hold 
well in explaining underpricing variance. This research uncovers significant evidence documenting 
the endogenous underwriting-underpricing relationship in the global IPO market and between 
developed stock markets. However, this endogenous association does not exist in developing IPO 
markets. Instead, evidence of spinning behaviour is observed where high-status underwriters in 
developing stock markets charge IPO firms large underwriting fee, in turn, they leave large amount 
of money on the table for investors to cash it out at the expense of IPO owners. Entrepreneur 
founders in developing countries seem not to be upset by this practice because they simply do not 
care much about their wealth losses given that they obtain a successful listing. This is because, 
contrary to their developed country counterparts, developing23 IPO issuers, on average, sell 1% and 
create 10% less secondary and primary shares when they go public, respectively. This is likely to 
justify why IPO firms domiciled in a developing G20 economy incur larger discount premiums by 
up to 19%.    
 
2.9. Concluding Remarks  
This chapter contributed to the ongoing debate in the IPO underpricing literature explaining 
differences in underpricing in the global IPO market. Here this research combined two broadly 
separated strands of literature. On one hand, the first strand provided fragmented results about the 
endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. Conversely, the 
second strand focused on detecting the existence of one- and two-way clustering in error terms 
amongst IPO observations without proper econometric adjustment. Hence, the author provided the 
                                                 
23 This is evident according to the results in Table 7 referring to the mean equality test between developed and 
developing nations in relation to the PR and DF variables.  
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first empirical evidence for the simultaneous effect of one-way and two-way clustering on the 
endogenous underwriter-underpricing relationship in the global IPO market. Joining those two 
strands of literature allowed the author to investigate important issues that could explain part of the 
mystifying phenomenon of underpricing difference in the global IPO market. Firstly, this thesis 
examined if the witnessed dispersion in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market is related to the 
failure to capture the endogenous effect of underwriter reputation on underpricing. Secondly, the 
author investigated if this underpricing difference is related to not capturing the effect of one- and 
two-way clustering in standard errors within years, industries, countries, and developed versus 
developing countries. Thirdly, this research examined if the global IPO underpricing difference is 
related to not capturing the simultaneous effect of endogeneity and clustering in the IPO data. 
 
The three dimensions of the EWL theory were used to construct three research hypotheses that 
seek to answer the research questions. Those dimensions contained the incentive of IPO issuers, 
promotion costs, and ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering. This theory was chosen because 
it is the only one that captures the endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO 
underpricing built on asymmetric information explanation. This research employed a global dataset 
comprising 10,217 IPO-issuing firms from 22 developed and developing countries that operate 
within 33 industries between January 1995 and December 2016. To carry out the analysis, this 
thesis gradually employed a battery of empirical estimations including 48 OLS and 2SLS versions 
with one- and two-way clustering estimations while accounting for omitted variable bias, shared 
correlations in residuals between developed and developing economies, and existence of outliers. 
The aim of employing those models was to arrive at a reliable conclusion, i.e. if the observed 
variations in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market are linked to ignoring the endogenous 
relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing.  
 
This chapter emphasised that understanding IPO underpricing variance is a problematic topic in 
cross-country settings. Yet, the author capitalised on the three stages of econometric examination 
carried out by this study including the use of robust OLS, 2SLS, and one- and two-way clustered 
robust 2SLS models to disentangle part of this enigma. From an international perspective, this 
study attributed significant differences in IPO underpricing to the three dimensions of the EWL 
theory. This research confirmed that an increase by one percent in the incentive of IPO issuers 
results in lowering underpricing by up to 1.4%. Moreover, the findings uncovered significant 
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evidence showing that when entrepreneur founders of IPO firms endogenously choose to hire high-
status underwriters they successfully reduce their underpricing by up to 12%. This thesis also 
discovered robust evidence demonstrating that when the ex-ante uncertainty about IPO firms 
increases, IPO issuers experience higher underpricing. This is because the results revealed that IPO 
owners who list their firms when the pre-IPO stock market volatility is higher by one percent, on 
average, suffer greater IPO discount by 5%. More evidence reported showing that when the length 
of elapsed time between setting the offer price and first trading day increases by one unit, 
underpricing falls by 3.3%. The findings confirmed the observation that an increase in the size of 
the IPO firms by one unit also leads to reduced underpricing by 2.2% across countries. 
 
The persisting refutation of the underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship that this research 
encountered whenever the author accounts for clustering in error terms between G20 stock markets 
motivated this thesis to dig deeper. After the author achieved complete separation of the influence 
of correlations between developed versus developing G20 countries, this research discovered 
remarkable evidence. In developed stock markets, the findings revealed that dissimilarity in IPO 
underpricing is related to the three dimensions of the EWL theory while it is attributed to something 
else in developing nations. For example, the evidence showed that an increase in the incentive of 
developed IPO issuers by one percent leads to reducing underpricing by up to 1.1%. This thesis 
also found that the endogenous choice of prestigious underwriters by IPO owners reduces 
underpricing by 4.2% in developed equity markets. The underpricing of IPO firms increases by up 
to 2.5% when the level of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO firm increases by one unit in 
these advanced economies.  
 
In contrast, in developing equity markets, the findings documented that the endogenous 
underwriting-underpricing link is absent and has no effect on underpricing difference. Instead, the 
results provided significant evidence made this thesis inclined toward the possibility that 
underpricing difference is attributed to the spinning behaviour only within developing countries. 
The evidence this research uncovered pointed to this scenario because this research found that 
entrepreneur founders of IPO firms in developing nations incurred the cost of hiring reputable 
underwriters paying them high underwriting fees. In turn, instead of receiving lower discount, IPO 
firms suffered greater underpricing by 4.7% when hiring prestigious underwriters compared to non-
reputable underwriting banks. The results related this finding to the lack of care IPO issuers 
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illustrated about their willingness to accept wealth losses. Consequently, the results attributed the 
significant difference in underpricing of 19% between developed and developing stock markets to 
the variation in the incentive of IPO issuers when going public. This is because, on average, unlike 
their counterparts in developed economies, the evidence this thesis uncovered showed that owners 
of IPO firms in developing countries sell 1% and create 10% less secondary and primary shares 
when they go public, respectively.   
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 The Modifier Effect of Country-level Transparency on 
Global Underpricing Difference: New Hierarchical Evidence 
3.1. Introduction  
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) occurs when the share price for a newly listed firm 
on its first trading day exceeds its offer price. This underpricing is a documented global 
phenomenon with notably varying levels of underpricing distinctions across countries (Engelen & 
van Essen 2010; Banerjee et al. 2011; Judge et al. 2014; Boulton et al. 2017). For instance, 
Loughran et al. (1994) report periodic global underpricing figures across 54 nations dated January 
9, 2018. Specifically, they document the following for average initial return: 16% in the United 
States, 33.1% in Brazil, 21.8% in Australia, 145.4% in China, 6.5% in Canada, 7.4% in Denmark, 
50.80% in Greece, 88% in India, 24.90% in Indonesia, 44.70% in Japan, 270.1% in the United 
Arab of Emirates, and 16% in the United Kingdom, etc. This wide underpricing dispersion 
emphasises the importance of understanding well what contributes to differences in IPO 
underpricing across countries by looking at country-specific characteristics (Boulton et al. 2010). 
This is because a nation’s business environment is likely to be shaped and influenced by the formal 
institutional set-up it has put in place (Hopp & Dreher 2013). 
 
The law and finance literature was advanced by La Porta et al. (1997) and La Porta et al. (2002). 
The authors established and demonstrated the vital impact of formal institutional environments, 
such as the quality of a nation’s legal system or its level of transparency or its level of governance, 
on various corporate finance activities. This enabled the IPO literature to account for the impact of 
country-specific transparency characteristics on IPO underpricing difference from nation to nation. 
Two conflicting strands of law and IPO underpricing literature emerge to examine the association 
between variations in country-level formal institutional24 environments and the phenomenon of 
underpricing difference across countries.    
                                                 
24 The intersection of the law and finance literature measures differences in the formal institutional environments by 
variations in country-level legal system or governance or transparency aspects. Hence, these terms are used 
interchangeably by the law and IPO underpricing literature and also by this thesis.  
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The first strand employs OLS-based econometric modelling providing fragmented results in 
relation to the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship. This school of thought, for example, 
employs a number of country-level formal institutional measures including creditors’ rights, 
property rights, efficient judicial system, public enforcement mechanisms, rule of law, anti-self-
dealing, control of corruption, and voice and accountability. For instance, Boulton et al. (2010), 
Banerjee et al. (2011), Hopp and Dreher (2013), and Autore et al. (2014) provide contradictory 
evidence from being significantly positive to negative to being insignificant at all. This makes any 
understanding of the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship problematic. Therefore, it 
becomes unclear if the observed differences in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market are due 
to: firstly, a weakness in country-level transparency; secondly, a reinforcement of country-level 
transparency; or thirdly, a difference in country-level transparency is basically indeterminate to the 
IPO market. This motivates this thesis to pose the following question: could the observed 
differences in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market be related to the variability in country-
level transparency? 
 
The second group of the law and IPO underpricing literature is only represented by the work of 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) who demonstrate that IPO data has an unobservable hierarchical 
structure. These authors contend that ignoring the hierarchical structure of the IPO data leads to 
biased results. This creates a lack of methodological credibility in the findings of prior law and IPO 
underpricing literature that employed OLS-based modelling (Engelen & van Essen 2010). This is 
because OLS-based estimation does not capture the nesting structure in the IPO data. This 
hierarchical or nesting structure implies that IPO firms within a country could be more alike, on 
average, than IPO firms from different countries. These within-country IPOs, for example, share 
similar country-level transparency characteristics that differ from other IPO firms listed in other 
nations. For example, the notion of the hierarchical structure postulates that IPOs listed in China 
should share similar low country-level investor protection characteristics in comparison to high 
country-level investor protection characteristics observed in Australia. This implies that error terms 
between IPOs listed in Australia are likely to correlate because they share a similar level of 
transparency, likewise for China. Not accounting for the impact of sharing similar country-level 
transparency characteristics would lead to a violation of the assumption of independence of 
observations in statistical models, leading to biased results (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). 
 
102 
 
In nesting structure data such as IPO data, the independence assumption is frequently violated, 
encouraging OLS-based models to provide biased standard errors that are too small for the 
parameters estimates (Twisk 2006; Judge et al. 2014). Hox et al. (2018) argues that fixing the 
intercept of a model implies that observations only belong to one nest of which observations are 
scattered amongst unobserved several nests. The issue of nesting and hierarchical structure has a 
severe effect on standard errors as such data implies that error terms should be correlated within a 
nest or hierarchy. However, between nests or hierarchies are uncorrelated and this subsequently 
produces inflated T-statistic values, leading to erroneous conclusions being drawn from over-
rejecting the true null hypothesis (Cameron & Miller 2015). Engelen and van Essen (2010) also 
argue that studies that employ OLS method aggregate the results by pooling all observations, 
creating a mean intercept for the entire model. They find that once they allow the intercept to vary 
across 21 countries, they find a statistically negative relationship between country-level legal 
system and underpricing across countries of which the variability in those 21 countries explained 
10% of the underpricing difference. This leads the auhtor to pose the following hypothetical 
question; did failure to recognise the hierarchical structure of the IPO data lead to fragmentation in 
results of previous law and IPO underpricing literature in relation to the true nature of the 
transparency-IPO underpricing relationship? Stated differently, could the observed differences in 
IPO underpricing in the global IPO market be related to the variability in country-level 
transparency if the hierarchical structure in the IPO data is empirically captured? 
 
The distinguished empirical work of Engelen and van Essen (2010) has a number of limitations 
might affect their generalisability and reliability. Firstly, they did not recognise the time-variant25 
property of country-level transparency, and secondly, employed IPO data that is largely dominated 
by developed countries. Thirdly, they did not control for the endogenous relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing, and fourthly, they neglected the importance of a 
possible modifier effect of inter-temporal “time-variant” changes in country-level transparency on 
the behaviour underpricing determinants. These issues could well impact on the relationship 
between firm-level variables and IPO underpricing across countries. This motivates this research 
to pose the following question; can capturing the modifier effect of inter-temporal changes in 
country-level transparency provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of underpricing 
                                                 
25 This thesis uses the terms ‘time-variant’ and ‘inter-temporal changes’ interchangeably in this thesis since they both 
refer to changes over time. 
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difference in the global IPO market? This thesis attempts to answer some of those questions in this 
chapter. 
 
In this chapter, the author bridges the two literature strands by providing exhaustive empirical 
evidence for the modifier effect of inter-temporal changes in country-level transparency on the 
underpricing difference across countries. Specifically, this chapter aims to find if the perceived 
differences in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market are due to: the direct effect of inter-
temporal changes in transparency across countries; indirect effect of inter-temporal changes in 
country-level transparency on IPO underpricing; or to both while accounting for the simultaneous 
direct and indirect effects.  
 
Here, a number of deliberate departures from the current empirical literature are noted. First, this 
research employs 34 Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) models with random intercept only, 
random intercept with firm-level variables, and random intercept and random slope coefficient 
while controlling for various firm-level factors. This robust examination is undertaken for the 
purpose of investigating the direct influence of time-variant changes in country-level transparency 
on underpricing difference in the global IPO market using the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses 
(EWL) theory, which seeks to explain the endogenous underwriter-underpricing relationship. More 
importantly, this research examines if the variability in country-level transparency significantly 
modifies the relationship between IPO underpricing and firm-level covariates. This thesis also 
examines the nature of the endogenous underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship in varying 
transparency environments. This allows the author to extend the empirical testing for the EWL 
theory by understanding how the relationship between the theory and the phenomenon of 
underpricing difference in the G20 countries may vary in terms of variability in country-level 
transparency. Second, this research employs a large set of global IPO underpricing data comprising 
10,217 firms from 22 advanced and emerging countries that were listed between January 1995 and 
December 2016. Employing this global dataset helps this thesis to produce the first comprehensive 
cross-country study examining the impact of the nesting structure of the IPO data across different 
transparency nests. It also assists in explaining the underpricing difference in a global context.  
 
The results confirm that by accounting for the hierarchical structure of the IPO data, 22%, 25%, 
and 5% of the variations in IPO underpricing are attributed to differences between all G20 (22 
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economies), developing G20 (10 economies), and 12 developed G20 (12 economies) countries, 
respectively. By employing five time-variant country-level transparency proxies including voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption, this research manages to explain up to 35% of the variability in IPO underpricing across 
G20 countries. Most importantly, this thesis provides a solid confirmation of the negative impact 
of time-variant variability in country-level transparency in reducing underpricing differences 
across the G20 countries. Hence, the results confirm that treating country-level formal institutional 
quality as time-invariant factor leads to biased conclusions. This finding has a serious implication 
for Engelen and van Essen (2010) in that these authors disregard the time-variant nature of changes 
in the quality of legal system across countries when deriving their underpricing difference results. 
The results provide new evidence linking the enhancement of formal institutional quality to wield 
an indirect influence on IPO underpricing in three possible ways. The first is by increasing the 
relationship between underpricing and the incentive of IPO issuers by up 1.4%. The second is 
marked by curtailing the relationship between underpricing and high-status underwriters by up to 
12%. The third way is by weakening the connection between underpricing and ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding the offering by up to 5% for every unit increase in transparency. Hence, the work 
confirms that capturing the simultaneous direct and indirect effects of variability in country-level 
formal institutional quality is very important in understanding the global underpricing difference 
in the primary market. 
 
Additionally, more profound analysis of the split sample revealed that the dissimilarities in 
transparency factors elucidate up to 28% of underpricing difference within developing G20 
economies. Contrarily, this research finds that only characteristics of firms in emerging economies 
elucidate up 8% of the underpricing difference. Not found here is any association between 
differences in country-level transparency and underpricing variance within developed G20 
economies. This is perhaps because advanced economies already attain a mature level of 
transparency in their equity markets. Thus, any small improvements in a country’s governance 
performance do not reflect on their stock markets in contrast to emerging countries. The findings 
also document that the three dimensions of the EWL theory partially explain underpricing 
dissimilarity across G20 countries when transparency is in play. This is because this research finds 
only support for the incentive of IPO issuers and ex-ante uncertainty in affecting IPO underpricing 
while the role of high-status underwriters is insignificant across the 22 largest economies. The 
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theory has only a minor relevance to advanced and emerging G20 countries as well. This is because 
the author only attains support for the first dimension of the EWL model, the incentive of IPO 
issuers, in explaining IPO underpricing variance within developed and developing G20 countries. 
Although the results affirm the endogenous relationship between reputable underwriters and 
underpricing, the influence of high-status underwriters emerges as significantly and negatively 
related to underpricing only in advanced economies. Remarkably, when country-level formal 
institutional quality is in play, the findings reveal that prestigious underwriters in developing equity 
markets exploit the availability of fragile legal system in their nations. Therefore, they deliberately 
underprice issuers. This is possibly done to benefit themselves and their buy-side institutional 
investors. This finding encouraged the auhtor to assert that in such countries with a weak formal 
institutional environment, owners of IPO firms will be undermined in their intention to sue 
fraudulent underwriting banks when deliberate underpricing is evident.  
 
The results thus suggest the probable existence of spinning behaviour in developing IPO markets. 
The findings reveal that this practice likely exists because IPO firms tolerate the expense of 
employing reputable underwriters and instead of attaining lower underpricing, IPOs underwritten 
by prestigious underwriters suffer from greater underpricing. Finally, this research finds the 
relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing contradicts the prediction of the EWL 
model within developed and emerging countries. This implies that in a cross-country setting, IPO 
underpricing difference is more closely related to differences in country-level formal institutional 
quality while firm-level determinants play a less important role. The confidence in the results 
remained intact after executing a series of robustness tests, including additional firm and country-
level covariates, and performing several diagnostic tests. 
 
Taken together, the results contribute to the growing but fragmented body of literature that 
examines the relationship between differences in country-level formal institutional quality on 
underpricing difference in the IPO market. The notable studies on this context, for example, 
include: Boulton et al. (2010), Banerjee et al. (2011), Hopp and Dreher (2013), Autore et al. (2014), 
and Hearn (2014). In a more focused way, the study contributes to the intersection of law and IPO 
underpricing literature that captures the importance of the hierarchical structure of the IPO data, 
while testing the direct and indirect effects of differences in country-level formal institutional 
quality on underpricing difference. This is evident only in the analysis conducted by the 
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distinguished work of Engelen and van Essen (2010) which the author extends in this study. This 
is done by accounting for the modifier effect of inter-temporal changes in country-level 
transparency on affecting the relationship between firm-level variables and IPO underpricing 
across nations. 
  
Second, this research contributes to several strands of literature that utilise data suffering from the 
nesting effect in error terms while examining the effect of differences in country-level formal 
institutional quality on different capital market outcomes. For instance, scholars in the field of IPO 
activity (Lewellyn & Bao 2014; Gupta et al. 2018), financial stability (Anginer et al. 2018), 
capitalisation strategies for banks (Anginer et al. 2016), mergers and acquisitions (Bris et al. 2008; 
Dang et al. 2018), and seasonal equity offering (Gupta et al. 2013; Fauver et al. 2017) all document 
the presence of a nesting structure in their data while investigating the impact of differences in 
institutional quality across countries without proper econometric adjustment. Such studies may 
benefit from the results which tackles econometrically the modifier effect of inter-temporal changes 
in country-level institutional quality in affecting the relationship between their independent and 
dependent variables. Furthermore, the results can benefit IPO issuers and investors in 
understanding the direct and indirect effects of differences in country-level formal institutional 
quality on underpricing difference in the global IPO market. For example, based on the findings, 
IPO issuers and investors can better understand that when the degree of transparency in a country 
is low then the positive impact of ex-ante uncertainty on underpricing increases, in turn triggering 
higher investor demand for underpricing.  
 
Consequently, the low degree of country-level transparency works as a positive modifier effect in 
increasing the magnitude of the positive association between the ex-ante uncertainty of IPO 
investors and underpricing across countries. This surely allows IPO issuers and investors to 
articulate informed investment decisions. Policy-makers in G20 countries, specifically within 
developing economies, are interested in expanding their local stock markets. This of course would 
support their local economic growth plans where the growth of IPOs is seen as a fundamental tool 
in ensuring perpetual stock market growth (Tian 2011; Jamaani & Roca 2015). Thus, policy-
makers in the G20 markets will benefit from a better understanding of the extent to which their 
country-level transparency can economically affect underpricing in local stock markets. The results 
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offer them the opportunity to make the proper adjustment to reduce the impact of lack of 
transparency on their stock market growth. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents a brief literature review on the impact of 
country-level transparency on underpricing using OLS-based estimation. Section 3.3 discusses 
related literature on the impact of country-level transparency on underpricing using HLM-based 
estimation. Section 3.4 presents the research questions and hypothesis development. Sections 3.5 
and 3.6 outline the data and methodology employed in this chapter. Sections 3.7 and 3.8 present 
the empirical results and concluding remarks, respectively.    
 
3.2. Related Literature on the Impact of Country-level Transparency 
on Underpricing Using OLS-based Estimation 
The law and finance literature has been advanced by the work of La Porta et al. (1997) and La Porta 
et al. (2002), who have recognised and confirmed the significant influence of variations in the 
formal institutional environments, such as differences in countries’ legal system, on several 
corporate finance activities across countries. The prominence of differences in the quality of formal 
institutional framework in shaping country-level transparency environments that affect the 
information asymmetry environment and its impact on investment decisions and asset pricing, has 
been increasing in the finance literature. There is a significant strand of empirical research linking 
the existence of good transparency at the country-level with a decrease in the information 
asymmetry problem at the country-level, resulting in the following: an increase in investment 
attraction (Globerman & Shapiro 2003; Razin & Sadka 2007); reduced excessive capital flow 
volatility (Wei & Shleifer 2000; Gelos & Wei 2005); lower investor herding behaviour (Gelos & 
Wei 2002; Zhou & Lai 2009); enhanced market valuation (La Porta et al. 2002; Klapper & Love 
2004); improved stock market liquidity (Brockman & Chung 2003; Pagano & Volpin 2012); 
reduced cost of equity capital (Easley & O'hara 2004; Chen et al. 2009); reduced susceptibility of 
a country’s financial markets to a crash (Johnson et al. 2000; Mitton 2002); and finally, enhanced 
credit rating (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  
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The law literature facilitates the IPO literature to account for the influence of country-specific 
institutional environments26 such as transparency characteristics on IPO underpricing across 
jurisdictions. In the pursuit of this understanding, a law and IPO underpricing literature arises. 
Conceptually, this literature in general attributes variations in underpricing across countries to the 
existence of weak legal environments reflecting the existence of weak transparency environments 
that increase the information asymmetry problem among IPO parties. The consequence of this is 
increased investment uncertainty, and higher demand for underpricing to compensate for legal risk 
as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: The Relationship Between Country-level Transparency and IPO Underpricing 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
The conceptualisation of the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship is assumed to be a 
negative one by the law and IPO underpricing literature. In practice, this literature progresses into 
two methodological strands producing fragmented empirical results about the true nature of the 
transparency-IPO underpricing relationship. The first strand employs transparency measures using 
OLS-based econometric models, while the second strand argues for the lack of efficiency of OLS 
models in capturing the nesting structure of the IPO data. Here it uses HLM estimation instead.  
                                                 
26 The intersection of the law and finance literature measures differences in institutional environments by variations in 
country-level governance or transparency or legal aspects. Hence, three terms - governance or legal or transparency - 
are used interchangeably by the law and IPO underpricing literature.   
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The first strand of the law and IPO underpricing literature employs OLS-based econometric 
modelling providing fragmented results in relation to the transparency-IPO underpricing 
relationship. This makes the ability to understand this relationship challenging. For instance, 
Boulton et al. (2010) use 4,462 IPOs across 29 countries from 2000 to 2004 to examine how 
differences in country-level governance influence the underpricing of IPO firms. They employ a 
number of country-level transparency proxies including creditors’ rights, property rights, 
efficiency of judiciary system, public enforcement mechanisms, rule of law, and anti-self-dealing. 
Boulton et al. (2010) find contradictory evidence fluctuating from being significantly positive to 
negative to being insignificant at all. For example, the authors document a significantly positive 
association between the level of creditors and property rights and the level of IPO underpricing 
across those 29 countries. In contrast, the results indicate a significantly negative relationship 
between the level of public enforcement mechanisms and rule of law with the underpricing of IPO 
firms across countries. Boulton et al. (2010) find no relationship between the efficiency of judiciary 
system and anti-self-dealing with differences in underpricing across their sample.  
 
Banerjee et al. (2011) employ a larger set of data using 8,776 IPO listed in 36 countries between 
2000 and 2006 to examine differences in underpricing across different transparency environments. 
The authors measure the level of transparency in a country by the effectiveness of contract 
enforcement mechanisms and accessibility of legal recourse. Banerjee et al. (2011) add more 
fragmentary understanding to the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship. They show that the 
higher the level of effective contract enforcement mechanisms the lower asymmetric information 
problem amongst IPO parties. In turn, this leads to significantly less underpricing across countries. 
In contrast, the authors document a significantly positive relationship between the accessibility of 
legal recourse and the level of underpricing across the 36 countries. Hopp and Dreher (2013) also 
aim to investigate the impact of differences in the formal institutional environments on equity 
markets of 24 countries using 500 country-year observations between 1988 and 2005. The authors 
provide additional contradictory evidence widening the lack of understanding to the true nature of 
the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship. While Hopp and Dreher (2013) find higher 
underpricing in jurisdictions with stronger investor protection mechanisms, they document lower 
underpricing in countries with a stronger law enforcement mechanism and availability of quality 
accounting information. 
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Autore et al. (2014) argue that the employment of time-invariant transparency measures by 
previous law and IPO underpricing literature biases the results about the true nature of the 
transparency-IPO underpricing relationship. Hence, they contend that omitting the time-variant 
nature of differences in institutional environments across countries plays a major role in observing 
the fragmentary results by prior studies. Autore et al. (2014) employ 7,397 IPOs offered in 37 
countries between 1998 and 2008 to investigate the impact of time-variability in institutional 
quality on explaining differences in underpricing in the global IPO market. The authors measure 
the variability in country-level transparency by the annual change in voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption in 37 jurisdictions. They conclude the existence of overall significant evidence 
documenting a positive relationship between country-level transparency and IPO underpricing. 
However, the results of Autore et al. (2014) report the existence of a significantly positive 
association between the level of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of 
corruption. In contrast, the results show no significant relationship to exist between the 
underpricing of IPO firms and the level of voice and accountability, political stability, and rule of 
law.  
 
Opposing empirical evidence about the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship is still reported. 
Nonetheless Hearn (2014) argues for the importance of avoiding omitted variable bias in the law 
and IPO underpricing literature due to the employment of time-invariant transparency measures; 
the author also produces fragmented results, using 86 IPO firms from across six North African 
countries between 2000 and 2013. The author employs six time-variant country-level transparency 
proxies similar to the ones used by Autore et al. (2014). Hearn (2014) finds underpricing declines 
when corruption is better controlled, and effective government, political stability, and rule of law 
are in place. In contrast, the results show no association existing between differences in IPO 
underpricing and the level of regulatory quality and voice and accountability. Hearn’s (2014) 
results contradict those of Autore et al. (2014), although they employ the same country-level time-
variant transparency measures.  
 
Understanding the true relationship between differences in country-level transparency and IPO 
underpricing across countries remains problematic in the law and IPO underpricing literature. 
Hence, it becomes ambiguous if the perceived variations in IPO underpricing in the global IPO 
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market are related to either: a flaw in country-level transparency; a toughening up of country-level 
transparency; or a variation in country-level transparency having no relationship to the IPO market.  
 
3.3. Related Literature on the Impact of Country-level Transparency 
on Underpricing Using HLM-based Estimation 
The second strand of the law and IPO underpricing literature that employs the application of the 
HLM modelling is represented only by the work of Engelen and van Essen (2010). These authors 
advanced the methodological limitation of the law and IPO underpricing literature by accounting 
for the nesting structure of the IPO data. Engelen and van Essen (2010) employ 2,921 IPO firms 
nested within 21 countries between 2000 and 2005 by allowing the intercept to vary across 21 
countries. They explained the variability of the intercept by differences in country-level 
transparency on the underpricing across countries. Engelen and van Essen (2010) measure the level 
of transparency or the quality of a country’s legal framework by the observed annual level of anti-
self-dealing index, rule of law control for corruption, legal enforcement, and legal origin in every 
country.  
 
The authors employ a combination of the winner’s curse hypothesis proposed by Rock (1986) and 
ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis proposed by Beatty and Ritter (1986). To visualise the concept of 
allowing the intercept to vary across nests such as countries or industries or years, Figure 9 provides 
a hypothetical example of what Engelen and van Essen (2010) achieved by using a HLM model 
with random intercept and fixed slope coefficients. The authors argued that once they allow the 
intercept to vary across 21 countries, they find a statistically and consistently negative relationship 
between country-level transparency and underpricing across countries of which the variability in 
those 21 countries explained 10% of the underpricing difference in their sample. 
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Figure 9: The Relationship Between Country-level Transparency and IPO Underpricing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
However, other studies accounted for the nesting structure of the IPO data to explain underpricing 
difference in the IPO market including Luo (2008) and Judge et al. (2014). Yet, they do not examine 
the transparency-IPO-underpricing relationship. For example, Luo (2008) employs 1,981 IPOs 
listed in the United States stock market from 1996 to 2005, examining the nesting structure of IPO 
firms that nested within different industries. It was achieved by allowing the intercept to vary across 
industries to explain underpricing through the pre-IPO variability in marketing spendings for every 
industry. Judge et al. (2014) also apply HLM accounting for the nesting structure of the IPO data 
by allowing the intercept to vary across 17 countries using 927 IPOs between 2006 and 2008. They 
employ differences in the management knowledge base to explain these differences in 
underpricing. However, there are a number of limitations in the results reported by Luo (2008) and 
Judge et al. (2014) that make them difficult to be generalisable. Luo (2008) examines the impact 
of variability in marketing spendings across industries in the United States while Judge et al. (2014) 
focus on the variability of knowledge-based management across 17 countries in affecting 
differences in IPO underpricing. The former employs marketing-based theories developed by 
Srivastava et al. (1998) and Rust et al. (2004) while the latter employs knowledge-based 
management theory that does not account for the information asymmetry between IPO parties. 
Thus, they provide no understanding of the impact of the variability in country-level transparency 
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in explaining underpricing difference across countries. Hence, the empirical work of Luo (2008) 
and Judge et al. (2014) cannot be generalised to the law and IPO underpricing literature.   
 
To date, the law and IPO underpricing literature that accounts for the nesting structure of the IPO 
data is only represented by the unparalleled work of Engelen and van Essen (2010)27, which has a 
number of limitations. First, Engelen and van Essen (2010) treat country-level transparency as a 
time invariant factor while in fact it is a time-variant factor. For example, they employ a number 
of country-level transparency measures, such as a rule of law index developed by the World 
Economic Forum. The index measures the extent to which individuals have assurance in and abide 
by the rules of society. The rule of law index includes elements that measure the incidence of 
violence, the effectiveness of judicial independence, and the legal enforcement of contracts. The 
authors used pooled average values for the rule of law index of 21 countries only for 2002 when 
examining IPO underpricing across these countries with IPO data between 2000 and 2005. This 
implies that they assume that rule of law in a country does not change over time. The World 
Economic Forum (2017) argues that country-level transparency proxies are time-variant factors, 
for example, showing the judicial independence for Chile, Brazil, Bangladesh, and South Korea 
from 2006 to 2014 has mean (standard deviation) values of 4.9 (55%), 3.54 (32%), 2.88 (45%), 
and 4.07 (56%) out of a total of 7, respectively.  
 
In this regard, De la Torre et al. (2007) and Autore et al. (2014) argue that the status of country-
level transparency varies over the course of time causing dramatic effects on capital market reforms 
over the last decade. This implies that the employment of contemporaneous measures provides an 
accurate portrayal of the relationship between institutional quality and IPO underpricing. In fact, 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) acknowledge this limitation by stating that “future research should 
look into the evolution of the institutional framework through time and its impact on IPO 
underpricing”. Hence, the result of Engelen and van Essen (2010) is likely to suffer from omitted 
                                                 
27 Recently, Zattoni et al. (2017) employ HLM modelling to capture the nesting structure of the IPO data. This is to 
investigate the influence of rule of law and power distance in a nation on the relationship between board independence 
and long-term performance “one-year” after the IPO has been listed in the secondary market. The authors use 1,024 
firms listed between 2006 and 2008 in 18 countries. This thesis argues that the work of Zattoni et al. (2017) is 
completely different from this study. This is because this thesis examines the problem of short-term performance “IPO 
underpricing” of IPOs calculated as the difference from offer price and the closing price of the IPO share on its first 
trading day. In contrast, Zattoni et al. (2017) compute the long-term performance which is calculated as a one-year 
buy-and-hold abnormal market return for each IPO from the closing price of the firm on its first trading day.  
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variable bias as they omitted the time-variability of their transparency measures. Thus, their 
findings may not be reliable.  
 
The second limitation is that the IPO data employed by Engelen and van Essen (2010) is largely 
dominated by developed countries. Thus, it may suffer from a lack of generalisability since their 
developing countries data represents less than 3% of their total data (92 out of 2,921). One possible 
explanation for the limited inclusion of developing market IPOs in previous empirical studies 
including Engelen and van Essen (2010), is that they restricted their sample selection to IPOs with 
offer price being no lower than $5. Interestingly, when this thesis replicates similar selection 
criteria that limit offer price to IPOs to more than $5 as stated in Engelen and van Essen (2010), 
the research sample drops from 10,217 to 2,457 observations (recall Engelen and van Essen’s 
(2010) sample is 2,921 observations). Thus, this research argues that limiting the offer price range 
to exclude offerings with less than a value of $5 leads to dropping a large number of IPOs in 
developing countries. The reason is that average offering price of developing market IPOs is far 
less than in developed markets such as the U.S. stock market. For example, Kim et al. (2004) find 
that average offer price for IPOs listed in Thailand is equivalent to approximately $2.8, while Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001) show that $11 is the average offer price in the U.S. IPO market and has been 
since 1970.  
 
The third limitation to the work of Engelen and van Essen (2010) is that they do not control for the 
endogeneity problem between underwriter reputation and underpricing. This is because they do not 
control employ underwriter reputation regressor in their HLM models. Thus, they ignore the fact 
that choice of the underwriter is an endogenous decision made by issuers of which this happens 
when issuers intend to sell part of their holding before going public, and ignoring this endogeneity 
leads to omitted variable bias as argued by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001).  
 
The fourth limiting characteristic of Engelen and van Essen (2010) is that they neglect the 
importance of a possible “modifier effect” of changes in country-level transparency in affecting 
the relationship between firm-specific variables and underpricing. Hence, it is possibly this 
“modifying effect” that could be responsible for the current differences in IPO underpricing across 
countries. To put this limitation into perspective, one can say that when country-level transparency 
is poor then a lack of trust between IPO parties exists. This leads to the information asymmetry 
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problem, and, in turn, resulting in maximisation in the ex-ante uncertainty problem among 
investors. Consequently, this poor level of country-level transparency increases investors’ ex-ante 
uncertainty requiring higher underpricing to alleviate this uncertainty. Therefore, this research 
argues that this modifier effect notion postulates that underpricing could be lower for IPO issuers, 
for example, who employ reputable underwriter and are simultaneously domiciled in a country 
with a high level of transparency. In contrast, IPO issuers who employ non-reputable underwriter 
and are simultaneously domiciled in a country with a low level of transparency will experience 
higher underpricing. That is, a weak level of transparency at the country-level adds more 
uncertainty to the existing level of uncertainty in the IPO market.  
 
To understand and capture this modifier effect, firm-level variables have to be allowed to vary 
across nests, for example, across countries and to be explained by the variability in country-level 
transparency. This means the employment of a full HLM model utilising both random intercept 
and random slope coefficients in two levels of IPO data where firm-level factors are the lower level 
and country-level factors are the higher level (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). Kayo and Kimura (2011) 
and Tennant and Sutherland (2014) allowed firm-level variables to be random across countries in 
examining the hierarchical explanation of determinants of capital structure for the former and to 
test the type of banks that profit most from fees charged for the latter. Therefore, the awareness of 
the modifier effect of inter-temporal changes in country-level transparency on the underpricing 
difference across countries is absent in the law and IPO underpricing literature. Stated differently, 
it is only vaguely understood if the observed variations in IPO underpricing across countries are: 
related to not controlling for the effect of inter-temporal changes in transparency across countries; 
or related to not controlling for the modifier effect of inter-temporal changes in country-level 
transparency; or related to not controlling for the simultaneous effects of both. 
 
3.4. Developing Hypothesis and Research Questions  
Building on the previous discussion, this chapter assesses the relevance of both firm- and country-
level characteristics in explaining the variance of IPO underpricing.  Specifically, this research 
tests the direct effect of time-variant variability in country-level transparency on explaining the 
underpricing difference in the global IPO market. This research also investigates the influence of 
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time-variant differences in country-level transparency on affecting the relationship between firm-
level variables and IPO underpricing across countries. These outcomes are achieved by employing 
the application of hierarchical linear modelling using two-level of covariates. For the lower level, 
the author of this thesis applies number of firm-level factors associated with the EWL theory – 
which has three examinable dimensions in order to examine differences in IPO underpricing across 
countries. Those dimensions include the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion costs, and ex-ante 
uncertainty surrounding the offering. For the upper level, this research employs five time-variant 
country-level transparency proxies related to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) 
published by Kaufmann et al. (2017). They include voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the control of corruption characteristics of 
nations. Based on this, this research pose four research questions as follows: 
 
Q1: Do differences in country-level transparency explain IPO underpricing difference 
across IPO markets?  
 
Q2: Do differences in country-level transparency influence the relationship between the 
incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing across IPO markets? 
 
Q3: Do differences in country-level transparency influence the relationship between 
promotion costs and underpricing across IPO markets? 
 
Q4: Do differences in country-level transparency influence the relationship between ex-
ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing across IPO markets? 
 
This research develops five hypotheses related to WGIs to answer the first research question related 
to direct influence of country-level transparency on IPO underpricing difference across IPO 
markets. The remaining three questions all intend to address the indirect “modifier” influence of 
differences in WGIs on the relationship between determining factors of IPO underpricing and 
underpricing difference from country to country. This thesis proposes five hypotheses to examine 
the influence of differences in WGIs on the link between the incentive of IPO issuers and 
underpricing across countries in order to answer the second research question. To address the third 
research question, another five hypotheses are developed to examine the influence of variability in 
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WGIs on the relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing difference. To provide 
an answer to the fourth question, this research also proposes another five hypotheses to evaluate 
the effect of differences in WGIs on the link between ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering 
and underpricing difference across IPO markets.  
 
3.4.1. The Direct Effect of Differences in Transparency on IPO 
Underpricing Difference   
3.4.1.1. Voice and Accountability 
The concept of voice and accountability is concerned with how a nation’s people believe that their 
government’s representatives and/or policy-makers value their opinion as worthy in relation to 
micro and macro government decisions (Kaufmann et al. 2017). It also captures how individuals 
in a state have a strong confidence in exercising their freedom to express their thoughts and 
communicate their affiliations to any party. Beck et al. (2004) have documented the influence of 
voice and accountability in a country beset by the information asymmetry problem. Houston et al. 
(2010) argue that the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media, affects 
the degree of trust or transparency existing between market participants. The more trustworthy or 
transparent a country is, the more it is perceived by investors to be transparent (Williams 2015). 
Investors in such countries that maintain a sound level of voice and accountability are likely to 
have a low level of ex-ante uncertainty about the freedom of business activities and the reliability 
of information from influences of government officials, firms, and well-connected citizens, as it 
affects the credibility of the business environment (Hearn 2012).  
 
When investors believe that their country has a high level of voice and accountability, then their 
ex-ante uncertainty about the destruction of information in that country will consequently mitigate 
the information asymmetry problem in their country (Autore et al. 2014). Buchanan et al. (2012) 
find that a good level of voice and accountability in a country increases the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and reduces FDI volatility. Hearn (2014) and Autore et al. (2014) find that when 
the degree of voice and accountability in a country is high then the level of ex-ante uncertainty 
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amongst IPO parties is expected to be lower. Consequently, this research expects IPO firms 
domiciled in nations with a high level of voice and accountability to experience less ex-ante 
uncertainty leading to lower IPO underpricing. Based on the above discussion, this thesis develops 
the first research hypothesis as follows; 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
The underpricing IPO firm that is nested in a nation with a high level of voice and accountability 
is expected to be low.  
 
3.4.1.2. Government Effectiveness 
The quality of government effectiveness reflects the overall quality of government services and the 
liberation of policy-making in a nation from the influence of powerful members (Kaufmann et al. 
2017). Beck et al. (2004) argue for the presence of a negative association between government 
effectiveness and the information asymmetry problem. Houston et al. (2010) contend that the 
transparency of a government is unlikely to be high when the following factors are also not high: 
quality of public sector services, quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies. Then the investors’ uncertainty about 
government transparency likewise will be affected. That is, when a government is not functioning 
effectively in terms of safeguarding the business environment from political pressures, then it 
becomes easy for a business or for a connected group of investors to obtain specific information 
(Williams 2015).  
 
This information is related to changes in government regulations and policies that may have an 
impact on their businesses before other affected parties (Hearn 2012). In such countries that lack 
an appropriate level of government effectiveness an asymmetric information problem emerges 
between market participants, including IPO parties. This leads to an increasing level of uncertainty 
being established among uninformed investors. Subsequently, this leads to greater required 
discount to offset this uncertainty (Hearn 2014). In turn, this research anticipate that IPO companies 
traded in stock markets where the level of government effectiveness is high to experience lower 
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level of ex-ante uncertainty. Consecutively, this results in lower IPO underpricing. The second 
research hypothesis is presented below; 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
The underpricing IPO firm that is nested in a nation with a high level of government effectiveness 
is expected to be low.  
 
3.4.1.3. Rule of Law 
The rule of law in a country reflects how market participants are convinced about the enforceability 
of law in business and other aspects of life (Kaufmann et al. 2017). The influentially negative 
impact of the rule of law on the presence of the asymmetric information problem and the creation 
of ex-ante uncertainty environment amongst investors is also documented in the literature 
(Banerjee et al. 2011; Hopp & Dreher 2013; Williams 2015). In their argument, those authors 
contended that when investors have good confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence, then the business and investment environment will be fair 
and transparent.  
 
Buchanan et al. (2012) uncover empirical evidence showing a positive relationship between the 
existence of a sound level of rule of law in a nation and an increase in FDI inflows and information 
symmetry. Helmke and Rosenbluth (2009), Drobetz et al. (2010), and Engelen and van Essen 
(2010) argue that the presence of an unfair and non-transparent business environment simply 
reflects weak rule of law. The authors contend that weak rule of law is blamed for triggering high 
asset volatility, high systemic risk, high earning management practices, and ineffective 
implementation of information disclosure regulations. Hearn (2011) and Hearn (2014) employed 
the rule of law as a proxy to examine the impact of transparency of a legal system and how it 
negatively affects information asymmetry amongst IPO parties. Thus, this thesis conjunctures that 
IPO firms nested within countries that provide a weak level of rule of law will experience greater 
investment uncertainty, and in turn, higher underpricing. Based on the above discussion, this 
research develops the third research hypothesis shown here; 
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Hypothesis 3:  
The underpricing IPO firm that is nested in a nation with a high level of rule of law is expected to 
be low. 
 
3.4.1.4. Regulatory Quality 
Kaufmann et al. (2017) define a nation that has a good standard of regulatory quality as being 
effective in articulating and implementing legislation that supports its private sector to flourish. 
Chen et al. (2011) find a positive association between the existence of weak government practices 
and increased level of information asymmetry in the business sector. Buchanan et al. (2012) 
discover evidence relating lower level of asymmetric information to a reduction in FDI volatility 
in a country with a good standard of regulatory quality. Bruton et al. (2010) argue that in the IPO 
process, the asymmetric information problem can introduce moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems between management and the new owners. Cumming et al. (2014) assert that the former 
occasionally has the incentive to mislead the latter. Thus, Houston et al. (2010) and Williams 
(2015) contend that the efficacy of a government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development can be seen as a realignment tool 
that works to enhance information communication and disclosure. Hearn (2014) finds that when 
the level of regulatory quality in a country is high then IPO firms suffer from lower level of 
asymmetric information problem. In turn, this research predicts that the availability of a sound level 
of regulatory quality in a country mitigates the asymmetric information problem amongst IPO 
parties resulting in lower underpricing. Based on the above discussion, posited here is the fourth 
research hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
The underpricing IPO firm that is nested in a nation with a high level of regulatory quality is 
expected to be low. 
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3.4.1.5. Control of Corruption  
Kaufmann et al. (2017) define a country for being a corrupt nation when public authority is utilise 
d wrongly on a frequent basis to attain private interest at the expense of the public. The degree of 
corruption in government officials is believed to cause an asymmetric information problem 
amongst market participants (Drobetz et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2013). According to Engelen and van 
Essen (2010), the presence of bribery and corruption among government officials could allow 
certain groups of corrupt investors to access public information related to specific classes of 
information that are not readily accessible by all market participants. That is, in a market where 
information related to a firm’s performance or related to changes in government regulation 
affecting the firm’s activities can be easily sold, then the corrupt group of investors will be 
informationally advantaged, “informed” over the other uncorrupted class “uninformed” of 
investors (Boulton et al. 2011). The presence of this informational gap between corrupt and 
uncorrupted investors would increase ex-ante uncertainty about the true value of firms (Hearn 
2012). Hearn (2014) empirically finds that IPOs offered in countries where public officials are 
corrupt suffer greater ex-ante uncertainty regarding their valuation uncertainty, in turn leading to a 
greater discount. Based on the above discussion, this research proposes the fifth research 
hypothesis below; 
 
Hypothesis 5:  
The underpricing IPO firm that is nested in a nation with a high level of control of corruption is 
expected to be low. 
 
3.4.2. The Indirect Effect of Differences in Transparency on IPO 
Underpricing Difference  
3.4.2.1. Relationship Between the Incentive of IPO Issuers and 
Underpricing 
There is a paucity of empirical research into the indirect effect of formal institutional quality 
concerning the relationship between determinants of IPO underpricing and the observed variance 
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in underpricing. Recently, Zattoni et al. (2017) examine the moderating effect of rule of law and 
how it influences the relationship between board independence and financial performance after the 
IPO listing. The authors employed HLM modelling for testing their indirect effect hypothesis using 
1,024 firms listed between 2006 and 2008 in 18 countries. They find that a high level of rule of law 
modifies the link between board independence and long-term performance of IPO firms. To 
visualise this modifying effect, Figure 10 below provides a hypothetical example of what Zattoni 
et al. (2017) achieved. 
 
Figure 10: HLM Model with Random Intercept and Random Slope Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
In this hypothetical example, every country presents the slope coefficient of the relationship 
between an independent variable, for example, pre-IPO stock market volatility and a dependent 
variable such as IPO underpricing in that country indicating the existence of a positive relationship. 
Having a number of slope coefficients at different levels implies that the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables is not constant as current law and finance literature assumes, 
in particular Engelen and van Essen (2010). By employing a full HLM model that includes random 
intercept and slope coefficient, Zattoni et al. (2017) conclude that differences in country-level 
characteristics significantly modify the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. Not accounting for this modifying effect leads to a lack of understanding of the true 
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relationship between the independent and dependent variables across different transparency 
environments as argued by Osborne (2000) and Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 
This research conjectures that the observed positive association between pre-IPO stock market 
volatility and underpricing is not the same across those countries. For example, a country with a 
slope coefficient coloured orange has a lower positive coefficient value than a country with a slope 
coefficient in gray. This is because the level of transparency in the country with the orange slope 
coefficient is poorer than the gray one. Therefore, the level of transparency across those countries 
modifies the strength of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables without 
changing its directional nature. The change in the strength of the relationship occurs because of the 
low transparency level in the country with the gray slope coefficient breeding extra ex-ante 
uncertainty. Here the slope coefficient takes on a larger value as the more the ex-ante uncertainty, 
the more investors will be concerned about the price of the IPO firm on its first listing data. Hence, 
they demand higher underpricing to subscribe at the initial offering.  
 
Building on the above rationale, this research anticipates that in a country with low voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the control of 
corruption, the influence of IPO issuers’ incentive to underprice is noticeably less. Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) find a negative association between both the 
percentage of secondary shares sold and primary shares created and underpricing. The authors 
measure the incentive of IPO issuers by the percentage of secondary shares sold and primary shares 
created. They gathered empirical evidence showing that the higher the percentage of secondary 
shares sold and primary shares created, the higher the incentives of issuers to limit underpricing. 
This research predicts that in such countries with a low level of transparency, the formation of an 
asymmetric information atmosphere will make entrepreneur founders worry more about wealth 
losses triggered by higher anticipated underpricing. Hence, IPO issuers in such nations will have 
less incentive to sell more of their holdings when they go public. That is, the existence of poor 
formal institutional quality in the country will consequently fuel the anxiety of IPO issuers when 
they decide to go public. This is because in a nation with a poor transparency environment, 
influential players in the IPO market including politically connected institutional investors and 
underwriting institutions can possibly influence the law to exploit IPO issuers. 
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Ljungqvist (2007) and Liu and Ritter (2010), for instance, gathered evidence showing that some 
IPO firms were deliberately underpriced and offered at a large discount to buy-side institutional 
investors by powerful underwriters seeking private benefits at the expense of issuers. In a country 
such as China which has a poor record of voice and accountability and relaxes or ignores the rules 
and regulations concerning transparent market practices, Chen et al. (2017) present current 
evidence documenting anticipated exploitation of IPO issuers’ wealth. The scholars gathered 
evidence presenting that politically affiliated underwriters charge entrepreneur founders of IPO 
enterprises greater underwriting fees when they go public. The authors show that when less 
powerful underwriters underwrite those IPO firms they incur lower fees. Subsequently, the wealth 
of IPO issuers will be seriously compromised by incurring higher underwriting fees.  
 
There is vast empirical evidence reporting that the quality of corporate decisions and investment 
behaviours of entrepreneurs deteriorate when the level of voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the successful control of corruption decline (John 
et al. 2008; Anokhin & Schulze 2009; Slangen & Van Tulder 2009; Acharya et al. 2011; Levie & 
Autio 2011). The author hypothesises that entrepreneur founders of IPO firms domiciled in 
countries with feeble transparency frameworks will be less interested in floating more of their 
shares when they go public. Based on the above discussion, this research develops the following 
hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 6a:  
High level of voice and accountability increases the relationship between the incentive of 
IPO issuers and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 6b:  
High level of government effectiveness increases the relationship between the incentive 
of IPO issuers and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 6c:  
High level of regulatory quality increases the relationship between the incentive of IPO 
issuers and underpricing. 
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Hypothesis 6d:  
High level of rule of law increases the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers 
and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 6e:  
High level of control of corruption increases the relationship between the incentive of 
IPO issuers and underpricing. 
 
3.4.2.2. Relationship Between Underwriter Reputation and 
Underpricing 
Prior IPO literature documents a positive relationship between employing reputable underwriters 
and a reduction in the ex-ante uncertainty about the firm’s valuation uncertainty (Beatty & Ritter 
1986; Habib & Ljungqvist 2001). Hence, IPO issuers who intend to float larger percentage of their 
holdings will find it necessary to employ prestigious underwriters. This need escalates when the 
overall observed level of information asymmetry in the country is high. This is because hiring high-
status underwriters can provide a certification signal to IPO firms that in turn reduces the ex-ante 
uncertainty for anxious IPO investors about the quality of the IPO issuers. Lewellen (2006) argues 
that apart from demanding higher underwriting fees, underwriters with sound market reputations 
care more about sustaining their reputations. The author also contends that prestigious underwriters 
possess well-established financial and technical advisory teams that enable them to maintain strong 
relationships with institutional investors in the local market and abroad. Therefore, high-status 
underwriters have the ability to undertake inclusive evaluation for IPO firms differentiating 
superior quality from inferior quality issuers, which in turn facilitates a successful listing (Jones & 
Swaleheen 2010). For this reason, investors in the IPO market recognise prestigious underwriters 
are an assuring certification indicator that explains the problem of underpricing (Torstila 2003). 
This implies greater role for high-status underwriters in alleviating the perceived information 
asymmetry at the country-level. 
 
That is why this research expects that when an IPO firm is located in a nation with low voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the control of 
corruption, the link between underwriter reputation and underpricing improves. The reason behind 
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this is that in such countries with a weak level of transparent market practices insiders tend to 
circulate private information (Houqe & Monem 2016). Prior literature documents a strong link 
between poor country-level institutional quality and the existence of an asymmetric information 
problem amongst market participants (Johnson et al. 2000; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Core et 
al. 2006; Fan et al. 2007; Bhagat & Bolton 2008). Consequently, in such nations with poor country 
governance practices where investors suffer from the existence of high level asymmetric 
information in their markets, IPO parties will find it difficult to make investment decisions based 
on inefficient information (Zattoni et al. 2017). For this reason, this thesis expects IPO investors in 
these sorts of transparency-poor countries will be concerned more about the endorsement role 
prestigious underwriters offer to IPO companies (Fang 2005; Hanley & Hoberg 2012).  
 
Another reason for IPO investors’ dependency on the certification role of reputable underwriters 
is to moderate the unattainability of an effective lawsuit system in the country. In such countries 
with weak formal institutional system investors will be incapacitated to litigate fraudulent IPO 
issuers when a scam is evident (Hughes & Thakor 1992; Lowry & Shu 2002; Hanley & Hoberg 
2012). For instance, Hope (2003b), Khurana and Raman (2004), and Fan and Wong (2005) uncover 
empirical evidence documenting inferior audit quality, weak disclosure practices, and asymmetric 
information problem in countries where litigation risk is low. Houqe et al. (2012a) show that 
countries with low voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption simply motivates ongoing fraudulent financial reporting. 
Consequently, this research postulates that in countries that lack an adequate level of transparency, 
IPO investors will have to rely more on reputable underwriters. This is done to moderate their ex-
ante uncertainty about the quality of IPO prospectus from fraudulent financial reporting. The 
following hypotheses are based on the above discussion: 
 
Hypothesis 7a:  
Low level of voice and accountability increases relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 7b:  
Low level of government effectiveness increases relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. 
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Hypothesis 7c:  
Low level of regulatory quality increases the relationship between underwriter reputation 
and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 7d:  
Low level of rule of law increases the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 7e:  
Low level of control of corruption increases the relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. 
 
3.4.2.3. Relationship Between Ex-ante Uncertainty and Underpricing 
The influence of weak formal institutional quality in a country on ex-ante uncertainty problem is 
supported in the literature. Several scholars gathered empirical evidence showing that some nations 
retain transparency characteristics that cause ex-ante uncertainty environment to be unavoidable 
(Black 2001; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Geiger & van der Laan Smith 2010; Abdi & Aulakh 2012; 
Li & Zahra 2012; Gupta et al. 2018). For instance, Li and Filer (2007) find evidence documenting 
the role of country-level transparency in increasing the ex-ante problem between entrepreneur 
founders and prospective investors. The authors show that in countries with weak country 
governance practices the volatility of foreign portfolio investment increases. 
 
Li and Filer (2007) explained their findings by arguing that although foreign investors have 
ownership they lack control and trust with local managers due to the agency problem that triggers 
investors’ ex-ante uncertainty. Consequently, the authors conclude that the degree of this agency 
problem makes ex-ante uncertainty of foreign investors higher when investors are investing in poor 
transparency nations. In this context, Bae et al. (2006) detect a positive relationship between the 
availability of poor country governance mechanisms and increases in stock market volatility. The 
authors attribute this evidence by stating that in poorly governed stock markets managerial 
discretion is frequently administered poorly, hence permitting managers to conceal bad news. Hope 
(2003b), Houqe et al. (2012a), and Houqe and Monem (2016) uncover evidence showing that 
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investors and analysts in countries with a low level of transparency such as China, should anticipate 
an additional level of ex-ante uncertainty. The authors argue that this added uncertainty is initiated 
by the actuality of a poor level of disclosure quality at the country-level. This research therefore 
hypothesises that IPOs nested within high transparency economies, have characteristics moderating 
ex-ante uncertainty at the country-level. Subsequently, this moderates the impact of firm-level ex-
ante uncertainty on underpricing. Based on the above discussion, this research develops the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 8a:  
Low level of voice and accountability increases the relationship between ex-ante 
uncertainty and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8b:  
Low level of government effectiveness increases the relationship between ex-ante 
uncertainty and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8c:  
Low level of regulatory quality increases the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty 
and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8d:  
Low level of rule of law increases the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and 
underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8e:  
Low level of control of corruption increases the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty 
and underpricing. 
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3.5. Data  
This chapter employs two-level data to capture the direct and indirect effects of differences in 
country-level transparency on underpricing variance across the global IPO market. The first level 
of the dataset contains firm-level data while the second level has country-level transparency data. 
This results in the inclusion of 10,217 IPO-issuing firms IPOs listed between January 1995 and 
December 2016 in the G20 countries. The dataset is divided into three groups. The first group 
represents all 22 developed and developing countries. The second group includes only 12 
developed economies while the third group contains only 10 emerging states. The previous and 
subsequent empirical chapters employ the same set of firm-level data while they differ for country-
level data. In this chapter, country-level transparency data is time-variant and sourced from the 
annual reports of the WGIs published by Kaufmann et al. (2017) from 1995 to 2017. 
 
The WGIs include five measures for more than 200 countries measuring institutional quality, 
namely voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the 
control of corruption. Kaufmann et al. (2017) developed those measures and presented the 
combined aggregation of 30 individual data sources by gathering the opinions of numerous 
enterprises, citizen and expert survey respondents, think tanks, non-governmental organisations, 
international organisations, and private sector companies in both developed and developing 
countries. The employment of these country-level time-variant proxies of transparency levels from 
country to country, against the single dummy variable such as an individual legal origin dummy 
similar to the common law as opposed to civil law developed by La Porta et al. (2008), serves to 
enhance the understanding of the impact of variability in country-level transparency within and 
between markets on IPO underpricing. Thus, this time-variant feature allows this chapter to capture 
the improvement in institutional quality between and within countries over time. The WGIs have 
been used intensively in the literature to proxy for differences in institutional quality between and 
within countries and their implications for the capital market (Aguilera 2005; Asongu 2012; Hopp 
& Dreher 2013; Dewandaru et al. 2014; Hearn 2014; Zattoni et al. 2017). The number of IPO firms 
included in this chapter is determined following Ritter and Welch (2002) and Boulton et al. (2017) 
in constructing the sample selection criteria (see Table 18). 
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Table 18: Sample Selection Criteria for this Analysis 
Selected search criteria Description 
Number 
of IPOs 
Matches 
Exclusion of 
Duplicates 
This research excludes all duplicate28 IPOs from this sample from January 
1995 to December 2016 (9,548 IPOs are excluded). 
 
32,585 
 
Exclusion non-
trading IPOs 
 
This research only includes IPO firms that are already traded at the time of 
inclusion; therefore, all pending, withdrawn, postponed, and rejected IPOs 
are excluded since they are beyond the research interest of this study (1,450 
IPOs are excluded). 
 
23,037 
Exclusion of non-G20 
IPOs 
The G20 countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the 
United States plus the European Union as the 20th country. Within the 
European Union, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, 
Romania, and Sweden are included. Due to IPO data unavailability, 
Argentina, Slovenia, Spain, and Bulgaria, and Romania were excluded, 
creating a final sample consisting of 22 countries (5,951 IPOs are 
excluded). 
 
21,587 
Exclusion of IPO data 
with missing values 
for PR and DF, UR, 
PMV, LET, and LOP 
This research excludes IPOs with missing values needed to calculate all 
explanatory variables (6,047 IPOs are excluded). 
15,339 
   
Exclusion of IPO data 
with missing values 
for UP 
This research excludes IPOs with missing values of the dependent variable 
(2,045 are IPOs excluded). 
12,886 
   
Exclusion of Non 
initial public offering 
data  
 
This research excludes REITs, ADRs, units offer, close-end-funds, and 
stock with warrants (2,669 IPOs are excluded).  
10,217 
Exclusion of IPO data 
with no country-level 
transparency data 
All data is available. The WGIs were updated every two years between 
1996 and 2002 while they are updated annually from 2003 and 2017. 
Hence, the author uses extrapolated values for the WGIs when their values 
are missing. 
10,217 
 
In addition to the attractive economic and stock market characteristics for the G20 countries 
discussed in the Data Section in the previous chapter, the G20 countries offer a distinctive dataset. 
The G20 economies provide diverse time-variant measures of country-level transparency. This 
allows for rigid testing of the research hypotheses and thereby provide generalisable answers to the 
research questions for this chapter. For example, Figure 11 below displays varying scores, from as 
                                                 
28 This thesis follows cautionary observation made by Smart and Zutter (2003) to; firstly, scrutinise the existence of 
duplicate IPO records; and secondly, eliminate them from the sample to avoid double counting. 
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low (high) as -2.33 (1.85) out of 2.5 for Saudi Korea (Denmark), for a country-level transparency 
among the G20 countries proxy according to the level of regulatory quality from 1995 to 2016.  
 
Figure 11: Regulatory Quality in the G20 Countries from 1995 to 2016 
 
(Sourced from Kaufmann et al. (2017)) 
 
This measures the perceptions of the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. In this measure, 
estimate of governance ranges from approximately a value of -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) measuring 
the overall governance performance. The variability of this score for every country from 1995 to 
2016 is considerably large as shown in Figure 11. Looking at this more closely, this research can 
clearly observe a large (small) change in the level of regulatory quality between 1995 and 2016 for 
26% (4%) in Japan (China). Across the entire sample, the average standard deviation for G20 
country is roughly 112% from the mean value of 0.80. This implies that on average the level of 
regulatory quality in G20 countries changes by 112% from 1995 to 2016. This simple statistical 
evidence clearly documents that country-level transparency is a time-variant factor within 
countries.  
 
For the above discussion, the focus on the G20 countries makes it ideally possible to better 
understand the impact of time-variant differences in country-level transparency in explaining 
differences in IPO underpricing across countries. Also shown is how time-variant differences in 
country-level transparency can affect the relationship between firm-level variables and IPO 
underpricing across the G20 countries. The outcome variable is IPO underpricing (UP), which is 
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defined as the percentage return from the offer price to the first closing price on its first trading 
day. Independent variables include two levels of data, specifically country-level transparency and 
firm-level data. The employed firm-level data along with control variables used in this chapter are 
similar to what was used in the previous chapter. For a detailed discussion of those firm-level data 
along with control variables employed, please see Table 3 in Section 2.6.1. where the variables are 
defined. 
 
3.5.1. Country-level Transparency Data  
Country-level transparency data includes voice and accountability (VA), government effectiveness 
(GE), rule of law (RL), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of corruption (CC). The rationale 
behind using five country-level transparency proxies is to prevent measurement error in cross-
country level metrics. It is contended here that if one can attain uniform results across variables, it 
will provide greater confidence, in particular in cross-country research (Boulton et al. 2010; 
Banerjee et al. 2011; Houqe et al. 2012b). Table 19 presents the five country-level transparency 
variables along with description of variables, expected coefficient signs, and source of the variable. 
 
Table 19: Key Country-level Transparency Variables 
Variables Description 
Expected29 
Coefficient 
Sign 
Source of 
data 
Voice and 
Accountability 
(VA) 
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance). 
 
Negative Kaufmann et 
al. (2017) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Government effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public 
sector services, quality of the civil service and degree of its independence 
from political pressures, quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies. Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
 
Negative Kaufmann et 
al. (2017) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
(RQ) 
Regulatory quality reflects perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. Estimate of governance (ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
Negative Kaufmann et 
al. (2017) 
                                                 
29 See Section 3.4.1. for a discussion on the expected sign of the transparency variables.  
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Rule of Law 
(RL) 
Rule of law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate of 
governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance). 
 
Negative Kaufmann et 
al. (2017) 
Control of 
Corruption 
(CC) 
Control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) 
to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
Negative Kaufmann et 
al. (2017) 
 
3.6. Methodology and Estimation Approach 
3.6.1.  HLM Estimation 
Prior literature including Engelen and van Essen (2010), Li et al. (2013) Judge et al. (2014), 
Tennant and Sutherland (2014), and Zattoni et al. (2017) asserts that finance data including IPO 
data is commonly identified to embody a multilevel nesting structure. Therefore, this research 
structures the IPO data over two levels of data including firm- and country-level observations. At 
the lower level, firm-level, the data encompasses 10,217 IPO companies. At the upper level, 
country-level, the sample IPO firms are nested within 22 different developed and developing 
countries. Li et al. (2013) highlight the importance of differentiating the upper and lower levels 
and their outcomes, in order to better understand the individual effect for every level. Establishing 
accurate estimations of their interactions is important here. The IPO data take the form of an 
unbalanced cross-section, hence this research employs hierarchical nested estimation of the general 
linear modelling to investigate the nesting structure of the multilevel data (Raudenbush & Bryk 
2002). To offset the effect of using unbalanced data in cross-country settings from reducing the 
efficiency of the estimation, this thesis follows Li et al. (2013) by employing a full maximum 
likelihood estimation to control for this problem.  
 
This research attains three advantages from making use of the HLM technique in the cross-country 
setting. HLM, firstly, allows this thesis to capture econometrically for characteristics (i.e., 
dissimilarity in transparency measures) of the upper level (i.e., countries) data that is very likely to 
influence the characteristics (determinants of IPO underpricing) of the lower level (i.e., IPO firms). 
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Having such data structured in this way implies that error terms within the higher level, i.e. 
countries, may embody some inner strong correlations because they may share comparable 
country-level characteristics. Yet, across countries these error terms are not likely to exhibit any 
form of strong correlations (Hofmann 1997). The problem is that ignoring the existence of such a 
multilevel effect in finance data when it exists results in causing acute violations to basic statistical 
assumptions related to OLS regressions (Kayo & Kimura 2011). 
 
The second advantage is that HLM permits this thesis to estimate the lower models, firm-level 
covariates, using a country mean-centered method (Kreft et al. 1995). By doing so, this research 
increases the accuracy of the estimation by isolating the variance of IPO underpricing into what is 
related to the characteristics of countries (i.e., difference in transparency proxies) in comparison 
with the characteristics of firms (determinants of IPO underpricing). For example, Li et al. (2013) 
employ a country mean-centered technique in their HLM method by centering determining factors 
of corporate risk-taking within each country. The authors also incorporate country-level means into 
the collection of independent variables, from which they manage to segregate perfectly the effects 
of covariances within- and between-country. For this reason, this research uses the extension of a 
country mean-centered method to decompose the effect of the firm-level determinants such 
underwriter reputation to what is attributable at the firm-level and country-level when this research 
creates interaction terms (i.e., transparency*underwriter reputation) (Osborne 2000).  
Consequently, the advantage of HLM estimation comes from its econometric competence to 
precisely estimate firm-level effects within every country while controlling for country-level 
effects (Hofmann 1997). While this research estimates the firm-level characteristics to be country-
mean centered, the author models the country-level transparency covariates to be grand-mean 
centered following Li et al. (2013). This estimation permits this thesis to capture the direct and 
indirect influences of dissimilarities in country-level transparency on IPO underpricing variance 
from country to country (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002; Li et al. 2013). 
 
The third advantage is that HLM technique corrects for potential size distortion which may 
materialise by using unbalanced sample size. It is something commonly observable in cross-section 
regressions related IPO underpricing testing (Li et al. 2013). IPO underpricing data is frequently 
distributed unevenly across industries, years, and countries. The problem is that when this research 
uses traditional OLS pooling estimation for unbalanced cross-section data, then the coefficient 
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associated with a country-level covariate is likely to be spuriously significant. This is because of 
the effect of large sample size at the firm-level (Li et al. 2013). Ignoring the presence of such a 
problem may be dangerous when there are subnational dissimilarities between nations in terms of 
number of IPO companies attributed to every nation in the sample. Consequently, HLM rectifies 
this problematic issue by approximating simultaneously regression models at the country- and 
firm-level. In contrast, under the OLS estimation, observations related to firm-level are equally 
weighted. Li et al. (2013) show that this correction is attained under the HLM method by making 
country-level regressions weighted by the precision of the firm-level data that is contrarily 
associated within a country’s sample size. 
 
To accommodate the three research objectives, this research commences the empirical testing over 
three phases following Kayo and Kimura (2011). Phase 1 commences with the commonly named 
empty HLM model or the HLM null model. Here this research seeks to confirm the necessity of 
using HLM estimation due to the existence of a nesting structure in the data. This research also 
gathers some outputs related to the decomposition of IPO underpricing variance into what is related 
to firm- and country-level covariates. Phase 2 begins by estimating HLM models with only random 
intercepts. This is done to test the direct effect hypotheses related to the direct influence of 
dissimilarities in country-level transparency on underpricing variance across nations. Phase 3 
follows by estimating a full HLM model that incorporates both random intercepts and random 
slopes. This step is important because it examines the indirect effect hypotheses concerned with 
the “modifier” effect of differences in country-level transparency covariates. These differences 
modify the association between determinants of IPO underpricing and underpricing variance across 
nations.  
 
3.6.1.1. HLM Null Model 
This phase commences formally by investigating the one-way ANOVA model. In this model, one 
fixed term - the grand mean - is included while a variance for the lower level (firm-level) and for 
the upper-level (country-level) is generated. This implies that this research omits deliberately all 
covariates (fixed effects) because this research focus here on the random effects component. 
Consequently, this research produces information related to the variance decomposition of the 
dependent variable (IPO underpricing). Stated differently, the empty HLM model permits this 
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thesis to properly estimate the role for the lower level (firm-level) and for the upper-level (country-
level) in the variance of the outcome variable (IPO underpricing). The empty model’s null 
hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in the mean underpricing across the sample 
countries. Henceforth, this research seeks to test if differences in IPO underpricing (UP ) across the 
G20 countries are significantly different from zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis allows this 
research to contend that the IPO data has a hierarchical structure. This of course justifies the 
employment of the HLM technique (Engelen & van Essen 2010). This research specifies the empty 
model as shown in Equations (1) and (2): 
 
0ij j ijUP                                                                                                                                                                                        (1)                     
where  
0 00 0j j                                                                                                                          (2)                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The lower level, i.e. firm-level, is captured in Equation (1) while the upper level, country-level, is 
presented in Equation (2). In this model, a firm i  is nested in the nation j where 0 j  can be assumed 
as the mean IPO underpricing in the nation j, while 00  is the grand mean (i.e., the mean of IPO 
underpricing across all IPO firms and nations). The term ij  represents the random error term at 
the firm-level in Equation (1). This presents the extent to which a company’s underpricing diverges 
from the mean of IPO underpricing in the country where this IPO company operates. The term 0 j
in Equation (2) specifies the random error term at the nation-level demonstrating how mean IPO 
underpricing in nation j diverges from the grand mean. The estimation of Equations (1) and (2) 
allows the auhtor to compute the Intra-Class Correlation (ICC) coefficient. This coefficient helps 
the author determine the relative importance of each level in explaining observed deviations in IPO 
underpricing across nations (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). This research calculate the ICC estimator 
ˆ  by using estimates of 2 20 00( ) and ( )ij jVar Var     , by adopting the below definition in Equation 
(3):  
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Calculation of Coefficient of Determination 
This research follows in the footsteps of Tennant and Sutherland (2014) to employ the information 
produced by the variance components in the random effects ANOVA model (the empty model) so 
that the succeeding estimations can be compared. Then this research can evaluate the efficiency 
and explanatory of every model this research estimate. This research assesses the elucidated 
variability in the variance using Equation (4):  
 
2 ( )1
( )
new
m
ANOVA
Var m
R
Var m
                                                                                                                     (4) 
 
The term m in Equation (4) denotes differences in every level where the lower level, for instance, 
accounts for within-country variance while between-country variance is accounted for in the 
second level. The term ( )newVar m signifies the estimated variance for level m in the random 
intercept and random slope regressions. The term ( )ANOVAVar m , on the contrary, provides the 
required information for the one-way ANOVA model (the empty model) linked to the estimated 
variance in level m. This research runs these estimations whenever the author has a new model in 
order to calculate the within-country and between-country R-squares. Stated differently, HLM 
divdides the R-squares to elucidate variability in underpricing to what are related variations within 
every nation and between nations. Apart from this, HLM produces the deviance score for every 
estimated model. The score measures lack of fit between model and data (Gelman 2006). Overall, 
the rule of thumb is that the higher the deviance score, the inferior the fit to the data. The deviance 
is typically not inferred directly, but rather compared to deviance(s) from prior models fitted to the 
same data (Osborne 2000; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002).  
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3.6.1.2. Random Intercept HLM Models 
In this phase, this research expands the basic one-way ANOVA model to include both firm-level 
and country-level covariates. The intercept ( 0 j ) is introduced in Equation 5 and this research 
allow this intercept to be random across different country-level transparency proxies. It serves to 
capture variability across nations in terms of UP  in the lower model beyond what is explained by 
firm-level characteristics including Incentive of  IPO Issuersaij , Underwriter Reputationbij , and 
 UncertaintycijEx - ante . By doing so, this research provides answers to hypotheses 1 to 5. 
Consequently, the lower level, firm-level, is specified as follows; 
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and this research specifies the upper level using the five country-level transparency proxies as in 
random intercept models (6) to (10): 
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For the lower level equation, UP  for company i in nation j is denoted by a function of firm-level 
characteristics, Incentive of  IPO Issuersaij , Underwriter Reputationbij ,and  UncertaintycijEx - ante
plus the random error term component ij .
.
For the upper level equation, the mean of UP in nation 
139 
 
j, 0 j is denoted as a linear combination of country-level characteristics proxies including 
  A djoice and ccoV untability ,  E ejovernment ffG ectiveness ,    L fjule of awR  ,  Q gjRegulatory uality  , 
and   C hjControl of orruption plus interpret 00 and the random error term 0 j . Equations (5) and 
(10) are consolidated to form what Tennant and Sutherland (2014) designate a mixed-effect model 
as shown in Equation (11):       
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This thesis calls the model that has been developed in Equation (11) the formal model. This model 
examines the direct influence of differences in country-level transparency on underpricing variance 
between G20 nations. The assumption made here is that the model presented in Equation (11) is 
estimated based on random effects calculation. The objective here is to develop this random effects 
estimation, since it will have the competence to produce corresponding fixed effects coefficients 
for the lower level. The expectation is that this model is likely to create efficient outputs. This is 
because it simultaneously integrates country-level transparency characteristics for the upper level 
when it is properly estimated (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008).  
 
3.6.1.3. Random Intercept and Slope Coefficient HLM Models 
In this testing phase, this research expands the previously developed model in Equation (11) 
following Kayo and Kimura (2011) and Tennant and Sutherland (2014). The rationale is here to 
develop a HLM model that permits the intercept to vary (i.e., similar to the model in Equation (11)) 
and to permit the slope coefficients for all of the firm-level characteristics to vary as well. 
Developing this model enables firm-level covariates to be elucidated by the changeability in 
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country-level transparency covariates across nations. Therefore, such modelling allows this thesis 
to provide answers for the 15 hypotheses associated with the indirect influence of dissimilarities in 
country-level transparency. These dissimilarities moderate the association between determinants 
of IPO underpricing and IPO underpricing variance across nations. Equations (12), (13), and (14) 
present the required model for testing hypotheses 6a to 6e, 7a to 7e, and 8a to 8e, respectively: 
 
10 11 12
13 14                                                            
                                 
  A  E
  L  Q
a dj ej
fj gj
oice and ccountability overnment ffectiveness
ule of aw egul
V
atory uality
G
R R
   
 
  
 
15 0                             C hj jControl of orruption  
             (12) (H6a to H6e) 
20 21 22
23 24                                                           
                                  
  A  E
  L  Q
b dj ej
fj gj
oice and ccountability overnment ffectiveness
ule of aw egulaR tory uR alit
V
y
G   
 
  
 
25 0                           C hj jontrol of orrupti nC o  
             (13) (H7a to H7e) 
30 31 32
33 34                                                       
                                      
  A  E
  L  Q
c dj ej
fj gj
oice and ccountability overnment ffectiveness
ule of aw egulatoryR uali
V
ty
G
R
   
 
  
 
35 0                   C hj jontrol of orrupti nC o  
                  (14) (H8a to H8e) 
The formal random-effects model is represented below in Equation (15). The model simultaneously 
captures the direct effect and the estimations of interaction covariates demonstrating the indirect 
“modifier” effect of transparency characteristics on IPO underpricing.  
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Again, the main function of this model is to test the indirect influence of dissimilarities in country-
level characteristics proxies on underpricing variance across G20 nations. This model represents 
the random coefficient model that embodies the fixed effects component defined as:  
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The assumption made by utilising random slopes highly anticipates that the association between a 
model’s explanatory covariates and the outcome variable is expected to be random across nations 
(Twisk 2006; Hox et al. 2018). Osborne (2000) contends building an estimation based on this 
reasonable expectation is likely to improve the precision of the model. It does this by uncovering 
the influence of possible ignored forces that influence the behaviour of the outcome variable. Yet, 
Preacher et al. (2006) caution against trading off augmented model specification with precision of 
modelling random slopes because it decreases the degree of freedom. Consequently, if such a case 
occurs then the model’s overall efficiency should be evident. The author of this thesis explores this 
issue further by following Kayo and Kimura (2011) in terms of comparing the overall efficiency 
of models drawn for the same dataset. The authors achieved this by comparing the outputs of the 
deviance score for models estimated with random slopes against fixed slopes to measure the overall 
fitness of the model.             
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3.7. Empirical Results  
This section incorporates three subsections. The first subsection contains a brief presentation of 
key highlights for firm-specific variables, summary statistics for IPO underpricing by year, and, 
summary statistics for IPO underpricing by industry. In this way having to reiterate the firm-
statistics-related discussions is negated because this research utilises the same set of IPO data in 
this chapter similar to the preceding chapter. This section also presents the summary statistics for 
country-level transparency variables in the G20 IPO markets. Also the variance inflation factors 
for firm and country-level transparency variables are provided in order to investigate possible 
multicollinearity in the dataset. In the second subsection, this research provides the results and 
discussion of: (1) the HLM null model; (2) the direct influence of differences in transparency on 
underpricing variance across states; and (3) the indirect influence of variations in transparency on 
underpricing variance across nations. In the third and final subsection, alternative specifications 
and robustness checks are provided.  
 
3.7.1. Summary Statistics  
3.7.1.1. Summary Statistics for Firm-level Variables  
The previous discussion in Section 2.8.1.1 on preliminary statistical evidence showed that the G20 
countries do not share similar firm-level characteristics. This implies that firm-level variables are 
heterogeneous across these countries and their heterogeneity may play a role in explaining 
underpricing difference in them over the last two decades. This difference turns out to be noticeable 
across the two blocks of developing and developed G20 countries. For example, the results for the 
mean and median of UP markedly demonstrate that underpricing in developing IPO economies is 
almost twice what is perceived in developed stock markets. This research also discovers some 
remarks signifying similar behaviours concerning the degree of dissimilarities in underpricing and 
firm-level covariates within developed compared to developing G20 economies.  
 
This outcome might highlight the presence of a nesting structure in the IPO data; subsequently, it 
proposes that each block of stock markets may share comparable firm-level characteristics. For 
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instance, this research uncovers that, on average, underpricing is greater in developing G20 nations 
because entrepreneur founders of IPO companies sell and create less secondary and primary shares, 
respectively. This research also obtains some evidence documenting that proxies of ex-ante 
uncertainties for IPO firms located in developing G20 countries are larger, on average, when 
compared to developed economies. Some indicative results demonstrate that developing 
(developed) IPO entrepreneur founders, on average, underwrite their firms using more (less) high-
status underwriters. Their probable aims are to get their firms certified by prestigious underwriters 
in order to reduce the ex-ante uncertainty of their underwritten IPO firms. 
 
3.7.1.2. Summary Statistics for IPO Underpricing by Year 
In summary, Section 2.8.1.2 shows that the change in underpricing across the period of the study 
from 1995 to 2016 encapsulates that time could play an important role in explaining underpricing 
differences across the G20 countries. A similar observation has been documented by IPO 
underpricing literature including Loughran and Ritter (2004), Boulton et al. (2010), and Engelen 
and van Essen (2010). Across the 22-year window that this study employs, underpricing seems to 
peak around the financial crisis for G20 IPO markets. Consequently, the presence of such an effect 
provides the necessity to control for this yearly effect and financial crisis effect. 
 
3.7.1.3. Summary Statistics for IPO Underpricing by Industry 
Overall, Section 2.8.1.3 indicates that the variation in underpricing between different IPO 
industries illustrates that some specific industries could play a significant role in explaining 
differences in underpricing across the G20 countries. IPO underpricing scholars including 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), Boulton et al. (2010), and Engelen and van Essen (2010) argue that 
controlling for industry effect when examining underpricing in IPO markets is a vital consideration. 
This is because some industries have some uncertainty characteristics that require investors to 
demand a larger premium, leading to higher underpricing. Across the 33 IPO industries described 
in Section 2.8.1.3, underpricing indeed tends to be higher in certain industries, such as agriculture, 
insurance, other utilities, and pers/bus/rep svc in the G20 IPO markets. Therefore, the occurrence 
of such an effect emphasises the importance of controlling for industry effects. 
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3.7.1.4. Summary Statistics for Country-level Transparency 
Variables    
Table 20 presents the summary of a descriptive statistics analysis of country-level transparency 
variables including mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, and number of IPO 
observations for the G20 countries. It is for the period January 1995 until December 2016. The 
mean of VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC for the G20 countries is 0.48, 1.01, 0.91, 0.80, and 0.88 points, 
respectively, while the median values are 1.08, 1.51, 1.44, 1.26, and 1.32 points, also respectively. 
Dispersion from the mean values of VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC for the G20 countries is 1.27, 1.02, 
0.97, 1.12, and 1.08 points, respectively, indicating that there is great deal of heterogeneity in mean 
value country-level transparency between the G20 countries. An ideal opportunity is offered here 
to examine the impact of differences in country-level transparency in causing differences in 
underpricing in the G20 countries. 
 
The VA proxy captures perceptions regarding the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in choosing their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media in the G20 countries from 1995 to 2016. For all G20 countries, Sweden (South 
Korea) has the highest (lowest) mean score of VA, equal to 1.6 (-2.2) out of 2.5 points (-2.5), 
followed by Denmark, Canada, and Australia (Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia), with mean scores 
of 1.59, 1.46, and 1.44 (-1.71, -1.60, and -0.93) out of 2.5 points (-2.5), respectively. Consistently, 
the median values of VA are similar to the mean values in the G20 countries. However, when 
looking at changes over time in VA for all G20 countries from 1995 to 2016, VA in the United 
States (India) shows the largest (smallest) dispersion from the mean, equal to 0.12 (0.02), followed 
by Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Poland (South Africa, Germany, and Australia), with standard 
deviation values of 0.12, 0.10, and 0.10 (0.03, 0.04, and 0.05), respectively. This finding implies 
that from the mid-1990s to the present time, the perceptions of the extent to which citizens of the 
United States, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Poland are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media within 
those countries, had improved by 12%, 12%, 10%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 20: Summary Statistics of Country-level Transparency Measurements of the G20 Countries 
  VA GE RL RQ CC 
Total Sample              
(Count: 10217) 
Mean 0.48 1.01 0.91 0.80 0.88 
Median 1.08 1.51 1.44 1.26 1.32 
Minimum -2.29 -2.14 -1.57 -2.53 -1.79 
Maximum 1.75 2.36 2.09 2.02 2.55 
Standard Deviation 1.27 1.02 0.97 1.12 1.08 
Developed Countries 
(count: 7191) 
 
Mean 1.24 1.60 1.50 1.41 1.53 
Median 1.30 1.70 1.50 1.60 1.60 
Minimum 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.30 -.020 
Maximum 1.80 2.40 2.10 2.00 2.60 
Standard Deviation 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.35 0.36 
Developing Countries 
(count: 3021) 
Mean -1.30 -0.35 -0.49 -0.67 -0.68 
Median 
-1.60 0.00 -0.40 -0.30 
-0.60 
.6060 
Minimum -2.30 -2.10 -1.60 -2.50 -1.80 
Maximum 1.10 0.80 0.81 1.10 0.60 
Standard Deviation 0.92 0.83 0.48 0.92 0.47 
Australia 
(Count: 1138) 
Mean 1.44 1.75 1.76 1.67 1.98 
Median 1.42 1.76 1.75 1.68 1.99 
Minimum 1.36 1.56 1.67 1.23 1.75 
Maximum 1.52 2.04 1.93 1.87 2.10 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.10 
Brazil 
(Count: 88) 
Mean 0.47 -0.16 -0.32 0.02 -0.10 
Median 0.48 -0.20 -0.44 -0.03 -0.12 
Minimum 0.11 -0.24 -0.49 -0.21 -0.43 
Maximum 0.53 0.07 0.00 0.41 0.15 
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.09 
Canada 
(Count: 193) 
Mean 1.46 1.82 1.75 1.64 1.99 
Median 1.44 1.78 1.76 1.69 1.99 
Minimum 1.38 1.75 1.63 1.43 1.82 
Maximum 1.68 2.01 1.89 1.83 2.24 
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.11 
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China 
(Count: 1533) 
Mean -1.60 0.16 -0.38 -0.22 -0.50 
Median -1.59 0.10 -0.34 -0.22 -0.55 
Minimum -1.69 -0.10 -0.55 -0.53 -0.65 
Maximum -1.36 0.42 -0.32 -0.13 -0.25 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.12 
Denmark 
(Count: 26) 
Mean 1.59 2.10 1.98 1.82 2.42 
Median 1.57 2.09 1.99 1.81 2.43 
Minimum 1.52 1.81 1.80 1.72 2.23 
Maximum 1.69 2.36 2.09 1.92 2.55 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.12 
France 
(Count: 95) 
Mean 1.25 1.50 1.43 1.18 1.37 
Median 1.21 1.48 1.43 1.21 1.35 
Minimum 1.09 1.34 1.20 0.87 1.24 
Maximum 1.47 1.81 1.51 1.31 1.52 
Standard Deviation 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.08 
Germany               
(Count:35) 
Mean 1.36 1.61 1.71 1.59 1.75 
Median 1.35 1.62 1.75 1.58 1.74 
Minimum 1.31 1.40 1.61 1.49 1.70 
Maximum 1.46 1.74 1.85 1.70 1.94 
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
Greece 
(Count:28) 
Mean 1.05 0.76 0.80 0.94 0.46 
Median 1.06 0.75 0.80 0.99 0.42 
Minimum 0.90 0.59 0.71 0.73 0.10 
Maximum 1.14 0.83 0.92 1.00 0.91 
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.12 
India 
(Count: 363) 
Mean 0.42 -0.02 0.03 -0.35 -0.44 
Median 0.42 -0.01 0.02 -0.36 -0.42 
Minimum 0.37 -0.20 -0.11 -0.46 -0.57 
Maximum 0.45 0.12 0.27 -0.24 -0.29 
Standard Deviation 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.09 
Indonesia 
(Count: 103) 
Mean -0.08 -0.26 -0.65 -0.36 -0.72 
Median -0.07 -0.25 -0.64 -0.33 -0.74 
Minimum -0.42 -0.45 -0.97 -0.78 -1.13 
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Maximum 0.14 -0.01 -0.35 -0.10 -0.45 
Standard Deviation 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.14 
Italy 
(Count: 63) 
Mean 1.05 0.45 0.48 0.90 0.34 
Median 1.05 0.39 0.44 0.92 0.38 
Minimum 0.90 0.21 0.25 0.66 -0.11 
Maximum 1.16 0.87 0.87 1.09 0.72 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.20 
Japan 
(Count: 1913) 
Mean 0.99 1.32 1.31 0.96 1.23 
Median 1.00 1.35 1.32 1.10 1.21 
Minimum 0.89 0.96 1.14 0.48 0.86 
Maximum 1.11 1.82 1.60 1.26 1.73 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.24 0.10 0.26 0.23 
Mexico 
(Count: 28) 
Mean 0.01 0.22 -0.58 0.40 -0.48 
Median 0.09 0.21 -0.56 0.40 -0.45 
Minimum -0.13 0.07 -0.77 0.26 -0.74 
Maximum 0.15 0.34 -0.45 0.48 -0.24 
Standard Deviation 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.17 
Poland                     
(Count:64) 
Mean 0.89 0.49 0.48 0.83 0.29 
Median 0.84 0.41 0.37 0.77 0.19 
Minimum 0.76 0.40 0.35 0.71 0.17 
Maximum 1.10 0.82 0.82 1.06 0.59 
Standard Deviation 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.14 
Russia 
(Count: 31) 
Mean -0.93 -0.37 -0.87 -0.37 -0.93 
Median -0.90 -0.38 -0.93 -0.36 -0.95 
Minimum -1.07 -0.46 -0.95 -0.52 -1.09 
Maximum -0.68 -0.18 -0.72 -0.17 -0.78 
Standard Deviation 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Saudi Arabia                      
(Count: 102) 
Mean -1.71 -0.08 0.19 0.08 -0.09 
Median -1.71 -0.07 0.19 0.09 -0.06 
Minimum -1.86 -0.39 0.10 -0.06 -0.37 
Maximum -1.31 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.10 
Standard Deviation 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.13 
Mean 0.61 0.38 0.11 0.38 0.00 
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South Africa                         
(Count: 29) 
Median 0.63 0.35 0.11 0.36 -0.04 
Minimum 0.55 0.27 0.03 0.30 -0.16 
Maximum 0.70 0.68 0.23 0.78 0.42 
Standard Deviation 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.16 
South Korea                      
(Count: 689) 
Mean -2.20 -1.85 -1.23 -2.33 -1.46 
Median -2.20 -1.80 -1.27 -2.29 -1.39 
Minimum -2.29 -2.14 -1.57 -2.53 -1.79 
Maximum -2.02 -1.63 -0.89 -1.93 -1.17 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.17 
Sweden                         
(Count: 57) 
Mean 1.60 1.89 1.97 1.75 2.24 
Median 1.60 1.84 1.97 1.81 2.25 
Minimum 1.51 1.79 1.76 1.29 2.14 
Maximum 1.75 2.14 2.04 1.91 2.32 
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.05 
Turkey                          
(Count: 24) 
Mean -0.27 0.35 0.05 0.39 0.00 
Median -0.26 0.38 0.04 0.41 0.03 
Minimum -0.37 0.23 -0.06 0.30 -0.12 
Maximum -0.09 0.41 0.12 0.44 0.17 
Standard Deviation 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 
United Kingdom                   
(Count: 404) 
Mean 1.34 1.69 1.72 1.78 1.81 
Median 1.33 1.66 1.68 1.79 1.73 
Minimum 1.20 1.48 1.55 1.59 1.56 
Maximum 1.61 1.92 1.89 2.02 2.23 
Standard Deviation 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.16 
United States                                
(Count: 3211) 
Mean 1.27 1.68 1.52 1.55 1.52 
Median 1.35 1.71 1.54 1.59 1.56 
Minimum 1.06 1.46 1.43 1.26 1.26 
Maximum 1.37 1.84 1.63 1.74 2.01 
Standard Deviation 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.17 
Note: Country-level transparency variables are as defined before in Table 19.
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Table 20 above also presents the second proxy of country-level transparency, GE, which measures 
perceptions of the quality of public sector services, quality of the civil service and degree of 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of government commitment to such policies in the G20 since 
1995. The highest (lowest) mean score of GE of 2.1 (-1.85) out of 2.5 points (-2.5) is reported for 
Denmark (South Korea), followed by Sweden, Australia, and Canada (Russia, Indonesia, and 
Brazil), with mean scores of 1.89, 1.82, and 1.75 (-0.37, -0.26, and -0.16) out of 2.5 points (-2.5), 
respectively.  
 
Since 1995, the effectiveness of governments’ quality of public sector services and civil service, 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitment 
in the G20 countries have changed significantly. For example, the Japanese government displays 
the largest change in GE score, with 0.24 dispersion from the mean value of GE from 1995 to date. 
This is followed by governments in Italy, Denmark, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia, with GE scores 
rising by 22%, 21%, 15%, and 15%, respectively. Moreover, Table 20 presents the RL score for 
all G20 countries where the highest mean score of 1.98 (-1.23) out of 2.5 points (-2.5) is achieved 
by Denmark (South Korea), followed by Sweden, Australia, and Canada (Russia, Indonesia, and 
Mexico), with mean scores of RL of 1.97, 1.76, and 1.75 (0.87, -0.65, and -0.58) out of 2.5 points 
(-2.5), respectively. South Korea records the lowest mean score of RL, indicating that perceptions 
of the extent to which its people have confidence in and abide by the rules of their society, with 
particular reference to the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence in their country. The score for the country 
changed significantly as dispersion from the mean value is 0.18 from 1995 to 2016. As with South 
Korea, RL scores in Poland, Brazil, and Italy change over time, with dispersion from mean values 
of 17%, 17%, and 15%, respectively, since 1995.    
 
Table 20 also displays the fourth proxy of country-level transparency, RQ, which captures 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development in the G20 countries. Here, 
Denmark records the highest mean score at 1.82 out of 2.5 points, followed by the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and Australia, which have mean scores of 1.78, 1.75, and 1.67, respectively. Meanwhile 
the quality of regulation is weakest in South Korea, with a mean score of -2.33 out of -2.5 points, 
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followed by Russia, Indonesia, and India, with mean scores of -0.37, -0.36, and -0.35, respectively. 
Over the last two decades, the ability of governments to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development has improved in some G20 
countries. For instance, the Japanese government records the largest change in RG score with 0.26 
dispersion from its mean score of RE from 1995 to date, followed by Sweden, Australia, and the 
United States, with improvement in RQ scores of 14%, 14%, and 13%, respectively.  
 
Table 20 also exhibits the scores of the fifth country-level measure of transparency in the G20 
countries, CC, that measures the perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests since 1995. The control of corruption is at its best (worst) in Denmark 
(South Korea), with a mean value of 2.42 (-1.46) out of 2.5 points (-2.5), followed by Sweden, 
Canada, and Australia (Russia, Indonesia, and China), with mean scores of CC of 2.24, 1.99, and 
1.98 (-.93, -0.72, and -0.50), respectively. Over the last two decades, some G20 countries have had 
considerable variability in corruption, including Japan, Italy, the United States, and South Korea, 
as deviation from mean values of CC for these nations is 23%, 20%, 17%, and 17%, respectively. 
On the other hand, Germany and Sweden have the lowest dispersion from mean score of CC since 
1995, with their respective values in this area improving by only 5% in the last two decades. This 
suggests that country-level transparency status is a time-variant factor, so treating this variability 
as a constant would lead to omitted variable bias as argued by Autore et al. (2014) and Jamaani 
and Roca (2015).  
 
Finally, Table 20 shows that even though there is a reasonable level of heterogeneity in the level 
of transparency within developed G20 countries, this heterogeneity is largely smaller than what is 
detected in developing countries. For instance, the table reports a large dispersion in the level of 
country-level transparency within developed countries of 20%, 27%, 23%, 35%, and 36% in 
relation to VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC, respectively. When this level of dispersion is compared to 
what is observed in developing countries, this research can see a notable change over time in the 
average degree of transparency in developing countries over the last two decades. For example, 
Table 20 shows that the average levels of VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC deviated from their mean 
values by 92%, 83%, 48%, 92%, and 47% from 1995 to 2016 within developing countries. This 
sizable dispersion in the level of country-level transparency within developing and developed 
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markets may indicate the importance of time-variant property of institutional quality across 
countries. 
 
 In summary, the overall descriptive statistics of the five country-level transparency measures in 
the G20 countries for the last two decades show there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the results 
and, importantly, transparency in the G20 countries is a time-variant factor. Thus, the time-
variability feature of transparency from country to country makes it important to account for this 
time-variant heterogeneity in country-level transparency. It is something previous studies on this 
topic have failed to account for, particularly Engelen and van Essen (2010). 
 
3.7.1.5. Variance Inflation Factors for Country-level Transparency, 
Firm-specific, and Control Variables 
The presence of high correlations amongst independent variables can violate the OLS assumption 
of independence leading to a multicollinearity problem (Belsley et al. 2005). The HLM model 
assumes and controls for the presence of correlations between level 1 observations including firm-
specific variables. Meanwhile the presence of correlations between level 2 observations including 
country-level transparency data violates the assumption of independence of the HLM model 
(Hofmann 1997; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). To detect the absence of a multicollinearity problem 
that could arise from the existence of a collinear relationship amongst independent variables, Table 
21 presents Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) tests of the country-level transparency, firm-level, 
additional firm-level, additional country-level, and dummy effects control variables. Liu and Ritter 
(2011) argue that a multicollinearity problem exists when the value of VIF exceeds a threshold 
value of 5. The table below indicates that amongst the six VIF models, the Model 1 values for the 
five country-level transparency proxies are largely higher than a value of 5. On the other hand, 
once this research uses those proxies separately, Table 21 provides VIF values largely below the 
threshold value of 5. This means that country-level transparency proxies are collinear with each 
other, and consequently they cannot be used jointly. There is also high collinearity between 
transparency variables and the variable DS. This means that if this research controls for the impact 
of listing an IPO firm in a developing stock market when testing the impact of transparency, the 
model would suffer from a multicollinearity problem. The results of Model 2 to Model 6 imply 
that any concern about the presence of multicollinearity in both levels 1 and 2 is mainly minimal. 
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Table 21: Variance Inflation Factors of Country-level Transparency and Firm-specific, and Control Variables 
in the G20 Countries 
Variables                            VIF 
                           Country-level transparency variable 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VA 15.23 2.25     
GE 56.84  1.87    
RL 53.15   1.66   
RQ 44.09    1.59  
CC 48.76     1.72 
DS 15.95      
Firm-level variables 
PR 1.69 1.67 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.66 
DF 3.54 3.49 3.45 3.46 3.45 3.45 
UR 1.17 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
PMV 1.20 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.15 
LET 1.36 1.32 1.31 1.30 1.30 1.30 
LOP 1.50 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.41 1.40 
Additional firm-level variables 
BBM 1.25 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.14 1.14 
TF 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 
PF 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
IOP 1.61 1.38 1.42 1.38 1.41 1.40 
UF 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.07 
AFC 1997 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 
GFC 2008 1.17 1.14 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.14 
Additional country-level variables 
FMS 2.17 1.89 2.93 1.76 1.73 1.83 
MS 5.43 2.73 1.87 1.96 1.91 1.96 
Dummy Effects 
IE 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.50 1.06 1.51 
YE 1.71 1.62 1.53 1.06 1.50 1.06 
CE 4.62 3.65 3.62 3.43 3.44 3.43 
Mean VIF 10.86 1.71 1.69 1.55 1.55 1.56 
Note: Country-level transparency, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. 
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3.7.2. Results and Discussion 
In this section, a discussion of the empirical results begins with a basic analysis using a simple 
random ANOVA model (HLM null model). The following section presents the results of the 
random-intercept models with empty30 firm-level variables, followed by the results of the random-
intercept models with firm-level variables, while the final section involves discussing the results 
of the full model using random-intercept and slope models with firm-level variables. All models 
employ heteroscedastic robust standard errors to control for the unequal error variance distribution 
of the number of IPO firms within the G20 countries. HLM 7 software package is used to execute 
the empirical testing because it relaxes the assumptions of the variance–covariance matrix 
(Steenbergen & Jones 2002; Twisk 2006; Hox et al. 2018). 
 
3.7.2.1. Results and Discussion of HLM Null Model 
The outcomes of the analysis of variance ANOVA model across the G20 countries from 1995 to 
2016 are presented in Table 22. The results show that the adjusted all sample grand mean for IPO 
underpricing is 30%. In contrast, results related to the adjusted grand means for IPO underpricing 
for developed and developing G20 countries show values of 18% and 47%, respectively. The 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistic for the null hypothesis that
2
00 , that is, there is no significant 
statistical cross-country variance in IPO underpricing is also reported in the table. The main 
emphasis of the analysis is to assess if there is a significant variance between the G20 economies 
in IPO underpricing. Also provided here is an exploration of the null hypothesis which assumes 
there is no significant cross-developed and cross-developing nations in relation to differences in 
IPO underpricing. Rejecting the null hypothesis implies that empirical evidence exists and confirms 
that the independence assumption amongst observations is not violated (Raudenbush & Bryk 
                                                 
30 The empty model means that the author uses a HLM model where this thesis runs two level equations of which level 
one (firm-level) and two (country-level) equations include the intercept of every equation in order to observe how 
much the differences between countries can explain underpricing the G20 countries without controlling for either firm-
level and country-level variables (Engelen & van Essen 2010). The variance component - both level one and two at 
the empty model - will serve as the benchmark with the subsequent models that gradually add firm-level and country-
level variables. This will help to observe the change in the variance of level one and two when the research adds more 
variables (Kayo & Kimura 2011). 
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2002). Subsequently, it can be interpreted that the IPO data does indeed possess a nesting structure 
across the three datasets including all G20, developed, and developing G20 countries.  
 
Table 22: Analysis of Variance ANOVA Model 
       
 Fixed-Effects Parameter Coefficient Standard Error P-value of LR Test Statistic 
All Sample Grand Mean UP, 00  0.30 0.09 0.00  
Developed Countries Grand Mean UP, 00  0.18 0.05 0.00  
Developing Countries Grand Mean UP, 00  0.47 0.19 0.00  
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance 
Component for 
Level 2 Effect, 
0 j  
Variance 
Component for 
Level 1 Effect, 
ij  
ICC Deviance DF Observations 
All Sample 0.18392 0.63905 0.22 2448031 21 10,217 
Developed Countries 0.02517 0.49966 0.05 15439 11 7,188 
Developing Countries 0.32764 0.97105 0.25 8520 9 3,021 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity for two-
tail. 
 
Table 22 documents that this research obtain significant results for the 1% significance level of LR 
test statistic for the three subsamples. This means that this research confirms significant differences 
exist in IPO underpricing among all G20 (22 countries), developed (12 countries) and developing 
(10 countries) G20 economies. The table also indicates that 
2
00ˆ  and 
2ˆ  for all samples, developed, 
and developing G20 countries are projected to be 0.18392 and 0.63905, 0.02517 and 0.49966, and 
0.32764 and 0.97105, respectively. These numbers are essential in calculating the ICC for every 
group where this research document ˆ results for 0.22, 0.05, and 0.25. Table 22 indicates that 
22%, 5%, and 25% of the dissimilarities in IPO underpricing across nations are primarily driven to 
variances in core country-level characteristics between all G20, developed, and developing G20 
countries respectively.  
 
Remarkably, the outcomes of the ICC tests reported in Table 22 are in reverse inferences to Kayo 
and Kimura (2011). These writers uncover evidence showing that dissimilarities in capital structure 
                                                 
31 Deviance results reported in Table 22 are comparable to similar deviance values reported by Kayo and Kimura 
(2011) for the whole sample of 114,788 firms (Deviance 816070; Table 5; Model 1), emerging country sample of  
17,696 firms (Deviance 131989.6; Table 6; Model 2), and for developed country sample of 70,114 firms (Deviance 
477682.6;Table 6; Model 1). 
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in 10,061 companies domiciled within 40 countries between 1997 and 2007 only elucidate 3.3% 
of the difference of firm leverage. Kayo and Kimura (2011) interpret the minute ICC outcome to 
the similarly capital structure determinants across nations irrespective of the presence of 
institutional dissimilarities among states. Conversely, the ICC outcomes provide the contrary in 
the IPO market. The results reveal that 22% of the variance in IPO underpricing is attributed to 
cross-country dissimilarities. This finding complements but is more economically vigorous than 
what Engelen and van Essen (2010) observed in relation to the variance of IPO underpricing across 
2,921 IPOs companies listed within 21 countries from 2000 to 2005. The authors find merely 10% 
of the differences in IPO underpricing is attributed to institutional dissimilarities between nations. 
The results of the ICC tests are virtually twice what Engelen and van Essen (2010) perceived. This 
sizeable difference is attributed to the fact that the scholars’ IPO data is overweighed by developed 
country observations32, ranged only for 5 years, and has many country-level observations with very 
few33 IPO observations.  
 
A deeper analysis of the ICC results associated with the decomposition of the underpricing variance 
on the two groups of economies including developed compared to developing G20 countries 
uncovers something equally remarkable. This research uncovers evidence attributing the variability 
in the underpricing variance across countries of 25% (5%) to an enormous (minor) variability 
within developing (developed) economies. This is due to the fact ICC results attribute 25% of 
underpricing variance to cross-country dissimilarities within developing nations versus only 5% 
related to developed G20 economies. This finding has an important implication. It implies the need 
for paying attention for within cluster correlations in residuals within developed compared to 
developing nations. This is of course an essential observation in order to better comprehend the 
mystifying phenomenon of IPO underpricing in the global IPO market. This finding also 
emphasises that dissimilarity in country-level institutions could exert an influence on differences 
in IPO underpricing between developed and developed economies. This finding challenges a 
                                                 
32 Engelen and van Essen (2010) include only 3 developing countries while they have 18 countries that are classified 
as developed countries of which their developing country data represents less than 3% of their total data (92 out of 
2,921). In contrast, this thesis provides a more comprehensive dataset that includes 10,217 IPO firms nested within 22 
countries of which 3,025 IPOs are nested in 10 developing countries. Meanwhile 7,172 IPO firms are nested within 12 
developed nations over the 20-year window from 1995 to 2016. See Table 4 for more details. 
33 Engelen and van Essen (2010) have 3, 4, 4, 5, 7, 10, and 10 IPO firms nested within Portugal, Mexico, Argentina, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, and  Brazil, respectively. In contrast, the lowest IPO observation per country in this 
thesis’s data is recorded for Turkey with 24 IPO firms. See Table 4 for more details.   
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reverse outcome provided by Booth et al. (2001) and Kayo and Kimura (2011). The authors argue 
that the variance in firms’ leverage policies is not affected by country-level institutional 
dissimilarities between developed and developing countries. Consequently, the outcomes reveal 
that differences in country-level institutions within developing (developed) countries matter more 
(matters less) in triggering underpricing variance in the global IPO market. This research reaches 
a new understanding that the hierarchical structure in finance data may have contradictory market 
outcomes when it comes to dissimilarities in institutional characteristics across economies, 
particularly across developed compared to developing ones.  
 
3.7.2.2. Direct Influence of Variations in Transparency on 
Underpricing Difference across Countries  
This research begins the analysis here by presenting the results in Table 23 that include only firm-
level variables. This is done in order to observe the consistency of the results before and after the 
inclusion of the five country-level transparency proxies. Model 1 to Model 4 present a similar HLM 
model with only firm-level variables, with the models differing only in the gradual inclusion of 
year and industry effects. All models in Table 23 treat the intercept as a random parameter while 
treating the slope coefficients of firm-level variables as fixed parameters. This means that those 
models assume that G20 countries vary in their underpricing levels, but that firm-level variables 
between the G20 countries do not behave differently. This follows a similar testing environment 
provided by Engelen and van Essen (2010).  
 
For example, Model 1 reports the slope coefficients of the two proxies measuring the incentive of 
IPO issuers, including PR and DF, of which both coefficients exhibit strongly significant results at 
the 1% level of significance of -0.02, equally. These results confirm that the greater the incentive 
of IPO issuers, the lower is the underpricing in the G20 IPO markets. This outcome is consistent 
with the findings of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010). Model 1 also 
presents the results of UR showing a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. The result 
concerning UR is qualitatively similar to the negative coefficient results of Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) who control for the endogenous relationship between the decision to employ reputable 
underwriters and IPO underpricing. This implies that the results obtained using HLM models are 
made robust by factoring in this endogeneity problem regardless of the loss of statistical 
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significance. In fact, endogeneity has no effect on HLM’s level 1 model because the HLM model 
assumes the presence of correlations between level 1 observations (Hofmann 1997; Raudenbush & 
Bryk 2002).  
 
Table 23: HLM Analyses on the Effect of Firm-specific Variables in G20 Countries with Random Intercept 
Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Transparency-level variables 
VA     
     
GE     
     
RL     
     
RQ     
     
CC     
Firm-level variables 
     
PR -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 [-14.20] [-14.31] [-14.25] [-14.28] 
DF -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 [-20.20] [-20.21] [-20.15] [-20.17] 
UR -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.52] [-0.60] [-0.57] [-0.59] 
PMV 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 [1.51] [1.62] [1.46] [1.55] 
LET -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 [-5.30] [-5.60] [-5.31] [-5.59] 
LOP -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 [-10.23] [-10.40] [-10.17] [-10.32] 
Dummy Effects  NO YE IE YE & IE 
Constant 1.800*** 1.830*** 1.780*** 1.800*** 
 [12.29] [12.32] [11.90] [11.91] 
Observations 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 
 R2 within countries 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 R2 between countries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 0 j  0.18419 0.18420 0.18419 0.18420 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, ij  0.60550 0.60533 0.60537 0.60519 
Deviance  23936 23933 23934 23928 
Note: Country-level transparency and firm-level variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. 
Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail. 
 
Moreover, Model 1 presents the results of the three proxies of ex-ante uncertainty including PMV, 
LET, and LOP. For example, PMV provides a positively significant coefficient of 0.01 at the 10% 
level of significance, implying that prior to the listing of an IPO firm in the G20 countries from 
1995 to 2016, IPO firms suffer from greater underpricing when stock market volatility is high. This 
finding is consistent with what Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2002) and Chang et al. (2017) reported. 
Moreover, the second proxy of ex-ante uncertainty, LET, demonstrates that the longer the elapsed 
time between the offer price set up and the first trading date, the lower is the underpricing in the 
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G20 stock markets. Indicated here is when informed investors show low demand for an IPO firm, 
then this IPO requires more time to be fully subscribed in order to avoid subscription failure. That 
is, low demand by informed investors is interpreted by uninformed investors with high uncertainty 
that the quality of the IPO is poorer. This situation leads to two things: firstly, lower demand for 
the offering on the first trading day; and secondly, lower underpricing. This result is similar to Lee 
et al. (1996) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012). The third proxy of ex-ante uncertainty, LOP, 
proposes that underpricing of IPO firms with large offer proceeds is lower as these firms tend to 
be well-established and non-speculative businesses. Thus, IPO investors regard such firms that 
have high offer size with lower ex-ante uncertainty, consequently leading to lower underpricing. 
The result of Model 1 clearly supports this proposition as the coefficient of LOP equals -0.06 and 
is significant at the 1% level. This finding is in line with Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Boulton 
et al. (2010). Table 23 also shows that the results obtained from Model 1 remain qualitatively the 
same after controlling for YE and IE in Models 2, 3, and 4.   
 
To recapitulate, the findings of Table 23 show that covariates related to the EWL model have the 
anticipated coefficients’ sign and statistical significance with the exception of the underwriter 
reputation factor. The variable UR constantly provides a negative but insignificant coefficient 
across all models in Table 23. The finding supports a similar result obtained by Luo (2008). This 
particular author used the variable prestigious underwriter in a HLM model to investigate the 
influence of pre-IPO marketing spendings on difference in underpricing across nations. Luo (2008) 
finds a negative but insignificant association between underpricing and underwriter reputation. 
Hitherto, the insignificant coefficient of the variable UR differs from Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), 
Kennedy et al. (2006), and Chahine (2008) who apply OLS-based estimation. The authors find a 
significant role of high-status underwriters in alleviating IPO underpricing. An attribution of this 
critical and contrary result for coefficient UR is related to the use of a country “group” mean-
centered approach to firm-level covariates. This extended estimation offered by the HLM 
estimation controls for size distortion influence triggered by utilising unbalanced IPO data (Kreft 
et al. 1995). The difference is that OLS-based estimation employs the overall mean of the 
independent variable, UR in the case, which is calculated using the mean from the full sample ( X
).  
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The HLM model, conversely, is estimated using the group mean centering approach where it 
replaces the individual's group “country” mean ( jX ) from the individual's score (Enders & Tofighi 
2007). From an econometric point of view, this implies that the UR coefficient provides an 
unbiased representation of the mean of 22 clusters “countries” in the data instead of reflecting the 
mean of the complete sample of 10,217 IPOs. Therefore, this research cautions that prior literature 
documents a significant relationship between prestigious underwriters and underpricing because 
the UR coefficient is likely to be spuriously significant. This problematic econometric shortfall is 
probably caused by the influence of large sample size for some nations that biased the overall T-
statistic values and produced falsely significant results (Li et al. 2013). The results concerning the 
UR variable are therefore obtained after correcting this econometric error. This is done by 
approximating regressions where observations related to the variable UR are group centered by 
every nation in the sample, in turn removing the influence of nations with dominant UR 
observations as explained above.  
 
This research concludes from Table 23 with reference to EWL theory that the model partly explains 
underpricing variance across nations. This summation implies that in a cross-country setting, IPOs 
are underpriced dissimilarly because entrepreneur founders sell more secondary shares and create 
more primary shares; this condition is also clarified by the degree of ex-ante uncertainty perceived 
at the time of offering. Differences in underpricing across nations are not explained by the 
employment of prestigious underwriters. The gathered evidence in Table 23 attributes a minor role 
played by characteristics of firms in elucidating the variance in IPO underpricing across nations. 
Therefore, this research contends that variances in the characteristics of nations should contribute 
largely in influencing the phenomenon of underpricing from nation to nation. This is indeed evident 
by the outputs of the adjusted R2 within countries that attribute only 5% of dissimilarities in IPO 
underpricing across nations to the characteristics firms as shown across all models in Table 23. 
Prior IPO literature obtains similar low adjusted R2 values in relation to the explanatory of firm-
level variables to the phenomenon of underpricing using single and global IPO data. For example, 
adjusted R2 values reported by Loughran and Ritter (2004) (0.05; Table VII; Model 2), Lowry et 
al. (2010) (0.03; Table V; Model c), Boulton et al. (2011) (0.07; Table 5; Model 2), Shi et al. (2013) 
(0.05; Table 6; Model 1), Leitterstorf and Rau (2014) (0.06; Table 2; Model 1), and Chang et al. 
(2017) (0.03; Table 4; Model 5). 
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In the next section, this research redirects the focus to testing the hypotheses related to the direct 
influence of transparency on IPO underpricing variance across nations. Table 24 provides the 
empirical outcomes of five HLM models that permit the intercept to be random at the upper level 
but without accounting for the characteristics of firms. The purpose of this arrangement is to 
segregate the influence of the characteristics of countries’ transparency on underpricing. Doing so 
helps to avoid disturbing this influence when the characteristics of firms are included. 
Consequently, in these five models, the intercept of every HLM model is allowed to be random 
across the G20 nations and helps this thesis to examine if the dissimilarity in nations’ transparency 
can actually elucidate the variance in the intercept for every model. In the upper level of the HLM 
model, five proxies for countries’ transparency are employed, namely, VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC. 
This research uses each proxy at a time in order to avoid a multicollinearity problem among the 
covariates of the upper level. Next, in Models 6 to 10 in Table 24, firm-level characteristics are 
incorporated along with both year and industry dummies to re-examine the direct influence of 
differences of transparency on IPO underpricing.  
 
3.7.2.2.1. Voice and Accountability 
This research employs the voice and accountability proxy of Kaufmann et al. (2017) to measure 
how individuals in an economy have a confidence that their legislators value their opinion as being 
valuable in relation to the development of government decisions. Hypothesis 1 anticipates there to 
be a negative association between the level of voice and accountability and underpricing of IPOs. 
The coefficients for voice and accountability are negative and significant for IPO underpricing 
under the HLM estimation with only VA covariate (-0.220; Table 24; Model 1; p<0.05) as well as 
for VA variable plus firm-level variables (-0.210; Table 24; Model 6; p<0.01). The results support 
the anticipation in the theoretical section. This outcome implies that when the perceptions of the 
extent to which IPO investors in the G20 countries are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as enjoying freedom of expression, having freedom of association, and having 
a free media increases by one unit, average underpricing decreases by 22%. In other words, this 
result suggests that an increase in VA score by one unit leads to 22 percent lower underpricing. 
The results evidently infer that when the voice and accountability in a country are high, this reflects 
the existence of a good degree of trust or transparency between market participants. 
 
161 
 
Table 24: Effect of Transparency on IPO Underpricing of the G20 Countries with Random Intercept Model with Firm-specific Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Transparency-level variables 
VA -0.22**     -0.21***     
 [-1.81]     [-3.10]     
GE  -0.13**     -0.13**    
  [-1.75]     [-1.73]    
RL   -0.09**     -0.08*   
   [-1.65]     [-1.60]   
RQ    -0.13**     -0.12**  
    [-1.90]     [-1.85]  
CC     -0.10**     -0.10** 
     [-1.96]     [-2.00] 
Firm-level variables 
PR      -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
      [-14.20] [-14.22] [-14.30] [-14.20] [-14.00] 
DF      -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
      [-20.10] [-20.19] [-20.20] [-20.11] [-20.00] 
UR      -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
      [-0.54] [-0.57] [-0.59] [-0.58] [-0.53] 
PMV      0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
      [1.73] [1.74] [1.70] [1.72] [1.70] 
LET      -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
      [-5.60] [-5.56] [-5.57] [-5.60] [-5.58] 
LOP      -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
      [-10.30] [-10.39] [-10.36] [-10.30] [-10.35] 
Dummy Effects      YE & IE YE & IE YE & IE YE & IE YE & IE 
Constant 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 1.90*** 1.86*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 [3.13] [2.85] [3.10] [3.10] [3.10] [2.70] [2.42] [11.40] [2.40] [2.41] 
Observations 10209 10209 10209 10209 10209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 
 R2 within countries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 R2 between countries 0.30 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.05 
Random-Effect Parameter  
 
 Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 0 j  0.12881 0.17068 0.18020 0.17173 0.17304 0.13025 0.17185 0.18145 0.17294 0.17423 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, ij  0.63905 0.63905 0.63905 0.63905 0.63905 0.60507 0.60508 0.60508 0.60508 0.60508 
Deviance  24457 24463 24465 24463 24464 23902 23908 23909 23907 23908 
Note: Country-level transparency and firm-level variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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This means that the more trustworthy or transparent a country is, the more it is perceived by 
investors to be a less risky investment environment. Investors in such countries that maintain a 
sound level of voice and accountability are likely to have a low level of ex-ante uncertainty about 
the freedom of business activities and the reliability of information provided by government 
officials, firms, and well-connected citizens. Consequently, the VA result contends that when 
investors have an adequate level of belief that their country has reasonably high voice and 
accountability, then their ex-ante uncertainty about the destruction of information reliability in that 
country is expected to be marginal. In this way the information asymmetry problem in that country 
is mitigated.  
 
The negative and significant results of the variable VA in Models 1 and 6 are inconsistent with 
positive and insignificant results obtained by Autore et al. (2014) and Hearn (2014) using OLS-
based estimation. This research attributes this important contradiction in the signage and 
significance of the VA variable between the findings and Autore et al.’s (2014) and Hearn’s (2014) 
outcomes to an econometric shortfall. It is due to capturing the within cluster “nation” correlations 
using HLM approach in the work. Hofmann (1997), Engelen and van Essen (2010), and Kayo and 
Kimura (2011) emphasise that the consequence of a failure to control for the nesting structure in 
the finance data means producing a false coefficient reading. This also means that the findings of 
Autore et al. (2014) and Hearn (2014) in relation to the VA variable are biased. This is because the 
authors do not capture the correlations amongst error terms within countries for nested finance data 
such as the IPO data. In fact, the VA results provide a perfect and empirical sketch of the incorrect 
conclusions that might be attained by disregarding the nesting structure of the IPO data.  
 
The R2 outcomes provide an accurate quantification of the direct influence of country-level 
characteristics (i.e., differences in voice and accountability between nations) and firm-level 
characteristics (i.e., differences in determinants of IPO underpricing within nations) on IPO 
underpricing. By applying the HLM approach, this research obtains R2 between nations attributes 
30% of the variance in IPO underpricing to differences in voice and accountability as shown in 
Model 1 in Table 24. In Model 6, this research attains closely similar results for R2 between 
countries showing that the difference in voice and accountability elucidates 29% of underpricing 
difference. Yet, dissimilarities in the characteristics of firms within nations only explain 5%.  
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3.7.2.2.2. Government Effectiveness 
The second proxy to estimate differences in countries’ transparency is the level of government 
effectiveness in the G20 countries. Hypothesis 2 expects that the underpricing of IPO firms nested 
in nation with high government effectiveness will be lower. Models 2 and 8 in Table 24 present 
significant support for H2 with a coefficient for GE of -0.130 at the 5% level of significance. This 
implies that when G20 governments are perceived to provide quality public services, a quality civil 
service that is independent from political pressures, quality policy formulation and implementation, 
and credibility of government commitment to such policies increases by one unit, then IPO 
underpricing in a country will reduce by 13%. 
 
This outcome suggests that when a government is not functioning effectively in terms of 
safeguarding the business environment from political pressures, it becomes easier for a business or 
for a connected group of investors to obtain first-hand information related to changes in 
government regulations and policies that may influence their businesses before other affected 
parties. In such countries that lack appropriate levels of government effectiveness or oversight, an 
asymmetric information problem exists between market participants, including IPO parties, leading 
to an increasing level of ex-ante uncertainty between politically connected and unconnected 
investors. Consequently, the GE results infer unconnected investors will demand greater 
underpricing to offset this ex-ante uncertainty.  
 
The results of the variable GE in Models 2 and 7 disagree with the positive and significant results 
obtained by Autore et al. (2014) and negative and insignificant ones provided by Hearn (2014) 
using OLS-based estimation. This research again relates this significant conflict in the signage and 
significance of the GE covariate between the outcomes and Autore et al.’s (2014) and Hearn’s 
(2014) findings to an econometric bias. This bias occurs from ignoring the within cluster “nation” 
correlations that are perfectly accounted for in the study employing the HLM approach. Again, the 
outcomes of Autore et al. (2014) and Hearn (2014) in relation to the GE variable should be treated 
with caution. Utilising the HLM approach allowed the author to obtain R2 value of 11% between 
nations. This attributes the change in IPO underpricing to the divergence in government 
effectiveness across nations as shown in Model 2 in Table 24. In Model 8, this research reachs 
weaker results for R2 between countries documenting that the variance in GE clarifies 7% of 
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underpricing variance while differences in the characteristics of firms within nations only explain 
5%.  
 
3.7.2.2.3. Rule of Law 
The level of rule of law provides the third country-level transparency measure which was 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2017). It concentrates on perceptions of the extent to which 
individuals in the G20 countries have confidence in and abide by the rules of their society. It also 
focuses on the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. The existence of poor rule of law suggests that companies 
do not firmly comply with the regulatory standards when conducting business and the economic 
success of enterprises may rely on personal relationships. Hypothesis 3 predicts that underpricing 
of IPO firms nested in high rule of law countries should be lower than nations with a lower level 
of respect for the law. The coefficients of the RL variable provide significant and negative values 
before (-0.090; Table 24; Model 3; p<0.05) and after controlling for firm-level determinants (-
0.080; Table 24; Model 8; p<0.10). These results indicate that when the rule of law in the G20 
countries increases by one unit, underpricing decreases by up 9%, thus supporting H3. 
 
The findings assert that when investors do not believe their governments abide by the rules of 
society and are too strict in safeguarding contract enforcement and property rights, then the 
business and investment environments are expected be unfair and non-transparent to all market 
participants, including IPO parties. Consequently, the presence of an unfair and non-transparent 
business environment is a reflection of weak rule of law. Stated differently, the RL results infer 
that deterioration in the rule of law in a country should be blamed for triggering higher required 
underpricing by IPO investors. This is to compensate those investors for the unfair and non-
transparent market practices that cause a higher level of ex-ante uncertainty. The negative and 
significant outcomes of the variable RL in Models 3 and 8 are contrary to the positive and 
insignificant results obtained by Autore et al. (2014) using OLS-based estimation. However, the 
RL result in Model 8 in Table 24 is perfectly aligned with Engelen and van Essen (2010) who 
employ HLM estimation to capture the nesting structure of the IPO data. The authors show that an 
increase in the rule of law leads to reduced underpricing by 8% at the 10% level of significance. 
An assessment of the explanatory relevance of the RL shows that R2 between countries relates only 
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2% of the difference in IPO underpricing to changes in the level of rule of law between countries. 
Yet, variations in the characteristics firms within G20 countries elucidate 5% of the underpricing 
difference.  
 
3.7.2.2.4. Regulatory Quality 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the level of IPO underpricing will be lower for IPO firms located in 
nations with a high level of regulatory quality. This is because Kaufmann et al. (2017) measure a 
government body in a sovereign state as being non-transparent when the quality of investment 
policies in such a country are ineffective and opaque, in turn hindering the growth of the private 
sector. Models 4 and 9 in Table 24 employ the fourth proxy of country-level transparency, RQ, 
providing consistent support for H4. The coefficients of the RQ factor present significant and 
negative values before (-0.130; Table 24; Model 4; p<0.05) and after adjusting for the 
characteristics of firms (-0.120; Table 24; Model 9; p<0.05). These findings indicate that when 
regulatory quality in the G20 countries, as measured by perception of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development, increases by one unit, underpricing reduces by up to 13%. To explain this result, this 
research contends that in the IPO process, the asymmetric information problem can introduce moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems between management and new owners, as argued by Bruton 
et al. (2010). Thus, the former occasionally has the incentive to mislead the latter, and thus the 
efficacy of a government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development can be seen as a realignment tool that works to enhance 
information communication and disclosure. In turn, this overcomes the asymmetric information 
problem amongst IPO parties, and leads to lower underpricing in that country. 
 
The findings of the variable RQ differ from the positive and significant outcome provided by 
Autore et al. (2014) and negative and significant result shown by Hearn (2014) using OLS-based 
estimation. This research again attributes this substantial inconsistency in the direction and 
significance of the RQ variable between Autore et al.’s (2014), Hearn’s (2014) outputs, and the 
findings to a methodological shortfall. This research continues to caution, as explained in previous 
sections, that this problematic econometric issue causes bias in the results of Autore et al. (2014) 
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and Hearn (2014). They are driven by disregarding the within cluster “country” correlations that is 
flawlessly captured in the empirical work using HLM estimation. An evaluation of the explanatory 
importance of the RQ variable documents that R2 between countries attributes up to 7% of the 
variability in IPO underpricing to variations in regulatory quality between G20 economies. 
Nevertheless, 5% of the underpricing variance is attributed to the characteristics of firms within 
G20 nations. 
 
3.7.2.2.5. Control of Corruption  
The fifth hypothesis is related to testing the direct effect of variances in control of corruption 
between IPO investors and its effect on IPO underpricing in G20 countries. It captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann et 
al. 2017). Hypothesis 5 postulates that the degree of underpricing for IPO firms nested in nations 
that can control corruption to a great extent, is expected to be lower than nations that do not. The 
results for Models 5 and 10 show that CC provides a significant coefficient of -0.10 at the 5% level 
of significance.  
 
This result offers strong support for H5, and suggests that when control of corruption in a G20 
country increases by one unit, underpricing diminishes by 10%. The finding also indicates that the 
degree of corruption in government officials in a G20 country is related to the asymmetric 
information problem. This research explains this linkage by arguing that the presence of bribery 
and corruption amongst government officials could allow certain groups of corrupt investors to 
access specific classes of public information that are not readily accessible to all market 
participants. That is, in a market where information related to a firm’s performance or related to 
changes in government regulation affecting the firm’s activities can be easily sold, then the corrupt 
group of “informed” investors will be informationally advantaged over the uncorrupted 
“uninformed” class of investors (Hopp & Dreher 2013). The CC result confirms that the presence 
of this information gap between corrupt and uncorrupted investors increases ex-ante uncertainty 
about the true value of firms. In turn, a lack of transparency amongst IPO parties that consequently 
leads to higher IPO underpricing, is likely to occur. 
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The negative and significant coefficients of the variable CC in Models 5 and 10 are in disagreement 
with the positive and significant results reported by Autore et al. (2014) and negative and 
significant output attained by Hearn (2014). In contrast, the CC results in Table 24 are in line with 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) who apply the HLM approach to account for the nesting structure 
of the IPO data. This research reiterates that CC results provide an idyllic and empirical example 
of the flawed conclusions that might be accomplished by discounting the nesting structure of the 
IPO data. Outputs related to the explanatory relevance of the CC variable document that R2 between 
G20 countries relates 6% of the variance in IPO underpricing to fluctuations in the level of control 
of corruption between G20 economies. 
 
To recap, the findings this research achieves in relation to the direct influence of variances in 
country-level transparency on the dissimilarity of IPO underpricing permit this thesis to answer the 
first proposed research question: do differences in country-level transparency explain IPO 
underpricing difference across IPO markets? The answer is affirmative; dissimilarities in countries’ 
transparency significantly influence the variability in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market 
by up to 30%. In contrast, 5% of underpricing variance is attributed to characteristics of IPO firms 
within the G20 economies. However, the findings should settle the fragmentation in the IPO 
literature in relation to the true nature of the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship. The 
results also lend support to Engelen and van Essen (2010) in regard to the importance of capturing 
the nesting structure of the IPO data by employing the HLM estimation.  
 
3.7.2.3. The Indirect Influence of Variations in Transparency on 
Underpricing Difference across Countries  
In this section, this research progresses in Table 25 by presenting the results of the full HLM models 
using both random coefficients for the intercepts and slopes. The coefficients in Panel A present 
the direct influence of country-level transparency characteristics along with controlling for the 
characteristics firms.  
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Table 25: Effect of Transparency on IPO Underpricing of the G20 Countries with Random Slope Coefficient Model with Firm-specific Variables 
Model 1       Model 2        Model 3          Model 4             Model 5 
Panel A: Direct Effect 
Transparency-level variables 
VA -0.23*** GE -0.15** RL -0.11** RQ -0.13** CC -0.11*** 
 [-3.32]  [-2.00]  [-2.30]  [-2.21]  [-2.34] 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.05*** PR -0.03*** PR -0.02*** PR -0.03*** PR -0.03*** 
 [-21.44]  [-16.93]  [-12.50]  [-14.75]  [-14.22] 
DF -0.05*** DF -0.04*** DF -0.02*** DF -0.03*** DF -0.03*** 
 [-22.86]  [-18.80]  [-15.22]  [-17.12]  [-16.69] 
UR -0.03* UR -0.02 UR -0.02 UR -0.02 UR -0.02 
 [-1.53]  [-1.10]  [-0.80]  [-0.75]  [-.81] 
PMV 0.01 PMV 0.01 PMV 0.02** PMV 0.01** PMV 0.01* 
 [1.10]  [0.41]  [1.87]  [1.75]  [1.53] 
LET -0.04*** LET -0.05*** LET -0.05*** LET -0.05*** LET -0.05*** 
 [-3.79]  [-4.99]  [-5.03]  [-5.26]  [-5.26] 
LOP -0.06*** LOP -0.06*** LOP -0.06*** LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.07*** 
 [-10.90]  [-10.70]  [-10.61]  [-11.02]  [-11.34] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE 
                                             Panel B: Indirect Effect “Interaction Variables” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VA * PR 0.04*** GE * PR 0.01*** RL * PR 0.01*** RQ * PR 0.01*** CC * PR 0.02*** 
 [15.84]  [6.80]  [6.13]  [5.80]  [10.06] 
VA * DF 0.04*** GE * DF 0.01*** RL * DF 0.01*** RQ * DF 0.01*** CC * DF 0.02*** 
 [16.56]  [8.38]  [7.64]  [6.70]  [11.38] 
VA * UR -0.03** GE * UR -0.03** RL * UR -0.03* RQ * UR -0.04*** CC * UR -0.03** 
 [-1.96]  [-1.82]  [-1.51]  [-2.34]  [-1.88] 
VA* PMV -0.01* GE* PMV 0.02*** RL* PMV 0.01 RQ* PMV 0.01 CC* PMV 0.01** 
 [-1.53]  [2.93]  [1.15]  [0.26]  [1.76] 
VA * LET 0.01** GE * LET 0.01 RL * LET 0.03*** RQ * LET 0.02*** CC * LET 0.01** 
 [1.90]  [0.99]  [3.38]  [3.00]  [1.68] 
VA * LOP 0.03*** GE * LOP 0.03*** RL * LOP 0.04*** RQ * LOP 0.02*** CC * LOP 0.02*** 
 [7.08]  [5.72]  [5.87]  [3.76]  [4.82] 
Constant 0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30*** 
 [3.97]  [3.37]  [3.38]  [3.37]  [3.34] 
Observations 10209  10209  10209  10209  10209 
R2 within countries 0.08  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.06 
R2 between countries 0.34   0.08   0.09   0.11   0.06 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 
0 j  0.12050  0.16970  0.16729  0.16370  0.17313 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, ij  0.58571  0.5947  0.59561  0.59843  0.59891 
Deviance 23583   23666   23760   23808   23817 
Note: Country-level transparency and firm-level variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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The estimations of interaction covariates demonstrating the indirect “modifier” influence of 
transparency characteristics on IPO underpricing are offered in Panel B. The emphasis here is 
primarily on the outcomes of Panel B. In this way, answers can be provided for the indirect 
influence hypotheses while this research evaluate the uniformity of outcomes provided in Panel A 
with prior direct effects findings summarised in Table 24. 
 
3.7.2.3.1. The Influence of Transparency Characteristics on the 
Incentive of IPO Issuers-IPO Underpricing Relationship  
In this section, this research shows the outcomes of five hypotheses regarding the indirect 
influences of variances in country-level transparency proxies on IPO underpricing through the 
incentive of IPO issuers. Hypotheses 6a, b, c, d, and e postulate that high levels of voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption 
improve the association between the incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing, respectively. Table 
25 shows that the positive and significant coefficients for the interaction terms VA*PR (0.04; Table 
25; Model 1; p<0.01) and VA*DF (0.04; Table 25; Model 1; p<0.01) provide supporting outcomes 
for hypotheses 6a. These results confirm that impact of participation ratio and dilution factor on 
underpricing is higher by 4% when level of voice and accountability increases by one unit in G20 
countries. 
 
Similarly, Table 25 provides supporting results for hypotheses 6b, c, and d. This is because the 
interaction terms GE*PR (0.01; Table 25; Model 2; p<0.01), GE*DF (0.01; Table 25; Model 2; 
p<0.01), RL*PR (0.01; Table 25; Model 3; p<0.01), RL*DF (0.01; Table 25; Model 3; p<0.01), 
RQ*PR (0.01; Table 25; Model 4; p<0.01), and RQ*DF (0.01; Table 25; Model 4; p<0.01) provide 
positive and significant coefficients. Based on these results, the author confirms that across the 
G20 nations, an increase in the level of government effectiveness, rule of law, and regulatory 
quality by one unit leads to improving the influence of participation ratio and dilution factor on 
IPO underpricing by 1%, equally. Finally, Table 25 confirms the prediction of hypotheses 6e as 
the interaction terms CC*PR (0.04; Table 25; Model 5; p<0.01) and CC*DF (0.04; Table 25; Model 
5; p<0.01) are both positive and significant coefficients. 
170 
 
The predictions of the hypotheses being true are achieved. These findings assert that entrepreneur 
founders of IPO companies in G20 countries indeed perceive the availability of a high level of 
voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of 
corruption in their countries as a reflection of the existence of an information environment that 
deters the presence of ex-ante uncertainty. The availability of such an environment with a solid 
formal institutional quality in a G20 economy relieves the anxiety of IPO issuers when they decide 
to go public. This is because owners of IPO firms in nations with strong governance practices are 
not afraid that powerful underwriting banks and institutional investors will purposely underprice 
their IPO firms for personal gain. In turn, those entrepreneur founders in such a transparent stock 
market create and sell a larger proportion of secondary and primary shares when going public. They 
in fact have strong confidence in the fairness and quality of their legal system, so their fear of a 
substantial loss of wealth is negligible. Consequently, issuers who are nested within high (low) 
transparency nations have more (less) inclination to sell and create more secondary and primary 
shares, respectively, when they float a portion of their holdings. 
 
Overall, the findings confirm similar observations pinpointed recently by Zattoni et al. (2017). The 
authors confirmed that the quality of formal institutions significantly modifies the association 
between board independence and long-term financial performance of IPO firms across national 
economies. The results this research attained here in relation to the indirect influence of variations 
in countries’ transparency on IPO underpricing difference enable this thesis to answer the second 
research question: do differences in country-level transparency influence the relationship between 
the incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing across IPO markets? The results provide a 
satisfyingly strong answer. In this chapter, this research reveals evidence confirming that 
dissimilarities in transparency across nations indirectly influence the variability in IPO 
underpricing in the global IPO market. It happens through affecting the association between the 
incentive of IPO issuers and IPO underpricing. The new empirical evidence this research provide 
in this chapter is likely to be foreign to the intersection of IPO underpricing-transparency literature, 
represented by Boulton et al. (2010), Engelen and van Essen (2010) Banerjee et al. (2011), Hopp 
and Dreher (2013), Autore et al. (2014), and Hearn (2014). This literature has no awareness that 
formal institutional quality wields a significant modifying influence in determining the behaviour 
of entrepreneur founders with reference to the proportion of shares they aim to sell or create when 
they go public.   
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3.7.2.3.2. The Influence of Transparency Characteristics on the 
Underwriter Reputation-IPO Underpricing Relationship 
This research carries out the investigation in this section by presenting the results of five hypotheses 
related to the modifier influences of differences in country-level transparency on IPO underpricing 
via the choice to hire reputable underwriters. Hypotheses 7a, b, c, d, and e assume that in G20 
economies with high levels of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
regulatory quality, and control of corruption, the association between high-status underwriters and 
underpricing is expected to be weaker, respectively.  
 
Table 25 provides agreeable results for all the research hypotheses. The negative and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term VA*UR (-0.03; Table 25; Model 1; p<0.05) supports the 
prediction of hypothesis 7a. Indicated here is that when the level of voice and accountability in 
G20 countries increases by one unit, the influence of prestigious underwriters on IPO underpricing 
falls by 3%. Likewise, the interaction terms GE*UR (-0.03; Table 25; Model 2; p<0.05), RL*UR 
(-0.03; Table 25; Model 3; p<0.10), and CC*UR (-0.03; Table 25; Model 5; p<0.05) support the 
theoretical argument pinpointed in hypotheses 7b, c, and e, respectively. These findings 
demonstrate that an increase in the level of GE, RL, and CC by one unit results in undermining the 
association between reputable underwriters and underpricing by 3%, equally. Lastly, Table 25 
affirms the expectation of hypothesis 7d. This is because the interaction term RQ*UR (-0.04; Table 
25; Model 4; p<0.01) provides a negative and significant coefficient. It implies that when the level 
of regulatory quality between G20 stock markets increases by one unit, the link between prestigious 
underwriters and underpricing weakens by 4%.  
 
These outcomes imply that IPO investors indeed perceive the existence of a high level of 
transparency in their countries as additional tool that reduces their ex-ante uncertainty. In turn, the 
magnitude of the negative effect of underwriter reputation on underpricing becomes lower in such 
economics with strong legal system. To further explain these findings, the results infer that when 
the degree of VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC in nations is at a high level, then the anxiety of IPO 
investors, in relation to ex-ante uncertainty about the credibility of information included in the IPO 
prospectus reduces. In this kind of scenario, hiring high-status underwriters to obtain a certification 
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signal to IPO firms - in order to alleviate the ex-ante uncertainty for concerned IPO investors about 
the quality of the IPO issuers – becomes less important.  
 
The motive behind this is that in such national economics with effective country governance 
practices, stakeholders will surely fear the law, hence refrain from circulating private information. 
In such nations that maintain quality formal institutions, IPO investors will not find it challenging 
to formulate investment decisions because they can access efficient and reliable information. The 
results contend that in countries with sound formal institutional systems, IPO investors are likely 
to prosecute fraudulent IPO issuers when fraud occurs. Consequently, it becomes unnecessary for 
those investors to have much concern regarding the reputation of IPO underwriters in providing an 
IPO prospectus with reliable information on the quality of IPO firms. To recapitulate, in such 
nations with a high level of transparency, IPO markets possess an information environment that is 
characterised by: firstly, low levels of information asymmetry, allowing for a lower level of ex-
ante uncertainty between IPO parities; and secondly, less importance being given to the reputable 
underwriters’ assurance role. 
 
In general, the inferences for the indirect influence of dissimilarities in transparency on IPO 
underpricing difference help this research to answer the third research question: do differences in 
country-level transparency influence the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing across IPO markets? This research attains a strong answer to this question. This thesis 
learns that dissimilarities in formal institutional quality across the G20 nations significantly modify 
the association between the reputable underwriter and IPO underpricing. The findings of this 
chapter are the first in the IPO underpricing-transparency literature to empirically document that 
the quality of a country’s legal system truly matters in adjusting the correlation between high-status 
underwriters and IPO underpricing.  
 
3.7.2.3.3. The Influence of Transparency Characteristics on the Ex-
ante Uncertainty-IPO Underpricing Relationship 
The last set of hypotheses connected with testing the indirect influence of country-level 
transparency on the perceived underpricing variance across nations is provided in this section. 
Hypotheses 8a, b, c, d, and e propose that low levels of voice and accountability, government 
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effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption undermine the relationship 
between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing, respectively. Table 25 provides supporting results 
for the three ex-ante measures earning firm support to hypothesis 8a. This is because the interaction 
term VA*PMV provides negative and significant (-0.01; Table 25; Model 1; p<0.10) result. The 
outcome infers that when the level of voice and accountability between G20 economies rises by 
one unit, the influence of pre-IPO stock market volatility on IPO underpricing declines by 1%. 
Following the hypothesised relationship in the hypothesis development section, VA*PMV 
proposes the following. The existence of fragile country governance regulations breeds a stock 
market environment that suffers from asymmetric information problem amongst market 
participants. Therefore, in this type of market with a low level of VA, participants in the IPO market 
will maintain the view that IPO managers have ultimate control of window dressing accounting 
numbers and finance-related information. In such a stock market environment, the ex-ante 
uncertainty amongst IPO investors accumulates to the extent investors become very sensitive to 
any bad news; in turn, they react aggressively to fluctuations in pre-IPO stock market volatility. 
This of course attracts more underpricing.  
 
Similarly, the second interaction term of VA*LET provides positive and significant (0.01; Table 
25; Model 1; p<0.05) outcome as anticipated in the theoretical section. It indicates that an increase 
in the level of voice and accountability by one unit amongst G20 stock markets results in increasing 
the influences of elapsed time on IPO underpricing by 1%. This finding can be explained as 
follows. Remember that previous IPO underpricing literature proxies the level of ex-ante 
uncertainty in amongst IPO investors utilising the variable elapsed time (Lee et al. 1996; 
Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti 2012). This literature asserts that when institutional investors34 have some 
worries or are not enthusiastic about subscribing in full to some IPO companies, then the length of 
the elapsed time between the first trading day and fixing the offer price of the IPO firm increases. 
Subsequently, uninformed investors read the low appetite or demand by institutional investors for 
some IPOs as being of high uncertainty risk (Lee et al. 2003). This perception turns into less 
demand for an IPO firm on the first trading day and generates less pressure on the share prices of 
IPO firms leading to lower underpricing. The result suggests that when this IPO firm is traded in a 
                                                 
34 Lee et al. (1996) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) argue that institutional investors can be seen as “informed” 
investors because they enjoy a high level of financial knowledge and resources. In contrast, the authors see “non-
informed” IPO investors as retail investors who have limited financial awareness and capability.  
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nation with high voice and accountability standards, the influence of LET on UP becomes larger. 
The reason for this is that uninformed IPO investors in high VA stock markets have confidence in 
the investment actions of institutional investors. This is because IPO investors nested in such 
countries can rely on their legal system to protect them in case they were manipulated by the 
misleading actions of informed investors.  
 
Likewise, the third interaction term of VA*LOP presents a positive and significant (0.03; Table 
25; Model 1; p<0.01) coefficient as expected. Recall that IPO underpricing scholars including 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Loughran et al. (1994), and Boulton et al. (2010) employed IPO offer 
size to proxy for ex-ante uncertainty. The authors confirm that well-established IPO firms routinely 
offer larger offerings while speculative firms offer smaller offerings. Consequently, IPO investors 
nested in nations with a high level of VA will have greater confidence in the quality of prospectuses 
issued by large IPO firms. This is because investors in such economies trust that managers in well-
established IPO firms fear breaking the law, hence, they will not become involved in fraudulent 
financial reporting. The outcome is less underpricing for large IPO firms offered in high VA 
countries. For this reason, the relationship between the size of the IPO firm and underpricing 
becomes stronger in high transparency nations.  
 
The outcomes related to hypotheses 8c, d, and e provide overall significant results giving support 
for their claims. Table 25 shows that interaction terms RL*LET (0.03; Table 25; Model 3; p<0.01), 
RQ*LET (0.02; Table 25; Model 4; p<0.01), and CC*LET (0.01; Table 25; Model 5; p<0.05) are 
positive and significant. These results imply an increase in the level of rule of law, regulatory 
quality, and control of corruption across the G20 economies by one unit leads to improving the 
influence of LET and LOP on IPO underpricing by 3%, 2%, and 1%, respectively. Similarly, Table 
25 reveals positive and significant coefficients for the interaction terms RL*LOP (0.04; Table 25; 
Model 3; p<0.01), RQ*LOP (0.02; Table 25; Model 4; p<0.01), and CC*LOP (0.02; Table 29; 
Model 5; p<0.01). Yet, this research obtains weak support for hypothesis 8b. This is because the 
interaction term GE*LOP (0.03; Table 29; Model 2; p<0.01) provides a result that is consistent 
with the hypothesis while GE*LET (0.01; Table 25; Model 2; p>0.10) is insignificant and 
GE*PMV (0.02; Table 25; Model 2; p<0.01) is contrary to the prediction. 
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Table 25 documents minor contradictory results in relation to the influence of RL, RQ, and CC on 
the relationship between PMV and IPO underpricing. This research argues that these unanticipated 
results are due to the presence of contrary expectations about the influence of pre-IPO market 
volatility across stock markets with a high level of RL, RQ, and CC. The findings are in line with 
a similar observation made by Kayo and Kimura (2011). These scholars found that contrary to their 
expectation, munificence has no influence on the association between growth opportunities and 
leverage ratio across countries. Generally, the results provide strong support for hypotheses 8a, c, 
d, and e while weak support is evident for hypothesis 8b. 
 
Overall, Table 25 reveals sufficient evidence permitting this thesis to answer the fourth research 
question of this chapter: do differences in country-level transparency influence the relationship 
between ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing across IPO markets? 
Confidently, the author of this thesis attains evidence that dissimilarities in the formal institutional 
quality indirectly affect the IPO underpricing’s variability from country to country. This novel 
empirical evidence will certainly improve the comprehension of the intersection of IPO 
underpricing-transparency literature represented by Boulton et al. (2010), Engelen and van Essen 
(2010), Banerjee et al. (2011), Hopp and Dreher (2013), Autore et al. (2014), and Hearn (2014). 
This literature asserts that the variability in formal institutional quality exerts only a direct influence 
on IPO underpricing across the global IPO market. 
 
This research notes that the results for the direct influences of the five transparency proxies along 
with the firm-level variables in Panel A in Table 25 exhibit similar findings with Table 24. Across 
the five models, Table 25 affirms the prior conclusion that VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC significantly 
matter in elucidating the variance in IPO underpricing across G20 economies. Table 25 shows that 
the analysis of the model fit for the five formal institutional proxies disclose that voice and 
accountability (Deviance 23583; Table 25; Model 1; R2 between countries 34%; R2 within 
countries 8%) demonstrates the largest direct and indirect influence on IPO underpricing. This 
outcome implies that 34% of variability of underpricing across nations is mainly attributed to 
dissimilarities in the level of voice and accountability while only 8% is related to determinants of 
IPO underpricing. The level of government effectiveness appears as a second powerful country-
level transparency proxy (Deviance 23666; Table 25; Model 2; R2 between countries 8%; R2 within 
countries 7%) having significantly direct and indirect influence on underpricing. The direct and 
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indirect effects of rule of law (Deviance 23760; Table 25; Model 3; R2 between countries 9%; R2 
within countries 7%) and regulatory quality (Deviance 23808; Table 25; Model 4; R2 between 
countries 11%; R2 within countries 6%) arise second in elucidating the variance in IPO 
underpricing across the international IPO market. The level of control of corruption (Deviance 
23817; Table 25; Model 5; R2 between countries 6%; R2 within countries 6%) comes last in terms 
of the direct and indirect influences on the worldwide underpricing difference.   
 
3.7.3. Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks 
3.7.3.1. Time-Invariant Country-level Transparency Proxies  
In this section, this research seeks to observe if employing time-invariant country-level 
transparency proxies is econometrically an accurate estimation as employing time-variant ones. 
Recall that in the literature review, the author argues that the true association between differences 
in country-level transparency and IPO underpricing across countries continues to be a problem in 
the law and IPO underpricing literature. Consequently, this thesis made a claim by arguing that 
using time-invariant country-level transparency proxies instead of time-variant ones led to a lack 
of understanding in relation to transparency-IPO underpricing relationship. Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) indicate that ignoring the time-varying characteristics of changes in institutional quality 
leads to omitted variable bias. Hence, this research reconverts the time-variant country-level 
transparency measures to time-invariant ones following Engelen and van Essen (2010), in order to 
retest if not accounting for the time-variance trait of country-level transparency would bias the 
results. 
 
Table 26 presents the results for five full HLM models using both random intercept and slope 
coefficients while treating country-level transparency proxies as time-invariant factors. This 
research does this by using the average score of, for example, the voice and accountability measure 
for every country over the entire period of the study following Engelen and van Essen (2010). In 
contrast to the time-variant results in Table 25, the five HLM models in Table 26 document 
interesting findings. This research discovers that only VA (-0.27; Table 26; Model 1; p<0.10) and 
CC (-0.27; Table 26; Model 5; p<0.10) are negative and weakly significant.  
177 
 
Table 26: HLM Analyses on the Effect of Time-Invariant Country-level Transparency on IPO Underpricing of the G20 Countries with Random Intercept and 
Slop Coefficient Model with Firm-specific Variables 
Model 1       Model 2        Model 3          Model 4             Model 5 
Panel A: Direct Effect 
Transparency-level variables 
VA -0.27* GE -0.23 RL -0.20 RQ -0.23 CC -0.27* 
 [-1.45]  [-1.20]  [-1.00]  [-1.19]  [-1.50] 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.02*** PR -0.02*** PR -0.02*** PR -0.02*** PR -0.02*** 
 [-11.50]  [-11.38]  [-11.70]  [-11.40]  [-11.00] 
DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** 
 [-15.25]  [-14.72]  [-15.30]  [-14.70]  [-15.00] 
UR -0.01 UR -0.01 UR -0.01 UR -0.01 UR -0.01 
 [-0.30]  [-0.24]  [-0.29]  [-0.20]  [-0.22] 
PMV 0.01 PMV 0.01 PMV 0.01* PMV 0.01 PMV 0.01 
 [1.28]  [1.10]  [1.30]  [1.00]  [1.10] 
LET -0.05** LET -0.05** LET -0.05** LET -0.05** LET -0.05** 
 [-5.65]  [-5.51]  [-5.70]  [-6.00]  [-6.75] 
LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.07*** 
 [-12.00]  [-11.54]  [-12.10]  [-12.00]  [-11.65] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE 
                                             Panel B: Indirect Effect “Interaction Variables” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VA * PR 0.01*** GE * PR 0.01*** RL * PR 0.01*** RQ * PR 0.01*** CC * PR 0.01*** 
 [2.75]  [2.86]  [3.00]  [2.90]  [2.80] 
VA * DF 0.01*** GE * DF 0.01*** RL * DF 0.01*** RQ * DF 0.01*** CC * DF 0.01*** 
 [4.92]  [5.00]  [4.95]  [4.95]  [5.00] 
VA * UR -0.07** GE * UR -0.06* RL * UR -0.06* RQ * UR -0.06* CC * UR -0.06** 
 [-1.75]  [-1.60]  [-2.00]  [-1.62]  [-1.70] 
VA* PMV 0.04*** GE* PMV 0.04*** RL* PMV 0.04*** RQ* PMV 0.05*** CC* PMV 0.04*** 
 [2.60]  [2.70]  [3.00]  [2.75]  [2.62] 
VA * LET 0.05*** GE * LET 0.03** RL * LET 0.03** RQ * LET 0.04** CC * LET 0.05*** 
 [2.56]  [1.90]  [2.00]  [1.95]  [3.00] 
VA * LOP 0.08*** GE * LOP 0.07*** RL * LOP 0.07*** RQ * LOP 0.06*** CC * LOP 0.08*** 
 [6.77]  [6.00]  [5.85]  [5.58]  [6.80] 
Constant 0.27***  0.30***  0.30***  0.26***  0.27*** 
 [2.87]  [2.80]  [3.00]  [2.77]  [2.90] 
Observations 10,209  10,209  10,209  10,209  10,209 
R2 within countries 0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
R2 between countries 0.09   0.07   0.06   0.07   0.09 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 
0 j  0.16744  0.17294  0.17300  0.17294  0.16744 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, 
ij  0.60020  0.60118  0.60120  0.60118  0.60020 
Deviance 23839   23856   23860   23856   23839 
Note: Country-level transparency and firm-level variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail. 
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The remaining three proxies GE, RL, and RQ demonstrate no relationship existing between 
country-level transparency and IPO underpricing difference across nations. Judging from these 
outcomes, this research would reach a false conclusion that refutes the direct influence of 
differences in country-level formal institutional quality on underpricing variance across the global 
IPO market. These results imply that omitting the time-variant nature of country-level transparency 
means that this research could have arrived at an erroneous conclusion. Table 26 also shows that 
disregarding the time-variant nature of country-level characteristics causes no notable impact on 
firm-level variables in relation to the EWL theory. This is because in Panel A in Table 26, 
consistent with previous findings, this research continues to observe partial support for two out of 
the three dimensions of the EWL model: the incentive of IPO issuers and ex-ante uncertainty in 
explaining IPO underpricing variance. This conclusion suggests that IPOs are underpriced 
differently because owners of IPO firms sell more secondary shares and create more primary 
shares; this condition is also elucidated by the degree of ex-ante uncertainty perceived at the time 
of offering. The employment of reputable underwriters has no influence on IPO underpricing across 
nations.  
 
This similarity between the results of firm-level factors in Tables 25 and 26 comes as no surprise. 
This is because in both tables the author estimates firm-level covariates using the group mean 
centering approximation. In Panel B, this research notes that the effect of omitting the time-varying 
nature of country-level transparency only biased the indirect relationship between the pre-IPO 
stock market volatility and underpricing. By assessing the impact of discounting the time-variant 
characteristics of country-level transparency on the model fit of the five HLM models, this research 
notes the following. The R-squared results in Table 26 provide poor quantification of the direct and 
indirect influences of country-level formal institutional characteristics on IPO underpricing. This 
is because, for example, the R2 between (within) nations attributes only 9% (6%) of the variability 
in IPO underpricing to the time-invariant changes in the level of voice and accountability (firm-
level factors) across nations as shown in Model 1 in Table 26. On the contrary, the robust results 
this research obtains previously (Table 25; Model 1; R2 between countries 34%; R2 within countries 
8%) document that the time-variant changes in the level of voice and accountability elucidates 32% 
of underpricing difference while differences in firm-level factors within countries explain 8%.  
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This thesis attributes this large loss in the R-squared values for 25% between and for 2% within 
countries in Model 1 in Table 25 compared with Model 1 in Table 26 to omitting the time-variance 
characteristics of country-level transparency. This loss in R-squared figures is translated into a 
similar loss in the efficiency of all models in Table 26 compared to Table 25. This is evident in the 
inefficient outcome of the deviance score test of 23839, for example, in Model 1 in Table 26 
compared with the efficient deviance score test of 23583 reported in Model 1 in Table 25. Hence, 
the results in Table 25 provide a bias-free and efficient conclusion supporting the negative and 
significant relationship between time-variant difference in country-level transparency and 
underpricing difference across countries. This finding implies that the conclusions reached by 
previous IPO underpricing-law literature and in particular Engelen and van Essen (2010) should 
be treated with caution. 
 
3.7.3.2. Variations in Developed and Developing Countries 
There is a strand of research that distinguishes between developed and developing stock markets 
in relation to the impact of institutional quality on information asymmetry in stock markets. For 
example, Harvey (1995), Klapper and Love (2004), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) document 
dissimilar effects of country-level institutional quality for developing and developed markets on 
stock market behaviour. Kayo and Kimura (2011) also acknowledge the impact of differences in 
information environments between developed and developing stock markets, and their impact on 
the capital structure of firms. They argue that firms nested within developing stock markets exhibit 
similar firm-level information characteristics that are not similar to developed ones. Hence, to 
control for the effect of country-level transparency on IPO underpricing difference in developing 
and developed IPO market, this research follows Kayo and Kimura (2011) to split the sample 
between developing and developed countries. In Table 22, this research presented the results of the 
one-way ANOVA with random effects for 10 developing35 and 12 developed stock markets to 
confirm the nesting structure of the IPO data. 
 
                                                 
35 See Table 3 for a detailed list of countries. 
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This research checks if variations in IPO underpricing across the 3,025 developing and 7,188 
developed IPO firms are significantly different within each group. The results of the random-effect 
parameters in Table 22 support the use of HLM technique as they show significant variation within 
developing and developed G20 countries in underpricing. This research shows that by controlling 
for the nesting structure of the IPO data, 25% (5%) of the variation in IPO underpricing in 
developing (developed) G20 countries is related to differences between those countries. To check 
the direct impact of time-varying changes in transparency within developing and developed G20 
countries on underpricing difference in the G20 countries, Tables 27 and 28 separately run the 
HLM results for IPOs listed in developing and developed stock markets. This research manages to 
isolate the effect of differences in country-level transparency on IPO underpricing in developing 
and developed market samples.  
 
Interestingly, across the five models in Table 27, this research finds only a significant impact of 
time-varying changes in the level of voice and accountability on the underpricing difference within 
developing G20 countries. Model 1 in Table 27 documents that an increase in the voice and 
accountability level by one unit leads to a fall in the underpricing level within developing G20 
countries by 30% at the 5% level of significance. Hence, the value of R2 between countries for 
Model 1 shows that 28% of the variability in underpricing between emerging G20 countries is 
entirely explained by differences between the level of voice and accountability. The results of 
Models 2 to 5 in Table 27 show no association between the level of regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law and underpricing difference in developing 
countries. 
 
However, how does this research interpret this conflicting result? This research argues that 
although these five proxies measure overall country-level transparency, VA focuses on measuring 
the perception of individuals concerning the degree of transparency in their countries. In contrast, 
the remaining four proxies - RQ, CC, GE, and RL - focus on gauging the status of transparency 
that is provided by a country’s government. This research therefore argues that those individuals 
in developing countries include investors in the IPO who fear that when the degree of voice and 
accountability in their countries is in question, their ex-ante uncertainty about the credibility of 
information included in the IPO prospectus is higher.  
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Table 27: The Effect of Country-level Transparency on IPO Underpricing of Developing G20 Countries with Random Intercept and Slope Coefficient Estimations   
Model 1             Model 2                      Model 3         Model 4                              Model 5 
Panel A: Direct Effect 
Transparency-level variables 
VA -0.30** GE 0.01 RL 0.32 RQ -0.07 CC 0.06 
 [-1.90]  [0.03]  [1.00]  [-0.75]  [0.20] 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.01 PR -0.05*** PR -0.07*** PR -0.05*** PR -0.10*** 
 [-0.53]  [-4.65]  [-4.24]  [-5.30]  [-6.88] 
DF -0.02 DF -0.05*** DF -0.07*** DF -0.05*** DF -0.10*** 
 [-1.01]  [-4.70]  [-4.13]  [-5.42]  [-7.01] 
UR 0.07 UR 0.08** UR 0.11** UR 0.07** UR 0.11** 
 [1.12]  [1.72]  [2.30]  [1.83]  [2.73] 
PMV 0.02 PMV 0.06*** PMV 0.06*** PMV 0.05*** PMV 0.04*** 
 [0.77]  [3.84]  [3.30]  [3.25]  [2.97] 
LET 0.03* 
* 
LET 0.03** 
* 
LET 0.05*** 
* 
LET 0.04** 
* 
LET 0.04** 
*  [1.60]  [1.65]  [2.43]  [1.97]  [2.18] 
LOP -0.09*** LOP -0.11*** LOP -0.13*** LOP -0.11*** LOP -0.12*** 
 [-4.90]  [-7.03]  [-7.41]  [-7.50]  [-8.40] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE 
Panel B: Indirect Effect “Interaction Variables” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VA * PR 0.05*** GE * PR 0.01 RL * PR -0.09*** RQ * PR 0.03*** CC * PR -0.03 
 [3.13]  [1.10]  [-3.50]  [2.40]  [-0.91] 
VA * DF 0.04*** GE * DF 0.02 RL * DF -0.10*** RQ * DF 0.03*** CC * DF -0.03 
[2.75]  [1.25]  [-3.64]  [2.64]  [-0.89] 
VA * UR -0.01 GE * UR -0.04 RL * UR 0.14* RQ * UR -0.02 CC * UR 0.07 
 [-0.05]  [-0.71]  [1.40]  [-0.34]  [0.76] 
VA* PMV -0.03* GE* PMV 0.07*** RL* PMV 0.05 RQ* PMV 0.05*** CC* PMV 0.06* 
 [-1.50]  [3.02]  [1.10]  [2.68]  [1.43] 
VA * LET 0.01 GE * LET -0.06** RL * LET 0.11*** RQ * LET -0.01 CC * LET 0.10** 
 [0.33]  [-1.96]  [2.73]  [-0.36]  [2.20] 
VA * LOP 0.04** GE * LOP -0.01 RL * LOP -0.08***   RQ* LOP -0.02 CC * LOP -0.05* 
 [2.47]  [-0.43]  [-2.45]  [-1.01]  [-1.40] 
Constant 1.42***  1.47***  1.39***  1.45***  1.40*** 
 [7.45]  [6.81]  [6.79]  [6.85]  [6.61] 
Observations 3,021  3,021  3,021  3,021  3,021 
R2 within countries 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.07 
R2 between countries 0.28   0.01   0.10   0.01   0.01 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 
0 j  0.23700  0.32495  0.29450  0.32487  0.32400 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, 
ij  0.89580  0.89729  0.89415  0.89739  0.89945 
Deviance 8270  8281  8273  8282  8288 
Note: Country-level transparency and firm-level variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
182 
 
Table 28: The Effect of Country-level Transparency on IPO Underpricing of Developed G20 Countries with Random Intercept and Slope Coefficient Estimations   
Model 1             Model 2                      Model 3         Model 4                              Model 5 
Panel A: Direct Effect 
Transparency-level variables 
VA -0.22 GE -0.03 RL -0.02 RQ 0.01 CC -0.02 
 [-1.20]  [-0.43]  [-0.24]  [0.02]  [-0.30] 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.02*** PR -0.02*** PR -0.02*** PR -0.01*** PR -0.01*** 
 [-13.70]  [-12.42]  [-14.09]  [-10.50]  [-13.30] 
DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** DF -0.02*** 
 [-19.53]  [-19.32]  [-21.84]  [-18.51]  [-21.80] 
UR -0.05** UR -0.04** UR -0.05*** UR -0.04** UR -0.05** 
 [-2.30]  [-2.19]  [-2.40]  [-1.95]  [-2.20] 
PMV -0.02** PMV -0.02** PMV -0.03*** PMV -0.04*** PMV -0.03*** 
 [-1.75]  [-2.10]  [-2.73]  [-4.21]  [-2.85] 
LET 0.03** 
* 
LET 0.03* 
* 
LET 0.01 
* 
LET -0.01 
* 
LET -0.01 
 [1.82]  [1.50]  [0.50]  [-0.81]  [-0.40] 
LOP -0.06*** LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.07*** LOP -0.08*** 
 [-10.80]  [-11.27]  [-11.20]  [-11.30]  [-10.45] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE 
Panel B: Indirect Effect “Interaction Variables” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VA * PR 0.02** GE * PR -0.01*** RL * PR -0.02*** RQ * PR -0.01 CC * PR -0.01*** 
 [2.13]  [-3.20]  [-4.40]  [-0.40]  [-3.90] 
VA * DF 0.03*** GE * DF -0.02* RL * DF -0.01*** RQ * DF -0.06*** CC * DF -0.01*** 
[4.73]  [-1.30]  [-5.20]  [-2.50]  [-4.68] 
VA * UR -0.01 GE * UR 0.01 RL * UR 0.01 RQ * UR 0.01 CC * UR 0.01 
 [-0.04]  [0.11]  [0.10]  [0.08]  [0.05] 
VA* PMV 0.31*** GE* PMV 0.21*** RL* PMV 0.14** RQ* PMV 0.15*** CC* PMV 0.11*** 
 [8.30]  [8.24]  [2.30]  [8.44]  [4.65] 
VA * LET -0.04*** GE * LET -0.05* RL * LET -0.08** RQ * LET -0.02*** CC * LET -0.08*** 
 [-4.40]  [-1.30]  [-1.97]  [-3.81]  [-3.20] 
VA * LOP 0.15*** GE * LOP 0.10*** RL * LOP 0.11*** RQ* LOP 0.08*** CC * LOP 0.07*** 
 [5.80]  [5.20]  [3.98]  [6.42]  [4.50] 
Constant 0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.01 
 [0.22]  [-0.24]  [-0.10]  [0.15]  [-0.21] 
Observations 7,188  7,188  7,188  7,188  7,188 
R2 within countries 0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.10 
R2 between countries 0.04   0.11   0.12   0.05   0.12 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 0 j  0.02408  0.02782  0.02860  0.02636  0.02843 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, ij  0.44954  0.45195  0.45327  0.45032  0.45275 
Deviance 14679  14719  14740  14693  14732 
Note: Country-level transparency and firm-level variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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Those investors will pay no attention to changes in the level of regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law as improvements in their governments’ 
operational and informational efficiency are frequently questioned. Those investors will pay no 
attention to changes in the level of regulatory quality, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, and rule of law as improvements in their governments’ operational and informational 
efficiency are frequently questioned. 
 
Governments in developing economies can make numerous policy changes in their 
legislation/regulations cosmetically enhance their global transparency ranking but market 
participants in those countries will discount or disregard those fictitious transparency 
improvements. Hence, what is really matter in practice in developing IPO markets is the way 
investors perceive the association between the ability of their voice to make a genuine change and 
their believe of the genuine accountability of their governments. Investors in such developing 
equity markets that preserve a sound level of voice and accountability are likely to have a low level 
of ex-ante uncertainty about the freedom of business activities and the reliability of information 
from influences of government officials, firms, and well-connected citizens, as it affects the 
credibility of the business environment. When those investors believe that their country has a high 
level of voice and accountability, then their ex-ante uncertainty about the destruction of information 
in that country will consequently mitigate the information asymmetry problem in their country. 
The explanation of this effect is intuitively supported by Harris et al. (2009), Knill (2012), 
Cumming et al. (2014), Autore et al. (2014), and Hearn (2014). These scholars acknowledged the 
influence of voice and accountability in a country on the information asymmetry problem 
prevailing in it.  
 
Table 28 presents the results of HLM models for developed G20 countries. Across the five models, 
this research does not find that time-varying changes in country-level transparency wields a 
significant impact on the underpricing difference within advanced G20 economies. These results 
do not come as a surprise for two reasons. Firstly, this research showed previously in Table 4 and 
Table 20 that although there is a good level of heterogeneity in underpricing and transparency 
within industrial G20 nations, this heterogeneity is far lower than what is observed in developing 
stock markets. For example, this research reports in Table 4 (20) that dispersion in the level of IPO 
underpricing (voice and accountability) in developed countries is 74% (20%) while it is 105% 
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(92%) within developing economies. This indicates that advanced nations are already reaching a 
mature level of transparency in their markets where any minor enhancements in governance do not 
reflect on their stock markets. This should be the opposite for emerging equity markets.  
 
This could possibly imply that institutional quality in developed countries is time-invariant yet 
time-variant in developing countries. Kayo and Kimura (2011) provide a similar observation when 
they examine the hierarchical structure of determinants of capital structure between developing and 
developed stock markets. They state that because their sample includes a heterogeneous set of 
developing and developed countries, the importance of time increases in the sense that countries 
with stable institutional and economic quality such as the U.S., changes in firms’ financial policy 
may become time-invariant. On the other hand, Kayo and Kimura (2011) assert that companies in 
emerging countries are likely to be subject to many changes in their policies arising from 
institutional instabilities over the course of time. Secondly, this research argues that any changes 
in government policies that have an effect on stock markets and investors’ confidence in developed 
markets are already incorporated efficiently in stock prices. In fact, there is a strand of literature 
including Morck et al. (2000), La Porta et al. (2006), Fan et al. (2007), Griffin et al. (2010), and 
Jamaani and Roca (2015) who argue that information about macroeconomic and institutional 
changes in advanced economies is efficiently reflected in stock market behaviour. Hence, IPO 
investors across developed G20 nations have no information advantage compared to their fellow 
investors in developing G20 economies.    
 
This research now inspects the behaviour of firm-level covariates related to the EWL theory after 
the author groups the observations based on the level of stock market development. In Panel A in 
Tables 27 and 28 the results provide overall agreement supporting the negative and significant 
association between incentive of IPO issuers and IPO underpricing in both developed and 
developing countries. Both PR and DF are negative and significant in most models. The findings 
are in line with prior IPO literature including Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Jones and 
Swaleheen (2010). Yet, the PR and DF’s outcomes reported in Tables 27 and 28 are in 
disagreement with Autore et al. (2014). The authors employ OLS-based estimation to find positive 
and significant relationship between PR and DF and underpricing in both developed and 
developing country subsamples. This research attributes the difference in results between Autore 
et al.’s (2014) work and ours to two issues. First, from an econometric perspective, the authors’ 
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results could be spuriously positive due to the impact of a large domination in country observations 
related to the variables PR and DF. For example, 78% of their data is related to only four developing 
nations, these being China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea while the remaining 22% is related 
to 12 developing countries. The problem is that under the simple pooling estimation for the OLS 
estimation, Li et al. (2013) caution that some covariates could be spuriously significant due to the 
effect of large sample size at the firm-level. In contrast, the HLM estimation adjusted for this 
econometric shortfall by estimating regressions where PR and DF observations are group centered 
by every country in the sample.  
 
Consequently, this research completely eliminates the impact of countries with large PR and DF 
observations. The second issue is associated with the difference in data size and coverage between 
Autore et al.’s (2014) work and the study. The data on developed (developing) countries includes 
7,160 (3,021) IPO firms ranging from January 1995 to December 2016. Conversely, Autore et al.’s 
(2014) developed (developing) country data contains 5,490 (1,907) IPO firms listed between 1998 
and 2008. 
    
Nevertheless, Tables 27 and 28 report notable differences related to the association between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing between emerging and industrial economies, 
respectively. For example, unexpectedly, Table 27 shows that the overall outcomes of the variable 
UR utilising developing countries sample are positive and significant. The reverse is the case, i.e. 
negative and insignificant for Autore et al. (2014) who employ and develop a country IPO sample. 
They also differ from the negative and significant results attained by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), 
Chahine (2008), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) for developed countries. This research explains 
the difference in the finding as follows. This research contends that underwriters in developing 
stock markets exploit the existence of a weak legal system in their countries, hence they 
intentionally underprice IPO firms seeking benefits for themselves and to profit buy-side 
institutional investors. Hence, this thesis asserts that in such economies with fragile formal 
institutional environment IPO issuers will not be able to prosecute fraudulent underwriters when 
intended underpricing is evident.  
 
This implies possible existence of a spinning practice in emerging IPO markets. This practice 
occurs when issuers bear the expense of hiring high-status underwriters and instead of obtaining 
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lower underpricing, IPOs underwritten by reputable underwriters experience higher underpricing. 
Liu and Ritter (2010) confirm the existence of spinning behaviour in the IPO market bringing 
support the argument. The authors found some reputable underwriters exploit their market power 
to underprice IPO firms seeking side payments from institutional investors. Chen et al. (2017) also 
lend support to the rationale by arguing that in countries where non-transparent market practices 
are tolerated, big underwriting banks frequently tend to exploit owners of IPO companies. The 
authors also discovered IPOs underwritten by high-status underwriters charge with higher 
underwriting fees compared with low quality underwriting banks for the same service they provide.  
In contrast, Table 28 shows in the developed G20 stock markets, the relationship between 
prestigious underwriters and underpricing is negative and significant. This finding means that 
underwriters in developed economies accomplish their certifying role to quality IPO firms in 
exchange for higher underwriting fees. The UR outcomes for developed nations are consistent with 
the endogenous underwriter-IPO underpricing relationship documented by Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010). The authors confirm that entrepreneur founders 
endogenously select prestigious underwriters when they intend to sell a large fraction of their 
secondary shares. By employing the 2SLS model as opposed to OLS estimation to account for this 
endogenous effect, the authors report the signage of UR shifts from positive to negative. This 
explains why Autore et al. (2014) find UR positively impacts on IPO underpricing throughout their 
sample for developed stock markets. This is indeed due to not accounting for this endogeneity 
problem. The HLM estimation corrected for this outcome and produced results that are consistent 
with the 2SLS estimation used by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010). 
 
Tables 27 and 28 also report dissimilarities in the anticipated coefficient sign and significance of 
ex-ante uncertainty proxies including PMV and LET between developed and developing 
economies. For example, Table 27 documents that PMV provides positive and significant 
coefficients in four out of five models when this research restricts the sample to developing 
countries. In contrast, using developed IPO data sample in Table 28 this research finds the variable 
PMV is significant and negatively related to underpricing in all models. The association between 
the elapsed time and underpricing is also inconsistent across developed and developing stock 
markets. The outcomes reported in Table 27 propose that investors in developing countries observe 
IPO firms that require longer time to be listed as being a risky investment. Consequently, higher 
underpricing is demanded by IPO investors to reward for this extra ex-ante uncertainty. The LET 
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outcomes and explanation for developing economies are in line with comparable arguments and 
findings achieved by Mok and Hui (1998) and Chan et al. (2004).  
 
Contrariwise, Table 28 shows that, on average, IPO investors in developed nations’ stock markets 
place no significance on the length of time between fixing the offer price and the first trading day. 
However, this research finds an agreement between developed and developing stock markets in 
relation to the negative and significant influence of IPO firm size on IPO underpricing. Irrespective 
of the level of stock market development, larger IPO firms are recognised by IPO investors as low 
risk investments. This is because large IPO companies are usually well-established, while small 
IPOs tend to be speculative firms with inadequate market histories. The LOP outcomes are in 
harmony with Boulton et al. (2010) and Autore et al. (2014).  
 
The interpretations of the interaction terms in Panel B in Tables 27 and 28 exemplify dissimilar 
effects when this research compares developed to developing countries. For example, the level of 
VA increases the influence of PR and DF in decreasing IPO underpricing in both developing and 
developed countries. Yet, the degree of CC decreases the driving influence of PR and DR in easing 
underpricing in developed stock markets while it exerts influence in developing economies. 
Similarly, however, within both developing and developed countries, the influence of most 
transparency proxies on the association between reputable underwriters and IPO underpricing is 
not significant. When this thesis examines the influence of country-level transparency on the 
relationship between pre-IPO market volatility and underpricing, this research observes an opposite 
role for developed economies. Meanwhile in the developing stock markets this research finds 
contradictory results for the effect of PMV on IPO underpricing. More inconsistent outcomes are 
reported in relation to the influence of elapsed time on IPO underpricing in developed nations while 
this research finds consistent results within developing stock markets. This research uncovers a 
complete agreement in relation to the connection between IPO offer size and IPO underpricing 
between developed and developing stock markets. Kayo and Kimura (2011) also reported similar 
contradictory behaviours related to the interaction terms across developed and developing stock 
markets.  
 
The analysis of the model fit across the two blocks of stock markets reveals the following. Model 
1 in Table 27 offers the largest direct and indirect influences of voice and accountability on 
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determinants of IPO underpricing in emerging G20 nations. The variability of voice and 
accountability in developing G20 economies elucidates 28% of the underpricing variance while 
firm-level variables elucidate only 8%. In contrast, Model 1 in Table 28 is the most efficient model 
because it has the lowest deviance score of 14679. This model reveals that dissimilarities in voice 
and accountability within developed nations explain only 4% of underpricing variance while 10% 
of this difference is attributed to the firms. On average, the evidence this research discovers here is 
that characteristics of firms in developed and developing economies elucidate up 10% and 8% of 
the variability underpricing, respectively. In contrast, up to 28% and 12% of the underpricing 
variance is explained by the characteristics of formal institutional quality in developing and 
developed nations, respectively. This finding implies that the characteristics of country-level 
transparency are more important to the IPO market of developing countries compared to advanced 
ones.  
 
3.7.3.3. Endogeneity and Omitted Variable Bias 
In this section, this research conducts a series of robustness tests in order to maintain the assurance 
and reliability of the previous outcomes. This includes the following. First, the author checks no 
biased conclusions are derived from the results that do not account econometrically for a potential 
endogeneity problem. Second, this thesis incorporates extra firm and country-level covariates. 
Third, this research conducts a variety of diagnostic tests. Specifically, this research controls 
econometrically for a potential endogeneity problem between the variable UR and the residual at 
lower level observations (i.e., firm-level variables). This is done using robust cluster 2SLS models 
with the aim of checking if the significant findings this research achieved previously were not 
biased. IPO underpricing literature accentuates that a potential endogeneity problem may occur 
between the decision to hire a reputable underwriter and the residual of the OLS models (Habib & 
Ljungqvist 2001; Jones & Swaleheen 2010). This literature argues that ignoring this problem leads 
to flawed results. The variable UR is employed at the HLM lower level to elucidate the variance 
of IPO underpricing within nations. Hofmann (1997) and Antonakis et al. (2014) contend that such 
an endogeneity problem should not influence HLM’s lower level model. The reason behind this is 
that HLM estimation assumes the existence of correlations between lower level observations 
(Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). 
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Yet, Essen et al. (2013) and Zattoni et al. (2017) argue that while HLM corrects for correlations in 
observations within the lower level equation, there is still a chance that complete elimination of 
this endogeneity problem is not attained. The scholars proposed the employment of 2SLS 
estimation with a robust instrumental variable to check the reliability of the outcomes provided by 
HLM estimation. Consequently, this research follows Essen et al. (2013) and Zattoni et al. (2017) 
by using robust 2SLS models as a sensitivity test to check if the association between dissimilarities 
in country-level transparency and IPO underpricing will be consistent with the HLM results. 
However, this research aims to reproduce comparable testing settings to HLM technique that 
corrects for potential correlations in residuals while shielding against heteroscedasticity and 
endogeneity. Thus, this research utilises  2SLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered by 
countries following Zattoni et al. (2017). 
 
Secondly, this thesis incorporates seven additional firm-level and two country-level factors known 
to influence IPO underpricing. This is done to moderate the possibility that the derived conclusions 
from all models in Tables 24, 25 and in Model 1 in Table 27 are an artefact of omitted variable 
bias. This research only focuses here on retesting the robustness of models that provide significant 
results. Supplementary firm-level covariates contain book-building, technology firms, private 
firms, integer offer price, underwriter fees, the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and Global Financial 
Crisis that emerged in 2008. This research also incorporates two country-level proxies to control 
for differences between countries in relation to the level of financial market development. This 
includes capturing the level of market sophistication which is gauged by the level of financing 
through local equity markets and market size, this being determined by the size of domestic 
markets.  
 
Thirdly, prior IPO literature warns of the impact of outlier on the sensitivity of the results. 
Consequently, this research follows Zattoni et al. (2017) to protect against the potential influence 
of outliers. This action seems essential because this research reported in Table 4 some extreme 
underpricing values of 1680% for developing stock markets. Across all the sample of 10,217 IPOs 
this research includes in Table 4, the average underpricing level is recorded at 38% of which the 
average of underpricing for developing countries’ IPOs is 51%. Therefore, the existence of extreme 
underpricing observations is apparent in the data. This alerts the concern about potential biased 
inference being obtained from the econometric models this research uses. To eliminate this issue, 
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this research utilises an outlier recognition procedure proposed by Rousseeuw and Leroy (2005) to 
isolate those extreme underpricing observations greater than an underpricing value of 150%. 
Accordingly, this research disqualified 573 and 185 observations from the sample related to all 
countries and developing countries, respectively. 
 
Fourthly, a variety of diagnostic tests is used to ensure the trustworthiness of the model estimation. 
This includes conducting endogeneity, weak instrument, and variance inflation tests. This research 
follows Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) to employ Housman’s (1978) endogeneity test to examine 
the null hypothesis that the identified regressor (i.e., underwriter reputation) indeed is an exogenous 
covariate. To perform a trustworthy endogeneity test, Staiger and Stock (1997), Sanderson and 
Windmeijer (2016), and Jakob and Nam (2017) highlight that it is highly important to use a robust 
instrumental variable that lacks correlation with the error terms of the model in order to avoid 
causing further bias. Yet, the authors contend that this instrument should have a good correlation 
with the endogenous regressor. However, the identification of a perfect instrument to fix this 
endogeneity problem attracted a lot of debate in the IPO underpricing literature resulting in a lack 
of consensus. For instance, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Alavi et al. (2008) suggested using 
earnings per share and return on assets, respectively. In contrast, Chahine (2008) and Jones and 
Swaleheen (2010) proposed employing gross proceeds and number of IPO firms, respectively. This 
research failed to attain adequate data related to earnings per share and return on assets for the 
international data. This thesis also finds that both the gross proceeds and number of IPO firms 
failed the weak instruments test. Instead, this research employs two instrumental variables defined 
as the ratio equalling to the average and median amount of proceeds of all underwritten IPOs for 
every underwriter for every country, divided by the average and median number of underwritten 
IPOs in that country.  
 
This research chooses these two instruments because high-status underwriters have a tendency to 
underwrite volumes IPOs making them influentially dominant players in the IPO market. The 
anticipation is that these two instruments could be adequately correlated with the endogenous 
regressor, UR. At the same time, these two instruments are unlikely to have a strong correlation 
with the error terms of the model. This research employs a weak instrument test to guard against 
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mistakenly utilising a weak instrument that causes far more biased conclusions36. Thus, this thesis 
employs a weak instrument test developed by Cragg and Donald (1993) following the 
recommendation of Boulton et al. (2017) and Jakob and Nam (2017). Cragg and Donald’s Weak 
Instrument Test examines the null hypothesis that the utilise d instrument is weak and “not robust”. 
Finally, this research uses the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to become confident about the 
absence of a multicollinearity problem that could materialise from the presence of collinear 
relationships between explanatory variables. In doing so, this thesis disregard the presence of the 
multicollinearity problem when the value of VIF surpasses a threshold value of 5 (Liu et al. 2011). 
This research incorporates all of the aforementioned extended estimations in Table 29. 
 
In the first five models, this research aims to check if the VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC variables would 
sustain their significance reported in Tables 24 and 25. The results reported in Models 1 to 5 in 
Table 29 reconfirm the strong confidence in the previous findings. This research can reconfirm the 
significantly direct influence of differences in country-level transparency on underpricing 
dissimilarity across G20 nations using 2SLS estimation. This thesis further attains supporting 
outcomes reconfirming the direct influence of voice and accountability in affecting differences in 
IPO underpricing within developing G20 economies. This of course lends strong support to the 
previous HLM results (-0.31; Table 27; Model 1; p<0.05). This is because Models 6, 7, and 8 in 
Table 29 show that when the level of voice and accountability across developing stock markets 
increases by one unit, underpricing reduces by 9% to 10%.  
 
Table 29 also documents that firm-level determinants of IPO underpricing related to the EWL 
theory show overall results consistent with the prior outcomes. Across the first five models in Table 
29, evidence is consistent in showing that the theory partly elucidates underpricing dissimilarity 
across all G20 countries. This is because this research only finds two dimensions of the theory 
having a significant relationship with underpricing: incentive of IPO issuers and ex-ante 
uncertainty. The third dimension of the EWL model, UR, demonstrates no significant influence on 
underpricing across G20 countries as shown in Models 1 to 5 in Table 29. This is regardless of the 
confirmed endogeneity between underwriter reputation and underpricing as documented by 
significant results provided by the Housman Endogeneity Test. 
                                                 
36 Staiger and Stock (1997) and Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) argue using a weak instrument leads to misleading 
2SLS results compared to the OLS estimator and results are likely to suffer from large size distortions. 
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Table 29: Endogeneity and Omitted Variable Bias 
 
Model 1 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 2 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 3 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 4 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 5 
All 
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 6 
Developing 
Countries 
2SLS 
Model 7 
Developing 
Countries 
2SLS 
Model 8 
Developing 
Countries 
OLS 
Transparency-level variables 
VA 
-0.051***     -0.099*** -0.100** -0.093*** 
 
[-2.94]     [-5.96] [-1.75] [-5.51] 
GE 
 -0.034*       
 
 [-1.46]       
RL 
  -0.047***      
 
  [-2.35]      
RQ 
   -0.037**     
 
   [-1.75]     
CC 
    -0.040**    
 
    [-2.02]    
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.95*** -0.98*** -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.98*** -2.21* -2.23* -2.11 
 [-5.16] [-5.53] [-5.56] [-5.43] [-5.59] [-1.30] [-1.48] [-1.17] 
DF -1.03*** -1.07*** -1.06*** -1.07*** -1.07*** -2.37* -2.39* -2.27 
 [-6.55] [-6.65] [-6.75] [-6.62] [-6.78] [-1.34] [-1.55] [-1.21] 
UR -0.032 -0.038 -0.035 -0.041 -0.034 -0.055 -0.070 0.036*** 
 [-0.69] [-0.79] [-0.73] [-0.83] [-0.71] [-0.78] [-0.10] [4.54] 
PMV 0.47 0.81 0.59 0.68 0.65 0.89 0.89 0.85 
 [0.46] [0.75] [0.58] [0.67] [0.62] [0.77] [0.63] [0.71] 
LET -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0028 
 [-2.62] [-2.72] [-2.77] [-2.76] [-2.74] [-0.73] [-0.44] [-0.56] 
LOP -0.019** -0.020** -0.020** -0.019** -0.020** -0.025 -0.024 -0.031** 
 [-1.89] [-1.89] [-1.91] [-1.68] [-1.95] [-1.26] [-0.51] [-1.87] 
Additional firm-level variables 
BBM -0.0067 -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 -0.070** -0.068 -0.080*** 
 [-0.34] [-0.68] [-0.65] [-0.53] [-0.69] [-2.05] [-1.12] [-2.48] 
TF 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.043** 0.045*** 0.018 0.018 0.019* 
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 [2.61] [2.65] [2.74] [2.57] [2.73] [1.22] [0.93] [1.31] 
PF -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 
 [-0.011] [0.014] [0.080] [-0.011] [0.074] [-0.53] [-0.60] [-0.42] 
IOP 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.026 0.026 -0.10*** -0.10* -0.11*** 
 [0.64] [0.58] [0.57] [0.49] [0.50] [-3.05] [-1.55] [-3.51] 
UF -0.002 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 [-0.11] [-0.65] [-0.31] [-0.60] [-0.39] [3.31] [3.34] [2.90] 
AFC 1997 -0.099** -0.099** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10 -0.11 -0.069 
 [-2.52] [-2.39] [-2.59] [-2.55] [-2.58] [-1.03] [-0.34] [-0.75] 
GFC 2008 -0.043 -0.032 -0.033 -0.030 -0.037 0.014 0.016 0.0027 
 [-1.06] [-0.75] [-0.78] [-0.72] [-0.88] [0.24] [0.12] [0.046] 
Additional country-level variables 
FMS -0.036* -0.062** -0.052** -0.057** -0.050** -0.088** -0.089* -0.086** 
 [-1.53] [-2.29] [-2.17] [-2.23] [-1.89] [-2.10] [-1.61] [-1.99] 
MS 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.089 0.086 0.10 
 [5.77] [6.10] [6.66] [6.37] [6.65] [1.06] [0.56] [1.12] 
Dummy Effects 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE 
 & CE 
YE & IE  
& CE 
Constant 0.70*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.74*** 1.30*** 1.28* 1.38** 
 [3.83] [4.11] [4.07] [3.77] [4.15] [2.52] [1.57] [2.86] 
Observations 9,637 9,637 9,637 9,637 9,637 2,834 2,834 2,834 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.16 
P-value of F-statistic  0.01 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number of Clusters 22 22 22 22 22 10 10 10 
Diagnostics 
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.77 0.12 N/A 
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.35 0.01 N/A 
Mean Value of Variance Inflation Factor 1.57 1.54 1.55 1.55 1.56 3.15 3.15 3.15 
Note: Country-level transparency, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 19 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T and Z-statistics in brackets are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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Similarly, this research discovers consistently weak support for the EWL model using HLM (Table 
27; Model 1) and 2SLS (Table 29; Model 6) estimations, when employing the developing countries 
sample. Table 29 provides results that are consistent with Engelen and van Essen (2010) in relation 
to the relationship between book-building pricing method and underpricing across countries. This 
is because Models 1 to 5 in Table 29 show a negative and insignificant relationship between book-
building variable and underpricing.   
 
In contrast, this research finds a positive and significant BBM coefficient for developing IPO data 
as shown in Models 6 to 8 in Table 29. This result implies that the employment of book-building 
pricing technique rises IPO underpricing in developing stock markets by up 8%. Boulton et al. 
(2010) and Chang et al. (2017) uncover similar evidence. Ljungqvist et al. (2003) relate the profit-
sharing view to the positive effect of book-building on IPO underpricing. This interpretation 
suggests that in developing G20 countries underwriters assign attractive IPO stocks to institutional 
investors in exchange for receiving hefty commissions. Subsequently, in developing economies 
underwriting banks are drawn to offer underpriced IPO firms to institutional investors at the 
expense of IPO issuers. This is done in order to profit their buy-side investors in exchange for side-
payments. The overall evidence this research uncovers from Table 29 shows that the extra firm and 
country-level factors this research incorporates are relatively in harmony with the previous 
literature. Most importantly, the inclusion of these additional variables confirms that no change to 
the previously drawn conclusions in Tables 24, 25 and in Model 1 in Table 27 is occurred. This 
means that the prior findings are not an artefact of omitted variable bias. 
 
This research now concentrates on checking if the HLM estimation actually captures the 
endogenous relationship between prestigious underwriters and IPO underpricing within all G20 
countries and developing G20 stock markets. In Table 29, this research uncovers evidence showing 
a negative but insignificant association between high-status underwriters and underpricing between 
G20 countries after accounting for country-level transparency using HLM technique. Here this 
research aims to eliminate a likely concern that the significant transparency-based findings in 
Tables 24 and 25 have been corrupted by not controlling econometrically for a possible 
endogeneity issue. Models 1 to 5 in Table 29 confidently reconfirm that the prior outcomes reported 
in Tables 24 and 25 related to the negative but insignificant the coefficient UR. The takeaway 
message from this is that the VA, GE, RL, RQ, and CC results reported in Tables 24 and 25 are 
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not influenced by a model misspecification. This is because the results provided by the 
endogeneity, weak instrument, and VIF tests all affirm that the outcomes are vigorous in Models 1 
to 5 in Table 29. This research positively ascertains that the endogenous relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing employing both HLM and 2SLS approaches.  
 
On the contrary, remember that after this research divided the sample into two groups of stock 
markets, this thesis uncovers evidence showing that UR positively influences IPO underpricing in 
developing G20 economies37. Remarkably, recall that the overall HLM outcomes in Table 27 
document that employing high-status underwriters results in greater underpricing within emerging 
G20 stock markets. Hence, this thesis has a concern about the sensitivity to the negative and 
significant relationship this research uncovers between VA and IPO underpricing within 
developing nations using the HLM technique (-0.30; Table 27; Model 1; p<0.05). Model 6 in Table 
29 shows a negative but insignificant UR coefficient after using robust clustered 2SLS in contrast 
to the overall findings of Table 27. This research relates these contrary results to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the UR regressor is exogenous in Model 6 in Table 29. This research finds 
that the reason of this outcome is due to the use of a weak instrument for the sample of developing 
nations. The results of the weak instrument tests for Models 1 to 5 in Table 29 refute the null 
hypothesis that this instrument is not robust at the 1% level of significance across the entire sample 
of 22 countries38. Nonetheless, for the developing G20 stock markets sample, this research failed 
to refute the null hypothesis that this instrument is not a robust instrument as reported in Model 6 
in Table 29.  
 
Alternatively, in Model 7 in Table 29, this research uses a ratio equalling to the median amount of 
proceeds of all underwritten IPOs for every underwriter for every country, divided by the median 
number of underwritten IPOs in that country as the instrumental variable. As reported in Model 7 
in Table 29, this research still uncovers a negative and insignificant UR result (-0.070; Table 29; 
                                                 
37 In un-tabulated results, the author reconfirms that the negative and significant UR outcome achieved for developed 
nations sample using HLM estimation in Table 28 is also consistent with the unreported 2SLS estimation. The research 
does not report these results because all country-level transparency results in Table 28 show insignificant outcomes. 
Hence, the author only focuses on ensuring the significant results the research obtained previously are not the product 
of not accounting econometrically for the endogeneity problem and an artefact of omitted variable bias.  
38 It should be noted that for the whole sample this thesis employs the ratio equal to the average amount of proceeds 
of all underwritten IPOs for every underwriter for every country, divided by the average number of underwritten IPOs 
in that country as the choosen instrumental variable. 
196 
 
Model 7; p>0.10) but Housman Endogeneity Test fails to refute the null hypothesis that the UR is 
exogenous. The output of the Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test is significant at the 1% 
level meaning that the second instrument is robust this time. This finding implies that endogeneity 
does not exist between high-status underwriters and underpricing in emerging G20 economies. To 
fix this problem, this research employs OLS estimation in Model 8 by treating the variable UR as 
an exogenous regressor, as it should be. Remarkably, this research now finds a positive and strongly 
significant UR coefficient (0.036; Table 29; Model 8; p<0.01) comparable to the significant UR 
outcomes reported in Table 27 using HLM specification. At the same time, the coefficient VA 
reveals a negative and significant result for developing stock markets (-0.093; Table 29; Model 8; 
p<0.01). Hence, this thesis reconfirms the negative and significant association discovered between 
VA and IPO underpricing within developing economies using the HLM technique (-0.30; Table 
27; Model 1; p<0.05). This finding provides confidence in the previously obtained results in Model 
1 in Table 27 even after adjusting for the extended econometric estimation and controlling for the 
extra firm and country characteristics that protected the inference from possible omitted variable 
bias.   
3.8. Concluding Remarks  
Despite the fact that empirical evidence on IPO underpricing documents substantial variations 
across nations, the literature primarily neglects the simultaneous direct and indirect influences of 
formal institutional quality. Employing a large sample of 10,217 IPO-issuing firms from January 
1995 until December 2016 in 22 countries with varying levels of transparency, this chapter 
contributed to the ongoing debate in the law and IPO underpricing literature explaining differences 
in underpricing in the global IPO market. Here this research consolidated two conflicting strands 
of law and IPO underpricing literature. On one hand, the first strand provided fragmented 
conclusions about the transparency-IPO underpricing relationship across countries. Conversely, 
the second strand focused on the time-invariant property of a country-level legal system with 
reference to underpricing variance across stock markets using incomplete HLM models.  
 
Aiming to bridge those two stands of literature, this chapter examined the direct and indirect effects 
of country-level transparency in elucidating underpricing difference across the G20 economies. 
This allowed this thesis to simultaneously capture three aspects: firstly, to calculate the relative 
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importance of firm and country-specific characteristics on the variance of IPO underpricing; 
secondly, to test the direct influence of time-variant variability in country-level transparency on 
underpricing difference; and thirdly, to examine the indirect influence of inter-temporal changes in 
country-level transparency on affecting the relationship between firm-level variables and IPO 
underpricing across nations. This research achieved these goals by employing a full HLM model 
utilising both random intercept and random slope coefficients in two levels of data. Firm-level 
determinants related to the EWL theory are the lower level and country-level transparency 
characteristics are the higher level. This allowed this research to extend the empirical testing of the 
EWL theory by accounting for the characteristics of formal institutions internationally. This thesis 
captured the time-variant variability in country-level transparency using the level of voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
across nations.  
 
The author of this thesis uncovered significant economic evidence showing that 22%, 5%, and 25% 
of the differences in IPO underpricing between stock markets are primarily driven by the 
dissimilarity in country-level characteristics between all G20, developed, and developing 
economies, respectively. Remarkably, once this research integrates the characteristics of formal 
institutional quality along with firm-level determinants of IPO underpricing, this thesis discovered 
that across countries the characteristics transparency elucidates up to 34% while firm factors only 
explain up to 8%.  
 
The results on the direct influence of differences in country-level transparency on underpricing 
difference attributed variations in underpricing across countries to the existence of feeble legal 
environments. This research found that when the level of voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption in the G20 countries 
increases by one unit, underpricing significantly decreases by 23%, 13%, 11%, 15%, and 11%, 
respectively. By decomposing the sample into two blocks of stock markets based on their economic 
development, this research retrieved significant evidence documenting a reduction in IPO 
underpricing by 28% when the level of voice and accountability increases by one unit within 
developing G20 countries. Changes in the level of transparency within developed G20 nations 
found to have no significant influence on the variability in underpricing. These results confirmed 
that the existence of weak transparency environments affects the information asymmetry problem 
198 
 
among IPO parties. Consequently, this resulted in increased investment uncertainty and higher 
demand for underpricing to compensate for legal risk across countries. This effect is found to be 
more pronounced within developing G20 economies compared to developed ones.  
 
The work also uncovered new evidence showing that the improvement of formal institutional 
quality indirectly influences IPO underpricing in three means: first, by improving the relationship 
between the incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing by up 1.4%; second, by reducing the link 
between prestigious underwriters and underpricing by up to 12%; and third, by alleviating the 
association between ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing by up to 5% for 
every unit increase in transparency. Those findings are conclusive and original to the study. This 
is because current law and IPO underpricing literature including Engelen and van Essen (2010) has 
not yet captured the modifier effect of changes in country-level transparency on the relationship 
between firm-level variables and IPO underpricing across countries. The results confirm that when 
the level of transparency in a country is high then the positive relationship of ex-ante uncertainty 
on underpricing decreases, in turn triggering less investor demand for underpricing. Therefore, the 
high country-level governance acts as a modifier effect in reducing the magnitude of the association 
between the ex-ante uncertainty of IPO investors and underpricing across nations. In such G20 
countries with high levels of formal institutional quality, the negative relationship between the 
incentive of IPO issuers on underpricing becomes higher as those issuers become fearless about 
their wealth losses caused by underpricing. This occurs because the high level of country-level 
transparency acts as a moderator in improving the magnitude of the negative relationship between 
the incentives of IPO issuers and underpricing across the G20 countries.   
 
The findings contend that when the witnessed level of transparency in a G20 country is also high 
then issuers who wish to sell more secondary shares and create more primary shares need not hire 
an expensive underwriter with a reputable market position. The additional certification signal that 
high-status underwriters provide to reduce the uncertainty of IPO investors in order to lower 
underpricing becomes unnecessary. This is because the availability of a high level of country-level 
transparency reduces the role of employing reputable underwriters to the extent it becomes 
marginal. Hence, the availability of a high quality country-level legal system modifies the 
magnitude of the negative relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing across the 
G20 countries.  
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The findings also demonstrated that the EWL theory partly explains underpricing variance after 
this research captures the characteristics country-level formal institutional quality from country to 
country. This research found that only two dimensions of it had a significant association with 
underpricing, these being the incentive of IPO issuers and ex-ante uncertainty. While the results 
confirmed the endogenous relationship between high-status underwriters and underpricing, the 
third dimension, underwriter reputation, showed no significance on underpricing across stock 
markets. This research found a weak support for the ex-ante uncertainty dimension of EWL model 
while the incentive of IPO issuers and high-status underwriters are supported in elucidating 
underpricing variance within developed G20 economies. This research also found only weak 
support for the EWL for developing economies. While this research documented a negative and 
significant relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing in advanced countries, 
this research found positive and significant evidence in developing nations. This finding 
emphasised the inference that underwriting banks in emerging stock markets exploit the existence 
of weak legal systems in their countries to benefit themselves and their buy-side institutional 
investors at the expense of IPO firms. The consequence of this poor formal institutional 
environment is that entrepreneur founders in developing countries incur greater underwriting fees, 
bear expensive book-building pricing technique, and employ prestigious underwriters who in 
exchange for their own personal gain underprice them heavily. The results remained qualitatively 
robust after using alternative specifications and conducting series of robustness checks in order to 
preserve the confidence and trustworthiness of the outcomes. 
 
Overall, the results documented that the economic significance for companies nested within a weak 
transparency environment is crucial. The consequence of underpricing is of course more money is 
apparently ‘‘left on the table” by entrepreneur founders. The implication of the results is that higher 
level of underpricing causes IPO firms to receive less money from raising equity through the 
primary market. This inflates the cost of capital of those entrepreneur founders. From an economic 
perspective, the ongoing realisation of owners of IPO firms that they have to raise equity at a large 
discount will encourage prospective entrepreneur founders to not consider an IPO due to the high 
floatation cost they have to incur when going public. Since the characteristics of formal institutional 
quality directly and indirectly elucidate up to 34% of the variability in underpricing in the global 
IPO market, this indeed has to have some tangible economic consequences. Entrepreneur founders 
in stock markets with a weaker transparency environment on average incur a greater level of 
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underpricing. Consequently, they have to tolerate a larger cost of capital, which makes domestic 
IPO firms nested in such poor transparency nations disadvantaged when compared to their global 
rivals.   
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 Hierarchical Explanation of the Direct and Indirect Effects 
of National Cultures on Underpricing Variance in the Global IPO 
Market 
4.1. Introduction 
The flotation of part of a privately held enterprise in a process known as the Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) provides a number of benefits to IPO firms. It is considered to be an ideal way of financing 
future growth plans for corporations at a low-cost of capital (Brau & Fawcett 2006). It also offers 
entrepreneur founders the opportunity to liquidate part of their holdings in the company to reap 
their latent wealth (Lewellyn & Bao 2014). Changing a firm’s status to a publicly listed one also 
improves the legitimacy, visibility, and prestige of the company and this in turn augments the 
business’s long-term success (Luo 2008). However, purchasing shares in a newly listed firm that 
lacks historical market valuation and records causes prospective IPO investors to be anxious about 
the anticipated risk and return on investment (Gupta et al. 2018). This makes IPO companies suffer 
from the syndrome known as “liability of newness” which accentuates the ex-ante uncertainty of 
prospective IPO investors (Zattoni et al. 2017). In turn, it influences the expected level of 
underpricing to compensate for such uncertainty. However, this ex-ante uncertainty can be 
alleviated or worsened by the prevailing level of informal (i.e., cultural values) institutional 
environment that a country has. Differences in the quality of informal institution perhaps influence 
the associated level of ex-ante uncertainty in the IPO market, which consequently affects the 
perceived level of IPO underpricing across different cultural backgrounds (Chourou et al. 2018).   
 
Throughout the global IPO market, 1,974 firms floated in 2017 amassing US$338.4 billion of 
which countries in the Europe, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Africa accounted for approximately 
82% of these IPOs (EY Global IPO 2017). The money left on the table by these IPO firms takes 
the form of easy gains cashed out by investors and accounted for billions of U.S. dollars (EY Global 
IPO 2017). These nations represent varying levels of underpricing and cultural dissimilarities. For 
example, Loughran et al. (1994) provided an updated international insight dated January 9, 2018, 
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documenting average country-level underpricing that ranged from 3.3% to 270.1% across 54 
national cultures since 1990. Average underpricing for some of those national cultures who share, 
for example, a high power distance characteristic39 such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, China, and India 
is 44.7%, 239.8%, 145.4%, and 88%, respectively. In contrast, average recorded underpricing for 
other nations characterised with low power distance values40 such as Denmark, Australia, Canada, 
and Germany is 7.4%, 21.8%, 6.5%, and 23.0%, respectively.  
 
Hence, the critical question is: how do differences in national cultures cause a significant average 
underpricing variance to be as low as 3.3% and as high as 270.1% across national cultures? Why 
there is a tendency for some IPO issuers who are domiciled in high power distance cultures to 
accept a high level of underpricing when they sell part of their holdings compared to firms nested 
in low power distance nations? How can this considerable underpricing variance across different 
cultural backgrounds be fully elucidated?  
 
Culture and finance literature argues that an environment of asymmetric information that influences 
the ex-ante uncertainty of IPO investors may evolve in some cultures more naturally than in others 
(Costa et al. 2013; Gupta et al. 2018). This is because the manifestation of culturally accepted social 
values can lead to the evolution of an uncertain and untrustworthy market atmosphere amongst 
market participants (Kang & Kim 2010; Li et al. 2013). For illustration, Hofstede (2001) argues 
that in countries where there is high power distance amongst their society’s members, a lack of 
social equality will be prevalent causing an overall cultural acceptance of inequality throughout 
that society. In this regard, Lewellyn and Bao (2014) relate a deterioration in social trust between 
citizens in a society to an escalation of conflicts of interest and evolution of an asymmetric 
information environment between market participants. For this reason, an examination of the full 
effects of differences in national cultures on IPO underpricing difference for IPOs nested within 
                                                 
39 Hofstede (2011) scores Japan, Saudi Arabia, China, and India as having 54, 95, 80, and 77 out of a scale of 100 
points, respectively, in relation to the expected level of cultural value of power distance perceived in their societies. 
40 Hofstede (2011) scores Denmark, Australia, Canada, and Germany as having 18, 36, 39, and 35 out of a scale of 100 
points, respectively, in relation to the expected level of cultural value of power distance perceived in their communities. 
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different country cultures is an important research objective given that empirical investigation of it 
is currently lacking (Engelen & van Essen 2010)41.  
 
This chapter investigates deeply the influence of levels of firm-level and country-level national 
cultural determinants of IPO underpricing difference in the global IPO market. This research 
employs Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) to capture the nesting nature of these covariates 
using maximum likelihood estimation. This is done to simultaneously quantify the relevance of 
every level to the underpricing variance. The IPO underpricing covariates can experience a nesting 
structure in at least two levels: level 1 (firm characteristics) and level 2 (country interactions). 
Contextually, this thesis adopts a well-accepted assumption that characteristics of the lower level 
are probably influenced by the characteristics of the higher level (Kayo & Kimura 2011; Li et al. 
2013; Tennant & Sutherland 2014). The rationale here, for instance, is that IPO firms (level 1) 
operating in a given country’s culture (level 2) exhibit similar patterns of underpricing behaviour. 
Consequently, such IPO firms will exhibit a tendency to have a strong within-cluster correlation. 
However, the underpricing of these IPO companies is likely to differ from other IPO companies of 
different national cultures, resulting in substantial variations across clusters. Kayo and Kimura 
(2011) assert that the application of HLM can mitigate such econometric problems pinpointed by 
Fama and French (2002) with reference to the characteristics of the finance data. The authors 
caution that employing cross-section models (i.e., capital structure and IPO underpricing 
regressions) overlooks the existence of unobserved correlations in error terms across firms nested 
within different countries. This will in turn lead to erroneous conclusions.  
 
In this regard, the objectives of this chapter are three-fold. First, this research examines the relative 
association of both firm- and country-level national culture characteristics concerning the variance 
of IPO underpricing. This objective is attained by estimating an empty HLM model (i.e., without 
firm- and country-level covariates). It is necessary to do this in order to decompose the underpricing 
variance into what is explained by the lower and upper levels in the hierarchy. Second, this basic 
HLM model is further extended to incorporate random-intercepts so that the direct effect of national 
cultures on IPO underpricing variance can be examined. Third, this research advances the previous 
                                                 
41 Engelen and van Essen (2010) want research in the future to investigate the effect of informal institutional factors, 
such as variations in national cultures, and differences in IPO underpricing across IPO firms nested within different 
cultural backgrounds. 
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estimation to assemble a full HLM model to include both random intercepts and random slopes in 
order to examine the indirect influence of national cultures on IPO underpricing difference. To 
address the second and third objectives, while this research controls for traditional factors of IPO 
underpricing at both company and country levels, this thesis uses Hofstede's (2010) national culture 
dimensions (i.e., power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term 
orientation and indulgence). This research employs the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses (EWL) 
theory developed by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) to capture traditional determining covariates of 
IPO underpricing. This research makes use of the theoretical explanation offered by the EWL 
model because it is the only one that solves the problem of information asymmetry between the 
issuer and investor. At the same time, it accounts for the endogenous relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. 
 
Cross-country IPO underpricing studies that capture the nesting structure of the IPO data are scarce 
and have primarily concentrated on the formal aspect of institutional frameworks. For example, the 
focus was on the direct effect of formal institutions such as legal systems on underpricing of IPO 
firms across countries (Engelen & van Essen 2010). In contrast, current IPO underpricing-culture 
literature neither has consciousness of the nesting structure of the IPO data nor perceives the 
indirect effect of national cultures on IPO underpricing. In actual fact, as this research discusses 
later, this literature is underdeveloped, provides contrary results, and may suffer from omitted 
variable bias (Costa et al. 2013; Chourou et al. 2018). To the best of the knowledge, this chapter 
offers the first empirically comprehensive examination of the direct and indirect influences of 
national culture values on IPO underpricing across countries using HLM estimation. 
 
To fulfil the research objectives, this research employs a global dataset of 10,217 IPO-issuing firms 
listed from January 1995 until December 2016 in 22 different cultures, 12 developed national 
cultures, and 10 emerging countries. This thesis documents significant direct and indirect roles of 
culture in affecting the global underpricing difference, even in increasingly globalised stock 
markets. The main results of this chapter demonstrate that a significant percentage of the 
underpricing variance – empty HLM model attributes, which are nearly 88%, 95%, and 75% – are 
related to fundamental characteristics of firms within 22 countries, 12 developed G20 countries, 
and 10 developing G20 countries, respectively. Second, differences in country-level characteristics 
account for 22%, 5%, and 25% of the divergences in IPO underpricing between all G20 economies, 
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developed G20, and developing countries, respectively. While the variance attributable to country-
level is moderately low, this is not equivalent to claiming that characteristics of countries are trivial. 
Remarkably, after this research combines country-level culture with firm-level determinants of IPO 
underpricing for the entire sample of 22 countries, this research uncovers significant evidence to 
the contrary. This thesis shows that dissimilarities in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions elucidate up 
to 32% of underpricing variance. Yet, firm-level characteristics only explain up to 9%. Further 
analysis of the variability in national cultural measures within advanced and emerging stock 
markets shows that up to 40% and 59% of the variability of IPO underpricing is explained, 
correspondingly. This research finds that only 19% of underpricing variance is attributable to firm-
level factors between the two blocks of countries. 
 
The results postulate that national culture exerts its influence on the variability of IPO underpricing 
across countries through certain psychological and economic channels. Likewise, the findings 
stipulate a novel sketch of how informal institutions such as culture could directly affect the 
equilibrium of symmetric information between the principal IPO parties including IPO firms, 
underwriter, and investors. The results document and enumerate the indirect influences of culture 
in elucidating the money left on the table by entrepreneur founders across countries. This research 
produces exclusive evidence showing that culture indirectly influences underpricing variance in 
three ways: first, by transmogrifying the correlation between the incentive of IPO issuers and 
underpricing by up 33%; second, by moderating the relationship between underwriter reputation 
and underpricing by up to 10%; and third, by modifying the association between ex-ante 
uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing by up to 30%. 
 
The results show that the EWL theory partially explains underpricing difference across countries 
when national culture is in effect. While the results confirm the endogenous relationship between 
prestigious underwriters and underpricing, the effect of reputable underwriters emerges as being 
insignificant in the global IPO market. Remarkably, when culture is in play, the findings reveal 
solid support for the three dimensions of the EWL theory in explaining underpricing variance only 
for developed equity markets. The EWL theory receives only weak support in developing countries 
when culture is part of the equation. Instead, a shred of evidence documents the existence of 
spinning behaviour in developing nations when culture is captured. This finding emphasises the 
perception that reputable underwriters in developing nations exploit IPO managers’ cultural 
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lenience so that information and market supremacy are unfairly distributed. Subsequently, the 
results suggest that prestigious underwriters in developing stock markets recognise the 
psychological readiness of IPO managers to trade off personal success to accomplish a successful 
IPO listing with rational investment decisions. The results suggest that the subsequent effect of this 
cultural influence is that owners of IPO firms in developing countries pay more underwriting fees42, 
tolerate expensive book-building pricing methods, and employ prestigious underwriters who, in 
return, float their firms at a high discount. The confidence in the findings remained steady after 
conducting a series of robustness tests, incorporating extra nine firm and country-level covariates, 
and executing several diagnostic tests.  
 
Overall, the findings lend support to an increasing realisation between finance and accounting 
scholars that even in increasingly globalised stock markets with sophisticated market participants, 
an impalpable characteristic such as culture largely matters. It directly and indirectly influences 
global corporate decisions including the international underpricing variance. Taken together, the 
results contribute to the emergent but underdeveloped literature on the association between 
differences in country-level informal institution and underpricing difference in the global IPO 
market. Foundational and important underpricing-culture studies include Costa et al. (2013) and 
Chourou et al. (2018). This literature shows no awareness of the hierarchical structure of the IPO 
data and the indirect effect of variances in country-level informal institution on underpricing 
difference. The findings contribute methodologically to numerous strands of literature. For 
example, scholars in the field of IPO activity (Gupta et al. 2018), ethical decision-making (Curtis 
et al. 2012), international stock market movement (Lucey & Zhang 2010), cost of equity capital 
(Gray et al. 2013), corporate debt maturity (Zheng et al. 2012), dividend payout policies (Fidrmuc 
& Jacob 2010), and disclosure practices (Hope 2003b; Hooghiemstra et al. 2015) can benefit from 
the work.  
 
This is due to the fact that these researchers utilise data that is likely to have a nesting structure 
while investigating the effect of culture on capital market outcomes across countries without proper 
econometric modification. These scholars can employ the findings to advance their econometric 
estimations to control for the direct and indirect effects of informal institutions in modifying the 
                                                 
42 See Footnote 22. 
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relationship between independent and outcome variables. Moreover, the results may be valuable to 
owners of IPO firms as well as investors in understanding and enumerating the direct and indirect 
influences of variations in country-level national cultures on underpricing difference across 
countries. For example, based on the findings, IPO issuers and investors can become aware of the 
psychological and economic channels in which their national cultures can affect their investment 
decisions in the IPO market. Policy-makers in developed and developing countries will find the 
results beneficial. Stock market regulators are always concerned about increasing their local stock 
markets’ growth in order to boost their domestic economic growth. This is because the IPO 
market’s growth is understood as essential to guarantee continuous stock market growth (Tian 
2011; Jamaani & Roca 2015). Thus, officials in the G20 markets will also take advantage of a finer 
comprehension regarding the extent to which their local cultures can economically influence 
underpricing in their stock markets. The findings provide them with the opportunity to make the 
appropriate change to moderate the influence of national cultures on the expected level of 
underpricing in their stock markets. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. A brief revision of the related literature and 
development of questions and hypotheses are presented in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. Section 
3 describes the data while Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 presents results and 
discussion while providing a number of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. Review of Literature on the Impact of Country-level National 
Cultures on IPO Underpricing  
To understand the relationship between culture and IPO underpricing, one should first ask the 
question: what is culture? Culture was defined by Hofstede (1980) as “the collective programming 
of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. 
Similarly, culture can also be comprehended according to Sapienza et al. (2006) as “those 
customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged 
from generation to generation”. Research on culture has emerged from different roots in the social 
sciences literature where culture is operationally viewed as the values of a system (Parsons et al. 
1965; Rokeach 1973). Thus, in order to thoroughly comprehend a culture, it is important to 
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understand its cultural values. Values of a culture constitute attitudes which, in turn, shape 
individuals’ behaviour in the society and eventually shape the entire social environment of a 
country (Homer & Kahle 1988). In this conceptualisation, culture is mirrored in how individuals 
are attached to different aspects of life; the way people look at the world and the role they play in 
it, and in their values (Chui et al. 2002). That is, cultural values form the basis of what people 
regard as ‘good’ and ‘bad; in their shared beliefs, what people contemplate as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; 
in their imaginative expression, what people contemplate as ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’, etc. (Brannen 
& Salk 2000). In this context, values of a culture comprise complex patterns of thinking transferred 
from parents to children, from teachers to students, from friends to friends, from leaders to 
followers, from followers to leaders, from leaders to leaders, from organisations to organisations, 
and across nations (Hofstede et al. 1990; Ungar 2008; Dumay 2009).  
 
Scholars have attempted to develop frameworks to comprehend national cultures, with these 
frameworks containing a number of dimensions that are employed to elucidate differences in 
culture across nations (Hofstede 1980; Gray 1988; Schwartz 1994; Hofstede 2001; House et al. 
2002; Hofstede 2011). Among these cultural frameworks, Hofstede (2011) provide one of the most 
commonly used ones (Gupta et al. 2018). Hofstede (2011) introduce six cultural dimensions that 
measure differences in cultural values across countries, including power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, masculinity, long-term orientation, and the indulgence characteristics of 
societies. Differences in Hofstede's cultural dimensions have been observed to wield a significant 
role in shaping variations in economics, business, accounting, and finance activities throughout the 
world.  
 
In economic research, Kwok and Tadesse (2006) find that in Anglo-Saxon (non-Anglo-Saxon) 
economies with a lower (higher) level of uncertainty avoidance such as the U.S., the U.K., 
Australia, and Canada (Europe, Japan, and China), the financial system is dominated by stock 
markets (bank-based system). In business literature, Taylor and Wilson (2012) detect a positive 
association between collectivism and national innovation rates in various countries. Across 62 
nations, the authors find scholars who reside in collectivist cultures possess a lower rate of 
innovation because their rate of scientific research publication and technology patenting is 
significantly lower than their fellow researchers in individualistic cultures. Scholars in accounting 
literature including Hope (2003b), Han et al. (2010), and Hooghiemstra et al. (2015) document 
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strong evidence of lower earnings discretion practices and superior quality of information 
disclosure in annual reports produced by managers characterised by individualistic, feminine, and 
low uncertainty avoidance characteristics. 
 
 In finance research, it is generally agreed that Hofstede's cultural dimensions influence debt-taking 
behaviours, capital structure of firms, dividend policies, and IPO activity. For example, Li et al. 
(2013) document that executives from high uncertainty avoidance and collectivist countries 
demonstrate an aversion to corporate risk-taking. Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) and Zheng et al. (2012) 
find that lower dividend payouts and over-reliance on long-term compared to short-term debt are 
widely observed in corporations domiciled in nations characterised by low collectivism, power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. Gupta et al. (2018) document high levels of IPO 
activity as being constantly observed in stock markets located in cultures with a high level of power 
distance, collectivism, and long-term orientation.  
  
Among these schools of thought there is a common and shared theme. They assert that some nations 
may possess cultural values that induce an information asymmetry environment to appear, 
particularly in the IPO market. This could be due to the observed connection between information 
asymmetry between firms in the IPO market and the asymmetric information environment across 
different cultures. In this context, Gupta et al. (2018) contend that IPO participants have to navigate 
between two problematic types of information asymmetry across different cultures. These are: 
firstly, internal category of information asymmetry related to firm-level characteristics; and 
secondly, an external category of asymmetric information associated with the characteristics of 
national cultures. 
 
IPO literature reveals that notwithstanding the extensive disclosure requirements for IPO firms, a 
large fraction of asymmetric information related to firm-level characteristics forms an ongoing 
uncertain environment amongst market participants (Beatty & Ritter 1986; Ritter & Welch 2002; 
Ritter 2011). This problem is due to the fact the share prices of IPO firms have never been listed 
before and furthermore investors and analysts have never observed the performance of IPO firms. 
Hence, the only information available to investors and analysts in order to assess the quality of 
accounting information is that contained in the prospectuses organised by the issuers (Hanley & 
Hoberg 2010). In turn, IPO underpricing is a remedy to compensate for this uncertainty (Ritter & 
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Welch 2002). There is evidence documenting that IPO firms are predominantly vulnerable to 
earnings management (Kao et al. 2009). This is because the reported opportunistic disclosure 
behaviours by IPO issuers in the IPO market is found to positively influence their firms’ share 
valuation (Hanley & Hoberg 2010). Hence, a substantial information uncertainty may continue to 
dominate the IPO market (Hong et al. 2014). 
 
At the national level, Aggarwal and Goodell (2010) and Gupta et al. (2018) show that an 
asymmetric information climate may form in some cultures more easily than in others. This is due 
to the existence of commonly accepted cultural values that ease the establishment of market 
uncertainty amongst investors (Kang & Kim 2010; Li et al. 2013). For example, Hofstede (2001) 
argues that higher power distance in a society can result from a lack of social equality which in 
turn produces inequality throughout society. This low level of societal egalitarianism translates into 
a low level of social trust. In turn, in such societies it is difficult for socially unconnected 
individuals to move from a lower to a higher social class or caste. In this context, Bjørnskov (2008), 
Costa et al. (2013), and  Lewellyn and Bao (2014) relate a deterioration in social trust between 
citizens to a reinforcement of conflicts of interest and development of asymmetric information 
environment between market participants. Chourou et al. (2018) show that IPO firms listed in high 
power distance cultures such as in China, India, and Russia, means that a lack of social trust 
between market participants is likely to form.  
 
Consequently, this poor social trust translates into an information asymmetry problem regardless 
of firm-level uncertainty characteristics (Gupta et al. 2018). Estrin and Prevezer (2011) contend in 
high power distant cultures such as China, India, and Russia, the existence of weak country 
governance practices is associated with the formation of a poor social trust amongst investors. This 
is because individuals’ political power and social strata influence the distribution of market 
information in those nations. This leads to a rising ex-ante uncertainty problem for investors and 
results in higher demand for underpricing of IPO investors. This is done to compensate for the lack 
of social trust as shown below in Figure 12 (Costa et al. 2013). 
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Figure 12: Relationship Between Country-level Power Distance and IPO Underpricing 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
In the U.S. stock market, the observed level of information asymmetry and power distance amongst 
IPO participants including issuers, underwriters, and investors is low (Cai & Zhu 2015). For 
example, Ritter (2017) shows that from 1980 to 2016, 8,254 IPO firms went public in that country’s 
IPO market. The author illustrates that “money left on the table” accounted for $155.16 billion 
representing average underpricing level of 18.5%. There is evidence showing that the level of IPO 
underpricing seems to follow a consistent pattern across cultures with developed stock markets 
compared to developing ones. For instance, Costa et al. (2013) report a low level of underpricing 
for a number of developed IPO markets located in low power distance cultures, reaching 16.9%, 
16.3%, 19.8%, and 7.1% in the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Canada, respectively. In contrast, the 
authors document a high level of underpricing of 156.1%, 92.7%, 69.6%, and 63.9% in high power 
distance cultures - China, India, Malaysia, and South Korea - respectively.  
 
This implies that differences in national cultures can cause dissimilar capital market outcomes 
across different nations. This is because cultural values of countries are likely to intertwine with 
the way individuals or organisations within every country conduct business and shape their entire 
business environment. Javidan et al. (2006) and Hofstede (2011) argue that nations tend to form 
central preferences among their citizens, organisations, and countries. Hence, the variation will be 
higher between citizens, organisations, and countries of dissimilar cultures than those within the 
same culture. Consequently, individuals or organisations or IPO firms domiciled or nested within 
countries or a group of countries that share similar cultural values are likely to exhibit a hierarchical 
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or nesting structure (Li et al. 2013; Tennant & Sutherland 2014). This hierarchical structure can 
only be econometrically captured using at least two-level hierarchical linear modelling in order to 
capture information asymmetry related to firm- and country-level characteristics (Kayo & Kimura 
2011).  
 
The question here is: what is this hierarchical or nesting structure within cultures and what is the 
consequence for not observing such an effect from an econometric perspective? To understand this 
nesting structure within different cultural orientations, for example different power distance 
cultures, this research provides the following example. For instance, IPOs listed in Russia will 
share similar high country-level power distance characteristics compared to low country-level 
power distance characteristics observed in the United States. Econometrically, this infers that error 
terms between IPOs listed in the United States are likely to correlate because they share a similar 
level of power distance that permeates the country, and this is equally the case for Russia. Failure 
to capture the impact of sharing similar country-level power distance characteristics violates the 
assumption of independence of observations in statistical models, leading to biased results 
(Steenbergen & Jones 2002). In nesting structure data such as IPO data, the independence 
assumption is violated, enabling OLS-based models to provide biased standard errors resulting in 
erroneous conclusions (Twisk 2006; Judge et al. 2014; Hox et al. 2018).  
 
Li et al. (2013) and Tennant and Sutherland (2014) employ a hierarchical linear modelling 
approach to capture this nesting structure across different cultural backgrounds. The authors 
confirmed that employing this econometric approach enables empirical testing to avoid reaching 
biased econometric results. Consequently, the authors managed to reach bias-free understanding 
of the direct impact of variations in cultural values across countries on capital market outcomes43. 
By employing the HLM approach, the authors also manage to capture the indirect “modifier” effect 
that differences in cultures can cause when modifying the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. The modifier effect notion postulates that underpricing could be lower 
(higher) for IPO issuers who employ, for example, reputable underwriter44 (non-reputable 
                                                 
43 Li et al. (2013) and Tennant and Sutherland (2014) capture the nesting structure in their data by examining the 
impact of national culture on corporate risk-taking and banks’ ability to make high profits across countries, 
respectively.  
44 Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that underwriters are categorized as either prestigious and non-prestigious ones where 
employing the former usually demands high underwriting fees. The authors argue that IPO firms underwritten by 
prestigious underwriters are frequently underpriced less compared to IPOs floated by non-reputable underwriters. This 
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underwriter) and are simultaneously domiciled in a country with a low (high) level of power 
distance. It is evident that differences between cultures could modify the magnitude or relationship 
between prestigious underwriters and IPO underpricing.  
 
The current IPO underpricing-culture literature is not aware of the nesting structure of the IPO data 
and indirect effect of national cultures on IPO underpricing. In fact, this literature is immature, 
provides inconsistent outcomes, and likely to suffer from omitted variable bias (Costa et al. 2013; 
Chourou et al. 2018)45. For example, Chourou et al. (2018) employs 19,420 IPOs nested in 44 
countries from 1980 to 2009 using a simple OLS-based estimation to investigate if differences in 
national cultures can explain variations in the underpricing in the global IPO market. The author 
finds that a high level of IPO underpricing is associated with a low level of uncertainty avoidance, 
high collectivism, high masculinity and high power distance. In contrast, Costa et al. (2013) also 
employ a simple OLS-based estimation for 28,319 IPOs listed in 39 countries but find no 
significant association between the cultural characteristics of collectivism, masculinity, and 
indulgence with a difference in underpricing across countries.  
 
This thesis attributes the conflicting conclusions between Costa et al. (2013) and Chourou et al. 
(2018) to improper econometric estimation and an omitted variable bias problem that causes their 
results to be inconsistent. For example, Chourou et al. (2018) treated the decision to employ 
reputable underwriters by issuers as an exogenous factor in the employed OLS model while it is 
empirically proven to be an endogenous one (Habib & Ljungqvist 2001; Mantecon & Poon 2009; 
Jones & Swaleheen 2010). Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) empirically document that issuers are 
motivated to curtail underpricing, so therefore they endogenously affect underpricing by 
employing prestigious underwriters. This situation occurs when issuers intend to sell a larger stake 
in their firms to the public, the implication being there will be a correlation between underwriter 
                                                 
is because prestigious underwriters have superior financial knowledge and usually have well-connected links with 
institutional investors. Consequently, Lewellen (2006) contends that IPOs underwritten by prestigious banks enjoy 
favourable market evaluations and are regarded as less risky by IPO investors. This leads to less demand for 
underpricing. 
45 Cai and Zhu (2015) examine the influence of cultural distance on underpricing of 503 foreign IPOs from 27 countries 
listed on the United States stock market. Foreign IPOs, regardless of how culturally different they are from the U.S., 
are subject to rigorous listing requirements in the U.S. stock market. Rigid listing regulations in the U.S. stock market 
could reduce ex-ante uncertainty of investors, making the problem with information asymmetry only a minor one. 
Hence, the authors provide no understanding of the relationship between differences in underpricing across countries 
and national cultures.   
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reputation and the OLS model’s error term. Not accounting for this unobserved correlation leads 
to biased results (Habib & Ljungqvist 2001). In contrast, Costa et al. (2013) omitted the use of any 
firm-specific variables in their OLS estimation.  
 
To the best of the authors’s knowledge, Engelen and van Essen (2010) and Zattoni et al. (2017)46 
provide the only empirical work that examines the nesting structure of the IPO data. The former 
provides an explanation only for the direct relationship between differences in the formal 
institutional quality (e.g. legal system) and IPO underpricing across countries. The latter focuses 
on examining the influence of only the power distance dimension on the relationship between board 
independence and long-term financial performance for 1,024 firms between 2006 and 2008. 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) demanded that future research investigate the impact of informal 
institutional factors, such as difference in national cultures, on affecting differences in IPO 
underpricing across IPO firms nested within different countries.  
 
This thesis observes no awareness in the IPO underpricing-culture literature for the direct effect of 
differences in national culture on the underpricing difference of IPO firms nested within different 
countries. This research also realises there is no cognisance for the indirect “modifier” effect of 
differences in national cultures in modifying the relationship between the IPO underpricing 
determinants and underpricing in cross-country settings. This motivates the author to investigate 
the following two questions. Are there direct and indirect relationships between differences in 
national cultures and IPO underpricing difference across countries once this research control for 
the nesting structure of the IPO data? Will those effects remain constant across different cultures 
located in developed and developing countries? Here in this chapter this research aims to address 
these important questions and fill the research gap in the IPO underpricing-culture literature.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Please see Footnote27. 
215 
 
4.3. Research Questions and Hypothesis Construction    
 This thesis aims to study the impact of differences in country-level national cultures on causing 
direct and indirect “modifier” effects on underpricing difference in the global IPO market. For the 
direct effect, this research employs Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to elucidate the underpricing 
difference in the global IPO market. For the indirect effect, this research also uses Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions to examine the effect of differences in those dimensions on the relationship 
between determinants of IPO underpricing and underpricing difference across countries. The 
empirical examination uses the two-level hierarchical linear modelling. The first level is related to 
firm-level factors where this thesis employs the EWL theory, which has three testable dimensions 
in order to control for determinants of IPO underpricing across countries: the incentive of IPO 
issuers; underwriter reputation; and ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering. The second level 
of the HLM model employs Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, namely, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, masculinity, long-term orientation, and the indulgence characteristics of 
societies. Based on this, this research aims to answer four research questions as follows:  
 
Q1: Do differences in country-level national cultures explain IPO underpricing difference 
across IPO markets?  
 
Q2: Do differences in country-level national cultures affect the relationship between the 
incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing across IPO markets? 
 
Q3: Do differences in country-level national cultures affect the relationship between 
underwriter reputation and underpricing across IPO markets? 
 
Q4: Do differences in country-level national cultures affect the relationship between ex-
ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing across IPO markets? 
 
To answer the first research question, this research develops six hypotheses related to Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions to examine the direct effect of difference in national cultures on underpricing 
difference across countries. The second, third, and fourth questions all aim to address the indirect 
effect of dissimilarities in national cultures on the association between determining factors of IPO 
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underpricing and underpricing difference across countries. To answer the second research question, 
this research proposes six hypotheses to study the effect of variations in Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions on the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing across 
countries. To address the third research question, this research constructs six hypotheses to test the 
effect of variability in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on the relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing difference across countries. To provide an answer to the fourth 
question, this research develops six hypotheses to assess the effect of variations in Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions on the association between ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and 
underpricing difference across countries.  
4.3.1. The Direct Effect of Differences in National Cultures on IPO 
Underpricing Difference   
4.3.1.1. Power Distance  
Power distance symbolizes the uneven distribution of authority amongst individuals in a specific 
society. Hofstede (2011) show that when a society accepts the unequal allocation of power amongst 
its members, this society develops a hierarchy of power. In such a culture, individuals are nested 
into different clusters of power dividing the society into powerful and less-powerful groups where 
the former group centralises power and authority (Hofstede et al. 1990). The existence of such a 
hierarchical structure of power allows people at the top to perfectly control the flow of information 
(Lucey & Zhang 2010). Consequently, people below them have less power and are not informed 
about what is going on around them (Jain & Jain 2018). This of course enables those powerful 
members to effectively preserve authority at the expense of others, by controlling the systematic 
flow of information (Kanagaretnam et al. 2013). Hooghiemstra et al. (2015) contend that in high 
power distance cultures, the objective of social and organisational structures is to maintain the 
unjust dissemination of information. Consequently, the formation of an asymmetric information 
environment in high power distance cultures is widespread and thus is tolerated by individuals 
(Gupta et al. 2018; Jain & Jain 2018). This leads to aggregating problems amongst market 
participants closely connected to adverse selection, information monopoly, and moral hazard 
resulting in potential market failure (Akdeniz & Talay 2013). 
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Gray and Vint (1995) find that a poorer quality of information disclosure prevails in high power 
distance cultures. Managers in such authoritative societies promote secrecy in corporate financial 
reporting to preserve their authority. Zheng et al. (2012), Gray et al. (2013), and Barkemeyer et al. 
(2018) also find that lack of transparent financial reporting practices explains the large difference 
in cost of capital between countries characterised with high power compared to low power distance 
ones. Furthermore, Chourou et al. (2018) contends that in high power distance cultures, IPO 
managers are likely to exhibit authoritarian instincts and a high degree of opportunism for serving 
their personal benefit at the expense of shareholders. IPO investors growing up in high power 
distance ideologies can perceive the existence of psychological bias over personal gains between 
the insiders of IPO firms. Such a market atmosphere makes it possible to create an environment 
where there are trust issues. In high power distance cultures, lack of social trust channels available 
to market participants causes ex-ante uncertainty of IPO investors to be high. The evolution of such 
an ex-ante uncertainty atmosphere prompts high-quality IPO managers working in high-power 
distance countries to offer their firms a larger discount which signals their quality (Welch 1989; 
Costa et al. 2013). This action is a necessary strategy used by quality IPO firms to differentiate 
themselves from low quality IPO firms. Hence, IPO firms nested in high powder distance countries 
are likely to experience greater underpricing. Based on the above discussion, this research develops 
the first research hypothesis as follows; 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
The underpricing IPO firms that are nested in high power distance societies are expected to be high.  
 
4.3.1.2. Uncertainty Avoidance 
This cultural dimension refers to the extent to which a culture influences its members to deal with 
unstructured situations. Hofstede (1980) asserts that uncertainty avoidance focuses on the degree 
of tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. Hofstede (2001) shows that uncertainty-avoiding 
cultures strive to reduce sources of this uncertainty by following strict laws and rules. Gupta et al. 
(2018) contend that in cultures with a high (low) level of uncertainty avoidance, people work hard 
to avoid (tolerate) uncertainty, insecurity, and unpredictability. Thus in such high (low) uncertainty 
avoidance countries people are reluctant to accept risks (risk-loving). Lucey and Zhang (2010) 
assert that uncertainty avoidance can fuel the problem of information asymmetry between market 
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participants in equity markets. This is because in high uncertainty avoidance countries such as 
Saudi Arabia,47 Mexico, Poland, and Russia, their stock markets are normally not informationally 
efficient (Lucey & Zhang 2010; Jamaani & Roca 2015). Consequently, socially unconnected 
investors and analysts in such cultures have to deal with a larger likelihood that their investment 
analysis and decisions might be based on incomplete information (Hope 2003a; Lucey & Zhang 
2010). Houqe and Monem (2016) provide global empirical evidence from 104 countries showing 
weak disclosure practices and high corruption levels are observed in high uncertainty avoidance 
countries. This research postulates that feeble financial disclosure in uncertainty avoidance 
societies escalates asymmetric information problems amongst IPO parties resulting in higher 
underpricing. The second research hypothesis is presented below; 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
The underpricing IPO firms that are nested in high uncertainty avoidance societies are expected to 
be high.  
 
4.3.1.3. Individualism Versus Collectivism 
Individualism is very different from collectivism, and it reflects the different types and/or levels of 
integration between people in society or a community. Hofstede (1980) argues that in a collective 
society, there is strong ties between individuals and they are integrated into cohesive nests with a 
strong emphasis on family networks. In contrast, Hofstede (2001) shows that in cultures with an 
individualistic cultural orientation, weak cultural bonds exist between citizens and their group 
loyalty is much weaker. Lucey and Zhang (2010) contend that in a country like China which is 
highly collective, managers prioritise their own interests by securing success before focusing on 
making informed and rational investment decisions when they have to choose between success and 
failure. Hope (2003b) and Griffin et al. (2009) find that individualism discourages information 
asymmetry. The authors find that corporate disclosures practices including the availability of 
reliable financial statement information to users are better in individualistic societies than 
collectivist ones. 
                                                 
47 Hofstede (2011) gives Saudi Arabia, Mexico Poland, and Russia scores of  80, 82, 93, and 93 out 100, respectively, 
with regard to the level of uncertainty avoidance. 
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Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) and Cai and Zhu (2015) stress that due to the existence of strong ties 
between managers and shareholders in collectivist societies, the channelling of insider information 
between stakeholders becomes easier and a psychologically accepted practice. This is because in 
such collective societies, security regulations and rules are weakly imposed on connected investors. 
This results in the asymmetric information problem between connected and unconnected investors 
(Sapienza et al. 2006; Tsakumis 2007; Jain & Jain 2018). This research contends that in collectivist 
cultures, investors will be psychologically aware of the existence of insider information 
channelling, hence, their ex-ante uncertainty will be always at a high level when they want to invest 
in IPO firms. For this reason, Costa et al. (2013) show that underpricing of IPO firms originated 
from individualistic societies typically having lower underpricing compared to collectivist ones. 
This research attributes this underpricing difference to the existence of varying levels of ex-ante 
uncertainty between the two cultural groups. Consequently, this difference in ex-ante uncertainty 
causes IPO investors in collectivist societies to seek larger underpricing as a compensation for a 
higher level of ex-ante uncertainty. Based on the above discussion, posited here is the third research 
hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 3:  
The underpricing IPO firms that are nested in high individualistic societies are expected to be low. 
 
4.3.1.4. Femininity Versus Masculinity  
The femininity dimension, which is clearly the opposite of masculinity, refers to the distribution of 
cultural factors including accomplishments, financial rewards, and outputs between men and 
women in society. Hofstede (1980) asserts that in masculine societies such as China the power, 
control, ambition, and success of males are paramount compared to females. Yet, Hofstede (2001) 
also finds that in feminine cultures such as Sweden women are expected to have similar if not the 
same competitive values as men. Lucey and Zhang (2010) argue that in a nation with a high level 
of femininity, managers do not seek competitive outcomes or a ‘winner takes all’ mentality. Those 
managers rely less on their own arguments when making investment decisions. Griffin et al. (2009), 
Aggarwal et al. (2012), and Hooghiemstra et al. (2015) discover that investors and portfolio 
managers in nations with low femininity tend to illustrate overconfidence and exaggeration when 
making equity investment decisions. Hope (2003b), Williams (2004), and Callen et al. (2011) note 
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that femininity (masculinity) decreases (increases) information asymmetry. The authors show that 
information disclosure practices and absence of earning management practices are notably better 
(worse) in feminine (masculine) societies.  
 
In addition, Chourou et al. (2018) and Gupta et al. (2018) argue that issuers of IPO companies in 
cultures that are characterised as having high levels of masculinity place a higher value on personal 
accomplishment. This is done through growing their private wealth when going public. IPO 
managers in such masculine societies will be psychologically geared to secure successful IPO 
offerings at any cost. Subsequently, they are driven to endure undue levels of underpricing or even 
announce rose-coloured information to promote the listing of their IPO firms with the intention of 
securing their own personal or individual success. Such psychological fervour to achieve self-
actualisation exhibited by IPO managers is likely to be channelled into IPO investors. In this 
context, Costa et al. (2013) confirm that IPO managers in masculine countries are willing to accept 
excessive underpricing to secure successful listing in order to reflect personal achievement. In turn, 
IPOs nested in feminine cultures experience lower underpricing compared to masculine societies. 
Based on the above discussion, this research develops the fourth research hypothesis shown here; 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
The underpricing IPO firms that are nested in high femininity societies are expected to be low.  
 
4.3.1.5. Long-term Versus Short-term Orientation 
The long-term orientation dimension, which is the opposite of short-term orientation, emphasises 
pragmatic virtues oriented towards long-term rewards; these are saving money, determination, and 
adaptability to changing circumstances. Hofstede (2001) describes cultures that are preoccupied 
with thriftiness and tenacity in accomplishing future results as being long-term oriented cultures. 
In contrast, Gupta et al. (2018) argue that people in short-term oriented cultures have faith in 
normative thinking, exhibit lesser propensity for future savings, and concentrate on attaining rapid 
results and almost immediate outcomes. La Porta et al. (2000) find that investors in long-term 
oriented countries gravitate less to immediate cash compared to short-term oriented shareholders. 
The authors find that long-term oriented shareholders accept lower dividend payouts in exchange 
for higher retained earnings that can be used for future investment activities. Consequently, La 
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Porta et al. (2000) conclude that in this kind of long-term cultural orientation, firms have more 
discretionary financial resources and subsequently are able to focus on long-term growth plans.  
 
Costa et al. (2013) argue that long-term orientation behaviour affects two important parties in the 
IPO process: issuers and investors. They claim that issuers with a long-term orientation accept a 
low offer price, simply to secure required funds to meet firms’ long-term business objectives. 
Likewise, investors with long-term orientation cultural values tend not to flip their IPO shares for 
short-term gains (Cai & Zhu 2015). This investment behaviour leads to lower supply and higher 
demand for a company’s shares on the first day of trading. Because of this shortage of supply, 
Costa et al. (2013) contend that the share price of IPO firms located in long-term orientation 
countries considerably surges on the first trading day. The end result is high initial market returns. 
Based on the above discussion, developed and shown here is the fifth research hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 5:  
The underpricing IPO firms that are nested in long-term oriented societies are expected to be high. 
 
4.3.1.6. Indulgence Versus Restraint 
Indulgence is the antonym of restraint, which is the sixth cultural dimension. It refers to values 
associated with the observed level of subjective happiness and control of life’s desires from country 
to country. Hofstede (2010) describes an indulgent culture as a society that permits the fulfilment 
of human desires, which essentially means enjoying life and having “fun”. Hofstede (2010) then 
defines a restraint society as one that suppresses and regulates attraction towards human leisure. 
The author elaborates that in such restraint cultures, people follow strict social norms and are 
induced to place more significance on the virtue of hard work. Gupta et al. (2018) contend that in 
cultures where undue indulgence is avoided, individuals’ leisure times are utilise d to attain 
community respect by establishing businesses. The authors find empirical evidence documenting 
that IPO activity is significantly larger in restraint cultures compared to indulgent ones. In this 
context, Costa et al. (2013) assert that investors from indulgent cultures tend to flip their IPO shares 
on the first trading day, seeking the satisfaction of immediate gains.  
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This research contends that IPO investors in restraint cultures will maintain philosophical 
investment habits to resist flipping their IPO shares for economically indulgent reasons. This 
economic behaviour elicited by IPO investors in restraint societies will be channelled to other IPO 
investors in the secondary market. Consequently, post-IPO investors will react to the actions of 
pre-IPO investors, generating high demand for newly listed IPO shares in restraint countries. This 
causes a sudden increase in demand with a very short supply of IPO shares on the secondary 
market, which positively causes share prices to experience subnational increases. Thus, this 
research expects high initial returns for IPO shares on the first trading day in restraint cultures. 
Based on the above discussion, this research proposes the sixth research hypothesis below; 
 
Hypothesis 6:  
The underpricing IPO firms that are nested in high indulgence societies are expected to be low. 
 
4.3.2. The Indirect Effect of Differences in National Cultures on IPO 
Underpricing Difference  
4.3.2.1. Relationship Between the Incentive of IPO Issuers and 
Underpricing 
There is paucity of research on the indirect effect of cultural values regarding the relationship 
between IPO underpricing determinants and underpricing difference across countries. Hence, this 
research builds the hypothesis on capital structure research that employs the application of HLM 
technique to capture this indirect effect. Kayo and Kimura (2011) find significant evidence 
documenting that country-level munificence indirectly affects the association between growth 
opportunities and leverage across 17,061 firms nested in 40 different countries. Li et al. (2013) also 
employ two-level HLM estimation to examine the direct and indirect effects of national cultures 
on corporate risk-taking using 7,250 firms nested in 35 countries between 1997 and 2006. At the 
firm-level, the authors find a positively significant relationship between earning direction and 
corporate risk-taking measured by the standard deviation of return on assets.  
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At the country-level, Li et al. (2013) show that managers nested in high uncertainty avoidance 
nations have a higher tendency to avoid corporate risk-taking. The authors also capture the indirect 
effect of uncertainty avoidance on corporate risk-taking behaviour. They achieve this by examining 
the modifier effect of differences in uncertainty avoidance across countries on the relationship 
between earning discretion practices and corporate risk-taking. The authors employed the HLM 
method because it can explain two things: the slope coefficient of earning discretion to vary across 
35 countries; and its variability by differences in uncertainty avoidance across countries. Li et al. 
(2013) document strong evidence showing that the relationship between earning discretion and 
corporate risk-taking is lower in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. To envisage this indirect 
effect, Figure 13 provides a hypothetical example of the HLM model with random slope 
coefficients. 
 
Figure 13: Hypothetical Example of HLM Model with Random Intercept and Slope Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
 
In this illustration, every nation exemplifies a slope coefficient regarding the association between 
an independent variable, for example, pre-IPO stock market volatility and a dependent variable 
such as IPO underpricing. In this construct, this research follows the IPO underpricing literature to 
assume a positive association exists between pre-IPO stock market volatility and underpricing 
across countries. For example, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr (2002) and Chang et al. (2017) find that 
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High power distance at the country-level adds 
more uncertainty to the level of ex-ante 
uncertainty of IPO investors modifying the 
slope upwards. 
Low power distance at the country-level 
reduces uncertainty to the level of ex-
ante uncertainty of IPO investors 
modifying the slope downwards. 
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the level of volatility of a stock reflects its degree of risk perceived by market participants in which 
more volatility makes pre-market prices to be less informative resulting in higher underpricing. 
Hence, if the relationship between pre-IPO stock market volatility and IPO underpricing is not 
equal across countries, then the slope coefficient for every country should be allowed to vary across 
countries (Kayo & Kimura 2011). This econometric estimation makes it possible to better 
comprehend the behaviour of every slope coefficient (pre-IPO stock market volatility) on IPO 
underpricing under different cultural backgrounds (Li et al. 2013).  
 
Figure 13 depicts the positive relationship between pre-IPO stock market volatility and IPO 
underpricing as not being the same across those countries. This means that a country with a slope 
coefficient (yellow) has a lower positive coefficient value than a country with a slope coefficient 
(green). This is because the level of power distance in the country with the green slope coefficient 
is greater than the yellow one. Consequently, the level of power distance in those countries acts as 
a modifying effect that alters the strength of the positive relationship between pre-IPO stock market 
volatility and IPO underpricing. In other words, power distance increases the effect of pre-IPO 
stock market volatility in driving high underpricing. It does not change the directional relationship. 
As shown in Figure 13, this research conjectures that the change in the strength of the association 
happens due to the presence of high power distance level in the country with the green slope 
coefficient. This research discussed in hypothesis 1 that IPO firms nested in high power distance 
cultures should expect higher underpricing. This is because market participants in high power 
distance societies tolerate the existence of information gap amongst them (Gupta et al. 2018; Jain 
& Jain 2018). Consequently, IPOs nested within high power distance countries should accept an 
additional level of ex-ante uncertainty added to the uncertainty driven by pre-IPO stock market 
volatility. This means the slope coefficient will have a higher value because the more the ex-ante 
uncertainty there is, the more IPO investors will become anxious about the price volatility of the 
IPO firm on its first listing data. This in turn will mean much more underpricing. 
 
Following the above discussion, this research conjectures that in a country with high power 
distance, high uncertainty avoidance, high collectivism, high masculinity, long-term orientation, 
and low indulgence, the effect of IPO issuers; incentive on underpricing is markedly less. Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) empirically find a negative relationship 
between both the fraction of secondary shares sold and primary shares created and underpricing. 
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The authors assert that the larger the proportion of secondary shares sold and primary shares 
created, the greater the incentives of issuers to curtail underpricing. This research argues that in 
such cultures with the abovementioned characteristics, the presence of an asymmetric information 
environment will cause issuers to fear greater wealth losses caused by larger expected underpricing. 
This anxiety is caused by issuers’ perception of culturally accepted non-transparent market 
practices. Prior studies document that cultures with high power distance, high uncertainty 
avoidance, high collectivism, high masculinity, long-term orientation, and low indulgence tolerate 
poor transparency environments (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013; Lewellyn & Bao 2014; 
Hooghiemstra et al. 2015; Gallego-Álvarez & Ortas 2017; Gupta et al. 2018).  
 
Such a culture is likely to enable key players in the IPO market including connected institutional 
investors and large underwriting banks to benefit at the expense of owners of IPO firms. For 
example, Ljungqvist (2007) argues that some underwriters exploit their market power by 
intentionally underpricing IPO firms for personal gain. Similarly, Liu and Ritter (2010) contend 
that some underwriters take advantage of their market knowledge and position for their own benefit 
by receiving side payments from investors. They want this in exchange for a discount offering or 
large allocation of IPO stocks, a practice known as “spinning”. In high power distance cultures that 
induce the existence of non-transparent market practices, for instance China, Chen et al. (2017) 
provide recent supporting evidence for the expected abuse of IPO issuers’ wealth. The authors 
show that powerfully connected underwriters charge IPO issuers higher underwriting fees 
compared to non-connected underwriters. Consequently, higher underwriting fees undermine IPO 
issuers’ wealth. Torstila (2003) perceives this cost as having a similar effect on the financial burden 
of underpricing. Owners of IPO firms in such poor-transparency welcoming cultures will be less 
interested in selling more of their shareholdings when they go public. Based on the above 
discussion, this research develops the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 7a:  
High level of power distance undermines the relationship between the incentive of IPO 
issuers and underpricing. 
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Hypothesis 7b:  
High level of uncertainty avoidance undermines the relationship between the incentive of 
IPO issuers and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 7c:  
High level of individualism increases the relationship between the incentive of IPO 
issuers and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 7d:  
High level of femininity increases the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers 
and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 7e:  
High level of short-term orientation increases the relationship between the incentive of 
IPO issuers and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 7f:  
High level of indulgence increases the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers 
and underpricing. 
 
4.3.2.2. Relationship Between Underwriter Reputation and 
Underpricing 
The conjecture here is that when the witnessed level of information asymmetry in a country is high 
then issuers who wish to sell more secondary shares and create more primary shares will strive to 
employ a reputable underwriter. Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) assert 
that employing prestigious underwriters could indeed decrease the ex-ante uncertainty about the 
firm’s value. This is because reputable underwriters care more about maintaining good market 
reputation, have worked with financial and technical advisory teams, and established relationships 
with local and international investors (Lewellen 2006). Consequently, Jones and Swaleheen (2010) 
contend that prestigious underwriters can provide comprehensive assessments for IPO firms that 
separate good quality from bad quality firms so in turn, leading to a successful listing. As a result, 
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IPO investors perceive the presence of reputable underwriters as a certification signal that solves 
the problem of underpricing (Torstila 2003).  
 
This research postulates that when an IPO is nested in a country with low power distance, low 
uncertainty avoidance, low collectivism, low masculinity, low long-term orientation, and high 
indulgence, the relationship between prestigious underwriters and underpricing decreases. This is 
because in such cultures individuals have shared social virtues for not accepting weak governance 
practices or allowing the circulation of private information. For example, there is empirical 
evidence linking the formation of low level of country governance and inefficient stock market 
information in high power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, masculinity, long-term 
orientation, and high restraint cultures (Lucey & Zhang 2010; Houqe & Monem 2016; Jain & Jain 
2018). Therefore, in such societies with the above cultural merits, IPO parties will not be able to 
finalise their investment decisions based on reliable and honest information (Gupta et al. 2018).   
 
The argument this research establishs here is that IPO investors in these sorts of cultures will worry 
more about the certification role reputable underwriters provide to IPO firms (Hanley & Hoberg 
2012). The reason for this is the unavailability of an effective litigation mechanism and high corrupt 
legal system where investors cannot prosecute both IPO issuers and underwriters when a fraud is 
evident (Hughes & Thakor 1992; Lowry & Shu 2002; Hanley & Hoberg 2012). For example, 
previous literature finds that in low (high) power distance countries such the United States (France), 
the possibility of litigation risk is higher (lower)48 (Piot & Janin 2007; Lin et al. 2013). Tsakumis 
(2007) also provides empirical evidence showing that part of the wide difference in the quality of 
accounting information between Greece49 and the United States is due to large differences in their 
culture and litigation risk aspects. This research hypothesises that the existence of this country-
level assurance mitigates the importance of employing reputable underwriters. The following 
hypotheses are based on the above discussion: 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Hofstede (2011) gives France (the United States) a score of 68 (40) out 100 in relation to the level of power distance.  
49 Hofstede (2011) gives Greece a score of  60 out 100 in relation to the level of power distance. 
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Hypothesis 8a:  
High level of power distance increases the relationship between underwriter reputation 
and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8b:  
High level of uncertainty avoidance increases the relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8c:  
High level of individualism undermines the relationship between underwriter reputation 
and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8d:  
High level of femininity undermines the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8e:  
High level of short-term orientation undermines the relationship between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 8f:  
High level of indulgence undermines the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing. 
 
4.3.2.3. Relationship Between Ex-ante Uncertainty and Underpricing 
The linkage between national cultures and ex-ante uncertainty is established in the literature. The 
argument is that some countries possess cultural characteristics that make an ex-ante uncertainty 
climate inevitable (Yamin & Golesorkhi 2010; Hooghiemstra et al. 2015; Gupta et al. 2018). For 
example, Malhotra et al. (2011) find a positive association between the level of power distance and 
with uncertainty and risk related to international market entry. The authors document there is strong 
evidence linking difficulty in cross-border acquisitions due to an increase in ex-ante uncertainty in 
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high power distance cultures. Hope (2003b) and Hope et al. (2008) show that in societies with a 
high level of masculinity, power distance, and collectivism such as China, investors and analysts 
should expect an additional level of ex-ante uncertainty triggered by the existence of a weak level 
of disclosure quality at the country-level. Lucey and Zhang (2010) contend that developing 
countries’ stock markets suffer from more uncertainty compared to developing equity markets. The 
authors relate the existence of high level of masculinity, power distance, and collectivist traits in 
developing countries to the unequal distribution of market information between investors. This is 
what causes a higher level of uncertainty to emerge.  
 
In turn, this makes stock markets in such cultures experience high levels of stock market volatility 
(Lucey & Zhang 2010). Gray (1988), Gray et al. (2013), and Gallego-Álvarez and Ortas (2017) 
find poor financial reporting transparency, high cost of capital, and weak disclosure practices in 
countries characterised by much uncertainty avoidance and minor indulgence. Grimmelikhuijsen 
et al. (2013) discover that individuals in high power distance and long-term orientated cultures 
have a low level of trust in the transparency of their governments; for this reason they tend to 
disregard the virtues of transparency. This research contends that IPOs nested within low power 
distance, low uncertainty avoidance, low collectivism, low masculinity, low long-term orientation, 
and high indulgence cultures, have aspects mitigating ex-ante uncertainty at the country-level. 
Consequently, this reduces the impact of firm-level ex-ante uncertainty on underpricing. Based on 
the above discussion, this research develops the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 9a:  
High level of power distance increases the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and 
underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 9b:  
High level of uncertainty avoidance increases the relationship between ex-ante 
uncertainty and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 9c:  
High level of individualism undermines the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and 
underpricing. 
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Hypothesis 9d:  
High level of femininity undermines the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and 
underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 9e:  
High level of short-term orientation undermines the relationship between ex-ante 
uncertainty and underpricing. 
 
Hypothesis 9f:  
High level of indulgence undermines the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and 
underpricing. 
 
4.4. Data Used 
To capture the direct and indirect effects of differences in national cultures on underpricing 
difference across the global IPO market, this chapter employs two-level data. This data ranges from 
January 1995 until December 2016 and means using 10,217 IPO-issuing firms IPOs in the G20 
countries. The first level includes IPO underpricing determinants related to EWL theory. The 
second level includes country-level national culture data that is time-invariant secondary data 
sourced from Hofstede (2011). The authors argue that cultures do not change greatly over time and 
in fact, differences in national cultures are not time-variant. The number of IPO firms incorporated 
in this chapter is chosen following Ritter and Welch (2002) Boulton et al. (2017) in assembling the 
sample selection criteria summarised in Table 30. 
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Table 30: Key Sample Selection Criteria Used for the Empirical Analysis 
Selected search criteria Description 
Number 
of IPOs 
Matches 
Exclusion of 
Duplicates 
This research excludes all duplicate50 IPOs from this sample from January 
1995 to December 2016 (9,548 IPOs are excluded). 
 
32,585 
Exclusion non-
trading IPOs 
 
This research only includes IPO firms that are already traded at the time of 
inclusion; therefore, all pending, withdrawn, postponed, and rejected IPOs 
are excluded since they are beyond the research interest of this study (1,450 
IPOs are excluded). 
 
23,037 
Exclusion of non-G20 
IPOs 
The G20 countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the 
United States plus the European Union as the 20th country. Within the 
European Union, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, 
Romania, and Sweden are included. Due to IPO data unavailability, 
Argentina, Slovenia, Spain, and Bulgaria, and Romania were excluded, 
creating a final sample consisting of 22 countries (5,951 IPOs are 
excluded). 
 
21,587 
Exclusion of IPO data 
with missing values 
for PR and DF, UR, 
PMV, LET, and LOP 
This research excludes IPOs with missing values needed to calculate all 
explanatory variables (6,047 IPOs are excluded). 
15,339 
   
Exclusion of IPO data 
with missing values 
for UP 
This research excludes IPOs with missing values of the dependent variable 
(2,045 IPOs are excluded). 
12,886 
   
Exclusion of Non 
initial public offering 
data  
 
This research excludes REITs, ADRs, units offer, close-end-funds, and 
stock with warrants (2,669 IPOs are excluded).  
10,217 
Exclusion of IPO data 
with no country-level 
national culture data 
All data is available. 10,217 
 
Country-level national culture data includes Hofstede (2011) six cultural dimensions variables: 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, femininity, short-term orientation, and 
indulgence characteristics. To develop those six cultural measures, Hofstede (1980) received more 
than 116,000 questionnaire answers from over 60,000 respondents regarding employee values. 
These were collected by IBM between 1967 and 1973, during which time the first scores covered 
more than 70 countries. Hofstede first used the 40 largest nations only and afterwards extended the 
analysis to 70 countries and 3 regions. In the updated editions of Geert Hofstede's work since 2001, 
                                                 
50 The author follows the cautionary observation of Smart and Zutter (2003), in order to scrutinise the existence of 
duplicate IPO records and subsequently eliminate them from the sample to avoid double counting. 
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such as the most recent 3rd edition from 2010, scores are listed for 76 countries and regions. These 
are partly based on replications and extensions of the original IBM study and utilise d for different 
international populations. 
 
Since culture changes very slowly, the scores can be considered up-to-date (Hofstede 2011). 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions have been reliably employed in many academic disciplines, 
including management, marketing, economic, sociology, and psychology studies (Søndergaard 
1994; Smith et al. 1996; Soares et al. 2007; Reuter 2011; Aggarwal et al. 2012; Li & Zahra 2012; 
Taylor & Wilson 2012; Gupta et al. 2018). This research chooses Hofstede (2011) cultural 
dimensions over those propounded by Schwartz (1994) because the latter do not rely on factorial 
analysis, unlike Hofstede. Instead, Schwartz (1994) relied on a theoretically-grounded approach 
built from social theories that is more subjective and less frequently employed by finance scholars. 
For example, Reuter (2011) analyses 29 academic papers that investigate the impact of cultural 
dimensions on corporate finance and finds that 24 of these studies employ Hofstede (2011) 
rationale, while only five employ that of Schwartz (1994).  
4.4.1. Country-level National Culture Data  
Country-level national culture data includes Hofstede (2011) six cultural dimensions variables, 
these being power distance (PD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), individualism (IDV), femininity 
(FM), short-term orientation (STO), and indulgence (IDV) characteristics of societies. Detailed 
information including definition of each variable and source of data is provided in Table 31. The 
outcome variable is IPO underpricing (UP), which is defined as the percentage return from the 
offer price to the first closing price on its first trading day. Independent variables include two levels 
of data, specifically country-level national cultures and firm-level data. 
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Table 31: Country-level National Culture Variables 
Variables Description 
Expected 
Coefficient 
Sign51 
Source of 
data 
Power 
Distance 
 (PD) 
This cultural variable is an index that ranges from a value of 0 to 100 
scale points, with 50 points as a mid-level. 100 (0) points indicate the 
highest (lowest) degree of a power distance in a society, where less 
powerful members of that society (do not) accept and expect that power 
is distributed unequally. The rule of thumb is that if a score is under 50 
the culture scores relatively low on that scale, and if any score is over 50 
the culture scores high on that scale. 
 
Positive Hofstede 
(2011) 
 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
(UA) 
This cultural variable is an index that ranges from a value of 0 to 100 
scale points, with 50 points as a mid-level. 100 (0) points indicate the 
highest (lowest) degree of an uncertainty avoidance in a society where 
people feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have 
created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid them. The rule of thumb 
is that if a score is under 50 the culture scores relatively low on that scale 
and if any score is over 50 the culture scores high on that scale. 
 
Negative Hofstede 
(2011) 
 
Individualism 
(IDV) 
Versus 
Collectivism  
This cultural variable is an index that ranges from a value of 0 to 100 
scale points, with 50 points as a mid-level. 100 (0) points indicate the 
highest (lowest) degree of an interdependence a society maintains among 
its members. The low side (under 50) is considered "Collectivist", and 
above 50 is considered "Individualist". A country with a score of 43 
would be a collectivist one but is less collectivist than one with 28 which 
is approaching the 0 mark. 
 
Negative Hofstede 
(2011) 
 
Femininity 
(FM) 
 Versus 
 Masculinity 
This cultural variable is an index that ranges from a value of 0 to 100 
scale points, with 50 points as a mid-level. 100 (0) points indicate the 
highest (lowest) degree of a femininity society. The rule of thumb is that 
if a score is under 50 the culture scores relatively low on that scale, and 
if any score is over 50 the culture scores high on that scale. 
 
Negative Hofstede 
(2011) 
Short-term 
Orientation 
(STO) 
Versus 
Long-term 
Orientation 
 
This cultural variable is an index that ranges from a value of 0 to 100 
scale points, with 50 points as a mid-level. 100 (0) points indicate the 
highest (lowest) degree of short-term orientation. The rule of thumb is 
that if a score is under 50 the culture scores relatively low on that scale, 
and if any score is over 50 the culture scores high on that scale. 
 
Negative Hofstede 
(2011) 
Indulgence 
(IDG) 
Versus 
Restraint  
This cultural variable is an index that ranges from a value of 0 to 100 
scale points, with 50 points as a mid-level. 100 (0) points indicate the 
highest (lowest) degree of Indulgence in a society. The rule of thumb is 
that if a score is under 50 the culture scores relatively low on that scale, 
and if any score is over 50 the culture scores high on that scale. 
Negative Hofstede 
(2011) 
 
Firm-level data along with control variables this research uses in this chapter are identical to the 
one utilised in the previous chapter. For a detailed discussion of those firm-level data along with 
control variables employed, please see Table 3 in Section 2.6.1 on definition of variables.  
                                                 
51 See Section 4.3.1 for a discussion of the expected hypothesis sign. 
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4.5. Methodological Framework and Estimation Techniques 
4.5.1. HLM Technique  
This research identifies the IPO underpricing data to have a multilevel nesting structure following 
Engelen and van Essen (2010), Li et al. (2013) Judge et al. (2014), and Tennant and Sutherland 
(2014). At the firm-level, the data contains 10,217 IPO firms. At the country-level, the sample 
firms are nested within 22 different developed and developing countries. From a modelling 
standpoint, Li et al. (2013) stress the significance of separating the effects that occur at the firm-
level and country-level. This is done in order to comprehend the effect of country-level compared 
to firm-level determinants so that their interactions can be accurately estimated. This research uses 
unbalanced cross-sectional hierarchical nested estimation of the general linear modelling to 
examine the nesting structure of the multilevel data (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). This thesis 
employs a full maximum likelihood estimation to control for the nature of the data being 
unbalanced across countries (Li et al. 2013). In the data, observations related to IPO firms within 
countries set the base-level while observations related to countries are at the higher-level in the 
HLM technique.  
 
By employing the application of HLM estimation, this research creates three benefits in the setting. 
Firstly, this research manages to account econometrically for characteristics (i.e., difference in 
national cultures) of the higher-level (i.e., countries) data that are possibly to affect the 
characteristics (determinants of IPO underpricing) of the base-level (i.e., IPO firms). This means 
that error terms within countries are likely to correlate amongst themselves since they share similar 
country-level characteristics while across countries they may not correlate (Hofmann 1997). Kayo 
and Kimura (2011) confirm that discounting this multilevel effect is likely to cause severe 
violations to a number of statistical assumptions connected with traditional Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions.  
 
Secondly, the HLM framework makes it possible to employ a country mean-centered estimation 
to firm-level variables (Kreft et al. 1995). This is done to separate accurately the variance in firm-
level IPO underpricing into what is attributed to country-level characteristics (i.e., difference in 
national cultures) versus firm-level characteristics (determinants of IPO underpricing). Li et al. 
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(2013) show that by centering determinants of corporate risk-taking within-country and also 
including country-level means to the array of explanatory variables, HLM allowed them to isolate 
perfectly the covariances within- and between-country. Hence, this decomposition permits this 
thesis to examine the differential effects of the firm-level characteristics such as pre-IPO stock 
market volatility at the firm-level and also at the country-level.  
 
Employing the mean-centering approach to the IPO underpricing explanatory variables helps this 
research to estimate the interaction terms (i.e., culture*pre-IPO stock market volatility) efficiently 
(Osborne 2000). Li et al. (2013) show that the HLM technique facilitates accurate inclusion of 
cross-level interactions between the country- and firm-level covariates. The superiority of HLM 
application in fact derives from its econometric ability to accurately estimate firm-level effects 
over countries while capturing country-level relationships (Hofmann 1997). This research notes 
that the model specification includes independent variables that have only firm-level and country-
level values such as IPO stock market volatility and cultural values, respectively. The former 
variables are all country-mean centered while the latter ones are all grand mean-centered. It is then 
possible to understand well the direct and indirect effects of differences in national on underpricing 
difference of IPO firms across countries (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002; Li et al. 2013).  
 
Thirdly, Li et al. (2013) contend that the application of HLM rectifies the size distortion by the 
employment of unbalanced sample sizes, which is a common case in the IPO data. For example, 
the distribution of IPO data across industries, years, and countries is rarely equal. Under the simple 
pooling estimation for the OLS framework, Li et al. (2013) argue that the coefficient related to a 
country-level predictor variable could be spuriously significant due to the influence of large sample 
size at the firm-level. The existence of this problem may intensify when there are large differences 
across countries with reference to the number of firms related to every country in the sample. 
Therefore, HLM corrects this problem by estimating regressions at the country- and firm-level 
simultaneously, unlike OLS estimation where observations related to firm-level are equally 
weighted. HLM specification achieves this correction by making country-level regressions 
weighted by the accuracy of the firm-level data that is in reverse associated within a country’s 
sample size (Li et al. 2013). The empirical testing is a three-stage operation following Kayo and 
Kimura (2011). 
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In the first stage, this research commences with what is called the empty HLM model or the HLM 
null model. This is a necessary step to confirm the existence of the nesting structure in the data in 
order to justify the employment of HLM estimation. In the second stage, this research employs a 
number of HLM models with random intercepts in order test the hypotheses related to the direct 
effect of differences in national cultures on underpricing difference across countries. In the last 
stage, this research progresses to a complex HLM estimation that allows both the intercept and 
slope coefficients to be random. This research does this to examine the hypotheses related to the 
indirect “modifier” effect of variability in national cultures values in affecting relationship between 
determinants of IPO underpricing and underpricing difference across countries.  
 
4.5.1.1.  HLM Null Model  
The first step in the HLM testing commences formally by examining the one-way ANOVA. This 
only includes one fixed term - the grand mean - and then a variance for the base-level (firm-level) 
and for the higher-level (country-level). This means that this research omits intentionally all 
independent variables (fixed effects) as the concentration is on random effects. In so doing this 
research obtains relevant information on the variance decomposition of the outcome variable (IPO 
underpricing). In other words, this empty HLM model allows this thesis to appropriately estimate 
the role for the base-level (firm-level) and for the higher-level (country-level) in the variance of 
the dependent variable (IPO underpricing). The null hypothesis for the empty model is that there 
is no difference in the mean underpricing across the sample countries. The aim here is to examine 
if the variations in IPO underpricing (UP ) across the G20 countries are significantly different. This 
step is necessary in order to support the rationale for the hierarchical structure of the IPO data, 
consequently justifying the use of HLM framework (Engelen & van Essen 2010). Equations (1) 
and (2) specify the empty model: 
 
0ij j ijUP                                                                                                                                                                                                  (1)  
where  
0 00 0j j                                                                                                                                 (2)         
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Equations (1) and (2) present the base-model (firm-level) and the higher-level (country-level), 
respectively. In the model, this research has firm i in country j where 0 j  can be understood as the 
mean IPO underpricing in country j, whereas 00  is the grand mean (i.e., the mean of IPO 
underpricing across all IPO firms and countries). In Equation (1), ij  represents the error term at 
the firm-level showing the extant of which a firm’s IPO underpricing deviates from the mean of 
IPO underpricing in the country where this IPO firm operates within its domain. In Equation (2), 
0 j indicates the error term at the country-level exhibiting how mean IPO underpricing in country 
j deviates from the grand mean. By estimating Equations (1) and (2), this research can calculate 
the Intra-Class Correlation (ICC). The ICC assists the author to determine the relative significance 
of each level in elucidating perceived variations in IPO underpricing across countries (Raudenbush 
& Bryk 2002). This research computes the ICC estimator ˆ  by employing estimates
2 2
0 00( ) and ( )ij jVar Var     , following the below definition in Equation (3):   
 
    
2
00
2 2
00
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ


 


                                                                                                                             (3) 
 
Goodness of fit 
For the purpose of model evaluation, this research follows Tennant and Sutherland (2014), i.e. this 
research makes use of the information provided by variance components in the random effects 
ANOVA model (the empty model) to run a comparison with the subsequent estimations. This 
includes the following fully estimated random intercept and random slope HLM models. It serves 
to assess the usefulness of the explanatory variables at every level in explaining variability in UP . 
This research evaluates the explained variability in the variance using Equation (4):  
 
2 ( )1
( )
new
m
ANOVA
Var m
R
Var m
                                                                                                                    (4) 
 
In Equation (4), m represents the variations in every level where level 1, for example, captures 
within-country variance while between-country variance is captured in second level. ( )newVar m
represents the estimated variance for level m in the random-intercept and random slope models. In 
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contrast, ( )ANOVAVar m  provides the needed information for the one-way ANOVA model (the 
empty model) related to the estimated variance in level m. This research employs those estimates 
for every new model which this research construct to compute the within-country and between-
country R2. In other words, HLM partitions R2 to explain differences in underpricing derived from 
variations within every country and between countries, for example, variations within and between 
the G20 countries. HLM also provides the deviance score of every model. The deviance score is a 
measure of lack of fit between model and data (Gelman 2006). In general, the rule of thumb is that 
the larger the deviance score, the poorer the fit to the data. The deviance is usually not interpreted 
directly, but rather compared to deviance(s) from other models fitted to the same data (Osborne 
2000; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002).  
 
4.5.1.2. Random Intercept HLM Models 
Following the assessment of the variance decomposition of UP , this section extends the basic one-
way ANOVA model to incorporate covariates for level 1 and level 2. Regression equations 
represent each level. In Equation (5), this research introduces the intercept ( 0 j ) and allow it to 
vary across different country-level national culture measures in order to accommodate variations 
across countries in the baseline UP  beyond what is elucidated by qijX . This allows this thesis to 
provide answers to hypotheses 1 to 6. Therefore, this research specifies the level 1 model as 
follows: 
 
0
1
Q
ij j q qij ij
q
UP X 

                                                                                                                    (5)                        
and the level 2 model is specified as in Equation (6), 
0 00 0
1
R
j r rj j
r
   

                                                                                                                     (6) 
  
For the level 1 equation, UP  for firm i in country j is defined by a function of firm-specific 
characteristics, qijX  plus the random error term component ij . For the level 2 equation, the mean 
of UP in country j, 0 j is defined as a linear combination of country-specific characteristics ( rj ) 
239 
 
plus interpret 00 and the random error term 0 j . This research consolidates Equations (5) and (6) 
as able to produce a mixed-effect model which is shown in Equation (7);    
 
00 0
1 1
Q R
ij q qij r rj ij j
q r
UP X   
 
                                                                                                                                         (7) 
 
From the testing perspective, the model this research presents in Equation (7) is the formal model 
for testing the direct effect of Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions ( rj ) on underpricing difference 
across G20 countries. The assumption here is that this model is estimated based on random effects 
estimation. The interest in developing this random-effects estimation in Equation (7) is connected 
to its ability to generate equivalent fixed effects coefficients for level 1. This model can produce 
accurate results since it concurrently incorporates country-specific characteristics (i.e., Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions) for level 2 when it is appropriately estimated (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 
2008).  
4.5.1.3. Random Intercept and Slope Coefficient HLM Models 
This section extends the empirical testing following Kayo and Kimura (2011) and Tennant and 
Sutherland (2014) by allowing two things: firstly, the intercept to be random (i.e., as in the previous 
section); and secondly, the slope coefficients for all of the firm-level variables to be random as 
well. Doing so permits firm-level variables to be explained by the variability in national culture 
variables across countries. Consequently, this research can provide answers to the 18 hypotheses 
related to the impact of the indirect effect of differences in national cultures in modifying the 
relationship between determinants of IPO underpricing and differences in IPO underpricing across 
countries. In Equation (8), this research replaces with as follows :q qj   
 
00 0
1 1
Q R
ij qj qij r rj ij j
q r
UP X   
 
                                                                                           (8) 
 qj is defined as a constant plus a country-dependent deviation term as shown in Equation (9) 
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0qj q qj                                                                                                                                     (9) 
then  
00 0 0
1 1 1
Q Q R
ij q qij qj qij r rj ij j
q q r
UP X X    
  
                                                                         (10)  
    
Equation (10) represents the formal random effects model. The function of this model is to examine 
the indirect effect of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions ( rj ) on underpricing difference across the 
G20 countries. This model is the random coefficient model that has a fixed effects component given 
as 00 0q qij r rjX       . It also has random effects defined as 0qj qij ij jX    . Employing 
random slopes implies the relationship between a model’s independent variables and the dependent 
variable will vary across countries (Twisk 2006; Hox et al. 2018). Osborne (2000) argues that such 
an expectation might enhance the accuracy of the model by revealing the impact of potential 
unobserved forces that affect the behaviour of the dependent variable. However, Preacher et al. 
(2006) contend that the increased specification accuracy of modelling random slopes reduces the 
degree of freedom. Therefore, it should be traded off against the model’s overall efficiency. This 
research follows Kayo and Kimura (2011) to account for this problem by comparing the overall 
efficiency of the models. This entails comparing the results of fixed slopes with random slopes 
related to the deviance score that measures the overall fitness of the model.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
4.6. Analyses of Empirical Results and key Findings  
This section is organised into three subsections. In the first subsection, namely Summary Statistics, 
this research briefly highlights key observations related to summary statistics for firm-specific 
variables, for IPO underpricing by year, and for IPO underpricing by industry. In this way repetition 
is avoided because this research employs the same set of IPO data in this chapter similar to the 
previous two chapters. This section also presents the summary statistics for country-level national 
culture variables in the G20 IPO markets. This research also provides brief information about the 
variance inflation factors for firm- and country-level national culture variables to inspect any 
potential multicollinearity in the dataset. In the second subsection, namely Results and Discussion, 
this research presents the results and discussion of: (1) the HLM null model; (2) the direct impact 
of variations in national cultures on underpricing difference across countries; and (3) the indirect 
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influences of variations in national cultures on underpricing difference across countries. In the third 
and final subsection, namely Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks, a variety of 
sensitivity analysis is provided.  
4.6.1. Summary Statistics  
4.6.1.1. Summary Statistics for Firm-level Variables52  
Table 4 presents a range of statistical indications exhibiting that firm-level characteristics across 
G20 countries are very heterogeneous. It could be inferred from such an observation that this 
heterogeneity in determinants of IPO underpricing may contribute to explaining the underpricing 
difference in the G20 countries. This dissimilarity becomes prominent across the two blocks of 
developing and developed G20 countries. For instance, the mean and median results of UP 
evidently show that underpricing in developing IPO markets is almost double what is observed in 
developed markets. This research also finds some observations indicating similar behaviours 
regarding the degree of variations in underpricing and firm-level factors within developed versus 
developing G20 countries. 
 
This finding may highlight the existence of a nesting structure in the IPO data, so it suggests that 
each block of countries may share similar firm-level characteristics. For illustration, this research 
finds that, on average, underpricing is larger in developing G20 countries because owners of IPO 
firms sell and create less secondary and primary shares, respectively. This research also discovers 
some evidence showing that proxies of ex-ante uncertainties for IPO firms domiciled in developing 
G20 countries are greater, on average, when compared to developed markets. Also gathered here 
are some indications illustrating that developing (developed) IPO issuers, on average, employ more 
(less) reputable underwriters to provide a certification signal about the quality of their underwritten 
IPO firms.   
                                                 
52 For a detailed discussion please see Section 2.8.1.1.  
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4.6.1.2. Summary Statistics for IPO Underpricing by Year53 
Table 5 provides yearly-statistical evidence showing that IPO underpricing may follow a pattern 
across the course of time from January 1995 to December 2016. This research finds that in the 22-
year window the author covers in this thesis, underpricing tends to increase rapidly around the 
financial crisis periods. Consequently, the presence of such year effect provides the necessity to 
control for this effect. IPO underpricing literature including Loughran and Ritter (2004), Boulton 
et al. (2010), and Engelen and van Essen (2010) highlight the importance of controlling for year 
effect when examining the underpricing phenomenon.  
 
4.6.1.3. Summary Statistics for IPO Underpricing by Industry54 
Table 6 provides a statistical indication where underpricing seems to be persistent, on average, in 
some industries. This research finds that across the 33 IPO industries this research covers, 
underpricing is inclined to be larger in certain ones, such as agriculture, insurance, other utilities, 
and pers/bus/rep svc in the G20 IPO markets. Consequently, the manifestation of this industry 
effect emphasises the significance of accounting for this particular effect. This observation is 
consistent with what is reported by Loughran and Ritter (2004), Boulton et al. (2010), and Engelen 
and van Essen (2010). These authors document the importance of accounting for industry effect 
when studying the underpricing phenomenon across countries.  
 
4.6.1.4. Summary Statistics for National Cultural Variables    
Table 32 presents the mean values of Hofstede’s six country-level cultural dimensions of power 
distance, individualism, femininity, uncertainty avoidance, short-term orientation, and indulgence. 
Saudi Arabia (Demark) has the highest (lowest) power distance score of the G20 countries of 95 
(18) out of 100 points, followed by Mexico and China (Sweden and the United Kingdom) with 81 
and 80 (31 and 35), respectively.  
                                                 
53 For a detailed discussion please see Section 2.8.1.2. 
54 For a detailed discussion please see Section 2.8.1.3. 
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Table 32: Summary Statistics of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions of the G20 Countries 
  PD UA IDV FM STO IDG 
Total Sample 
(Count: 10,217) 
Mean 53 57 62 34 45 51 
Median 50 46 71 38 49 59 
Minimum 18 23 14 5 0 20 
Maximum 95 100 91 95 79 97 
Standard Deviation 17 23 30 16 30 19 
Developed Countries 
(Count: 7,191) 
Mean 43 59 77 30 55 61 
Median 40 46 90 38 74 68 
Minimum 18 23 35 5 12 30 
Maximum 68 100 91 95 79 78 
Standard Deviation 8 21 20 16 28 12 
Developing Countries 
(Count: 3,01) 
Mean 75 50 25 43 20 29 
Median 80 30 20 34 13 24 
Minimum 60 30 14 31 0 20 
Maximum 95 95 60 64 76 97 
Standard Deviation 9 25 11 11 20 10 
Australia          
 (Count: 1138) 
Brazil                    
(Count: 88) 
Canada                 
 (Count: 193) 
China                    
(Count: 1533) 
Denmark             
 (Count: 26) 
Mean 36 51 90 39 79 71 
Mean 69 76 38 51 56 59 
Mean 39 48 80 48 64 68 
Mean 80 30 20 34 13 24 
Mean 18 23 74 84 65 70 
France                  
(Count: 95) 
Germany             
 (Count:35) 
Mean 68 86 71 57 37 48 
Mean 35 65 67 34 17 40 
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Greece                  
(Count:28) 
India                      
(Count: 363) 
Indonesia          
(Count: 103) 
Mean 60 100 35 43 55 50 
Mean 77 40 48 44 49 26 
Mean 78 48 14 54 38 38 
Italy                      
(Count: 63) 
Mean 50 75 76 30 39 30 
Japan                     
(Count: 1913) 
Mean 54 92 46 5 12 42 
Mexico               
 (Count: 28) 
Mean 81 82 30 31 76 97 
Poland                 
(Count:64) 
Mean 68 93 60 36 62 29 
Russia                   
(Count: 31) 
Mean 93 95 39 64 19 20 
Saudi Arabia        
(Count: 102) 
Mean 95 80 25 40 64 52 
South Africa        
(Count: 29) 
Mean 49 49 65 37 66 63 
South Korea         
(Count: 689) 
Mean 60 85 18 61 0 29 
Sweden                
(Count: 57) 
Mean 31 29 71 95 47 78 
Turkey                 
 (Count: 24) 
Mean 66 85 37 55 54 49 
United Kingdom  
(Count: 404) 
Mean 35 35 89 34 49 69 
United States 
(Count: 3211) 
Mean 40 46 91 38 74 68 
Note: Country-level culture variables are as defined before in Table 31.
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Greece (Denmark) ranks highest (lowest) in terms of uncertainty avoidance with a score of 100 
(23) out of 100 points, followed by Poland and Japan (Sweden and China) with uncertainty 
avoidance scores of 93 and 92 (29 and 30), respectively. The United States (Indonesia) is classified 
as the most (least) individualistic culture in the G20, with a score for this measure of 91 (14) out 
of 100 points, followed by Australia and the United Kingdom (South Korea and China) with 90 
and 89 (18 and 20), respectively.  
 
The most feminine countries in the G20 are Sweden, followed by Denmark, with femininity scores 
of 95 and 84 out of 100 points, respectively, while the least feminine societies in the G20 are Japan, 
followed by Italy and Mexico with femininity scores of 5, 30, and 31, respectively. In terms of 
short-term orientation, South Korean (Australian) culture possesses the lowest (highest) score of 0 
(79) out of 100 points, followed by Japan and China (Mexico and the United States) with scores of 
12 and 13 (76 and 74), respectively. The highest recorded score for Hofstede’s cultural dimension 
of indulgence refers to Mexico which has 97 out of 100 points, followed by Sweden and Denmark 
with 78 and 70, respectively, while the least indulgent society in the G20 is Russia, followed by 
China and India, with indulgence scores of 20, 24, and 26, respectively.  
 
Across all cultures in the G20 the mean score of power distance (individualism) is 53 (62) out of 
100, with a standard deviation of 17% (30%). The mean score for the cultural dimension of 
femininity (uncertainty avoidance) is 34 (57) out of 100, with a dispersion of 16% (23%) from the 
mean value, while the mean value for short-term orientation (indulgence) in the G20 is 45 (51) out 
of 100 points, with deviation from the mean value equal to 30% (19%). Table 32 demonstrates that 
a large heterogeneity in national cultural variables is evident within developed and developing G20 
countries. For instance, the table reports a large dispersion from the mean values of individualism, 
femininity, and short-term orientation within developed (developing) countries. This is because the 
average level of individualism, femininity, and short-term orientation is 77 (25), 30 (43), and 55 
(20) out of 100 points in developed (developing) G20 countries where the standard deviation values 
for those three dimensions are 2000% (1100%), 1600% (1100%), and 2800% (2000%), 
respectively.  
 
Finally, the table also reports that average level of power distance and indulgence in developed 
(developing) countries is 43 (75) and 61 (29) out of 100 points. The deviations from these mean 
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values for developed (developing) countries are 800% (900) and 1200% (1000%), respectively. 
This implies the possibility of observing differential effect of differences in national culture values 
within developed compared to developed countries. In other words, it would be not surprising to 
find only some of those cultural dimensions actually matter in explaining IPO underpricing 
difference within developed and developing countries. 
4.6.1.5. Variance Inflation Factors for Country-level National 
Cultures, Firm-specific, and Control Variables  
The power of HLM technique is that it assumes and corrects for the possibility of having 
correlations between level 1 covariates, in other words, firm-specific variables (Belsley et al. 2005). 
In contrast, HLM becomes biased when such a correlation exists between level 2 observations (i.e., 
country-level national culture variables) (Hofmann 1997; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). To address 
this issue, Table 33 below presents seven Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) tests of the country-
level national cultures, firm-level, additional firm-level, additional country-level, and dummy 
effects control variables (Luo 2008). This research follows Liu and Ritter (2011) to reject the 
existence of a multicollinearity problem when the value of VIF exceeds a threshold value of 5. The 
table shows that across seven VIF models, the Model 1 values for all country-level national culture 
proxies are bigger than a value of 5. In contrast, once this thesis employs those measures separately, 
Table 33 offers VIF values largely below the threshold value of 5. This implies that country-level 
national culture values do exhibit collinearity.  
 
Table 33: Variance Inflation Factors of Country-level National Cultural, Firm-specific, and Control Variables 
in the G20 Countries 
Variables                                                                          VIF  
                           Country-level culture variable  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
PD 16.17 2.57      
UA 5.50  2.52     
IDV 57.5   2.76    
FM 5.20    1.52   
STO 34.36     2.14  
IDG 20.95      2.39 
DS 26.18       
Firm-level variables  
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PR 1.68 1.66 1.66 1.67 1.66 1.66 1.66 
DF 3.54 3.43 3.43 3.47 3.42 3.46 3.45 
UR 1.22 1.13 1.17 1.15 1.17 1.17 1.14 
PMV 1.19 1.17 1.15 1.18 1.15 1.17 1.18 
LET 1.38 1.32 1.31 1.33 1.31 1.34 1.32 
LOP 1.47 1.40 1.43 1.41 1.41 1.44 1.43 
Additional firm-level variables  
BBM 1.27 1.16 1.15 1.18 1.15 1.17 1.16 
TF 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.08 1.10 
PF 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.10 1.08 
IOP 1.75 1.43 1.55 1.48 1.39 1.43 1.47 
UF 1.11 1.09 1.06 1.10 1.06 1.09 1.09 
AFC 1997 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 
GFC 2008 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.12 1.13 
Additional country-level variables  
RSX 2.98 2.38 2.26 2.42 2.71 2.25 2.33 
FMS 2.40 2.13 1.83 2.18 1.88 2.18 2.16 
MS 4.76 2.8 3.48 2.73 2.93 2.73 2.75 
Dummy Effects  
IE 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.05 
YE 1.66 1.5 1.48 1.51 1.54 1.47 1.49 
CE 5.34 3.92 3.71 3.78 3.63 3.62 3.75 
Mean VIF 7.74 1.73 1.73 1.74 1.67 1.69 1.71 
Note: Country-level culture, firm-specific, and control Variables are as defined before in Table 31 and Table 3, respectively. 
 
For this reason, they should not be employed together. Also noticeable is a large collinearity 
between culture variables and the variable DS. This implies that if this research accounts for the 
influence of listing an IPO company in a developing stock market when examining the influence 
of culture, the model is likely to undergo multicollinearity problem. The outcomes of Model 2 to 
Model 7 dismiss any concern about the existence of multicollinearity in both level 1 and 2 in the 
HLM models. 
 
4.6.2. Results and Discussion 
In this section, this research commences with a basic analysis using a simple random ANOVA 
model (HLM null model). The subsequent section provides the results of the random intercept 
models with empty firm-level covariates and the results of the random intercept models with firm-
level covariates. The final section includes discussing the results of the full model utilising random 
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intercept and slope models with firm-level covariates. All models utilise heteroscedastic robust 
standard errors to account for the unequal distribution of the number of IPO firms within the G20 
economies. HLM 7 software package is used to produce the results because this relaxes the 
assumptions of the variance–covariance matrix (Steenbergen & Jones 2002; Twisk 2006; Hox et 
al. 2018). 
 
4.6.2.1. Results and Discussion of the HLM Null Model 
Table 34 reports the results of the analysis of HLM null model across the G20 countries from 1995 
to 2016. The results for the adjusted all sample grand mean report IPO underpricing of 30%. The 
adjusted grand means for IPO underpricing for developed and developing G20 countries are 18% 
and 47%, respectively. The table also reports the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistic for the null 
hypothesis that
2
00 , which means there is no significant statistical cross-country difference in IPO 
underpricing. The primary focus of the analysis is to find if there is a significant difference across 
the G20 countries in IPO underpricing. This research also extends this testing to explore the null 
hypothesis that no significant cross-developed and cross-developing countries variations in IPO 
underpricing exist. If this research fails to reject the null hypothesis, then this research arrives at 
empirical evidence showing that the independence assumption amongst observations is not violated 
(Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). It is subsequently inferred that the IPO data does not have a nesting 
structure across all G20 developed and developing countries. Consequently, the results of the 
random effect component produced by the ANOVA model in Table 34 should be similar to those 
obtained from an OLS model with a constant only (Tennant & Sutherland 2014).  
 
Table 34: Analysis of HLM Null Model 
       
 Fixed-Effects Parameter Coefficient Standard Error P-value of LR Test Statistic 
All Sample Grand Mean UP, 00  0.30 0.09 0.00  
Developed Countries Grand Mean UP, 00  0.18 0.05 0.00  
Developing Countries Grand Mean UP, 00  0.47 0.19 0.00  
   Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance 
Component for 
Level 2 Effect, 
0 j  
Variance 
Component for 
Level 1 Effect, 
ij  
ICC Deviance DF Observations 
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All Sample 0.18392 0.63905 0.22 24480 21 
10,217 
Developed Countries 0.02517 0.49966 0.05 15439 11 
7,188 
Developing Countries 0.32764 0.97105 0.25 8520 9 
3,021 
Note: All variables are as defined before in Table 3. Robust T-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity for two-tail. 
 
The results for the 1% significance level of LR test statistics for the three subsamples document 
significant variations exist in IPO underpricing among all G20, developed, and developing nations. 
The table also shows that 
2
00ˆ  and 
2ˆ  for all samples, developed, and developing G20 countries are 
estimated to be 0.18392 and 0.63905, 0.02517 and 0.49966, and 0.32764 and 0.97105, respectively. 
These figures allow this thesis to compute the ICC for the three groups giving ˆ results that are 
0.22, 0.05, and 0.25. These outcomes imply that 22%, 5%, and 25% of the variations in IPO 
underpricing across countries are mainly attributed to differences in country-level characteristics 
between all G20, developed, and developing G20 countries, respectively. In contrast, the results 
also imply that 88%, 95%, and 75% of differences in IPO underpricing across countries are 
connected to differences in firm-level characteristics within countries, developed, and developing 
G20 countries, respectively.  
 
The ICC results contradict the conclusions provided by Kayo and Kimura (2011). The authors find 
that variations in capital structure in 10,061 firms nested within 40 countries from 1997 to 2007 
only explain 3.3% of the variance of firm leverage. Kayo and Kimura (2011) attribute their low 
ICC result to the close similarly of determinants of capital structure across countries regardless of 
the existence of large institutional differences among countries. However, the results document the 
opposite in the IPO market. This research shows that 22% of the variability in IPO underpricing is 
related to cross-country differences. The finding complements but is more robust than what 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) found in relation to the variance of IPO underpricing across 2,921 
IPOs firms nested within 21 countries from 2000 to 2005. The authors document only 10% of the 
variations in IPO underpricing is related to institutional differences between countries. The ICC 
results are almost double what Engelen and van Essen (2010) observed. This research attributes 
this large difference to the fact that the authors’ IPO data is dominated by developed countries55, 
spanned only 5 years, and has many country-level observations with very few IPO observations.  
 
                                                 
55 Please see Footnote 32 and 33 for a detailed discussion for number of limitations of Engelen and van Essen’s (2010) 
distinguished empirical work. 
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The ICC results related to the decomposition of the underpricing variance on the two blocks of 
countries including developed versus developing G20 countries reveal an additional interesting 
finding. This research shows that the variability in the underpricing variance across countries of 
22% is driven by a large (small) variability within developing (developed) countries. This is 
because the ICC results attribute 25% of underpricing difference to cross-country differences 
within developing countries compared to only 5% related to developed G20 countries. The 
implication of this finding notes the importance for accounting for within cluster correlations in 
error terms within developed versus developing countries in order to better understand the 
mystifying phenomenon of IPO underpricing from a global perspective. This finding also 
highlights that differences in country-level institutions may have a differential effect on variations 
in IPO underpricing across developed and developed countries. 
 
This outcome is at odds with those reported by Booth et al. (2001) and Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
They assert that the variability of firms leverage policies is not influenced by country-level 
institutional differences between developed and developing countries. Therefore, the results 
demonstrate that the variability in country-level institutions within developing (developed) 
countries matters more (matters less) in causing underpricing difference in the global IPO market. 
Consequently, this research concludes that the hierarchical structure in finance data may have 
dissimilar market outcomes when it comes to differences in institutional aspects across countries, 
specifically across developed versus developing ones.  
 
4.6.2.2. Direct Impact of Variations in National Cultures on 
Underpricing Difference across Countries  
Before commencing hypothesis testing, as a robustness check this chapter investigates the 
uniformity of the attained coefficients of firm-level variables with previous literature. The objective 
of this exercise is to explore the validity and extend the empirical testing for the EWL theory. It 
will help to explain underpricing differences across the G20 market IPOs. This section focuses on 
examining the direct effect of differences in country-level national cultures on explaining 
differences in underpricing across the G20 countries. Model 1 to Model 4 in Table 35 deliver 
identical HLM models containing only firm-level variables differing in the gradual addition of year 
and industry effects. Model 1 presents firm-level coefficients of the two proxies measuring the 
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incentive of IPO issuers, these being PR and DF. Both coefficients reveal significant results at the 
1% level. 
 
These results ratify that the larger the incentive of IPO issuers, the lower is the underpricing in the 
G20 IPO markets. This result supports the findings of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Kennedy et 
al. (2006), and Chahine (2008). The result for underwriter reputation shows negative coefficient 
but statistically insignificant. This outcome is in line with the findings of Luo (2008). Model 1 
reveals the results of the three measures of ex-ante uncertainty of PMV, LET, and LOP. 
Collectively, they confirm previous literature inferring that when the ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding an offering is high, underpricing in the G20 countries turns out to be larger. PMV 
indicates a positively significant coefficient at the 10% level. This outcome suggests that before 
the listing of an IPO company in the G20 countries, this firm undergoes greater underpricing when 
stock market volatility is high. This outcome is in line with the result obtained by Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm Jr (2002) and Chang et al. (2017). Furthermore, the second proxy of ex-ante uncertainty, 
LET, confirms that the longer the elapsed time between the offer price set up and the first trading 
date, the lower is the underpricing in the G20 stock markets. This result suggests that when 
informed investors show high demand for an IPO firm then this IPO requires less time to be fully 
subscribed to achieve successful subscription. That is, the high demand by informed investors 
would be interpreted by uninformed investors with low uncertainty about the quality of the IPO. 
 
Table 35: HLM Analyses on the Impact of Firm-specific Variables in G20 Countries with Random Intercept 
Model 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Culture-level variables 
PD     
     
UA     
     
IDV     
     
FM     
     
STO     
     
IDG     
Firm-level variables 
 
Firm-level variables 
Firm-level variables 
     
PR -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 [-14.20] [-14.31] [-14.25] [-14.28] 
DF -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 [-20.20] [-20.21] [-20.15] [-20.17] 
UR -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [-0.52] [-0.60] [-0.57] [-0.59] 
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PMV 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 [1.51] [1.62] [1.46] [1.55] 
LET -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 [-5.30] [-5.60] [-5.31] [-5.59] 
LOP -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 [-10.23] [-10.40] [-10.17] [-10.32] 
Dummy Effects  NO YE IE YE & IE 
Constant 1.800*** 1.830*** 1.780*** 1.800*** 
 [12.29] [12.32] [11.90] [11.91] 
Observations 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 
 R2 within countries 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 R2 between countries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 
0 j  0.18419 0.18420 0.18419 0.18420 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, 
ij  0.60550 0.60533 0.60537 0.60519 
Deviance  23936 23933 23934 23928 
Note: Country-level culture, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 31 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the 
dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail. 
 
Consequently, lower uncertainty leads to higher demand for the offering on the first trading day, 
and results in higher underpricing. This finding supports a similar observation documented by Lee 
et al. (1996) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012). Model 1 also exhibits the result of the third 
proxy of ex-ante uncertainty, LOP. This proxy expects that the underpricing of IPO firms with 
large offer proceeds is lower as these firms tend not to be well-established and non-speculative 
firms. Therefore, IPO investors regard such firms that have large offer size with lower ex-ante 
uncertainty, subsequently leading to lower underpricing. The results of Model 1 evidently confirm 
this expectation as the coefficient of LOP is significant at the 1% level. This outcome supports 
similar evidence reported by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Kim et al. (2008), and Boulton et al. 
(2010). Table 35 also confirms that the results obtained from Model 1 continue to be qualitatively 
similar after controlling for year effect (YE) and industry effect (IE) in Models 2, 3, and 4.  
 
Overall, the three groups of variables related to the EWL theory have the expected coefficients’ 
sign and statistical significance with the exception of the underwriter reputation variable. This is 
because this research attains a negative but insignificant coefficient for the variable UR. The results 
for the UR variable are consistent with Luo (2008) who employed prestigious underwriter 
explanatory factor in a HLM model to examine the impact of pre-IPO marketing spendings on 
variation in underpricing across countries. Yet, the UR results disagree with Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001), Kennedy et al. (2006), and Chahine (2008) who employ OLS-based modelling 
documenting a significant effect of reputable underwriters in reducing IPO underpricing. This 
research attributes this important difference in the UR results to the employment of a country 
“group” mean-centered estimation to firm-level variables that captures size distortion effect caused 
by employing unbalanced IPO data (Kreft et al. 1995). This is because OLS-based estimation uses 
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the overall mean of the explanatory variable, UR in the case, which is computed utilising the mean 
from the full sample ( X ).  
 
In contrast, the HLM model employs group mean centering estimation where it subtracts the 
individual's group “country” mean ( jX ) from the individual's score (Enders & Tofighi 2007). 
Econometrically, this means that the coefficient of the variable underwriter reputation will be a fair 
representation of the mean of 22 groups “countries” in the data not the mean of the entire sample 
of 10,217 IPO firms. Hence, this research contends that previous literature finds a significant 
association between underwriter reputation and underpricing because the UR variable could be 
spuriously significant. This is again due to the effect of large sample size for some countries that 
could have driven the overall T-statistic results towards generating misleadingly significant results 
(Li et al. 2013). Consequently, the HLM models corrected this econometric shortfall by estimating 
regressions where UR observations are group centered by every country in the sample, hence 
eliminating the influence of countries with large UR observations.  
 
Based on the results in Table 35, it can be said that the EWL theory can partially explain 
underpricing difference across countries. In a cross-country setting, IPO firms are underpriced 
differently because IPO issuers sell more secondary shares and create more primary shares; this 
situation is also explained by the level of ex-ante uncertainty observed at the time of offering. The 
employment of reputable underwriters has no effect on variations in IPO underpricing across 
countries. The findings summarised in Table 35 document a small role played by firm-level 
characteristics in explaining the variance in IPO underpricing across countries. Hence, differences 
in country-level characteristics should play a larger role in causing the phenomenon of underpricing 
difference. This is because the R2 within countries show a value of 0.05, meaning that only 5% of 
variations in IPO underpricing across countries are related to the firm-level variables. The values 
of R2 within countries are comparable to values reported by IPO underpricing literature. For 
instance, similar R2 values documented by Loughran and Ritter (2004) (0.05; Table VII; Model 2), 
Lowry et al. (2010) (0.03; Table V; Model c), Boulton et al. (2011) (0.07; Table 5; Model 2), Shi 
et al. (2013) (0.05; Table 6; Model 1), Leitterstorf and Rau (2014) (0.06; Table 2; Model 1), and 
Chang et al. (2017) (0.03; Table 4; Model 5).  
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In the next paragraph, this research turns the attention to examining the hypotheses related to the 
direct effect of national cultures on IPO underpricing difference across countries. This research 
proceeds by evaluating the empirical results of six HLM models that allow the intercept to be 
random at level 2 but without controlling for firm-level covariates, as shown in Table 36. The aim 
here is to isolate the effect of differences in national cultures on underpricing in the G20 countries 
by not disturbing this effect with the addition of firm-level variables following Costa et al. (2013). 
Therefore, in these six models, this research allows the intercept of every HLM model to vary 
across the G20 countries and to test if the variability in national cultures can truly explain the 
variability in the intercept for every model. 
 
In level 2 of the HLM model, this research has six proxies for national cultures, namely, PA, UA, 
IDV, FM, STO, and IDG, of which each one is added at the time in order to avoid a 
multicollinearity problem among level 2 covariates. Subsequently, in Models 7 to 12 in Table 36, 
this research include all explanatory variables used in Model 4 in Table 35 to examine the direct 
effect difference of national cultures on IPO underpricing to control for firm-level characteristics. 
This research chooses Model 4 because it produces the lowest deviance score of 23928, which 
suggests it is the most efficient model amongst the four models in Table 35. 
 
4.6.2.2.1. Power Distance  
This research uses the power distance dimension of Hofstede (1980) to measure the unequal 
distribution of authority amongst market participants in the G20 countries. It is expected there will 
be a positive association between the level of power distance and underpricing of IPOs. Table 36 
reports supporting results for hypothesis H1. The coefficients for power distance are positive and 
significant for IPO underpricing under the HLM estimation with only PD variable (0.011; Table 
36; Model 1; p<0.05) as well as for PD factor plus firm-level variables (0.010; Table 36; Model 7; 
p<0.01). As expected in the theoretical section, in a G20 country with a culture characterised by 
high power distance, insiders of IPO firms are expected to exhibit a greater propensity to centralise 
decision-making. They are also expected to illustrate opportunism in focusing on their personal 
interests than those of the firm.  
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Table 36: HLM Analyses on the Effect of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions on IPO Underpricing of the G20 Countries with Random Intercept Model with Firm-
specific Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Culture-level variables 
PD 0.011**      0.010***      
 [1.80]      [2.80]      
UA  0.003      0.001     
  [1.10]      [0.41]     
IDV   -0.006**      -0.007**    
   [-1.70]      [-2.04]    
FM    -0.005*      -0.006***   
    [-1.30]      [-2.35]   
STO     -0.001      -0.001  
     [-0.39]      [-0.21]  
IDG      -0.005      -0.005*** 
      [-1.13]      [-2.35] 
Firm-level variables 
PR       -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
       [-14.16] [-14.18] [-14.20] [-14.19] [-14.18] [-14.28] 
DF       -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
       [-19.65] [-19.68] [-19.70] [-19.69] [-19.68] [-20.17] 
UR       -0.00 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
       [-0.62] [-0.51] [-0.52] [-0.51] [-0.51] [-0.59] 
PMV       0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
       [1.11] [1.14] [1.12] [1.14] [1.13] [1.23] 
LET       -0.060*** -0.050*** -0.060*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
       [-5.89] [-5.86] [-5.90] [-5.88] [-5.87] [-5.59] 
LOP       -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
       [-10.40] [-10.39] [-10.40] [-10.39] [-10.38] [-10.32] 
Dummy Effects       YE & IE YE & IE YE & IE YE & IE YE & IE YE & IE 
Constant 0.320 0.110*** 0.680*** 0.550*** 0.380*** 0.580*** 0.960***  1.470*** 1.930*** 1.940*** 1.600*** 0.300*** 
 [1.11] [0.42] [2.30] [3.14] [3.35] [5.22] [3.20] [4.54] [6.81] [5.95] [5.34] [3.23] 
Observations 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 10,209 
 R2 within countries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 R2 between countries 0.29 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.32 0.07 0.23 0.13 0.06 0.12 
Random-Effect Parameter  
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 
0 j  0.13133 0.17616 0.15441 0.17345 0.18137 0.18420 0.12355 0.17060 0.14253 0.15950 0.17171 0.16200 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, 
ij  0.63905 0.63905 0.63905 0.63905 0.63905 0.60519 0.59049 0.59047 0.59048 0.59047 0.59047 0.59047 
Deviance  24454 24460 24457 24460 24461 23928 23756 23762 23759 23761 23763 23761 
Note: Country-level culture, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 31 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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IPO investors in such cultures can read this psychological bias concerning personal gains between 
IPO managers and owners; it creates an environment where trust issues abound. Consequently, in 
high power distance countries, imbalance of social trust in transactions channels into market 
players making ex-ante uncertainty of IPO investors greater. The development of such an ex-ante 
uncertainty environment induces high-quality IPO managers located in high-power distance 
nations to provide underpricing in exchange for reducing the ex-ante uncertainty of investors. This 
action is necessary for high quality IPO firms to signal how different they are from low quality IPO 
firms. The result of Model 1 is consistent with a similar one obtained by Costa et al. (2013) 
confirming the positive effect of power distance in increasing the underpricing of IPO firms. 
However, the R2 results provide clearer quantification of the direct effect of country-level 
characteristics (i.e., differences in power distance between countries) and firm-level characteristics 
(i.e., differences in determinants of IPO underpricing within countries) on IPO underpricing.  
 
By employing HLM estimation, the R2 between countries attributes 29% of the variability in IPO 
underpricing to the variability in power distance across countries as shown in Model 1 in Table 36. 
In Model 7, this research obtains even greater results for R2 between countries documenting that 
the variance in power distance elucidates 32% of underpricing difference. Yet, differences in firm-
level factors within countries only explain 8%. This research notices a notable increase of the R2 
within countries from being 5% to 8% for all models in Table 35 compared to all models in Table 
36, respectively. This research attributes this difference to allowing the intercept to vary, not alike 
previous culture-IPO studies, across countries which enhances the association between 
determinants of IPO underpricing and IPO underpricing.  
 
4.6.2.2.2. Uncertainty Avoidance  
The level of uncertainty avoidance provides the second cultural measure which was developed by 
Hofstede (1980). It focuses on the degree of tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty accepted by a 
G20 society’s market participants. Hypothesis 2 predicts that underpricing of IPO firms nested in 
high uncertainty avoidance cultures should be higher than countries with a lower level of 
uncertainty avoidance. The results in Table 36 do not support hypothesis 2. Although the 
coefficients of UA are in the expected direction proposed under the two HLM estimations (0.003; 
Table 36; Model 2) (0.001; Table 36; Model 8), they provide no significance in both instances. The 
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positive and insignificant UA coefficient is very different from the significant and negative 
coefficient results noted by Costa et al. (2013) using OLS-based estimation.  
 
This research attributes this significant difference in the UA signage between the result and Costa 
et al.’s (2013) output to capturing the within cluster “country” correlations using HLM estimation 
in the study. Hofmann (1997), Engelen and van Essen (2010), and Kayo and Kimura (2011) 
confirm that false coefficient readings may be reached by a failure to observe correlations amongst 
error terms within countries for nested finance data such as the IPO data. In fact, Tennant and 
Sutherland (2014) employed HLM specification to capture the multilevel effect in their capital 
structure data, in order to examine the effect of differences in UA in causing variation in countries’ 
bank fees. The authors found a positive but insignificant coefficient, thereby indicating no 
relationship between increases in bank fees and uncertainty avoidance characteristics of countries. 
The conclusion for the UA variable is in harmony with the findings of Tennant and Sutherland 
(2014). The UA result provides an ideal and empirical illustration of the erroneous conclusions that 
might be achieved by ignoring the nesting structure of the IPO data.  
 
4.6.2.2.3. Individualism Versus Collectivism 
The third proxy to gauge differences in national cultures is the level of individualism compared to 
collectivism observed in the G20 countries. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the underpricing of IPO 
firms nested in high individualism cultures will be lower than countries with highly collectivist 
cultural values. Models 3 and 9 in Table 36 present supporting outcomes for hypothesis 3. The 
coefficients for individualism are negative and significant for IPO underpricing using HLM 
approximation with only the IDV variable (-0.006; Table 36; Model 3; p<0.05) along with the other 
extended HLM model containing the IDV variable plus firm-level characteristics (-0.007; Table 
36; Model 9; p<0.05). Following the projection in the theoretical section, the results confirm that 
when the level of individualism increases, the level of IPO underpricing declines. These findings 
support the intuition that in individualistic cultures the transmission of insider information between 
stakeholders is difficult to attain systematically. The reason behind this expectation is due to the 
absence of solid social channels between managers and shareholders in individualistic societies. 
Not only that, in such societies marked by low collectivism, there is a cultural endorsement that 
enforcement of the law and stock market regulations should be strongly imposed indiscriminately 
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on all investors. Consequently, the asymmetric information problem between connected and 
unconnected investors in such individualistic cultures becomes a minor one in the IPO market. It 
is a market environment with symmetric flow of information allowing IPO issuers to attain a fair 
market price resulting in lower IPO underpricing. 
 
Although the empirical finding is consistent with what was concluded by Costa et al. (2013), the 
HLM estimation provides further robust understanding. This is because the R-squared outcomes 
draw an accurate quantification of the direct effect of country-level characteristics (i.e., differences 
in individualism between countries) and firm-level characteristics (i.e., differences in determinants 
of IPO underpricing within countries) on IPO underpricing. For example, this research shows that 
R2 between countries relates 16% of the variation in IPO underpricing to changes in the level of 
individualism between countries as shown in Model 3 in Table 36. In Model 9, the HLM model 
provides larger value for R2 between countries, verifying that the variability in individualism 
explains 23% of underpricing variance. Nevertheless, dissimilarities in firm-level characteristics 
within G20 countries only elucidate 8% of the underpricing difference. Hence, this research 
provides important empirical evidence reporting that differences in IPO underpricing in the global 
IPO market are closely related to variations in country-level cultural aspects between countries 
more than differences in firm-level factors within countries.  
 
4.6.2.2.4. Femininity Versus Masculinity 
The fourth hypothesis relates to the direct effect of differences in the witnessed level of femininity 
between G20 market participants and its implications for IPO underpricing. Hypothesis 4 theorises 
that the level of underpricing for IPO firms clustered in high femininity civilisations is projected 
to be lower than countries with high masculinity. Interestingly, when this research ignores firm-
level factors, as in Costa et al. (2013), H4 is weakly supported (-0.005; Table 36; Model 4; p<0.10). 
In contrast, the hypothesis is strongly supported (-0.006; Table 36; Model 10; p<0.01) once this 
research controls for firm-level determinants along the variable of interest FM. This finding 
highlights the sensitivity of the national cultural dimension of femininity across countries to the 
omission of firm-level factors for IPO firms. Engelen and van Essen (2010) made a similar 
cautionary note arguing that depending on an elucidation of differences in underpricing across 
countries without accounting for firm-level variables would be inadequate, as it would omit 
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imperative variables that explain underpricing. The FM results clearly explain why Costa et al. 
(2013) failed to find support for the link between the level of femininity and IPO underpricing 
across countries. 
 
As hypothesised in the theoretical section, the results confirm that in countries with a high level of 
masculine characteristics, insiders in IPO firms focus on their own personal interests; hence, they 
are psychologically eager to secure a successful IPO listing at any cost. Consequently, they are 
prepared to tolerate undue levels of underpricing or even disclose overoptimistic information to 
maintain their individual success by securing a successful listing. Such psychological eagerness 
for IPO managers to please themselves is likely to be channelled into IPO investors. As a result, 
the ex-ante uncertainty of investors in IPO firms leads to higher demanding and higher 
underpricing. An assessment of model fit reveals that Model 10 is far more efficient compared to 
Model 4 in Table 36 since the deviance scores for the former and latter are 23761 and 24460, 
respectively. R-squared values for Model 10 demonstrate that differences in the level of femininity 
between the G20 countries explain 13% of the variability in underpricing while firm-level factors 
only explain 8%.  
4.6.2.2.5. Short-term Versus Long-term Orientation 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the level of IPO underpricing will be lower for IPO firms located in 
societies with low level of long-term orientation. This is because Hofstede (2001) measures 
cultures as being short-term oriented because they do not value thriftiness or the belief that time is 
needed to  realise future ambitions. This thesis argued that in these kinds of countries, IPO investors 
have a tendency to flip their IPO shares for short-term gains. Consequently, they generate a high 
supply of IPO shares on the first trading day. In turn, the share price of IPO firms domiciled in 
short-term orientation cultures drops quickly and leads to lower underpricing. The results in Table 
36 provide no support for hypothesis 5. Although coefficients of STO are in the anticipated 
direction under the two HLM estimations (-0.001; Table 36; Model 5) (-0.001; Table 36; Model 
11), they are insignificant on both occasions. The results for the variable STO are consistent in 
signage but inconsistent in significance as reported in Costa et al. (2013). Again, similar to the 
argument raised in Section 4.6.3.2 about the results of the UA variable, this research attributes this 
inconsistency to accounting for the within cluster “country” correlations estimated by the HLM 
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models. The results emphasise that not all cultural aspects matter in relation to underpricing 
difference across countries once this research controls for the nesting structure of the IPO data.  
 
4.6.2.2.6. Indulgence Versus Restraint 
The sixth hypothesis is associated with testing the direct effect of variances in indulgence between 
IPO investors and its effect on IPO underpricing in G20 countries. Hypothesis 6 postulates that 
degree of underpricing for IPO firms nested in high indulgent nations is expected to be lower than 
cultures with high restraint values. Remarkably, by disregarding the inclusion of firm-level 
characteristics, as in Costa et al. (2013), H6 is rejected (-0.005; Table 36; Model 6; p>0.10). Quite 
the reverse, the hypothesis is strongly supported (-0.005; Table 36; Model 12; p<0.01) after 
accounting for firm-level variables. Similar to what this research noted in Section 4.6.3.4 on the 
femininity variable, the IDV results reemphasise the sensitivity of cultural values across countries 
to the exclusion of firm-level characteristics. The results provided by the IDV variable evidently 
illustrate the existence of omitted variable bias for the empirical work done by Costa et al. (2013) 
who find no significant relationship between the level of indulgence and IPO underpricing across 
countries. 
 
Following the theoretical prediction, the outcomes of the IDV variables confirm that when an IPO 
firm is listed in a society, which endorses greater priority for leisure, underpricing falls by 0.5% 
when the indulgence score increases by one unit in the G20 countries. This is because investors 
born and bred on indulgent philosophies tend to flip their IPO shares on the first trading day to 
profit immediately. This economic behaviour of IPO investors who subscribe in the IPO offering 
in such indulgent cultures is timely channelled to other IPO investors in the secondary market. This 
encourages post-IPO investors to show less demand for newly listed IPO shares in indulgent 
cultures. Consequently, the flipping behaviour of IPO investors in the primary market causes a 
sudden increase in supply of IPO shares on the secondary market, which causes prices to fall. This 
action results in lower initial returns for IPO shares on the first trading day in indulgent countries. 
Model 12 provides a better efficient estimation compared to Model 6 in Table 36. This is because 
the deviance scores are 23761 and 23928 for the former and latter, respectively. According to the 
calculated R-squared values for Model 12, the variability in the level of indulgence in G20 
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countries directly elucidates 12% of the underpricing fluctuations across countries. In contrast, 8% 
of underpricing difference is attributed to firm-level characteristics. 
 
Overall, the findings related to the direct effect of differences in national cultures on the variability 
of IPO underpricing allow the author to answer the first proposed research question: do differences 
in country-level national cultures explain IPO underpricing difference across IPO markets? The 
answer is positive; variations in national cultures across countries affect the variability in IPO 
underpricing in the global IPO market. However, against the shared perception in the intersection 
of IPO underpricing-culture literature, represented by Costa et al. (2013) and Chourou et al. (2018), 
not all cultural dimensions matter to the IPO market. This research capitalises on the robust HLM 
estimation to capture the nesting structure of IPO data to confirm that only differences in the level 
of power distance, individualism, femininity, and indulgence across countries matter in influencing 
the global IPO underpricing difference.  
 
4.6.2.3. The Indirect Influences of Variations in National Cultures on 
Underpricing Difference across Countries  
Table 37 summarises the outcomes of random coefficients in the HLM models. Panel A shows the 
direct effect of country-level national culture variables along with firm-level underpricing 
determinant variables. Panel B exhibits the estimations of interaction variables illustrating the 
indirect “modifier” effects of national culture characteristics on IPO underpricing. Hence, the focus 
is mainly on Panel B while this thesis assesses the consistency of results provided in Panel A with 
previous direct effects findings summarised in Table 36. 
 
4.6.2.3.1. Impacts of National Culture Characteristics on the 
Incentive of IPO Issuers-IPO Underpricing 
Relationship  
In this section, this research presents the results of six hypotheses concerning the indirect effects 
of differences in national culture values on IPO underpricing through the incentive of IPO issuers.  
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Table 37: HLM Analyses on the Effect of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions on IPO Underpricing of the G20 Countries with Random Slope Coefficient Model with 
Firm-specific Variables 
Model 1       Model 2        Model 3          Model 4             Model 5                Model 6 
Panel A: Direct Effect 
Culture-level variables 
PD 0.011*** UA 0.003 IDV -0.070** FM -0.050*** STO -0.010 IDG 0.040*** 
 [2.67]  [0.86]  [-1.91]  [-2.43]  [-0.07]  [-3.97] 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.034*** PR -0.024*** PR -0.067*** PR 0.012 *** PR -0.030*** PR -0.024*** 
 [-12.78]  [-14.25]  [-21.30]  [5.80]  [-17.40]  [-17.39] 
DF -0.030*** DF -0.023*** DF -0.070*** DF 0.013*** DF -0.032*** DF -0.026*** 
 [-14.02]  [-18.50]  [-22.70]  [7.28]  [-20.01]  [-22.30] 
UR -0.010 UR -0.010 UR -0.020 UR 0.010 UR -0.020 UR -0.010 
 [-0.35]  [-0.51]  [-0.80]  [0.41]  [-0.90]  [-0.71] 
PMV 0.010* PMV -0.012* PMV 0.013** PMV 0.044*** PMV 0.017** PMV 0.028*** 
 [1.40]  [-1.45]  [1.70]  [4.38]  [2.10]  [3.10] 
LET -0.040*** LET 0.020** LET -0.040*** LET -0.030*** LET -0.050*** LET -0.050*** 
 [-4.45]  [2.03]  [-4.13]  [-2.95]  [-5.41]  [-4.80] 
LOP -0.070*** LOP -0.070*** LOP -0.070*** LOP -0.040** LOP -0.060*** LOP -0.050*** 
 [-11.95]  [-12.01]  [-12.00]  [-6.33]  [-10.03]  [-9.14] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE   YE & IE  YE & IE 
                                             Panel B: Indirect Effect “Interaction Variables” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD*PR -0.100*** UA*PR -0.05*** IDV*PR 0.150*** FM*PR 0.320*** STO*PR 0.070*** IDG*PR 0.060*** 
 [-6.73]  [-5.80]  [17.00]  [16.57]  [9.60]  [8.62] 
PD*DF -0.100*** UA*DF -0.06*** IDV*DF 0.160*** FM*DF 0.330*** STO*DF 0.070*** IDG*DF 0.070*** 
 [-7.40]  [-7.80]  [17.90]  [18.06]  [11.30]  [11.25] 
PD*UR 0.010*** UA*UR 0.010 IDV*UR -0.010** FM*UR 0.010 STO*UR -0.010 IDG*UR -0.010 
 [2.50]  [0.64]  [-1.98]  [1.20]  [-0.57]  [-0.56] 
PD*PMV 0.110*** UA*PMV -0.300*** IDV*PMV -0.010 FM*PMV 0.210*** STO*PMV 0.050** IDG*PMV 0.140*** 
 [2.40]  [-8.80]  [-0.18]  [4.17]  [2.10]  [4.65] 
PD*LET -0.010*** UA*LET 0.010*** IDV*LET 0.010*** FM*LET 0.010*** STO*LET 0.010*** IDG*LET 0.010*** 
 [-2.45]  [9.80]  [2.40]  [2.93]  [5.01]  [4.36] 
PD*LOP -0.010** UA*LOP -0.010*** IDV*LOP 0.010*** FM*LOP 0.010*** STO*LOP 0.010*** IDG*LOP 0.010*** 
 [-1.80]  [-5.30]  [7.33]  [3.62]  [4.12]  [5.53] 
Constant 0.310***  0.300***  0.310***  0.300***  0.300***  0.300*** 
 [3.75]  [3.30]  [3.51]  [3.30]  [3.23]  [3.32] 
Observations 10209  10209  10209  10209  10209  10209 
R2 within countries 0.06  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.07 
R2 between countries 0.26  0.02  0.15  0.05  0.00  0.05 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 0 j  0.13670  0.18031  0.15674  0.17561  0.18385  0.17540 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, ij  0.59895  0.58955  0.58307  0.58247  0.59409  0.59399 
Deviance 23513   23616   23534    23542   23716 
 
  23658 
 
Note: Country-level culture, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 31 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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Hypotheses 7a and 7b expect that high levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
undermine the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers and underpricing, respectively. In 
contrast, hypotheses 7c, d, e, and f conjecture that higher levels of individualism, femininity, short-
term orientation, and indulgence improve the association between the incentive of IPO issuers and 
underpricing. The negative and significant coefficients for the interaction terms PD*PR (-0.100; 
Table 37; Model 1; p<0.01), PD*DF (-0.100; Table 37; Model 1; p<0.01), UA*PR (-0.050; Table 
37; Model 2; p<0.01), and UA*DF (-0.060; Table 37; Model 2; p<0.01) provide supporting 
outcomes for hypotheses 7a and 7b.  
 
These results imply that increasing the level of power distance and uncertainty avoidance in G20 
countries by one unit reduces the effects of participation ratio and dilution factor in driving low 
IPO underpricing in the 5% and 10% range. Moreover, this research obtains significant coefficients 
at the 1% level for hypotheses 7c, d, e, and f. The largest indirect effect of culture on underpricing 
is reported for the interaction variables of FM*PR (0.320; Table 37; Model 4; p<0.01) and FM*DF 
(0.330; Table 37; Model 4; p<0.01). 
 
Remarkably, the results suggest that the relationships between participation ratio-IPO underpricing 
and dilution factor-IPO underpricing increase by 32% and 33%, respectively. This increase occurs 
when the level of femininity increases by one unit in G20 countries. This is followed by the 
interaction terms of IDV*PR (0.150; Table 37; Model 3; p<0.01) and IDV*DF (0.160; Table 37; 
Model 3; p<0.01). The interaction variables of STO*PR (0.070; Table 37; Model 5; p<0.01), 
STO*DF (0.070; Table 37; Model 5; p<0.01), IDG*PR (0.060; Table 37; Model 6; p<0.01), and 
IDG*DF (0.070; Table 37; Model 6; p<0.01) also report significant results. The anticipation of the 
hypotheses being correct is fulfilled. The results infer that IPO issuers in high power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance countries indeed share pre-fixed perceptions of the presence of opaque 
market practices, unequal distribution of power, and ambiguity when they decide to sell a part or 
parts of their firms. Conversely, the results suggest that owners of IPO firms located in 
individualist, feminine, short-term oriented, and indulgent cultures maintain higher levels of 
cultural confidence that promote fair market practices, identical distribution of information, and 
accountability.  
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Consequently, issuers who are nested within high power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
(individualist, feminine, short-term oriented, and indulgent) countries have less (more) inclination 
to sell and create more secondary and primary shares, respectively, when they go public. This is 
because IPO owners in individualist, feminine, short-term oriented, and indulgent nations are not 
afraid that underwriters and institutional investors will exploit their market power to deliberately 
underprice their company for personal gain. The results suggest the opposite is likely to occur in 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance cultures. The findings are consistent with a similar 
conclusion reached by Li et al. (2013) who contended that national cultural values modify the 
relationship between firm-level variables and corporate-risk taking decisions across countries.  
 
Overall, the findings associated with the indirect effect of variations in national cultures on IPO 
underpricing difference permit this thesis to answer the second research question: do differences 
in country-level national cultures affect the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers and 
underpricing across IPO markets? The answer is affirmative. The evidence this research uncovers 
confirms that differences in cultural values across nations indirectly affect the variability in IPO 
underpricing in the global IPO market. It occurs through influencing the connection between the 
incentive of IPO issuers and IPO underpricing. This new empirical evidence is foreign to the 
intersection of IPO underpricing-culture literature, for example Costa et al. (2013) and Chourou et 
al. (2018). This literature is not aware that national cultures play a significant modifying effect in 
shaping the behaviour of IPO issuers in relation to the percentage of shares they intend to sell or 
create when they go public.   
 
4.6.2.3.2. Effects of National Culture Characteristics on the 
Underwriter Reputation-IPO Underpricing 
Relationship 
The author proceeds in this section to test the six hypotheses related to the modifier effects of 
variances in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on IPO underpricing via the decision to employ 
prestigious underwriters. Hypotheses 8a and 8b assume that in cultures with high levels of power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance, the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing is expected to be stronger. In contrast, hypotheses 8c, d, e, and f predict that higher 
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levels of individualism, femininity, short-term orientation, and indulgence reduce the connection 
between prestigious underwriters and underpricing.  
 
This research only finds supporting results for hypotheses 8a and 8c. The positive and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term PD*UR (0.010; Table 44; Model 1; p<0.01) shows that the level 
of power distance in G20 countries increases the effect of underwriter reputation in causing low 
IPO underpricing. Similarly, the interaction term IDV*UR (-0.010; Table 44; Model 3; p<0.05) 
demonstrates that an increase in the level of individualism for one unit leads to reducing the 
relationship between prestigious underwriters and underpricing by 1%. The results are in the same 
category as Li et al. (2013) who found that the level of individualism reduces the association 
between firm size and corporate risk-taking. The authors measure the level of risk-taking by the 
level of research and development. Their results suggest that larger firms are already reaching 
maturity level in terms of research and development, and for this reason managers of large firms 
engage less in corporate risk-taking. When these managers are located in individualist cultures, 
their results reveal that the association between firm size and corporate risk-taking declines. The 
authors attribute this outcome by arguing that managers in individualist countries are frequently 
constrained by rules that reduce their desire to seek personal achievement by taking riskier 
corporate decisions. 
 
The results related to the interaction terms PD*UR and IDV*UR provide a similar inference. This 
research contends that IPO investors in high individualist and low power distance cultures 
understand the certification role reputable underwriters provide in reducing their ex-ante 
uncertainty. In turn, they demand lower underpricing for IPOs underwritten by prestigious 
underwriters. However, those IPO investors in stock markets characterised with low collectivism 
and power distance are likely to have a shared perception that IPO issuers follow rigid rules related 
to the reliability of financial information contained in the IPO prospectus. Consequently, the 
existence of this level of social trust between IPO issuers and investors in such cultures reduces the 
importance of the certification role reputable underwriters provide to IPO investors. The results for 
the remaining models, Models 2, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 37, are similar to Li et al. (2013) who find 
that the level of UA across countries does not influence the relationship between earnings discretion 
and corporate risk-taking.  
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In general, the conclusions for the indirect effect of differences in national cultures on IPO 
underpricing variance enable the author to answer the third proposed research question: do 
differences in country-level national cultures affect the relationship between underwriter reputation 
and underpricing across IPO markets? This research provides a slightly positive answer to this 
question. This thesis discovers that dissimilarities in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of 
individualism and power distance across the G20 countries modify the relationship between the 
prestigious underwriter and IPO underpricing. The findings are the first in the IPO underpricing-
culture literature to show that not all cultural dimensions actually matter when it comes to the 
relationship between reputable underwriters and IPO underpricing. The prestigious underwriter-
IPO underpricing relationship is largely affected only in countries that embrace high individualism 
and low power distance cultural values.  
 
4.6.2.3.3. Influences of National Culture Characteristics on the 
Ex-ante Uncertainty-IPO Underpricing Relationship 
This section provides the final set of hypotheses related to the indirect effect of Hofstede’s cultural 
values on the observed level of IPO underpricing across countries. Hypotheses 9a and 9b suggest 
that high levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance improve the relationship between ex-
ante uncertainty and underpricing, respectively. By contrast, hypotheses 9c, d, e, and f anticipate 
that higher levels of individualism, femininity, short-term orientation, and indulgence undermine 
the association between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing. This research obtains supporting 
results for the three ex-ante proxies bringing solid support to H9a. PD*PMV is positive and 
significant (0.110; Table 37; Model 1; p<0.01). The result suggests that when the level of power 
distance between G20 countries increases by one unit, the effect of pre-IPO stock market volatility 
increases in IPO underpricing by 11%. As this research hypothesised in the theory section, 
PD*PMV suggests the following. The presence of a low level of PD characteristics across G20 
countries generates a stock market environment that does not suffer from the unequal distribution 
of market information between investors. Hence, in this kind of market with a low level of PD, IPO 
participants have a shared belief that they can enjoy equal and timely access to information 
allowing them to realise informed investment decisions. In turn, this stock market environment 
reduces the level of ex-ante uncertainty amongst IPO parties. This encourages investors in stock 
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markets in such low power distance cultures to react less to changes in pre-IPO stock market 
volatility.  
 
Likewise, the interaction terms of PD*LET and PD*LOP provide negative and significant (-0.010; 
Table 37; Model 1; p<0.01) and (-0.010; Table 37; Model 1; p<0.05) outputs as expected in the 
theoretical section. They point out that an increase in the level of power distance by one unit 
between G20 countries leads to reducing the effect of elapsed time and offer size on IPO 
underpricing by 1% equally. The results document weak support for hypothesis 9b with reference 
to the impact of UA on the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing. This is 
because the interaction terms of UA*PMV and UA*LET provide significantly opposite coefficient 
signs (-0.30; Table 37; Model 2; p<0.01) and (0.010; Table 37; Model 2; p<0.01), respectively. 
Yet, the interaction term of UA*LOP provides negative and significant (-0.010; Table 37; Model 
2; p<0.01) results that are consistent with the prediction. The author reasons that these unexpected 
findings are due to the existence of reverse expectations about the effect of pre-IPO market 
volatility and elapsed time across countries with a high level of uncertainty avoidance. This finding 
is consistent with a similar observation in the study by Li et al. (2013). They discovered that in 
contrast to their prediction, UA decreased the association between earnings discretion and 
corporate risk-taking instead of increasing it.  
 
The results linked to hypotheses 9c, d, e, and f 9b provide overall significant outcomes lending 
support to their predictions. Due to rounding of coefficient values to the nearest numbers, the 
results show that an increase in the level of IDV, FM, STO, and IDG across the G20 countries by 
one unit leads to strengthening the influence of LET and LOP on IPO underpricing by 1%. This 
research explains these findings by providing the following rationale. Recall that the IPO 
underpricing literature including Lee et al. (1996) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) measure 
the level of ex-ante uncertainty in the IPO market using the variable elapsed time. The authors 
confirm that when informed56 investors have some concerns or are not eager to subscribe in full to 
some IPO firms, then the length of the elapsed time between the first trading day and fixing of the 
offer price of the IPO firm increases. The consequence of this is that the low demand by informed 
                                                 
56 Lee et al. (1996) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) argue that institutional investors can be seen as “informed” 
investors because they enjoy a high level of financial knowledge and resources. In contrast, the authors see “non-
informed” IPO investors as retail investors who have limited financial awareness and capability.  
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investors would be favoured with high uncertainty about the quality of the IPO by uninformed 
investors (Lee et al. 2003). Consequently, this translates to less demand for an IPO firm on the first 
trading day and resulting in lower underpricing. Collectively, when this IPO firm is listed in an 
IDV, FM, STO, and IDG culture, the effect of LET on UP will increase. This is because uninformed 
IPO investors in such cultures maintain cultural trust in the investment behaviour of informed 
investors. In contrast, the impact of LET in reducing IPO underpricing becomes weaker in countries 
with high levels of collectivism, masculinity, long-term orientation, and restraint. This is because 
IPO investors nested in such countries have pre-fixed perceptions about the lack of social trust, 
thereby encouraging them question the moral intentions and investment decisions of informed 
investors.  
 
Overall, the evidence this research reveals provides a satisfactory answer to the fourth research 
question of this chapter: do differences in country-level national cultures affect the relationship 
between ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing across IPO markets? This 
thesis can confidently affirm that variances in cultural values across nations indirectly influence 
the variability in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market. This is achieved through increasing 
the overall country-level ex-ante uncertainty amongst IPO parties. Consequently, an upward 
modification of the strength of the relationship between the degree of ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding the offering and underpricing across IPO markets occurs in nations characterised with 
a high level of high power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, masculinity, long-term 
orientation, and the restraint. This new empirical finding will surely enhance the understanding of 
the intersection of IPO underpricing-culture literature represented by Costa et al. (2013) and 
Chourou et al. (2018). This literature does not fully recognise variability in national cultures and 
how it indirectly impacts on IPO underpricing across countries.    
 
The results for the direct effect of national cultural proxies along with the firm-level variables in 
Panel A in Table 37 provide consistent outcomes with Table 36. Across the six models, Table 37 
confirms the previous conclusion that only PD, IDV, FM, and IDG cultural measures matter in 
explaining the variability in IPO underpricing across G20 countries. However, the analysis of the 
model fit for the six cultural dimensions reveal that power distance (Deviance 23513; Table 37; 
Model 1; R2 between countries 26%; R2 within countries 6%) makes the largest direct and indirect 
effects on IPO underpricing.  
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To give this finding a meaningful economic interpretation this research provides the following 
example. Economically, the results document that an increase in the level of power distance 
between the G20 countries by one-unit directly increases underpricing by 1.1%. Recall the scale of 
PD is a 100 point-scale and average level of PD across the sample is 53 as shown previously in 
Table 32, then an increase (decrease) in PD by 40 (17) points as for Russia57 (Australia) leads to 
increasing (reducing) IPO underpricing by 44.4% (18.87%)58 for average IPO firms listed in Russia 
(Australia). Indirectly, the interaction term PD*PMV infers that when an IPO firm is listed in a 
high power distance country, the coefficient PMV will increase by 11% (0.110; Table 37; Model 
1; p<0.10), so that it is 1.11% for every one unit increase in the level of PD across countries. In 
other words, Australian and Russian IPO firms, on average, should expect the effect of pre-IPO 
market volatility to increase their underpricing by 1.444% and 0.811%, respectively, for every unit 
increase in the standard deviation of their local stock market 15 days before listing. This differential 
effect of PMV on IPO underpricing in Russia and Australia is entirely driven by the difference in 
the level of power distance between the two nations.   
 
Individualism emerges as the second influential cultural variable (Deviance 23534; Table 37; 
Model 3; R2 between countries 15%; R2 within countries 9%) that wields significant direct and 
indirect effects on underpricing. The direct and indirect effects of femininity (Deviance 23542; 
Table 37; Model 4; R2 between countries 5%; R2 within countries 9%) and indulgence (Deviance 
23658; Table 37; Model 6; R2 between countries 5%; R2 within countries 7%) come second in 
explaining the variability in IPO underpricing in the global IPO market. Although the difference in 
UA and STO provide no direct effect on IPO underpricing difference, they contribute indirectly to 
explaining IPO underpricing as shown in Models 2 and 3 in Table 37, respectively.  
 
                                                 
57 Hofstede scores the level of PD in Russia (Australia) as having a high (low) level of power distance of 93 (36). 
Hence, Russia (Australia) is above the mean of PD by 40 (17) points. See Table 32 for descriptive statistics regarding 
all cultural measures.  
58 The author attains these figures by multiplying the value of the coefficient PD of 1.1% by the difference of PD 
measure between the mean value of PD (53) across the entire sample with the value of PD for Australia (36) and Russia 
(93).  
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4.6.3. Sensitivity Tests and Robustness Checks 
4.6.3.1. Developed and Developing Countries 
To further comprehend the effects of differences in national cultures on differences in IPO 
underpricing, this research repeats the previous tests, differentiating between developed and 
developing stock markets. Kayo and Kimura (2011) examine a subsample of developed versus 
developing countries to evaluate the direct and indirect effects of national cultures on the variability 
in firms’ leverage decisions. The authors find different behaviours for both country-level (i.e., 
national cultures) and firm-level (determinants of capital structure) factors in driving firm leverage 
choices between developed compared to developing countries. Hence, this research follows Kayo 
and Kimura (2011) to split the sample between developing and developed countries using the 
random intercept and slope coefficients in the HLM models. Tables 38 and 39 present the number 
of full HLM models including random intercept and random slope coefficients estimated for two 
subsamples including developed and developing59 countries, respectively.  
 
In this section, this research aims to observe if firm-level and country-level national cultural 
determinants of IPO underpricing are similar between the two blocks of countries. The covariates 
related to country-level differences in national culture characteristics in Panel A in Tables 38 and 
39 exhibit different outcomes. In the developed G20 countries, this research finds that the level of 
femininity is the only a direct influencer of IPO underpricing. The coefficient of FM is negative 
and significant (-0.005; Table 38; Model 4; p<0.01). The variability in PD, UA, IDV, STO, and 
IDG does not directly impact on the variability of underpricing across developed IPO markets. In 
contrast, the variability of power distance across developing G20 countries is the only prime driver 
of IPO underpricing. The coefficient of PD is positive and significant (0.033; Table 39; Model 1; 
p<0.01). In developing countries, differences in the degree of UA, IDV, FM, STO, and IDG cultural 
values have no direct link to underpricing difference.  
 
                                                 
59 Please see Table 3 for a list of countries.  
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Table 38: HLM Analyses on the Effect of Country-level Culture on IPO Underpricing of Developed G20 Countries with Random Intercept and Slope Coefficient 
Estimations   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Panel A: Direct Effect 
Culture-level variables 
PD 0.002 UA 0.001 IDV -0.002 FM -0.005*** STO -0.002 IDG -0.001 
 [0.56]  [0.85]  [-0.78]  [-3.45]  [-1.03]  [-0.22] 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.018*** PR -0.019*** PR -0.054*** PR 0.030*** PR -0.025*** PR -0.014*** 
 [-15.16]  [-15.75]  [-22.93]  [14.30]  [-15.75]  [-11.90] 
DF -0.017*** DF -0.021*** DF -0.055*** DF 0.028*** DF -0.026*** DF -0.015*** 
 [-22.05]  [-22.45]  [-25.75]  [16.37]  [-19.84]  [-19.63] 
UR -0.056*** UR -0.060*** UR -0.063*** UR -0.068*** UR -0.062*** UR -0.058*** 
 [-2.75]  [-2.96]  [-3.27]  [-2.47]  [-3.12]  [-2.95] 
PMV -0.001 PMV -0.001 PMV -0.025*** PMV 0.044*** PMV -0.024*** PMV -0.027*** 
 [-0.47]  [-0.64]  [-2.83]  [3.64]  [-2.68]  [-3.04] 
LET 0.002 LET -0.014 LET 0.009 LET -0.016 LET 0.015 LET 0.001 
 [0.14]  [-0.98]  [0.39]  [-1.21]  [0.82]  [0.01] 
LOP -0.047*** LOP -0.041*** LOP -0.045*** LOP -0.014** LOP -0.047*** LOP -0.055*** 
 [-7.79]  [-6.83]  [-7.45]  [-4.62]  [-7.90]  [-9.01] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE            YE & IE 
Panel B: Indirect Effect “Interaction Variables” 
PD*PR -0.080*** UA*PR -0.052*** IDV*PR 0.226*** FM*PR 0.532*** STO*PR 0.052*** IDG*PR -0.024*** 
 [-3.28]  [-6.03]  [19.61]  [25.53]  [7.39]  [-2.52] 
PD*DF -0.11*** UA*DF -0.064*** IDV*DF 0.222*** FM*DF 0.528*** STO*DF 0.057*** IDG*DF -0.001 
 [-5.21]  [-9.02]  [17.13]  [27.42]  [9.75]  [-0.17] 
PD*UR -0.003 UA*UR -0.001 IDV*UR -0.001 FM*UR -0.001 STO*UR 0.001 IDG*UR 0.001 
 [-1.05]  [-0.41]  [-0.01]  [-0.08]  [0.28]  [0.63] 
PD*PMV -0.810*** UA*PMV -0.347*** IDV*PM
V 
0.318*** FM*PM
V 
0.280*** STO*PMV 0.256** IDG*PMV 0.577*** 
 [-7.16]  [-8.50]  [-7.54]  [5.52]  [8.27]  [8.35] 
PD*LET 0.004** UA*LET 0.001 IDV*LET 0.002* FM*LET 0.001 STO*LET -.002** IDG*LET -0.001 
 [2.20]  [0.70]  [1.32]  [0.64]  [-2.12]  [-1.07] 
PD*LOP -0.004*** UA*LOP -0.002*** IDV*LOP 0.002*** FM*LOP 0.001*** STO*LOP 0.001*** IDG*LOP 0.03*** 
 [-5.32]  [-6.44]  [5.95]  [4.62]  [5.73]  [6.15] 
Constant 0.181***  0.182***  0.185***  0.179***  0.183***  0.181*** 
 [3.60]  [3.72]  [3.77]  [5.02]  [3.82]  [3.58] 
Observations 7,160  7,160  7,160  7,160  7,160  7,160 
R2 within countries 0.11  0.12  0.16  0.19  0.13  0.11 
R2 between countries  0.03  0.08  0.08  0.59  0.13  0.02 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 0 j  0.02444  0.02306  0.02300  0.01035  0.02195  0.02490 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, ij  0.44474  0.43856  0.42005  0.40283  0.43723  0.44343 
Deviance 14603  14501  14192  13884  14479  14582 
Note: Country-level culture, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 31 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail. 
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Table 39: HLM Analyses on the Effect of Country-level Culture on IPO Underpricing of Developing G20 Countries with Random Intercept and Slope Coefficient 
Estimations   
Model 1 Model 2             Model 3         Model 4                      Model 5                       Model 6 
Panel A: Direct Effect 
Culture-level variables 
PD 0.033*** UA 0.001 IDV -0.010 FM -0.010 STO 0.002 IDG -0.002 
 [2.47]  [0.05]  [-0.80]  [-0.62]  [0.25]  [-0.20] 
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.079*** PR -0.049*** 
*** 
PR -0.037*** PR -0.066*** 
*** 
PR 0.017 PR -0.026 *** 
 [-8.54]  [-5.70]  [-3.56]  [-6.84]  [0.48]  [-5.69] 
DF -0.080*** DF -0.048*** DF -0.046*** DF -0.065*** DF 0.012 DF -0.027*** 
 [-8.77  [-5.60]  [-4.85]  [-6.90]  [0.38]  [-5.70] 
UR 0.073** UR 0.168*** UR 0.120** UR 0.077** UR 0.273*** UR 0.243*** 
 [1.92]  [3.30]  [2.00]  [1.92]  [4.13]  [3.84] 
PMV 0.052*** PMV -0.019 PMV 0.015 PMV 0.019 PMV 0.013 PMV 0.001 
 [3.62]  [-0.81]  [0.73]  [1.05]  [0.52]  [0.17] 
LET 0.080*** LET 0.116*** LET 0.038** LET 0.068*** LET 0.113*** LET 0.110*** 
 [4.24]  [4.93]  [1.92]  [3.29]  [5.17]  [4.53] 
LOP -0.115*** LOP -0.123*** LOP -0.106*** LOP -0.110*** LOP -0.169 
*** 
LOP -0.208*** 
 [-8.44]  [-6.81]  [-6.39]  [-7.35]  [-8.79]  [-7.84] 
Dummy Effects YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE  YE & IE            YE & IE 
Panel B: Indirect Effect “Interaction Variables” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD*PR 0.306*** UA*PR 0.090*** IDV*PR 0.364*** FM*PR 0.177*** STO*PR 0.244** IDG*PR -1.080*** 
 [4.57]  [3.03]  [4.18]  [2.76]  [2.12]  [-4.54] 
PD*DF 0.369*** UA*DF 0.095*** IDV*DF 0.305*** FM*DF 0.162*** STO*DF 0.236** IDG*DF -1.070*** 
 [5.42]  [3.26]  [3.56]  [2.58]  [2.07]  [-4.49] 
PD*UR 0.003 UA*UR 0.04*** IDV*UR 0.004 FM*UR 0.001 STO*UR 0.07*** IDG*UR 0.11*** 
 [0.78]  [2.50]  [0.95]  [0.07]  [3.37]  [3.01] 
PD*PMV 0.275* UA*PMV -0.240*** IDV*PMV -0.294** FM*PM
V 
-0.443*** STO*PM
V 
-0.143** IDG*PM
V 
-0.277* 
 [1.48]  [-3.59]  [-1.97]  [-2.92]  [-1.72]  [-1.55] 
PD*LET 0.011*** UA*LET 0.003*** IDV*LET 0.001 FM*LET -0.002 STO*LE
T 
0.005*** IDG*LE
T 
0.006*** 
[5.69]  [3.63]  [0.63]  [-1.12]  [6.69]  [4.60] 
PD*LOP -0.011*** UA*LOP -0.001 IDV*LOP 0.002* FM*LOP 0.002* STO*LO
P 
-0.003*** IDG*LO
P 
-0.007*** 
 [-7.31]  [-0.58]  [1.47]  [1.63]  [-3.72]  [-4.55] 
Constant 0.474***  0.467***  0.466***  0.467***  0.468***  0.466*** 
 [3.26]  [2.52]  [2.60]  [2.57]  [2.54]  [2.52] 
Observations 2,995  2,995  2,995  2,995  2,995  2,995 
R2 within countries 0.13  0.10  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.10 
R2 between countries 0.40  0.00  0.06  0.04  0.01  0.01 
Random-Effect Parameter 
Variance Component for Level 2 Effect, 0 j  0.19779  0.32836  0.30795  0.31489  0.32577  0.32679 
Variance Component for Level 1 Effect, ij  0.84633  0.87692  0.89159  0.88515  0.87784  0.87577 
Deviance     8101  8212  8262  8240  8216  8209 
Note: Country-level culture, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 31 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T-statistics in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail.
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There are signs of different effects of firm-level variables related to the EWL theory contingent on 
the level of stock market development. This research finds a consensus across all 12 models in 
Tables 38 and 39 in relation to the relationship between incentive of IPO issuers and IPO 
underpricing in both developed and developing countries. Both PR and DF are negative and 
significant in most models. The PR and DF results for advanced and emerging economies are 
consistent with all sample results shown in previous results in Table 37. Although the findings are 
consistent with previous IPO literature including Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Chahine (2008), 
and Jones and Swaleheen (2010), they are inconsistent with Autore et al. (2014) who found PR and 
DF to be positively related to underpricing in both industrial and developing countries. The large 
difference in the data size and coverage could be related to this difference. The data on advanced 
(developing) countries comprises 7,160 (2,995) IPO firms spanning the years 1995 to 2016. In 
contrast, Autore et al.’s (2014) advanced (developing) country data includes 5,490 (1,907) IPO 
firms listed between 1998 and 2008.   
 
Yet, this research discovers a remarkable difference concerning the relationship between 
employing prestigious underwriters and IPO underpricing emerges between the two blocks of 
countries. In the developed G20 countries, underwriter reputation is negative and significant at the 
1% level to explain firm underpricing as shown in all models in Table 38. This implies that 
underwriters in advanced stock markets execute their expected role in providing a certification 
signal to quality issuers in exchange for higher underwriting fees. The UR results for developed 
countries are in harmony with the endogenous underwriter-IPO underpricing relationship found by 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Chahine (2008), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010). The authors noted 
that IPO issuers in industrial nations endogenously choose reputable underwriters when they intend 
to sell a large percentage of their secondary shares. After controlling for this endogenous effect 
using the 2SLS model as opposed to OLS estimation, the authors find the signage of UR shifts 
from being positive to negative. Failure to control for this endogeneity problem might explain why 
Autore et al. (2014) find UR positively influences IPO underpricing throughout their sample for 
developed countries.  
 
Conversely, in developing G20 countries the variable UR is significant and positively related to 
underpricing at the 5% level of significance for all models in Table 39. Remarkably, the results for 
the variable UR using the developing countries sample disagree with the negative and insignificant 
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sign for Autore et al. (2014) who also employ developing country IPO data. It is also inconsistent 
with the negative and significant coefficient obtained by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Chahine 
(2008), and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) for developed countries. This research attributes this 
contradiction to the fact that underwriters in emerging countries take advantage of IPO managers’ 
cultural acceptance that information and market power are distributed unequally. This thesis argues 
that underwriters in developing nations recognise the willingness of IPO managers to trade rational 
investment decisions with personal fulfilment so that they can have a successful IPO listing. This 
is discussed by Lucey and Zhang (2010) who argue that in developing stock markets with highly 
collectivist cultural values such as China, managers prioritise their own interests by securing 
personal success before considering informed investment decisions. Liu and Ritter (2010) confirm 
that some underwriters benefit from their market power by receiving side payments from investors. 
The authors argue that underwriters are involved in such practices by heavily discounting IPO firms 
or offering large allocations of IPO stocks. It is a practice known as “spinning”. Chen et al. (2017) 
contend that in high power distance cultures, which is probably a feature of developing stock 
markets, the acceptance of non-transparent market practices means that some IPO issuers are 
exploited by large investment banks.  
 
Variations in the expected coefficient sign and significance of ex-ante uncertainty proxies including 
PMV and LET are also reported between developed and developing countries. Table 38 shows that 
PMV provides negative and significant coefficients in four out of six models when the sample is 
restricted to developed countries. In contrast, the variable PMV is only significant and positively 
related to underpricing when the sample is confined to developing countries as shown in Model 1 
in Table 39. The relationship between the elapsed time and underpricing is also contradictory 
across developed and developing countries. The results in Table 38 show that IPO investors in 
developed countries’ stock markets place no importance on the length of time between fixing the 
offer price and the first trading day. Conversely, the results in Table 39 suggest that investors 
perceive IPO firms that take more time to be listed from the day the offer price is announced as a 
risky IPO. In turn, IPO investors demand higher underpricing to compensate for this additional ex-
ante uncertainty. The LET results and interpretation for developing countries are consistent with 
similar arguments and results documented in Mok and Hui (1998) and Chan et al. (2004). Yet, 
there is a complete agreement between developed and developing countries in relation to the 
negative and significant impact of IPO firm size on IPO underpricing. Regardless of the level of 
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stock market development, investors identify larger offerings as low risk investments. This is 
because established firms are normally large, while speculative firms with short market histories 
offer smaller IPOs. The LOP results are in line with Boulton et al. (2010) and Autore et al. (2014). 
 
The readings of the interaction variables illustrate different effects when this research compares 
developed to developing stock markets. While PD and UA seem to increase the effect of PR and 
DF in reducing IPO underpricing in developing countries, PD and UA decrease the driving effect 
of PR and DR in alleviating underpricing in developed stock markets. However, both blocks of 
countries exhibit similar behaviours in terms of the effect of IDV, FM, STO, and IDG on the 
relationship between the two proxies of the incentive of IPO issuers and IPO underpricing across 
countries. However, within the developed countries the effect of all cultural measures on the 
relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing is not significant. Nonetheless 
the interaction terms STO*UR, IDG*UR, and UA*UR are positive and significant. When this 
research analyses the effect of culture on the relationship between pre-IPO market volatility and 
underpricing, this thesis notices an inverse role for developed countries. Meanwhile in the 
developing countries the author finds a high level of individualism, femininity, short-term 
orientation, and indulgence that reduces the effect of PMV on IPO underpricing. More 
contradictory results are reported with reference to the effect of elapsed time on IPO underpricing 
across the two blocks of countries. The results are consistent with the effect of all six cultural 
proxies on the linkage between IPO offer size and IPO underpricing between developed and 
developing nations. Overall, the results related to the interaction terms across developed and 
developing stock markets are consistent with a similar observation made by Kayo and Kimura 
(2011).  
 
Across the 12 HLM models in Tables 38 and 39, the best model fit is provided in Models 4 and 1, 
respectively. The former and latter provide the largest direct and indirect effects of femininity and 
power distance on firm-level determinants of IPO underpricing in developed and developing G20 
countries, respectively. The variability of power distance in developing G20 countries explains 
40% of the underpricing variance while firm-level variables explain 13%. Remarkably, Model 4 
reveals that differences in femininity within developed countries explain 59% of underpricing 
variance while 19% of this variance is attributed to firm-level characteristics. On average, this 
research uncovers evidence showing that firm-level variables in developed nations explain from 
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11% to 19% of the underpricing variability. In contrast, only 8% to 13% of the underpricing 
variance is explained by firm-level characteristics in developing nations. This implies that 
determinants of IPO underpricing are more important to developed countries.  
 
4.6.3.2. Examining Endogeneity and Omitted Variable Bias 
To increase the confidence in the findings, this research runs a series of robustness tests, adding 
additional firm and country-level variables, and performing a number of diagnostic tests. Firstly, 
this research employs robust cluster 2SLS models with the purpose of checking if the significant 
results this research obtained in Tables 37, 38, and 39 were not undermined by the potential 
endogeneity problem between the variable UR and the error terms at level 1. IPO underpricing 
literature argues that a potential endogeneity problem may exist between the decision to employ a 
prestigious underwriter and the error term of the OLS models (Habib & Ljungqvist 2001; Jones & 
Swaleheen 2010). The argument is that disregarding this problem results in erroneous results. In 
the context of the HLM estimation, at the HLM level 1, this research uses the variable underwriter 
reputation to explain the variability of IPO underpricing across countries. However, Hofmann 
(1997) and Antonakis et al. (2014) argue that such an endogeneity problem should not have an 
effect on HLM’s level 1 model. This is because HLM estimation assumes the presence of 
correlations between level 1 observations (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). However, Essen et al. 
(2013) and Zattoni et al. (2017) state that although HLM controls for dependence in observations 
within the level 1 equation, it might not completely eliminate this endogeneity problem. The 
authors suggested using 2SLS estimation with a robust instrumental variable to check the 
consistency of the results obtained from HLM technique. This thesis follows Essen et al. (2013) 
and Zattoni et al. (2017) to employ robust 2SLS models as a sensitivity test to check if the 
relationship between differences in national cultures and IPO underpricing difference will be 
consistent with the HLM results. This research imitates a similar testing environment to HLM 
estimation that accounts for potential correlations in error terms while guarding against 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. This is done by employing 2SLS estimation with robust 
standard errors clustered by countries following Zattoni et al. (2017).     
 
Secondly, this research includes a number of additional firm-level and country-level variables 
known to affect IPO underpricing in order to diminish the risk that the findings in Tables 37, 38 
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and 39 are an artefact of omitted variable bias. Additional firm-level factors include book-building, 
technology firms, private firms, integer offer price, underwriter fees, the 1997-98 Asian Financial 
Crisis and Global Financial Crisis that erupted in 2008. This research also includes three country-
level measures to capture difference across nations in relation to the development of financial 
markets. It is measured by the enforcement of regulations concerning securities exchanges, while 
market sophistication is measured by financing through local equity markets, and market size is 
measured by the size of domestic markets.  
 
Thirdly, this research follows Zattoni et al. (2017) to guard the results against potential impact of 
outliers. This is because in Table 4 the largest recorded underpricing of 1680% in the G20 countries 
is observed in developing G20 countries while the highest underpricing recorded in developed G20 
countries was equal to 1350%. Throughout the entire sample of 10,217 IPOs this research includes 
in Table 4, the mean IPO underpricing is 38% of which the mean of underpricing for developed 
and developing countries’ IPOs is 32% and 51%, respectively. Hence, the presence of extreme 
underpricing observations is evident in the data, potentially leading to the misleading conclusion 
based on the econometric models this research employs. The author implements an outlier detection 
procedure suggested by Rousseeuw and Leroy (2005) to exclude those extreme underpricing values 
exceeding an underpricing value of 150%. After applying this outlier procedure, this research 
excluded 573, 388, and 185 observations from sample related to all countries, developed, and 
developing countries, respectively. 
 
Fourthly, this research performs a number of diagnostic tests in order to confirm the reliability of 
the model estimation. Apart from employing robust standard errors estimation to account for 
potential heteroscedasticity, this thesis conducts endogeneity and weak instrument tests. This 
research follows Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) to use Housman’s (1978) endogeneity test to 
examine the null hypothesis that the identified regressor (i.e., underwriter reputation) indeed is an 
exogenous variable. In order to obtain a reliable endogeneity test result, this research needs to 
employ a robust instrumental variable that has no significant correlation with the error term while 
it has a good correlation with the endogenous variable (Jakob & Nam 2017). Staiger and Stock 
(1997), Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016), and Jakob and Nam (2017) warn that using a weak 
instrument can lead to far-reaching biased results. This research observes that there is no consensus 
in the IPO underpricing literature what the ideal instrument to employ is. For example, while Habib 
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and Ljungqvist (2001) and Alavi et al. (2008) employ earnings per share and return on assets, 
Chahine (2008) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010) use gross proceeds and number of IPO firms, 
respectively. The author of this thesis fails to find sufficient data related to earnings per share and 
return on assets for the global data while gross proceeds and number of IPO firms tested out to 
weak instruments.  
 
Alternatively, this research employs two instrumental variables defined as the ratio equalling to the 
average and median amount of proceeds of all underwritten IPOs for every underwriter for every 
country, divided by the average and median number of underwritten IPOs in that country. This 
research employs these two instruments because reputable underwriters tend to underwrite the large 
number of IPOs and control a large stake of the IPO market. The author expects these two 
instruments to be well correlated with the endogenous variable, UR, while it is likely to have a low 
correlation with the error terms of the model. To guard against employing a weak instrument that 
can cause erroneous conclusions60, this research follows Boulton et al. (2017) and Jakob and Nam 
(2017) to use the Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test. This test examines the null hypothesis 
that the employed instrument is weak.  
 
Table 40 presents eight models that incorporate the above-mentioned robust additions. In Models 
1 to 4, this research retests to observe if the PD, IDV, FM, and IDG results reported in Table 37 
remain significant after the further robustness testing this research included in Table 40. In Models 
1, 2, 3, and 4 in Table 40, this research obtains satisfactory outputs confirming that the significant 
association between the level of PD, IDV, FM, and IDG and underpricing difference across G20 
countries. This research also finds consistent findings for the effect of feminism on underpricing 
difference within developed G20 countries, thus supporting previous the HLM finding (-0.005; 
Table 38; Model 4; p<0.01). This author reconfirms the negative and significant (-0.004; Table 40; 
Model 5; p<0.01) relationship of FM on the variability of IPO underpricing across developed 
countries using 2SLS estimation. 
                                                 
60 Staiger and Stock (1997) and Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) argue that using a weak instrument leads to 
misleading 2SLS results compared to the OLS estimator and results are likely to suffer from large size distortions. 
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Table 40: Endogeneity and Omitted Variable Bias 
 
Model 1 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 2 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 3 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 4 
All  
Sample 
2SLS 
Model 5 
Developed  
Countries 
2SLS 
Model 6 
Developing 
Countries 
2SLS 
Model 7 
Developing 
Countries 
2SLS 
Model 8 
Developing 
Countries 
OLS 
Culture-level variables 
PD  0.004***     0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 
 [2.81]     [1.35] [1.48] [1.45] 
IDV   -0.003***       
  [-8.39]       
FM   -0.003***  -0.004***    
   [-2.50]  [-4.13]    
IDG    -0.004***     
    [-4.19]     
Firm-level variables 
PR -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.090*** -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
 [-5.53] [-5.10] [-5.84] [-5.89] [-5.15] [-1.11] [-0.89] [-0.90] 
DF -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.020 -0.018 -0.019 
 [-6.72] [-6.75] [-6.40] [-7.07] [-6.07] [-1.24] [-1.02] [-1.01] 
UR -0.025 -0.034 -0.048 -0.034 -0.047* 0.014 0.120* 0.044*** 
 [-0.53] [-0.75] [-1.07] [-0.73] [-1.30] [0.04] [1.50] [3.97] 
PMV 0.020 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.013 0.018* 0.0178** 0.0184** 
 [0.16] [-0.13] [0.42] [0.055] [-0.69] [1.49] [1.65] [1.64] 
LET -0.023*** -0.020** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.018* 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 [-2.39] [-2.23] [-2.46] [-2.52] [-1.32] [0.78] [0.97] [0.82] 
LOP -0.021** -0.018** -0.019** -0.017** -0.023** -0.027 -0.034*** -0.029* 
 [-2.11] [-1.94] [-2.10] [-1.76] [-2.05] [-0.87] [-2.62] [-1.50] 
Additional firm-level variables 
BBM -0.001 0.005 -0.018 -0.014 -0.009 0.055*** 0.055** 0.055** 
 [-0.51] [0.36] [-0.84] [-0.69] [-1.16] [2.44] [2.26] [2.25] 
TF 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 [3.02] [2.75] [3.19] [2.73] [2.84] [2.69] [2.82] [2.47] 
PF 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.001 0.010 0.010 0.010 
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 [0.30] [0.22] [0.11] [0.16] [-0.049] [0.65] [0.61] [0.58] 
IOP 0.019 -0.001 0.033 0.011 0.063*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14*** 
 [0.40] [-0.031] [0.74] [0.24] [3.67] [-2.97] [-4.35] [-4.22] 
UF 0.005 0.016 -0.014 0.007 -0.087*** -0.038 -0.001 -0.027 
 [0.46] [1.18] [-1.11] [0.64] [-2.69] [-0.28] [-0.012] [-0.46] 
AFC 1997 -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.035 -0.045 -0.038 
 [-2.60] [-2.70] [-2.41] [-2.60] [-4.27] [-0.63] [-1.14] [-0.97] 
GFC 2008 -0.043 -0.049 -0.001 -0.040 -0.009 0.055*** 0.055** 0.055** 
 [-1.03] [-1.14] [-0.014] [-0.91] [-1.16] [2.44] [2.26] [2.25] 
Additional country-level variables 
RSX -0.017 0.0041 -0.093*** -0.017 -0.047** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 [-0.53] [0.26] [-3.55] [-0.74] [-1.88] [-5.73] [-5.67] [-5.51] 
FMS -0.023 0.003 -0.048** -0.015 0.057*** -0.072 -0.067 -0.071 
 [-1.04] [0.16] [-1.92] [-0.71] [4.46] [-1.04] [-1.17] [-1.12] 
MS 0.170*** 0.200*** 0.160*** 0.180*** 0.160*** 0.023 0.032 0.026 
 [6.16] [7.98] [3.92] [7.80] [2.92] [0.21] [0.37] [0.27] 
Dummy Effects 
YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE YE & IE & CE 
YE & IE & 
CE 
YE & IE & 
CE 
YE & IE & 
CE 
Constant 0.480*** 0.780*** 0.830*** 0.820*** 0.690*** 0.930 1.05** 0.960** 
 [2.62] [4.99] [4.98] [4.76] [4.27] [1.15] [2.28] [1.80] 
Observations 9,644 9,644 9,644 9,644 6,804 2,840 2,840 2,840 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.13 
P-value of F-statistic  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number of Clusters 22 22 22 22 12 10 10 10 
Diagnostics 
P-value of Housman Endogeneity Test 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.92 0.17 N/A 
P-value of Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument 
Test 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.01 N/A 
Mean Value of Variance Inflation Factor  1.74 1.75 1.68 1.72 1.90 2.96 2.96 2.96 
Note: Country-level culture, firm-level, and additional control variables are as defined before in Table 31 and Table 3, respectively. UP is the dependent variable. Robust T and Z-statistics in brackets are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity donate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for one-tail. 
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This thesis further obtains supporting results documenting the effect of power distance in 
influencing variations in IPO underpricing within developing G20 countries, which confirms prior 
HLM results (0.033; Table 39; Model 1; p<0.01). This is because Models 6, 7, and 8 in Table 40 
all document that the higher the level of power distance across developing nations, this increases 
the underpricing difference by 0.007 at the 10% level of significance.  
 
Firm-level variables related to the EWL theory reported in Table 40 provide overall consistent 
outcomes to the previous findings. For all G20 countries, the theory again partially explains 
underpricing difference as only two dimensions of it including the incentive of IPO issuers and ex-
ante uncertainty are found to have a significant association with underpricing. Although the 
endogenous relationship between prestigious underwriters and underpricing is confirmed, the third 
dimension, UR, has no significant effect on underpricing in the global IPO market.  
 
Interestingly, this research also uncovers overall consistent evidence using HLM (Table 38; Model 
4) and 2SLS (Table 40; Model 5) estimations. They provide strong support for the three dimensions 
of the EWL theory in explaining underpricing difference within developed stock markets. In 
contrast, when using the developing countries sample, this research finds consistently weak support 
for the EWL model using HLM (Table 39; Model 1) and 2SLS (Table 40; Model 8) estimations. 
Kayo and Kimura (2011) also uncover similar evidence arguing that theories designed to explain 
corporate finance behaviours in developed countries are not always applicable to developing 
countries. 
 
Additional firm-level covariates provide overall consistent results with previous literature. For 
example, consistent with Engelen and van Essen (2010), the results in Models 1 to 4 in Table 40 
document a negative and insignificant association between book-building pricing method and 
underpricing across countries. Similar to Autore et al. (2014), this thesis obtains a negative and 
insignificant result using developed IPO data as shown in Model 5 in Table 40. However, when 
using developing IPO data as shown in Models 6 to 7 in Table 40, this research documents a 
positive and significant BBM coefficient showing that the use of book-building pricing method 
increases IPO underpricing in developing countries by 5.5%. This evidence is consistent with 
Boulton et al. (2010) and Chang et al. (2017). Ljungqvist et al. (2003) attribute the positive effect 
of BBM on IPO underpricing to the profit-sharing view. This view implies that underwriters in 
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developing G20 countries allocate hot IPO shares to institutional investors in exchange for higher 
commission business. Consequently, underwriters in developing countries are tempted to offer IPO 
firms at a considerable discount to investors benefiting themselves and their buy-side investors at 
the expense of IPO issuers. Overall, additional firm and country-level variables this research 
includes in Table 40 are in line with prior literature. 
 
The author now assesses if HLM estimation really captures the endogenous relationship between 
the decision to employ reputable underwriters and IPO underpricing within all G20 countries, 
developed, and developing G20 countries. Recall in Table 37 this research finds a negative but 
insignificant relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing across all samples when 
this research controlled for Hofstede’s cultural dimensions using HLM estimation. Could the 
significant culture-based results have been distorted by not accounting for this endogeneity 
problem? The results in Table 40 using the entire sample in Models 1 to 4 confirm the previous 
findings reported in Table 37 about the negative but insignificant effect of the coefficient UR. This 
means that the PD, IDV, FM, and IDG results reported in Table 37 are not affected by this 
endogeneity problem. Outputs from the endogeneity, weak instrument, and VIF tests confirm that 
the findings are robust. This research confirms the endogenous relationship between the decision 
to employ prestigious underwriter and IPO underpricing using both HLM and 2SLS estimations. 
 
Conversely, recall that after this research splits the sample into two blocks of countries in Tables 
38 and 39, this thesis finds consistently significant evidence showing that UR negatively and 
positively affects IPO underpricing in developed and developing G20 countries, respectively. This 
research reconfirms that the negative and significant UR result obtained for developed countries 
using HLM estimation (-0.068; Table 38; Model 4; p<0.01) is also consistent with the 2SLS 
estimation (-0.047; Table 40 Model 5; p<0.10). Interestingly, recall that the previous HLM result 
revealed that hiring reputable underwriters leads to higher underpricing within emerging G20 
economies (0.073; Table 39; Model 1; p<0.05). This finding made the author worries about the 
sensitivity aspects for the positive and significant association between PD and IPO underpricing 
within developing countries using HLM estimation (0.033; Table 39; Model 1; p<0.01). The robust 
clustered 2SLS result reported in Model 6 in Table 40 documents a positive but insignificant UR 
coefficient in contrast to the previous HLM model.  
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This research attributes this result to the failure to reject the null hypothesis that the UR variable is 
exogenous in Model 6 in Table 40 due to the employment of weak instrument when using the 
developing countries sample. Note that for the entire sample and developing G20 countries sample, 
this research uses the ratio equal to the average amount of proceeds of all underwritten IPOs for 
every underwriter for every country, divided by the average number of underwritten IPOs in that 
country as the instrumental variable. The outputs of the Cragg and Donald Weak Instrument Test 
for Models 1 to 6 reject the null hypothesis that this instrument is weak at the 1% level of 
significance. 
   
However, when this research used this instrument for developing the G20 countries sample, this 
research failed to reject the null hypothesis of using a weak instrument as shown in Model 6 in 
Table 40. This research employs in Model 7 a ratio equalling to the median amount of proceeds of 
all underwritten IPOs for every underwriter for every country, divided by the median number of 
underwritten IPOs in that country as the instrumental variable instead. This research now finds a 
positive and weakly significant UR result (0.120; Table 40; Model 7; p<0.10) but the endogeneity 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the UR is exogenous. This means that UR is not an 
endogenous factor at all in emerging equity markets. To overcome this erroneous problem, this 
research treats the variable UR as an exogenous factor, as it should be, using OLS estimation in 
Model 8. The author now documents a positive and strongly significant UR coefficient (0.044; 
Table 40; Model 8; p<0.01) similar to the significant UR result reported using HLM specification 
(0.073; Table 39; Model 1; p<0.05). This reconfirms that the results remain statistically robust even 
after controlling for the additional econometric estimation and accounting for the added firm- and 
country-level variables that guarded the conclusion from potential omitted variable bias. 
 
4.7. Conclusion  
In this chapter, the author documents supporting evidence showing the significant role of culture 
in influencing the global underpricing difference in the IPO market, even in largely globalised 
equity markets. The objectives of this chapter are as follows. The first is to assess the relative 
significance of the levels of firm and country on the variance of IPO underpricing. The second 
examines the direct influence of the characteristics of national cultures on inducing the variability 
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in IPO underpricing across countries. Meanwhile the third objective investigates the indirect effect 
of national cultures’ characteristics in modifying the relationship between firm-level variables and 
IPO underpricing across nations. This research captures the hierarchical associations between these 
two levels by employing a hierarchical linear modelling. This is conducted by utilising a global 
dataset that comprises 10,217 IPO-issuing firms from January 1995 until December 2016 in 22 
countries with varying cultural traits.  
 
Not unexpectedly, this research discovers that firm-level determinants of IPO underpricing are the 
most relevant when it comes to explaining the variations in underpricing across all G20, developed, 
and developing G20 countries’ stock markets. This is because it emerged that 88%, 95%, and 75% 
of dissimilarities in IPO underpricing across countries are related to firm-level characteristics 
within G20 countries, developed and developing, respectively. Somewhat unexpectedly, 22%, 5%, 
and 25% of the deviations in IPO underpricing across countries are mainly driven by the variability 
in country-level characteristics between all G20, developed, and developing countries, 
respectively. One may perceive this finding militates against the importance of country-level 
characteristics as a determining factor of IPO underpricing for being unworthy of further analysis. 
However, this is not quite the case: once this research incorporates country-level culture covariates 
along with firm-level determinants of IPO underpricing, substantial shifting roles of all those 
factors emerge. 
 
Across all G20 countries, this research finds that variations in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
explain up to 32% while firm-level factors only explain up to 9% of the variability in IPO 
underpricing. Further in-depth analysis of the split sample showed that the differences in national 
cultural values within developing and developing countries explain up to 40% and 59% of 
underpricing variance, respectively. Firm-level covariates for these two blocks of countries only 
reveal up to 19% of underpricing variance. Therefore, the author has confidence that the findings 
will enhance the reliability of the IPO underpricing-culture literature.  
 
This author of this thesis identifies certain psychological and economic channels in which national 
culture influences the phenomenon of underpricing difference in the global IPO market. 
Furthermore, this empirical work provides a novel illustration of how informal institutions such as 
culture could influence the balance of information symmetry between the key players in the IPO 
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market including issuers, underwriter, and investors. This research also captures and quantify both 
the direct and indirect effects of culture in explaining the money left on the table by IPO issuers 
across countries.   
 
This research gathered important empirical evidence which allowed the auhtor to positively answer 
the first proposed research question: do differences in country-level national cultures explain IPO 
underpricing difference across IPO markets? Contrary to the mutual awareness of scholars who 
write on IPO underpricing-culture, for example Costa et al. (2013) and Chourou et al. (2018), not 
all cultural dimensions directly matter to the IPO market. This research benefited from the vigorous 
HLM technique to account for the hierarchical nature of IPO data. This enabled the author to affirm 
that only dissimilarities in the level of power distance, individualism, femininity, and indulgence 
across nations significantly and directly matter in shaping the variability in IPO underpricing 
internationally. The findings, for example, suggest that, psychologically, IPO managers in 
masculine societies are frequently zealous about securing a successful IPO listing at any cost. 
Therefore, the results suggest that managers of IPO firms accept excessive underpricing or are even 
involved in disclosing unjustifiably optimistic information. It helps to safeguard a successful listing 
so that their individual interests are maintained. This psychological zeal is also frequently 
channelled into IPO investors whose ex-ante uncertainty reaches an intolerable level. In turn, this 
research documents higher underpricing is a consequent outcome and form of compensation for 
increasing ex-ante uncertainty for IPO investors in such cultures.  
 
The findings, for instance, also show that when an IPO firm is nested within a culture that 
deprioritises leisure over hard work, underpricing increases when the level of restraint rises. The 
rationale is that investors grow up with restraint cultural values and maintain a particular 
investment predisposition that accords with the level of underpricing. This investment tendency 
means that they are not keen to flip their IPO shares on the first trading day for the aim of an 
immediate profit. These IPO investors place a low value on indulgently economic matters. In the 
secondary market, this economic predisposition of IPO investors who subscribe to the IPO offering 
in such restraint societies is channelled to other investors. This motivates post-IPO investors to 
demonstrate greater demand for newly listed IPO shares in stock markets characterised with a high 
level of restraint. Subsequently, the lack of flipping inclination exhibited by IPO investors in the 
primary market creates a shortage of IPO shares on the secondary market, which in turn increases 
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prices. The consequence is higher initial returns for IPO shares on the first trading day in countries 
with a restraint culture.  
 
Moreover, this research finds new evidence that culture indirectly impacts on IPO underpricing in 
three varied ways: first, through influencing the relationship between the incentive of IPO issuers 
and underpricing by up 33%; second, through modifying the association between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing by up to 10%; and third, through affecting the link between ex-ante 
uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing by up to 30%. The evidence this research 
discovers answered the second research question showing that culture influences the association 
between the incentive of IPO issuers and IPO underpricing. The findings suggest that owners of 
IPO firms nested within high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, low individualism, low 
femininity, low short-term orientation, and low indulgence societies sustain mutual psychological 
perceptions about the overall information environment in their stock markets. These IPO issuers 
have a predisposition to tolerate cultural norms that stimulate the acceptance of unfair market 
practices, unequal distribution of market information, and underwriters’ exploitation. Accordingly, 
the author finds that issuers who are nested within such cultures demonstrate not much preference 
for selling and creating more secondary and primary shares when they go public. This attitude leads 
to less wealth being lost because they anticipate they will be deliberately exploited by underwriters 
and institutional investors. These parties want to underprice their firms for their own personal 
benefit.  
 
The findings also provide a confirmatory answer to the third research question related to the 
indirect effect of national cultures on the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing. The results suggest that IPO investors in low individualist and high power distance 
nations recognise the certification role prestigious underwriters provide in alleviating their ex-ante 
uncertainty. Consecutively, they demand higher underpricing for IPOs underwritten by non-
reputable underwriters. Nonetheless, those investors in countries characterised with a high level of 
collectivism and power distance maintain a pre-established consciousness that IPO issuers do not 
follow firm standards connected with the trustworthiness of accounting information of IPO 
prospectuses that are primarily orchestrated by IPO issuers. The results suggest that this occurs due 
to the existence of a low level of social trust between IPO issuers and investors in cultures that 
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indirectly increase the importance of prestigious underwriters’ certification role for the benefit of 
IPO investors.  
 
The findings also contribute affirmatively to answering the fourth research question of this chapter: 
do differences in country-level national cultures affect the relationship between ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding the offering and underpricing across IPO markets? The results, for instance, suggest 
that in nations with a high level of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, 
masculinity, long-term orientation, and the restraint values, IPO investors suffer from inadequate 
distribution of stock market information. In such cultures, this stock market environment increases 
the level of ex-ante uncertainty amongst IPO parties, thus making IPO investors more sensitive to 
pre-IPO stock market volatility. Therefore, the results show that in such cultures the relationship 
between the degree of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering and underpricing across IPO 
markets significantly increases.  
 
After extending the EWL theory by accounting for country-level national cultural and firm-level 
characteristics, the findings show that the theory partially elucidates underpricing difference across 
countries. This is because only two dimensions are found to have a significant association with 
underpricing, these being the incentive of IPO issuers and ex-ante uncertainty. Although the 
endogenous association between reputable underwriters and underpricing is empirically confirmed, 
the third dimension, UR, turns out to be insignificant in the global IPO market. Remarkably, this 
research uncovers strong support for the three dimensions of EWL theory in explaining variability 
in underpricing within developed stock markets. In contrast, when utilising the emerging countries 
sample, the findings document weak support for the EWL model. This finding reinforces the 
contention that underwriters in developing countries exploit IPO managers’ cultural tolerance for 
unfairly disseminated information and market power. Consequently, underwriters in developing 
economies clearly understand the preparedness of IPO managers to trade rational investment 
decisions with personal self-actualisation to attain a successful IPO listing. The consequence of 
this cultural trait is that IPO issuers in developing nations pay higher underwriting fees, withstand 
expensive book-building pricing methods, and hire reputable underwriters who offer them high 
underpricing in return. This evidence encouraged this thesis to suggest the presence of spinning 
practice in the IPO market in emerging G20 economies. The confidence in the findings remained 
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qualitatively vigorous after employing alternative specifications and performing a variety of 
robustness tests.  
 
The finance and accounting community is likely to benefit from the findings. This is because 
economic and finance theories advocate corporate and investment decisions be determined by 
profit maximisation and rational investment decisions. In reality, the empirical work demonstrates 
that national cultural norms influence the way IPO parties around the globe make decisions. 
Consequently, such decisions are likely to exhibit a systematic and geographical departure from 
optimal practice in foreseeable ways. This indeed explains a large part of the ongoing existence of 
IPO underpricing differences in the global IPO market. Finally, the findings support a growing 
consciousness between finance and accounting researchers that even in progressively globalised 
equity markets with sophisticated market players, intangible characteristics such as national culture 
matter directly and indirectly in determining the variability that occurs in IPO underpricing. 
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 Conclusion 
5.1.   Recapitulation 
Remarkably, the initial public offerings are considered to be an example of exceptional corporate 
events that have in recent times captured the attention of researchers, the business world, media, 
and general public. This is because of the large and sporadic but nonetheless extraordinary first-
day instantaneous returns “underpricing” achieved by stock prices of newly listed firms. The 
money left on the table accounts for the losses of billions of US$ from IPO issuers’ wealth which 
in turn offers a lucrative investment opportunity to IPO investors across the global IPO markets. 
The phenomenon of IPO underpricing is reported virtually in every stock market worldwide. The 
continued existence of this stock market phenomenon makes it difficult to comprehend why 
entrepreneur founders want to sell all their own stock to initial IPO investors at a great discount, 
creating a substantial cost for the wider public community. In reality, what makes it even more 
mystifying is the existence of considerable heterogeneity in underpricing between countries. For 
example, in an annually updated global underpricing statistics report reported in January 9, 2018 
(Loughran et al. 1994), the authors document average underpricing ranging from 3.3% to 270.1% 
across 54 economies over the last three decades. Yet, some critical questions arise: how can this 
underpricing variance across nations be elucidated? What are the roles of the characteristics of 
firms and countries that contribute to this wide dispersion in IPO underpricing in the global IPO 
market? 
 
The mutual reasoning is that purchasing stocks in a recently listed firm that lacks sufficient 
historical market evaluation and records makes participants in the IPO market uncertain about the 
expected investment risk and return (Gupta et al. 2018). This causes IPO firms to agonise over a 
stock market syndrome known as “liability of newness” which influences the equilibrium of 
information asymmetry between IPO parties. Consequently, underpricing is seen as a reasonable 
remedy paid by issuers to compensate for such liability of newness (Zattoni et al. 2017). However, 
what makes it challenging to comprehend this underpricing mystery is the fact that IPO parties 
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have to get past two problematical categories of information asymmetry in cross-country settings. 
These are: firstly, internal type of asymmetric information associated with the characteristics of 
firms; and secondly, an external type related to the asymmetric information environment of formal 
and informal institutional characteristics of countries. At the firm-level, Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) contend that the problematic information asymmetry issue that causes underpricing in the 
primary market is generated by the manifestation of an ex-ante uncertainty problem between IPO 
parties; this can be endogenously influenced by IPO issuers. The authors show that by adjusting 
firm-level characteristics can be mitigated. This can happen when, for example, hiring a reputable 
instead of a non-reputable underwriter who endorses the quality of IPO companies particularly 
when ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO firms is high and issuers decide to sell a larger stake 
of their holdings.  
 
At the country-level, the effect of firms’ characteristics on the extent of IPO underpricing may 
differ based on the predominating level of information asymmetry in the country. In this context, 
IPO underpricing literature affirms that underpricing can be moderated or extremely compromised 
by the prevalent formal (i.e., legal, governance, and transparency structures) and informal (i.e., 
cultural values) institutional environments across economies (Banerjee et al. 2011; Judge et al. 
2014; Chourou et al. 2018; Gupta et al. 2018). For example, these scholars contend that an 
asymmetric information atmosphere affecting the ex-ante uncertainty of IPO parties may develop 
in some legal and cultural environments more naturally than in others. Consequently, the existence 
of variations in the quality of both formal and informal institutions across stock markets can 
seriously impact on the perceived level of information asymmetry in the IPO market. This 
behaviour in turn influences the observed level of IPO underpricing worldwide (Engelen & van 
Essen 2010). This thesis - based on a theoretical and empirical foundation – aims to solve part of 
the IPO underpricing difference riddle across nations over three independently interlinked essays.  
 
 In the first essay (Chapter Two), this thesis syndicated two broadly disconnected schools of 
thought. The first school of thought provided fragmented findings about the endogenous 
underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship. Conversely, the second literature concentrated 
on perceiving the presence of one- and two-way clustering in error terms amongst IPO observations 
without appropriate econometric rectification. Piecing together those two schools of thought 
permitted this thesis to examine imperative issues that could explain aspects of underpricing 
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difference across IPO markets. Therefore, this research provided the first empirical evidence for 
the simultaneous influence of one-way and two-way clustering on the endogenous underwriter-
underpricing relationship in an international setting. More specifically, this research firstly tested 
if the observed difference in IPO underpricing across countries is attributed to the failure to account 
for the endogenous influence of prestigious underwriters on underpricing. Secondly, this research 
examined if this underpricing variance is connected to ignoring the influence of one- and two-way 
clustering in error terms within years, industries, countries, and developed versus developing 
countries. Thirdly, this research investigated if underpricing dispersion in the global IPO market is 
attributed to the simultaneous effect of endogeneity and clustering. 
 
In the second essay (Chapter Three), this thesis consolidated two contradictory strands of law and 
IPO underpricing literature. While the first strand attained conflicting conclusions about the 
transparency-IPO underpricing relationship, the second strand concentrated on the time-invariant 
nature of country-level formal institutional quality with reference to underpricing difference across 
equity markets employing imperfect HLM estimation. This research combined those two schools 
of thought by examining the direct and indirect influences of country-level transparency in 
explaining underpricing variance across economies. In pursing this endeavour, Chapter Three 
captured three aspects. Firstly, it calculated the relative significance of the characteristics firms and 
countries on the variance of IPO underpricing. Secondly, it examined the direct effect of time-
variant differences in country-level transparency on underpricing variance. Thirdly, it tested the 
indirect effect of inter-temporal variations in country-level transparency on influencing the link 
between firm-level covariates and IPO underpricing across equity markets.  
 
In the third essay (Chapter Four), this research capitalised on the lack of awareness of the 
hierarchical structure of the IPO data and the indirect effect of national cultures on IPO 
underpricing in the underdeveloped IPO underpricing-culture literature. Hence, Chapter Four 
offered the first empirically comprehensive investigation of the direct and indirect effects of 
national culture values on IPO underpricing across stock markets. This is undertaken by accounting 
for the nesting structure of the IPO data using HLM estimation. Three objectives were attained in 
this chapter. The first objective assessed the relative importance of the levels of firm and country 
on the variance of IPO underpricing. The second tested the direct effect of differences in national 
cultures on the variability in IPO underpricing from country to country. Meanwhile the third 
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objective examined the indirect influence of national culture characteristics in modifying the 
linkage between firm-level factors and IPO underpricing across stock markets.  
 
Over the three essays, this research employed a large sample of 10,217 IPO-issuing firms from 
January 1995 until December 2016 in 22 developed and developing countries with varying levels 
of transparency and cultural traditions. To test this more deeply, the dataset was later divided into 
three groups containing all G20 (22 countries), developed (12 countries), and developing (10 
countries) economies. The three dimensions of the EWL theory were tested and extended to 
account for differences in the quality of formal and informal institutions across these 22 economies. 
The dimensions of the EWL theory contained the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion costs, and 
ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the offering. This theory was selected in the present study because 
it is built on asymmetric information reasoning while capturing the endogenous underwriter 
reputation-IPO underpricing relationship. To achieve the goals of the first essay (Chapter Two), 
this research employed 48 OLS, 2SLS, one-way clustered 2SLS, and two-way clustered 2SLS 
models. To attain the objectives of the second essay (Chapter Three), 34 hierarchical linear 
modelling models were deployed using two levels of data. Firm-level determinants related to the 
EWL theory were the lower level and country-level transparency characteristics were the higher 
level. Time-variant differences in country-level transparency were captured using the level of voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. The aims of the third essay (Chapter Four) were accomplished using 34 HLM models 
over two-level of data. In the upper level this research captured differences in national culture using 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, namely, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, 
femininity, short-term orientation, and the indulgence characteristics of societies. In the lower level 
this research employed the three dimensions of the EWL model.    
 
The findings of the first essay (Chapter Two) attributed underpricing variance in the global IPO 
market to differences in the level of the incentive of IPO issuers, promotion cost, and ex-ante 
uncertainty across the G20 economies. More specifically, this research found that underpricing 
decreased by 1.4% when the incentive of IPO issuers increased by 1%. Yet, this research found 
that owners of IPO firms who endogenously select to employ high-status underwriters do well by 
reducing their underpricing by 12%. This thesis attained evidence showing that when the pre-IPO 
stock market volatility increased by 1% IPO firms underpriced by 5%. The study also revealed that 
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underpricing decreased by 3.3% when the length of elapsed time between setting the offer price 
and first trading day increased by one unit. This research also found that underpricing decreased 
by 2.2% when the size of the IPO company increased by one unit. The results confirmed that 
underpricing difference across countries was linked to the gap in information asymmetry between 
developing and developed equity markets. This research found that when IPO companies were 
listed in an emerging G20 economy this added more uncertainty to the IPO firm due to the presence 
of a higher asymmetric information problem within emerging compared to advanced economies. 
Consequently, the author discovered that IPO issuers in developing nations should bear a higher 
underpricing up to 19% compared to their counterparts in advanced equity markets. This will help 
to compensate for the gap in information asymmetry. 
 
When the author used a developed G20 data sample, the findings attributed dissimilarities in IPO 
underpricing to the three dimensions of the EWL model as well. The results documented a 
reduction in underpricing by up to 1.1% when the incentive of IPO owners increased by 1%. The 
findings showed that when issuers endogenously select prestigious underwriters they succeeded in 
reducing their underpricing by 4.2% in advanced stock markets. This research found that when the 
level of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO firm increased by one unit the money left on the 
table by IPO firms increased by up to 2.5% in developed IPO markets. Yet, in emerging G20 
economies the findings indicated that the EWL theory does not explain much of the underpricing 
difference. This was because this research found that the endogenous underwriting-underpricing 
relationship does not exist in emerging IPO markets. Alternatively, this research attained evidence 
attributing underpricing differences to the spinning behaviour in developing equity markets. 
Specifically, the evidence this research uncovered shows that reputable underwriters in emerging 
stock markets charged issuers with large underwriting fees who in turn leave a large amount of 
money on the table for investors to reap at the expense of issuers. Remarkably, this research found 
that entrepreneur founders in such emergent economies seemed not to be troubled by this spinning 
behaviour. This is because issuers simply appeared to care more about attaining a successful listing 
and not being too bothered about their wealth losses. The attribution of this to issuers’ behaviour 
in developing stock markets was related to the fact they sell 1% and create 10% less secondary and 
primary shares when they go public compared to their counterparts in advanced economies, 
respectively. A variety of robustness checks confirmed the findings were not an artefact of omitted 
294 
 
variable bias, shared correlations in error terms between industrial and emerging equity markets, 
and presence of outliers. 
 
The findings of the second essay (Chapter Three) attributed 88%, 95%, and 75% of underpricing 
variance across, within advanced, and within emerging, G20 countries to intrinsic characteristics 
of firms, respectively. The results of this chapter overturned the misperception in the legal and IPO 
underpricing literature, in that it affirmed the existence of a significant and negative transparency-
underpricing relationship across countries. The findings showed that differences in the 
characteristics of proxies for formal institutional quality directly elucidated up to 34% of in IPO 
underpricing differences between G20 economies. The characteristics of firms were found to 
explain only 8% of the underpricing difference within the G20 countries. Remarkably, the findings 
provided the first empirical evidence supporting that time-variant differences in country-level 
transparency indirectly impact on underpricing in three ways: first, improving the relationship 
between underpricing and the incentive of IPO issuers by up 1.4%; second, minimising the 
association between high-status underwriters and underpricing by up to 12%; and third, 
diminishing the relationship between underpricing and ex-ante uncertainty by up to 5% for every 
unit increase in the transparency measures. The evidence this research uncovered in this chapter 
also documented that characteristics of firms in emerging economies only explained up to 8% of 
the underpricing variance. Conversely, the results documented that up to 28% the underpricing 
variance is explained by the characteristics of formal institutional quality in developing countries. 
No significant impact of transparency on IPO underpricing difference found in industrial 
economies. The implications of these findings showed, in emerging G20 economies, the 
characteristics of country-level transparency are more important to the IPO market. The inference 
was that developing stock markets have not reached a mature level of transparency compared to 
advanced economies’ stock markets. Hence, improvements in the formal institutional quality are 
treated favourably by market participants in alleviating the problem of information asymmetry in 
emerging nations.   
 
The findings demonstrated that, when time-variant changes in country-level transparency were 
captured, the EWL theory partially explained IPO underpricing difference between all G20 
countries, within developed, and developing G20 economies. While the results affirmed the 
endogenous underwriters-underpricing relationship between all G20 countries and developed G20 
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economies, the impact of underwriter reputation on underpricing was only negative and significant 
within advanced countries. The results documented weak support for the ex-ante uncertainty 
dimension of the EWL model while the incentive of IPO issuers was supported in explaining the 
underpricing difference within developed G20 countries. Strangely, when country-level 
transparency was in play, the findings showed that high-status underwriting banks in emerging 
stock markets indeed exploit the existence of a weak legal system in their markets. Consequently, 
they intentionally underprice IPO firms and this is done for their own profit and helping their buy-
side institutional investors. This was because the results revealed that IPO firms sustain larger 
underwriting fees, bear expensive book-building pricing methods, and hire reputable underwriters 
who in exchange for their own advantage underprice them heavily. This outcome accentuated the 
interpretation of the possible existence of a spinning effect in developing countries. This new 
finding leads the author to emphasise that in such economies with fragile transparency frameworks, 
entrepreneur founders of IPO firms are in fact powerless to prosecute fraudulent underwriters when 
intended underpricing is evident. The main findings continued to be qualitatively robust after 
employing alternative specifications and conducting a series of robustness checks in order to 
preserve the assurance and reliability of the results. 
 
The outcomes of the third essay (Chapter Four) showed that dissimilarities in the characteristics 
of countries were responsible for 22%, 5%, and 25% of the differences in IPO underpricing 
between all, advanced, and developing G20 countries, respectively. While the difference 
attributable to country-level was not very high, this does not mean that the characteristics of nations 
are unimportant. Remarkably, the author discovered significant evidence to the contrary, after this 
research included country-level national culture with determinants of IPO underpricing for the 
entire sample of countries. The results revealed that up to 32% of underpricing variance was 
explained by dissimilarities in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions while firm-level characteristics only 
explained up to 9%. Further analysis revealed that the differences in national culture within 
advanced and emerging G20 equity markets were responsible for up to 40% and 59% of IPO 
underpricing variance, respectively. Only 19% of underpricing difference were attributable to firm-
level determinates between the two blocks of economies. The findings confirmed that national 
culture does affect IPO underpricing difference across countries through certain psychological and 
economic channels. This chapter produced exclusive evidence documenting that culture indirectly 
impacts underpricing difference in three ways. The first is by moderating the relationship between 
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IPO underpricing and the incentive of IPO issuers by up 33%. For the second it means 
transmogrifying the link between IPO underpricing and high-status underwriters by up to 10%. 
Regarding the third, it is done by adjusting the relationship between IPO underpricing and ex-ante 
uncertainty surrounding the offering by up to 30%. 
 
This research found that the EWL theory was partially responsible for underpricing variance across 
countries when national culture is captured. This was because the findings showed that the effect 
of prestigious underwriters appeared to be insignificant in the global IPO market, although the 
endogenous relationship between prestigious underwriters and underpricing was confirmed. 
Remarkably, when culture was part of the equation, the three dimensions of the EWL theory were 
strongly supported in elucidating underpricing variance for developed stock markets. In contrast, 
a weak support was lent to the EWL theory in emerging economies when culture was in the scene. 
Evidence of spinning practice was found in emerging countries when differences in national 
cultures were captured. This finding stressed out the perception that, in developing economies, 
prestigious underwriting banks take advantage IPO managers’ cultural tolerance that information 
and market power are unevenly disseminated. Consequently, high-status underwriters in emerging 
equity markets differentiate the psychological willingness of IPO managers to achieve individual 
success through attaining successful IPO listing with rational investment decisions. The results thus 
showed that managers of IPO firms in developing G20 economies pay more underwriting fees, 
tolerate expensive book-building pricing techniques, and hire reputable underwriters who, in 
return, float their companies leaving large amounts of money on the table. The main findings 
proved to be reliable and robust after conducting a series of robustness tests, integrating additional 
nine firm- and country-level covariates, and performing several diagnostic tests. 
 
Overall, this thesis contributed to improving the understanding of the phenomenon of IPO 
underpricing variance in the global IPO market. To the best of the knowledge, this thesis documents 
the first global empirical evidence examining the validity of a theoretical model - the EWL theory 
- in capturing the simultaneous interactions between the three players in the IPO process: 
entrepreneur founders of IPO firms, underwriting banks, and IPO investors. In the process of 
testing this model, the author controlled for the influence of clustering in error terms on the outputs 
of underpricing regressions. Subsequently, this research extended the empirical testing for the EWL 
model to account for another methodological estimation. This was materialised by capturing the 
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nesting structure of the IPO data was captured using HLM framework. The aim was to capture the 
direct and indirect influences of formal and informal institutional quality in influencing the 
international IPO underpricing variance. The global and large dataset utilise d by this thesis 
containing heterogonous levels of underpricing, transparency, and cultural characteristics, 
permitted the auhtor to solve part of the IPO underpricing difference riddle. Therefore, the findings 
of the three independently interrelated essays will be of great significance to scholars in the 
literature on cross-country IPO underpricing, law-IPO underpricing, and culture-IPO underpricing. 
The findings also deliver numerous practical contributions to policy-makers, entrepreneurs and 
investors. 
 
5.2.   Directions for Future Research 
There are a number of areas that future research can explore and extend on the topic of IPO 
underpricing difference. While some researchers examined the suitability of several asymmetric 
information theories in elucidating the phenomenon of IPO underpricing (Kennedy et al. 2006) and 
relevance of firm-level factors to underpricing (Colaco et al. 2009), they all had single country 
perspectives, mainly using U.S. IPO data. The findings the author achieves in the thesis 
complement the outcomes attained by Kayo and Kimura (2011), arguing that theories and firm-
level factors explaining financial market outcomes in developed stock markets do not apply to 
those operating in developing economies. Hence, future researchers can examine the validity of 
groups of information asymmetry theoretical models and the relevance of determining firm-level 
factors in explaining underpricing within developed and emerging economies.   
 
Secondly, a natural line of inquiry would be to capture the joint effect of differences in country-
level transparency and national cultures on underpricing difference across countries. 
Unfortunately, the author could not accomplish this estimation as this research finds a strong 
correlation existed between the country-level culture and transparency measures exceeding a 
Pearson correlation coefficient value of 0.75. This of course can cause serious collinearity problems 
amongst the observations of the HLM estimation. Future research can perhaps use HLM to examine 
the simultaneous effect of both formal and informal institutional quality on underpricing difference 
by employing a larger set of countries where correlation between those factors is low.  
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Finally, future research endeavours can also look at the direct and indirect impacts of country-level 
financial literacy on IPO underpricing difference across countries when data availability improves. 
Part of the reason why underpricing existed is due to the asymmetric information problem between 
two groups of market participants in the IPO market. The first group is deemed to be financially 
literate, namely recognised as informed investors, while the second group is considered to be 
financially illiterate, known as retail investors. The existence of an information gap between the 
financially literate and illiterate investors leaves the latter in receipt of full allocations in overpriced 
offerings; this scenario constitutes an “adverse selection” problem. Rock (1986) therefore contends 
that to ensure the continued participation of uninformed investors, issuers must provide 
compensation to them in order to alleviate “adverse selection” by offering underpricing. Hence, 
the gaps in financial education between investors nested within nations may influence the expected 
level of underpricing across countries. There is evidence confirming the relationship between 
financial literacy and stock market participation (Van Rooij et al. 2011). Hence, future research 
can look into employing the HLM estimation to capture the direct and indirect effects of country-
level financial literacy and IPO underpricing difference across countries. 
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Appendix 1 
A. Review of Theoretical Explanations of IPO Underpricing   
The presence of vast empirical evidence documenting IPO underpricing has been documented in 
almost every stock market throughout the world. This has inspired the emergence of a large 
theoretical literature in the last four decades pursuing rational explanations as to why IPOs are 
underpriced differently across countries. As shown below in Figure 14, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
(2001), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Ritter and Welch (2002), Daily et al. (2003), Kennedy et al. 
(2006), Ljungqvist (2007), and Fitza and Dean (2016) have reviewed various IPO underpricing 
theories based on information asymmetry, institutional explanations, ownership and control 
reasons, and behavioral explanations.  
 
Figure 14: Dominant IPO Underpricing Theories 
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This section, first, presents a brief discussion of why IPO companies decide to go public and also 
presents the key IPO parties in order to understand the mechanism of information asymmetry in 
the IPO market. Second, this section presents a brief discussion concerning why this thesis 
discounts employing a number of competing information asymmetry, institutional explanations, 
ownership and control reasons, and behavioural explanations on top of the failure of those models 
to capture the endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. 
 
B. Why Do Firms Go Public? 
The decision to go public marks a significant landmark in the life of un-listed or private firms. The 
interesting question is why a privately owned company decides to go public. There are three main 
reasons explaining why a firm decides to list its shares on a stock market as shown in Figure 15. 
Firstly, by going public, a firm’s owners can sell part of their shareholdings in the company in 
exchange for cash, enabling them to utilise  the proceeds of the sale for other expenditures or to 
diversify their investments (Loughran & Ritter 2002). Secondly, by going public, a firm can access 
public equity capital in order to obtain less expensive funding for new investment plans, finance 
further business expansion, and repay outstanding loans (Ljungqvist 2007). That is, when a private 
firm reaches a stage where the financial capacity of the current shareholders is limited, and cannot 
finance further growth plans, entering the equity market provides an alternative financing choice. 
Thirdly, by going public, firms can reap other indirect benefits, such as increasing corporate 
publicity, enhancing the promotion or advertising of the firm’s trademarks and products, and 
attracting a different calibre of skilled employees (Demers & Lewellen 2003).  
 
Figure 15: Reasons for IPO Firm to Go Public 
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However, as well as certain advantages for going public, there are some disadvantages associated 
with this decision. For instance, a loss of control by business founders and current shareholders can 
be an obvious consequence due to public flotation of part of their shareholding (Smart & Zutter 
2003). That is, as the shareholding base is widened with public flotation, new shareholders gain 
voting rights that could dilute the voting rights of the founders and current shareholders (Dolvin & 
Jordan 2008). In addition, by going public the management of IPO firms take on additional legal 
and moral obligations in the form of rigid information transparency and disclosure requirements in 
order to act according to the best interests of the larger group of shareholders (Ritter 1987). Upon 
public listing, IPO firms might compromise their competitive advantage by being obligated to 
increase their information disclosure about current operations and expansion plans as required by 
security exchange commissions (Habib & Ljungqvist 2001).  
 
By going public IPO firms have to bear direct costs of public listing including listing fees, 
underwriting fees, and brokerage, legal and accounting fees, share registry costs, and also other 
indirect costs, such as the increased cost of preparing annual financial reports in compliance with 
disclosure and listing standards and codes (Loughran & Ritter 2002). In summary, Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist (2001) argue that despite the associated disadvantages of going public, approaching the 
equity capital market remains an efficient option for firms to provide sustainable financing sources 
and quick access to liquidate part of their holdings. Since the advantages of going public outweigh 
the disadvantages, it is imperative to understand the role of key IPO parties. This is discussed in 
the next section below. 
 
C. Key IPO Parties  
 Ljungqvist (2007) states that three important parties are involved in every IPO. These are the 
issuing firm, the underwriter, and the investor as shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16: Key IPO Parties 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
C.1. The Issuing Firm  
The issuer of an IPO firm is the first important part of the IPO market, and it lists part of its holdings 
in an existing or newly established company for the first time in a stock market. It does this either 
through selling existing shares or creating new ones where the former and the latter are secondary 
and primary share offerings, respectively. The offering could either be one of those two methods 
or a mixture of the two. The main goal of the issuer is to obtain the highest possible offer price for 
the floated shares. In general, the issuing firm has the absolute discretion to decide how much it 
needs to float in compliance with the requirements of every stock exchange authority in every 
country (Loughran & Ritter 2002). 
 
IPO literature including Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch 
(1989) shows that IPO issuers can be classified as high quality and low quality (see Figure 16). 
They argue that the former own comprehensive private information about the future cash flows of 
their operations; hence they know exactly the precise present value of their firms while the latter 
are unsure about the intrinsic value of their companies. The issuer appoints an underwriter to work 
as an advisory body setting up a suitable offer price and preparing the necessary documentation in 
compliance with the stock market listing requirements to ensure successful listing (Adams et al. 
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2008). Palmiter (1999) and Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) argue that high quality IPO issuers may be 
reluctant to disclose the true present value of their firms, fearing the loss of competitive advantage 
if they communicate positive information related to their future investment opportunities directly 
to the market. Consequently, Welch (1989) argues that by protecting their market competitive 
advantage, quality IPO issuers create an asymmetric information problem with IPO investors as 
shown above in Figure 16. Subsequently, those IPO issuers work to solve this problem by offering 
underpricing as compensation for IPO investors to differentiate themselves from low quality IPO 
issuers. 
 
In contrast, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) argue that 
information asymmetry exists between the issuer and the underwriter of the IPO firm when IPO 
issuers are unsure about the present value of their firms; then they refer the decision to the 
underwriters in order to determine the present value of their firms. Spatt and Srivastava (1991) 
show that once the underwriters take over then they either employ their advisory team to value the 
IPO firm or solicit the true value of their firms from institutional investors who are financially able 
to provide accurate valuation of the firm. This is done in exchange for receiving a reduced share 
price of the IPO firm as shown in Figure 16. In this way, the underwriter becomes the second most 
important party in the IPO market. 
 
C.2. The Underwriter 
The underwriting bank normally takes the form of a large investment bank or commercial bank 
that in practice conducts the issuing process on behalf of the issuer. The main function of 
underwriters is to prepare the IPO firm to go public in exchange for underwriting fees, generally 
referred to as “underwriting spread” (Chen & Mohan 2002). To do so, the underwriters have to buy 
the floating stake that the issuers decide to sell to the public and then the underwriter resells it back 
to the public (Chahine 2008). Hence, underwriters thoroughly evaluate the IPO firms in order to 
decide the desired offer price and price range that enables the IPO firm to be successfully listed. 
The level of success of an underwriter largely relies on its financial experience, hence the more 
IPOs it underwrites, the more it is considered to have a market reputation for successful listing 
(Kirkulak & Davis 2005).  
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Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Lewellen (2006) argue that underwriters can be classified into 
reputable and non-reputable underwriters as shown in Figure 16. The former tend to control a large 
stake in the IPO market, have superior advisory teams, and tend to have established connections 
with institutional investors including hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds. They can 
subsequently conduct thorough evaluations for IPO firms. Not unexpectedly, reputable 
underwriters are expensive to hire in exchange for the premium service they offer. In contrast, 
Jones and Swaleheen (2010) contend that non-returnable underwriters tend to have small market 
presentation, small advisory teams, and limited business connections; they tend to charge cheaper 
underwriting fees for taking the IPO firm public. Lowry and Shu (2002) argue that underwriters 
sometimes bear the risk of potentially non-full IPO subscription; hence they buy the IPO company 
at a discount to compensate for this risk. Carter et al. (1998) argue that underwriters have the 
incentive to underprice the IPO firm in order to attract more IPO investors, reduce marketing 
efforts, and avoid non-full IPO subscription. Ruud (1993) contends that although IPO issuers may 
be involved in a restricted number of offerings, underwriters are permanent players in the IPO 
market. They fear setting a low offer price that could result in upsetting future IPO issuers from 
taking their firms public at a large discount. 
 
However, Ljungqvist (2007) argues that the asymmetric information problem may exist between 
underwriters and IPO issuers when the former intentionally underprice the latter for personal gain. 
Liu and Ritter (2010) contend that some underwriters take advantage of their market knowledge 
and position for their own benefit by receiving side payments from investors. They want this in 
exchange for a discount offering or large allocation of IPO stocks, a practice that is known as 
“spinning”. Lowry and Shu (2002) argue that underwriters also fear setting the offer price of IPO 
firms too high because this could result in upsetting or even being sued by angry IPO investors on 
the grounds the underwriter overpriced the IPO. Ljungqvist (2007), however, asserts the 
asymmetric information problem may occur between underwriters and IPO investors when the 
former deliberately overprice the IPO company, thus benefiting the issuer and themselves at the 
expense of investors. Now that this research understands the role of the issuer and the underwriter, 
the role of the third part of the IPO party, the investor, is discussed below. 
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C.3. The Investor 
The investor of an IPO firm constitutes the third important part of the IPO parties. IPO investors 
tend to be either short-term or long-term investors of which the latter subscribe to the IPO offering 
and hold shares for a long investment horizon (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist 2001). The former, on the 
other hand, “flip” shares on the first listing day of the IPO firm seeking a quick return (Ljungqvist 
2007). IPO literature frequently differentiates between two types of IPO investors including retail 
and institutional investors (Ling & Ryngaert 1997; Hopp & Dreher 2013; Autore et al. 2014). Retail 
investors tend to be individual or private investors and frequently claimed to have limited financial 
capacity and in-depth knowledge when it comes to analysing the IPO prospectus (Chen & Kao 
2006; Dorn 2009).  
 
On the other hand, institutional investors tend to be financially sophisticated and understand the 
workings of mutual funds, pension funds, investment banks, and hedge funds. They know that 
these institutions have huge access to large pools of financial resources (Cornelli et al. 2006). 
Sullivan and Unite (2001) and Fitza and Dean (2016) argue that due to their large financial 
knowledge and capability, institutional investors can be repeat customers to underwriters and they 
have a mutual interest and business relationship in which both parties hope to maintain. This 
relationship allows the latter to have informational advantages in terms of accessing private 
information about IPO firms and receiving higher share allocations compared to retail investors. 
Acknowledging this information gap between retail and institutional investors, Beatty and Ritter 
(1986), Rock (1986), Michaely and Shaw (1994), and Brau and Fawcett (2006) argue that retail 
investors can be seen as non-informed investors compared to institutional investors who can be 
viewed as informed investors in the IPO market (see Figure 16).  
 
In sum, depending on the status of the IPO issuers, underwriters, and investors, an asymmetric 
information environment tends to exist between those IPO parties and causes IPO underpricing. In 
response to the mechanism of this asymmetric information environment between the IPO parties, 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Kennedy et al. (2006), and Ljungqvist (2007) argue that several 
information asymmetry theories have been developed to explain the phenomenon of IPO 
underpricing. Their rationale depends on the nature of the information asymmetry that exists 
between IPO parties. 
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 D. Information Asymmetry Theories   
This section presents a number of competing information asymmetry models based on the 
asymmetric information problem between issuing firms and underwriters, investors and 
underwriters, issuers and investors, and informed and uninformed investors. These include the 
Principal-agent, Ex-ante uncertainty, Book-building, Signalling, Winner’s Curse, and Certification 
theories as shown below in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17: Classification of Information Asymmetry Theories   
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D.1. Principal-agent  
Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron (1982) introduced a “principal-agent” model theorising 
the cause of IPOs underpricing as a response to information asymmetry between two IPO parties 
including IPO issuers and underwriters as shown in Figure 18. The authors argue that the latter 
underprice the former by employing their superior market knowledge, reducing marketing effort, 
and benefiting buy-side clients and themselves on account of issuers. 
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Figure 18: Information Asymmetry Based on Principal-agent Rationale 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) also argue for the presence of a ‘dark side’ of underwriters by stressing 
the possibility of agency problems occurring between underwriters and IPO issuers. This could 
well explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. Confirming the presence of the agency problem 
between IPO issuing firms and their underwriters, Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that Credit 
Suisse First Boston was fined $100 million in 2002 due to receiving side payments for causing 
deliberate underpricing of underwritten offerings. Conceptually, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 
argue that the “principal-agent” model can be refuted if underpricing exists for firms underwriting 
their own offerings, since there is no conflict of interest and no asymmetric information to be 
concerned about. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) examine the “principal-agent” model and find 
no underpricing difference between self-underwritten IPOs and non-self-underwritten IPOs, thus 
questioning the validity of the principal-agent model. Finally, the principal-agent model only 
captures the problem of information asymmetry between underwriters and IPO issuers. Yet it is 
silent on the problem of information asymmetry between investors and underwriters, issuers and 
investors, and informed and uninformed investors. 
 
D.2. Ex-ante Uncertainty  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that underpricing of IPO firms should increase in response to an 
increase of “ex-ante uncertainty” related to the issuing firm as shown in Figure 19. 
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 Principal-agent
The underwriter underprices the issuing firm to reduce marketing 
effort and benefit buy-side clients on account of issuers
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Figure 19: Information Asymmetry Based on Ex-ante Uncertainty Rationale 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) demonstrate that ex-ante uncertainty of the issuing firm with 
investors can, for example, include matters related to the age, size, use of IPO proceeds, and type 
of IPO firm. Ritter (1984) and Rock (1986) found that the degree of ex-ante uncertainty is a 
decreasing function of the age of the IPO firm. Engelen and van Essen (2010) discovered that 
younger firms create more ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the company; in turn investors 
demand higher underpricing for younger companies. Beatty and Ritter (1986) used IPO size to 
proxy for ex-ante uncertainty, where they empirically documented that larger offerings are 
normally offered by established firms, while smaller offerings are offered by speculative firms, 
naming this phenomenon “empirical regularity”. Banerjee et al. (2011), Autore et al. (2014), and 
Butler et al. (2014) empirically documented the presence of a negative association between the size 
of the proceeds of IPO firms and the amount of underpricing investors seek to compensate for this 
risk. 
 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Rock (1986) argued that information related to the use of IPO 
proceeds is useful in reducing ex-ante uncertainty because investors would be better informed 
about a firm’s reasons for going public. Leone et al. (2007) found that disclosure of proceeds used 
for debt repayment purposes, as compared to non-debt repayment uses61, increases ex-ante 
uncertainty regarding the true value of the firm. Prior literature discriminated between two types 
                                                 
61 Leone et al. (2007) classified non-debt repayment into using proceeds designated for expansion or acquisitions, 
research and development or product development, distribution to pre-IPO shareholders, advertising, marketing, 
promotion, or sales, etc.  
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of IPO firms, i.e. Privatisation and private companies (Ball et al. 2003; Darmadi & Gunawan 2013). 
Privatisation company IPOs often involve older firms and well known as relatively government 
regulated and well established industries, while private firm IPOs tend to be young, small, and 
relatively unknown (Jones et al. 1999). Fan et al. (2007) found that the ex-ante uncertainty of 
investors is higher for private firm IPOs than for Privatised IPOs. Although the “ex-ante 
uncertainty” hypothesis is empirically supported by Michaely and Shaw (1994), Mok and Hui 
(1998), and Brau and Fawcett (2006), it cannot explain the substantial underpricing that exists in 
some countries, particularly in developing markets (Loughran & Ritter 2002). Finally, the ex-ante 
uncertainty only captures the problem of information asymmetry between IPO issuers and 
investors. It does not capture the problem of information asymmetry between investors and 
underwriters, issuers and investors, and informed and uninformed investors. 
 
D.3. Book-building  
The book-building theories of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and 
Spatt and Srivastava (1991) collectively argue for the presence of asymmetric information between 
IPO issuers and institutional investors, assuming that institutional investors possess superior 
information than both underwriters and issuing firms as shown in Figure 20. Hence, the process of 
book-building reveals valuable information about an issuer by institutional investors. Underwriters 
compensate truth-telling institutional investors who bid aggressively, in turn, revealing favourable 
information with larger allocations of shares. 
 
Figure 20: Information Asymmetry Based on Book-building Rationale 
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In contrast, underwriters compensate truth-conservative institutional investors who bid 
conservatively, in turn, revealing no information with smaller allocations of shares. Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) support the usefulness of the book-building theory for divulging valuation 
information about the issuer, but argue that the book-building theory only explains a small 
percentage of IPO discounts. It does not explain the enormous underpricing that occurs in other 
markets, including developing markets. Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey 336 U.S. chief financial 
officers (CFOs) to seek their explanations for IPO underpricing and find that CFOs provide little 
support for the book-building explanation of underpricing. This subsequently leads to questioning 
the validity of the model in explaining underpricing across countries.  
 
Degeorge et al. (2007) argue that the book-building model used to be popular during the 1990s 
when IPO issuers had the option to choose between different selling methods including 
auctioning62, fixed offer63, book-building64 best offer, and book-building firm commitment. For 
example, in France in the 1990s, for example, Degeorge et al. (2007) show that the IPO market 
was approximately divided between auctioned and book-built IPOs, while during the 2000s the 
auctions method becomes virtually extinct. In Japan, Kutsuna and Smith (2003) show that auctions 
rapidly disappeared after book-building was introduced in the Japanese IPO market. Ljungqvist et 
al. (2003) also document that nearly all countries’ pre-existing IPO pricing mechanisms have 
vanished or lost significant market share when book-building entered the scene. Finally, the book-
building model only captures the problem of information asymmetry between IPO issuers and 
investors and investors and underwriters. As well, the model does not capture the problem of 
information asymmetry between: firstly, issuers and investors; and secondly, informed and 
uninformed investors. 
                                                 
62 According to Ljungqvist et al. (2003), the auction price method is defined as an offer price that is set in accordance 
with either discretionary or mandatory clearing rules. However, the allocations to bidders are not discretionary. 
63 Ljungqvist et al. (2003) defined the IPO fixed price method as an offer price that is set prior to the marketing of the 
offer to investors where the allocation decisions are not discretionary. 
64 Ljungqvist et al. (2003) also define the IPO book-building price method as an offer price that is set after the showcase 
conducted by an underwriter finishes, by soliciting indications of interest from investors and where the underwriter 
may have a full discretion over the allocation of shares. When an underwriter provides her or his commitment to the 
issuer to guarantee a successful offering, it is then obligated to sell all outstanding shares or buy them instead. In 
contrast, the book-building best effort method frees the underwriter from this obligation offering only his or her best 
intention to work diligently to provide a successful offering. 
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D.4. Signalling  
The signalling models65 of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch 
(1989) mutually assert that IPO firms’ motivation to underprice is to “leave a good taste in 
investors’ mouths”, where these models infer that IPO firms possess private information related to 
their future cash flows and are aware of their present value, with such private information not made 
available to investors. Hence, the asymmetric information problem exists between the issuers and 
investors requiring issuers to offer their firms at a discount to investors as shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: Information Asymmetry Based on Signalling Rationale 
IPO PartiesIssuing Firms IPO  Investors
Asymmetric Information 
 Signaling 
 
IPO issuers know the quality of their firms and also 
possess private information about the true value of 
the firm. This information is not available to 
investors making it hard for investors to 
differentiate between high quality and poor quality 
IPOs. Thus, IPO firms offer underpricing to 
distinguish themselves from low quality IPO issuers
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
 
The intuition behind these signalling models is that low quality issuers will be unwilling to tolerate 
the cost of the signal in order to mimic high quality issuers, meaning that after an IPO takes place 
the type of issuer is revealed exogenously (Ljungqvist 2007). By bearing the high cost of the signal, 
high quality issuers are expected to make subsequent aftermarket decisions, including issuing 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), which should be received favourably by investors. This will 
enable them to recoup their losses from underpricing by an increase in the firm’s market value 
(Jenkinson & Ljungqvist 2001). Opposed to the premise of “signalling” models, Spiess and 
Pettway (1997) Gale and Stiglitz (1989), Garfinkel (1993), Leleux and Muzyka (1997), Espenlaub 
and Tonks (1998), and Kennedy et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that IPO companies do 
not recover underpricing costs after their first seasoned equity offering.  
                                                 
65 Both Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) employ underpricing as a quality “signal”, while Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989) employ both underpricing and ownership retention rate as a quality “signal”. 
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The practicality of “signalling” models is also questioned by Ritter (2011), who describes them as 
“silly academic theories”, arguing that “it is unclear why underpricing is a more efficient signal 
than, say, committing to spend money on charitable donations or advertising”. Finally, the 
signalling model only captures the problem of information asymmetry between IPO issuers and 
investors while the model does not offer a remedy to the problem of information asymmetry 
between issuing firms and underwriters, investors and underwriters, and informed and uninformed 
investors. 
 
D.5. Winner’s Curse  
Rock (1986) introduces the “winner’s curse” hypothesis in response to asymmetric information 
between uninformed and informed investors, asserting that neither the issuer nor the underwriter 
are well informed compared to institutional investors, who are better informed about the true value 
of an IPO firm as shown in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22: Information Asymmetry Based on Winner’s Curse Rationale 
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Employing their sophisticated (limited) financial 
knowledge, informed (uninformed) investors bid only 
(bid indiscriminately) for underpriced (underpriced and 
overpriced) IPOs leaving uninformed investors to 
receive full allocations in overpriced offerings. Hence, 
to ensure the continued participation of uninformed 
investors, issuers provide compensation by 
underpricing. 
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
 
 
The author argues that institutional investors are indeed informed investors because they can 
employ their sophisticated financial knowledge to bid only for underpriced IPOs while uninformed 
investors employ their limited financial knowledge by biding indiscriminately for underpriced and 
overpriced IPOs. This information gap between informed and uninformed investors enables the 
latter to receive full allocations in overpriced offerings and create an “adverse selection” problem. 
Rock (1986) therefore argues that to ensure the perpetual participation of uninformed investors, 
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issuers must provide compensation to alleviate “adverse selection” by underpricing. The winner’s 
curse argument has enjoyed consistent empirical support as documented by Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Michaely and Shaw (1994), Banu Durukan (2002), and Brau 
and Fawcett (2006). It is, however, questioned by Beatty and Welch (1996), Lam and Yap (1998), 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Liu and Ritter (2011) as not having enough power to explain the 
high degree of underpricing, for instance, in developing markets.  
 
Additionally, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) state that the winners’ curse model assumes that the 
percentage of uninformed and informed investors are exogenously fixed. They argue that 
participation of uninformed investors can be determined endogenously by incurring promotion 
costs in order to reduce the “adverse selection” problem faced by these investors, thus leading to 
lower underpricing. Finally, the winners’ curse model only captures the problem of information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. It does not provide an understanding of 
the problem of information asymmetry between issuing firms and underwriters, investors and 
underwriters, and IPO issuers and investors. 
 
D.6. Certification  
Booth and Smith (1986) develop a model based on the assumption of asymmetric information 
between insiders who are shareholders and outsiders who are prospective subscribers to new issues 
as shown in Figure 23. They suggest that issuing firms may be viewed as effectively “leasing” the 
brand name of an underwriter to certify that the issue price reflects available inside information. 
Consistent with this, Carter and Manaster (1990) show that the issuer’s choice of underwriter 
reputation is inversely related to underpricing of IPOs.  
Figure 23: Information Asymmetry Based on Certification Rationale 
IPO PartiesIssuing Firms IPO  Investors
Asymmetric Information 
 Certification  
 
IPO issuers are aware of investors  concerns  about 
the true value of their firms. Hence, issuers employ, 
for example, reputable underwriters who certify the 
quality of the IPO of which underwriters demand 
the issuer to underprice the IPO to protect their 
market reputation
 
(Designed by the author of this thesis) 
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Hence, the certification hypothesis argues that underwriters, particularly reputable ones can 
effectively certify the fair valuation of the offer price of the IPO firm, in turn providing investors 
with a third party guarantee (Lee et al. 1996). In line with the certification hypothesis, Lee and 
Wahal (2004) argue that this third party can include certifying the quality of the IPO firm by 
associating the offering with underwriters, auditors, lawyers, and venture capitalists with 
established market reputation. The function of this third party is to provide extra quality 
certification to the issuers in exchange for reducing information asymmetry between the issuing 
firm and investors. The certification hypothesis receives favourable supporting evidence by 
Affleck-Graves et al. (1993), Chishty et al. (1996), Lin (1996), and Hamao et al. (2000). However, 
Tomczyk (1996) and Rasheed et al. (1997) reject it with evidence concerning the prediction of the 
certification hypothesis.  
 
Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) argue that the certification hypothesis does not provide an 
adequate explanation of the extreme underpricing in developing countries as most developing IPOs 
in those countries employ reputable underwriters. Yet they still suffer from large underpricing 
compared to the underpricing of IPO firms associated with non-reputable underwriters. Finally, the 
certification hypothesis only captures the problem of information asymmetry between issuers and 
investors. It does not provide an explanation concerning the problem of information asymmetry 
between issuing firms and underwriters, investors and underwriters, and informed and uninformed 
investors. 
 
E. Institutional Explanations        
The consideration of institutional explanations for IPO underpricing in the U.S. stock market has 
inspired the emergence of three dominant institutional-based theories, including lawsuit avoidance, 
price stabilization, and tax advantages hypotheses. 
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E.1. Lawsuit Avoidance  
The existence of litigious characteristics of American investors has motivated the emergence of the 
lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. The likelihood of a linkage between IPO underpricing and litigation 
risk goes back to Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975), who propose that U.S. IPO issuers deliberately 
underprice the value of their firms at the time of offering to avoid potential litigation risk from 
disappointed investors due to poor post-IPO performance. That is, the consequence of a lawsuit not 
only directly inflicts damages on the defendants including financial damages resulting from 
incurred legal fees and diversion of management time, it also extends to indirect damage including 
loss of reputation, capital and the likelihood of incurring higher costs of raising capital in the future 
(Jenkinson & Ljungqvist 2001). This lawsuit avoidance rationale is further extended and 
theoretically modelled by other researchers including Tinic (1988), Hughes and Thakor (1992), 
and Hensler (1995). The empirical validity of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis is tested by Lowry 
and Shu (2002) showing that approximately six percent of IPO firms in the U.S. were sued, with 
damages to plaintiffs averaging 13.3% of the proceeds of IPOs from 1988 and 1995.  
 
The empirical validity of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis is questioned by the contention that it 
is a U.S.-centric model, while the phenomenon of IPOs underpricing is global. This argument 
implies that the existence of a litigious culture among American investors may not exist in global 
settings, so this theoretical explanation may fail to explain underpricing around the world. 
Empirical evidence refuting the litigious effect of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis on explaining 
IPO underpricing shows the absence this hypothesis having any economic significance in the U.K. 
(Jenkinson 1990), Japan (Beller et al. 1992),Finland (Keloharju 1993), Switzerland (Kunz & 
Aggarwal 1994), Sweden (Loughran et al. 1994), and Australia (Lee et al. 1996).    
 
E.2. Price Stabilization  
The price stabilization hypothesis arises as a second institutional explanation of IPO underpricing. 
The basic notion of this hypothesis relates to the price support service that IPO underwriters offer 
in relation to post-IPO price stabilization, whereby underwriters intervene in the aftermarket to 
reduce potential price drops for a few days or weeks. The theoretical concept of price stabilization 
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was originally devised by Booth and Smith (1986), formalized by Benveniste et al. (1996), and 
proved its statistical validity in the U.S. market due to the empirical work carried out by Ruud 
(1993) and Ellis et al. (2000). However, the price stabilization rationale is criticised for being 
unobservable by investors, although it can be observed by market regulators. In other words, it is 
difficult to empirically know which IPO firms receive price support by underwriters and the 
magnitude and nature of this support is unknown to market participants (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist 
2001). The lack of availability of such an exclusive dataset makes it a challenging task to examine 
the validity of the price stabilization hypothesis, especially in cross-country settings.  
 
E.3. Tax Argument  
The third institutional-based explanation for IPO underpricing is inspired by the trade-off between 
tax benefits and underpricing of IPO firms. Rydqvist (1997) empirically explores this tax benefit-
based rationale in the Swedish IPO market and finds that before 1990, the Swedish tax system 
imposed a higher tax rate on employment income than capital gains. This created an inducement 
to pay employees by allocating appreciating assets in exchange for wages, and the offering of 
underpriced shares was a form of appreciating assets. Once the Swedish tax system was changed 
in 1990 to remove the higher tax on underpricing-related gains, thus removing management 
inducement to allocate underpriced shares to employees, the degree of IPO underpricing dropped 
from 41% in 1980-1989 to eight percent in 1990-1994. Similar evidence was documented in the 
U.S. IPO market by Guenther and Willenborg (1999) and Taranto (2003). However, this tax 
benefits argument for underpricing may not be useful in explaining the high degree of IPO 
underpricing observed in tax-free countries, such as the oil- and gas-rich countries66 where average 
IPO underpricing is around 250.17%, making the tax hypothesis questionable (Uddin & Raj 2012). 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Underpricing figure is average underpricing for the six Arabian Gulf countries, i.e. Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. 
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F. Ownership and Control Reasons 
Ownership and control theories contend that IPO underpricing works as an effective mechanism in 
shaping the shareholder base in order to deter outside investors from intervening in managing their 
firms once they are publicly listed. In addition, the existence of the agency problem due to the 
separation of ownership and control, means that misalignment could exist between managing and 
non-managing shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The outcome, for example, of this 
misalignment is that managers can exploit their controlling authority to maximise their expected 
private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders. Based on the above rationale, two main 
hypotheses emerged to explain the underpricing phenomenon, namely, the entrenchment of 
managerial control and agency costs hypotheses.    
 
F.1. Entrenchment Managerial Control  
The entrenchment of managerial control hypothesis is that owners or managers of IPO firms 
employ underpricing as a tool to maximise their control over the management of their firms by 
ensuring greater ownership dispersion (Shleifer & Vishny 1989). This hypothesis is empirically 
examined by Brennan and Franks (1997), who conclude that managers of U.K. IPO firms protect 
their private benefits by strategically allocating underpriced shares to small outside investors. The 
authors interpret this opportunistic behaviour as a strategy those managers tactically adopt when 
they fear the consequence of close internal monitoring resulting from involving large block 
investors in the decision-making of their firms. That is, the presence of a widely fragmented post-
IPO ownership offers reduced external monitoring, allowing insiders, such as managing owners 
and managers to have entrenched control over the company’s management (Booth & Chua 1996). 
Therefore, underpricing works to create excess demand enabling self-driven managers to ration 
share allocation in order to ensure wider ownership dispersion, leading to greater control of 
management operations.  
 
Although the validity of the entrenchment of managerial control hypothesis has been empirically 
proven by Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Pagano and Panetta (1998), it has been criticised for not 
being an efficient way to protect private benefits of control. Engelen and van Essen (2010) argue 
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against the managerial control explanation. They contend that this mechanism might provide a 
rational elucidation for underpricing in the U.K. and U.S., but not in many continental European 
and developing countries as IPO issuers in those nations normally sell a small portion of their 
secondary shares after going public, hence they need not underprice to retain control over the 
firm67. Khurshed and Chahine (2007) provided support for the argument raised by Engelen and van 
Essen (2010), i.e. the rationale of the managerial control explanation weakly explains whether 
block-holder ownership verifies the difference between family and non-family IPOs in France. 
Moreover, Wang (2005) rejected the rationale of the managerial control hypothesis in explaining 
IPO underpricing in China. 
 
Authors criticised the managerial control explanation for not being an efficient way to protect 
private benefits of control. For example, Field and Karpoff (2002) argue that instead of ensuring 
fragmented post-IPO ownership through the offering of underpriced shares, IPO firms can protect 
their private benefit of control by issuing non-voting shares when they go public. Conceptually, if 
the degree of underpricing of IPOs with voting shares is higher than IPOs with non-voting shares 
then it can be said that the managerial control hypothesis is a good theoretical candidate to explain 
the phenomenon of IPO underpricing (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist 2001). Smart and Zutter (2003) 
empirically find the degree of underpricing of U.S. IPO firms that issue voting shares is higher than 
IPO firms that issue non-voting stocks. Field and Sheehan (2004) empirically detect no significant 
relationship between IPO underpricing and the creation of post-IPO shareholding domination. 
Finally, the managerial control hypothesis treats the employment of reputable underwriters by the 
issuers of IPO firms as an exogenous decision ignoring the choice of the underwriter as decided by 
the issuers. This happens when issuers intend to sell part of their holding before going public, and 
ignoring this endogeneity leads to omitted variable bias as argued by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), 
Chen and Mohan (2002), Chahine (2008) Mantecon and Poon (2009), and Jones and Swaleheen 
(2010). In this way, the validity of the entrenchment managerial control hypothesis is questionable. 
 
                                                 
67 The results of the mean and median equality tests of the unequal variance are documented in Table 7 in relation to 
the average of the proportion of secondary and primary shares sold in developing countries. They show developing 
IPO issuers compared to developed ones sell and create fewer shares and the difference is significant at the 1% level, 
thus providing strong support for Engelen and van Essen’s (2010) argument. 
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F.2. Agency Costs  
The prediction of the agency costs hypothesis is contrary to the prediction of the entrenchment of 
managerial control hypothesis of IPO underpricing proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997). The 
agency costs hypothesis proposes that due to a separation of ownership and control, misalignment 
might exist between non-managing shareholders and managers. Thus, Stoughton and Zechner 
(1998) argue that owners of IPO firms underprice their firms when they go public, aiming to attract 
large block-holders who might work as an internal monitoring agent of their firms to minimise 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. This in turn leads to maximising the value 
of their firms post-offering. However, Field and Sheehan (2004) empirically find no supporting 
evidence of the relationship between IPO underpricing and the creation of post-IPO shareholding, 
thus questioning the rationale of the agency costs hypothesis. 
 
G. Behavioural Explanation 
Ljungqvist (2007) argues that the substantial amount of money left on the table by U.S. IPO issuers 
accounted for approximately $62 billion in 1999 and 2000, and that such substantial losses of issuer 
wealth has induced researchers to turn to behavioural explanations for IPO underpricing. In this 
section, the presence of informational cascades as a behavioural explanation is discussed where the 
central argument is that the IPO market is prone to the presence of ‘irrational’ investors who bid 
up the price of IPO shares beyond their true value.  
 
G.1. Informational Cascades  
Welch (1992) develops a model showing that ‘informational cascades’ can occur amongst IPO 
investors in an attempt to explain the presence of IPO underpricing based on the irrational investor 
argument. The author contends that IPO investors formulate their investment actions sequentially, 
whereby the bids of later investors are conditioned on the bids of earlier investors, irrationally 
ignoring their own information. When latter investors observe the presence of a number of 
successful initial sales by earlier investors, then later investors reach an understanding that earlier 
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investors possess some form of favourable information. Subsequently, later investors disregard 
their own information and invest in whatever earlier investors invest in (Jegadeesh et al. 1993). In 
contrast, when later investors observe the presence of a number of unsuccessful initial sales by 
earlier investors, then later investors withdraw their intention to invest irrespective of their own 
information. Due to the presence of this irrational investment behaviour, demand can be either low 
or, alternatively, snowballs over time (Pollock et al. 2008). 
 
Welch (1992) argues that the likelihood of cascades provides early investors with power to 
‘demand’ further underpricing in order to commit to purchasing IPO shares, thus ensuring 
continuity of a positive cascade. Hence, the presence of informational cascades among IPO 
investors can explain IPO underpricing. However, the possibility of empirically examining the 
presence of informational cascades among IPO investors requires the availability of exclusive 
information that shows bid patterns of IPO shares on the first trading day, something that might 
only be available in advanced countries where sophisticated and transparent trading systems are 
available. However, the empirical validity of the informational cascades hypothesis is proven 
amongst Israeli IPO investors (Amihud et al. 2003) and also amongst U.S. IPO investors (Pollock 
et al. 2008). However, employing the informational cascades hypothesis to explain differences in 
IPO underpricing across stock markets may be difficult due to the unavailability of exclusive 
information that shows the bid patterns of IPO shares on the first trading day in cross-country 
settings.  
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